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Main works-

A saga of Sacrifices: Praja Parishad Movement in J&K

100 Documents: A reference book J&K, Mission Accomplished

A Compendium of Icons of Jammu & Kashmir & our Inspiration (English)

Jammu Kashmir ki Sangarsh Gatha (Hindi)

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I. S. Gupta

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FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

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FILE NO: 28

Human Right Situation in Pakistan (Dr. Vidya Bhushan)  
Panchayati Raj Elites in an Indian Village (Ramesh Kumar)  
Indiscriminate Use of Lethal Force  
(The Killing of Ashiq Hussain)

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## HUMAN RIGHT SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

Human Right Watch Committee for Asia in its report Sept 19, 1993 pointed out "Government efforts to Islamicize Pakistan's Civil and Criminal law, which began in earnest in the early 1980's have dangerously undermined fundamental rights of freedom of religions and expression, have led to serious abuses against the country's religious minorities and writers. The report also pointed out the pitiable conditions of fair sex in Pakistan. Effects were being made to raise an entire generation to distrust and dislike any woman devia<sup>ted</sup> from the norm of good, house bound, veiled, effacing, self sacrificing second class citizen. Moreover, rape and abduction of women are viewed by society and courts as property dispute.

The US State department in its report on Human Rights situation in Pakistan pointed out :Government harassment of political opponents declined...however repression against a Sindh based<sup>ed</sup> political party continued. The arbitrary detention, arrest, torture and other abuse of prisoners and detainees continued to be a serious



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problems....Religious zealots continued to discriminate against and persecute non muslims...traditional social and legal constraints kept women in a subordinate position in society. Significant restraints remained on worker's rights. The use of child and bonded labour remained widespread in spite of legislation to restrict these practices. The report further points out that ahamdis in particular suffer from harassmt and discrimination and have limited change for advancement in the public sector. There is also much discrimination against religious minority groups in employment and education. Dispute clear injunctions in the Koran and the civil law, women generally do not receive their due share in family inheritance. In rural Pakistan the practice of a woman marrying the Koran is still widely accepted if her family cannot arrange a suitable marriage to keep the family wealth intact. The report further pointed out that law enforcement personnel were rarely estimated in hundreds. According to Govt. figures 600 prisoners died in Pakistan jails during the past 54 years, all reportedly from natural causes.

The report of Jubilee Campaign organisation



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also highlighted the violation of minority rights. The Christian school teacher, Nahmat Ahmad, was brutally murdered on the street in front of school by a radical Muslim....After murdering he reportedly danced over the body and was greeted by kiss from the police. Muslim religious leaders hailed him as a hero, local lawyers offered him free legal advice and villagers streamed to his cell with flowers and cookies, Christian churches also face destructive mobs. The clergymen were brutally beaten. The Govt. continued to close down Ahmadi places of worship and mobs attached on their congregation. Forced conversion of female members of the Ahmadi sect are also reported. Hindus describe kidnapping, forced conversion of young women, confiscation of the Hindu shrines, burning of Hindu's texts.

Amnesty international in its report Dec. 1993 reported there were torture, death in custody and extra judicial executions. The report pointed out several instances in which men and women were humiliated during arrest by being forced to strip naked in front of family members of the opposite gender. There were several cases of sexual abuse of women by police....cases of



that council for Islamic ideology postponed ruling on whether according to Islam a woman could be a ruler, a judge etc. and whether her evidence was admissible in Hudoo-the Islam punishments. The report confirmed the expression of the press in Pakistan. Council for Islamic ideology asked that only those persons should be invited on television who had Islamic minds and believe in the ideology of Pakistan. All focus should be on Islamic values. All reports of sexual assaults should be blacked out from the media. Local films should be banned on TV. A board of Ulema should censor every programme Nifaz-i-sharia working group asked for a ban on hishantenna, strong laws against and action against news papers revealing pictures.

Dawn daily news paper on November 6, 1993 mentioned that Govt. has miserably failed to protect rights given in Art. 7 of the UNO Human Rights charter. govt. had taken no notice of the gross violation of the rights of the minorities. Daily YOMIVR of Japan reported in Nov. 1993 Pakistan is one of those countries which still legally discriminate against certain of its citizen if they happen to be women Hudood



charges are a terror for women. Hudood laws require a women to produce four pious muslim witnesses to get a rapist convicted.

The Muslim a daily from Pakistan Dec, 15, 1993 reported that 4 lakh doing child labour in NWFP. It reported that eight to ten millions upto the age of 15 were presently engaged in different trades in the Frontier province in flagrant violation of the Human Rights and relevant laws which strictly prohibit child labour. The worst victims of this heinous crime were the brick kiln workers around Peshawar. The paper stressed that Pakistan was heading for a police state.

As reported by the Frontier post on January 28, 1994 <sup>tally of in</sup> ~~tally~~ the following is the human right in Pakistan 1993:

- ✓ 1. 176 persons were awarded death sentence.
2. 52 persons died in the custody of police or other law enforcing agencies.
3. 183 persons died in so called police encounters.
4. A woman was raped every three hours every other one raped was a minor, every fourth one



was gang raped.

5. A Christian nazir Masih was brutally tortured to death by Faisalabad police.

6. Qureshi Munawar was awarded three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 15,000 for writing Kalima-e-tayyeba on a calendar.

7. Kalash people were forcibly converted in Hindukush valley.

8. Eight persons were brutally gunned down in a Lahore mosque.

9. five persons were killed in a Bahawalpur shia mosque.

10. 75 to 80% of women in jails were charged under Hudood laws.

11. 50% women died in 400 cases of domestic violence in Punjab.

12. 400 children were kidnapped every month in Punjab.

13. 6 millions under 14 years were victims of child labour.

→ 14. 230,000 newborns did not live to see their first birthday.

- 15. 400,000 under 5s died, mostly from preventible diseases.

16. People who lost employment numbered more than those who gained it, including the educated



and semi skilled.

The News' newspaper reported on January 10, 1994 that 2500 women were raped in 1993, 80 persons were killed in police custody; 5000 political prisoners in jails, majority of whom belong to Sindh. Christian science Monitor an other paper mentioned on January 5, 1994 that Religious intolerance in Pakistan has now received judicial approval. Human Rights watch for Asia pointed out in world report of 1994 that torture and deaths in custody occurred throughout the country, particularly in Sindh province. The Frontier post writes on Feb. 10, 1994 that Human rights remain at low profile in Balochistan.

No doubts the violations of Human Rights in global phenomenon and third world nations present a depressing picture, Yet Human Rights situation in Pakistan is still worse. Pak government efforts to Islamicize its civil and criminal laws have dangerously undermined human rights of the people and led to serious abuses against the rights of children, women, and country's religious minorities.



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political parties torturing political opponents or dissidents within their own parties and or rural landlords torturing bonded labourers with the connivance of the authorities. There are several reports of beating, kicking with heavy boots, and burning with cigarette butts of men's genitals.

So far encounter killings, Amnesty international reported that most encounters are engineered by the police themselves.

The Human Right commission of Pakistan in its interim report-1993 also reported the denial of Human Rights to minorities-Hindus, Christian ahmadies, Sindhi etc. HRCP also reported the violence against women. A woman was raped every three hours, every another one raped was a minor, and every fourth one was gang raped. In an increasing numbers of cases influential persons were involved on the side of the crime, Police excesses against women in custody stripping the victim in public was a routine. Even the family laws remained discriminatory against women. Some 100,000 or one out of 30 women was divorced 4000 were divorced in Lahore alone. It reported



and semi skilled. X

In the end I may say that no doubts the violation of Human Rights is a global phenomenon and third world nations present a depressing picture, yet Human Right situation in Pakistan is still worse. Pak government's efforts to secularize its civil and criminal laws, its judicial system, judicial approval of religion into law, its patronage of the Sunni fundamentalists as well as Muslim fanatic forces and Islamic chauvinism have dangerously undermined human rights of their people and led to serious abuses against the rights of women, children, country's religious minorities and political opponents. As a result the entire democratic world is of the view that Human Rights remain at a lowest profile in Pakistan in general and in Sindh and Balochistan in particular.

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# THE ALL JAMMU AND KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE

Vidya Bhushan

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## I

### The Circumstances Leading to the Formation of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference

Before 1931, there was little political activity in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and consequently political parties did not exist. However, the masses did not remain completely isolated or immunised from the influence of the national movement in British India. Some of the young men who went for higher studies to the universities outside the State happened to mix with their contemporaries and thus get socialised in patriotic feelings and sentiments. The launching of the first civil disobedience movement by Mahatma Gandhi in 1921, followed by another movement in early thirties, and the intermitted hartals and satyagrahas, etc. did not fail to percolate into the students of the State.<sup>2</sup> The growth and role of the press particularly from British India had greatly helped in disseminating these news in the State. The growing tide of nationalism in the then British India, thus, found a ready echo in Kashmir State because of the poverty and exploitation of the masses, who too were not satisfied with the bureaucratic functioning of Maharaja's Government, their inadequate representation in the State services, neglect of their education, appointment of Rajputs at responsible posts, discrimination against them, denial of religious freedom, and lack of freedom of the press and platform were the main grievances particularly of the Muslims, which comprised a majority of population, against the state administration.<sup>3</sup> A small group of educated youngmen were, therefore, clamouring for a share in the state services.

In 1916-17, Summander Khash, however, applied to Maharaja Partap



Singh for the permission to set up a non-political Muslim Association.<sup>4</sup> On the grant of permission in 1921, a society known as '*Anjuman-e-Islamia*' was formed in Jammu to look after the educational and social welfare of the Muslims.<sup>5</sup> With the passage of time, a group of the youth tried to broaden its sphere of activity but it was opposed and resented by the elder members. Under the circumstances, the Youngmen Muslim Association was formed for the popular mobilisation of political awakening.<sup>6</sup>

On the other hand, Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah, Mohd. Rajab, Qazi Saif-ud-din and Ghulam Ahmed Muhtar returned to Srinagar in April, 1930 after completing their studies in Muslim University, Aligarh. They brought with them broad outlines of the plan for starting an agitation in Kashmir. Perhaps in accordance with that plan Mohd. Rajab and Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah in conjunction with Bashir (a retired Revenue Assistant) had set up a small Reading Room in the house of one Syed Ali Akbar in 1930,<sup>7</sup> where lengthy discussion took place as to how the Muslim grievances could be redressed.<sup>8</sup> Encouraged by the response of the educated Muslims and the interest shown by the uneducated, the Reading Room was given a regular organisational shape and Mohd. Rajab and Sheikh Abdullah were elected its president and secretary, respectively.<sup>9</sup>

The Youngmen Muslim Association of Jammu, also decided to coordinate the campaign of the Reading Room.<sup>10</sup> Alongwith the happening of 1931, when the Muslim population of the State blew the bugle of *Jehad* against the autocratic rule of the Dogra Maharaja, a need was felt to bring all Muslims of the state on one common platform in an organised manner. With that end in view, the various Muslim groups coalesced to form the All-Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference. Its first session, with Sheikh Abdullah as president, was held on 14, 15 & 16 October, 1932.<sup>11</sup> The party supported two-nation theory of the Muslim League, although it had time and again declared that if and when it would come in power, non-Muslims would be treated fairly and even generously.<sup>12</sup> It took part in Praja Sabha (State Assembly) elections of 1934 and 1939 and captured 16 out of 21 and 19 out of 21 Muslim seats, respectively.

During the early years of its life, the Muslim Conference was to see that more and more Muslims were absorbed in the government services, as recommended by the Glancy Commission of 1931. The leadership of the party soon found out that problem of the Muslim masses was something more than its due representation in State services. The party, therefore, began to clamour for a responsible government,<sup>13</sup> and the 8th of May, 1936 was observed as 'Responsible Government Day' through-



out the State. On the appeal of Sheikh Mohd. Abdullaha many progressive Hindus and Sikhs also joined hands and made the day a success.<sup>14</sup>

The leaders of the Muslim Conference then realised that if the gates of the Party were opened to the Hindus and the Sikhs, the Party would have a more effective voice. In August 1938, the Party issued a National Demand stating that the ultimate goal of the people was to bring about complete change in their social and political outlook and to achieve responsible government under the aegis of the Maharaja.<sup>15</sup> It was also customary of the government, to dub the leaders of the Muslim Conference as Muslim Communalists who cared much for the interest of the Muslims only. It was, therefore, felt that the inclusion of a large number of the Hindus and the Sikhs would take the string off any such criticism.

## II

### **The Formation of the National Conference and Its Struggle for Freedom in Pre-Independence Period**

Thus, in these circumstances, the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference met on 28th June, 1938 at Srinagar and after a hot discussion lasting for five days and spread over 52 hours passed the resolution for the transformation of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference into the the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference.<sup>16</sup> The delegates of the special session of the Muslim Conference almost unanimously passed this resolution of its Working Committee in mid-June 1939.<sup>17</sup>

The first session of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (henceforth to be referred as the National Conference) was, however, held in the end of September 1939 and, among other things, it ratified the document known as the National Demand. The National Conference thus began to carry out its activities on the lines of the Indian National Congress (henceforth to be referred to as Congress (I)). Till today, it is one of the most popular and very well organised political parties of the J&K State.

The Jammu and Kashmir Constitution of 1939, on the other hand, superseded the 1934 Constitution with little reforms. By the end of 1943, However, the Maharaja inaugurated some more Constitutional reforms in the State and the elected members were appointed as ministers. But the National Conference leadership regarded these reforms as half-hearted measures. They were struggling for a representative government, and



were not satisfied with a puppet assembly and a council of Ministers responsible only to the Maharaja. The National Conference, therefore, held its annual session on 29 and 30 September, 1944 at Sopore and unanimously approved a manifesto, 'NEW KASHMIR' as its objective.<sup>18</sup> The National conference in its memorandum to the Cabinet Mission (1946) criticised the working of the J & K Constitution of 1939. The Memorandum concluded with the words: "these mock reforms only injured the legitimate aspirations of politically awakened masses of Kashmir and whipped them into conducting more intensive struggle for establishment of the responsible government".<sup>19</sup>

In May 1946, the National Conference, therefore, launched a mass movement, known as Quit Kashmir, which challenged the validity of the Treaty of Amritsar, 1946. It was a struggle of the people in the State against autocracy. Thus bewildered at this new slogan, the bureaucracy was now full of vengeance and they were then out to 'do' and not to 'die' even if that meant finishing all people. The government was thus fully prepared to wipe off the popular movement. Military squads paraded the streets of Srinagar all day and night. Army was posted at all the important points.<sup>20</sup> Despite all this the movement went on and the National Conference proved to be the best organised party on non-communal lines with the nationalistic outlook, experienced leaders and progressive programme of its own.

### III

#### Post-Independence Period and Its Leadership

In the wake of the brutal Tribal-cum-Pakistan invasion on the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Mohd Abdullah, the president of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference took over as the head of the Emergency Administration and gradually managed to establish a grip over the affairs of the State. To the credit of the National Conference goes the accession of the State to the Indian Union in 1948.

Just after the instalation of popular government in the State in 1948, the National Conference leadership devoted their attention towards translating the dream of 'Naya Kashmir' into a reality. The first major thing, the National Conference government did was the passage of the Big Landed Estate Abolition Act and transferred land to the tillers. As a result, thousands of poor peasants were, therefore, relieved from exploitation.<sup>21</sup>

In order to end the state of uncertainty created by the Pak invasion as also the consequent inability of the United Nations to undo it, the Gen-



eral Council of the National Conference issued in recognition of the Kashmiris right of self-determination, a mandate to its supreme National Executive for the convening of the State Consembly for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>22</sup> The National Conference, thus, captured all the 75 seats of the Consembly because of its policy, programme and leadership.

The party leadership have succeeded in giving a separate distinctive Constitutional personality to the State. Because of their constant and forceful struggle the aspirations of Kashmiri Nationalism have been spelt out in Art 370 of the Constitution of India, Delhi Agreement of 1952, the salient features of which were: the abolition of monarchy, the desire to have an elected head of the States, a separate flag and separate emblem. In short, the National Conference under the charismatic leadership of Shekih Mohd. Abdullah, who had ever symbolised Kashmiri Nationalism, and Farooq Abdullah-his son, stressed the autonomous position of the State within the Indian Polity. The National Conference under the dynamic leadership of G.M. Bakshi stood for and achieved ratification of the State's accession with India. The National Conference during 1964-1971, under the progressive and nationalistic leadership of G.M. Sadiq, however, found ripe time for progressive integration of Kashmir with India.<sup>24</sup> The then National Conference Government, therefore, took many steps including the extension of some of the beneficial Union laws to the State, the extension to the Congress activities to the State and the merger of the National Conference with the Indian National Congress on 26 January, 1965.<sup>25</sup>

The National conference was revived again in July, 1975 by Sheikh Mohd Abdullah. It was a logical corollary of the historic Indira-Sheikh Accord of 1975.

After getting an absolute majority in 1977 Assembly elections, the National Conference leadership tried to revive the pre-1953 policies of the Party. Under the dynamic leadership of Farooq Abdullah the party emerged again as the most popular and well-organised party of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It succeeded in securing a majority of seats in all assembly elections till today.

In short, the National Conference represented continuity of political movement in the State. It is the State's most well-organised and the oldest party comparable in some way to the Indian National Congress. The party has outrightly rejected the two nation theory and has given a lead to the people to follow secularism, socialism and democracy. It is unified and stands solidly behind its leadership.



Inspite of factionalism and personality conflicts in the party, the National Conference has been able to continuously maintain its dominance because of the charisma of its leaderships, the pragmatic character and populist appeal of its programme and policies ; an efficient and strong party organisation; weak, fragile and fragmented structure of the opposition and the party's electoral performance and the nature of State elections as a whole.<sup>26</sup>

## The Party Organisation

The Party is particularly suited to evolve a composite personality of the State by harmonising the diverse regional personalities and accommodating their respective needs and sentiments. The Party is organised on the basis of a federal structure with provincial committees for each of the three regions of the State (Jammu, the Valley and Ladakh). It also proposes to reorganise the internal constitutional set up of the State on similar lines which would provide regional autonomy and help further decentralise political power through appropriate institutional arrangements at the district, block and village levels.

Starting from below, the primary members of the Party elect a Gram (Village) Committee in each village. Each Gram Committee has an elected president, a secretary and a treasurer. The Gram Committees in a Patwar (Circle) elect a Patwar Committee in rural areas while in urban areas there are Halka Committees. The Patwar and the Halka Committees then elect their delegates to the Block Committee, one delegate for each group of five hundred members. The delegates of the block committees, in turn, elect zonal committee - the next higher tier of the party. The delegates of each region/province of the State then elect the regional/provincial committee and its office bearers. Finally emerges the General Body of the Party whose members are elected by the regional/provincial delegates. Each group of five delegates elects one member for the General Body. The General Body of the Party as well as the delegates elect the party president, who, in turn: nominates the vice-president, the general secretary and the treasurer of the Party. In addition, he appoints the Working Committee which constitutes the apex of the Party.

The Party also has a youth wing, called the Jammu and Kashmir Youth National Conference. Besides, the party also has a separate labour wing with a number of trade unions affiliated with it. The headquarter of the party is at Majaid Manzil Srinagar.



### III

## **The Party Ideology, Programme and Policies**

The National Conference held its annual session on 29 and 30 September 1944 at Sopore and unanimously approved the 'New Kashmir' - the party programme and ideology/manifesto. The New Kashmir, was declared to be an objective of the National Conference. Consisting of two parts (constitutional and economic), it is a radical, dynamic and historic document providing blueprints for the replanning and rebuilding of the State on secular, socialistic and democratic lines. Politically, it proposes to democratise the whole governmental structure from village panchayat right up to the National Assembly, linking it with the independence of judiciary, on the one hand, and responsible executive, on the other.

In the economic sphere, it envisages a planned economy on a socialistic pattern.<sup>29</sup> The first part of the New Kashmir, however, covers - a) citizenship; b) national assembly; c) council of ministers; d) ruler; e) justice; f) local administration, and g) national language. The second part, on the other hand, underlines the need for the setting up of a National Agriculture Council to execute and supervise the national agriculture plan, the basic principles of which would be: a) abolition of landlordism; b) land to the tiller; c) cooperative associations; d) feeding the people as its primary objective and e) people's control of the forests.

It also proposes nationalisation of key industries on the principles of: a) abolition of big private capitalists; b) state management of all key industries; c) abolition of private monopoly - whether formal or virtual; and d) constitution of a national industrial council for the implementation of the policy.<sup>30</sup>

### IV

## **Factionalism and Defections in the National Conference**

Intra-party factionalism is the bane of all or nearly all political parties and groups. In other words, party system and intra-party factionalism as well as defections exist in political culture of several countries in general and in developing countries in particular. In India too, no political party is beyond the pull of factions. In fact, factionalism is a true feature of the Indian political scene, more so at the State level.<sup>31</sup>

If factionalism is taken purely as a struggle for power, there was no



factionalism as such in the National Conference in the 1940s, the reason being that up to 1947, the National Conference was leading a movement against the autocratic government of the Dogra dynasty. It was in the middle of 1949 that the first breach in the National Conference had taken place, when Ghulam Mohiuddin Karrar, the one who was not given a place in the first cabinet which Sheikh Abdullah formed under the Maharaja, left the Party in anger in 1949.<sup>32</sup> He then organised a new political party, named the Kashmir conference in June 1953.<sup>33</sup>

In the State of Jammu and Kashmir, factional politics was also relatively unknown during the early phases of the National Conference headed by Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah. When it assumed power in 1948, it was more cohesive and united, perhaps because of the personality of the Sheikh. After some time, however, some form of factional activities crept in, though in a highly subdued form, and Sheikh Abdullah did not seem to have taken any cognizance of the same. Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. was heading that faction. It did not come in the open until 1953 when Sham Lal Saraf was asked to resign from the cabinet on the ground of his having made a statement against the Prime Minister of the State. This faction ultimately succeeded in getting, first, the Sheikh Abdullah ministry dismissed on 9 August, 1953,<sup>35</sup> and then capturing power itself. This may be said to be the first phase of factionalism in the National Conference.

After the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953, a new kind of factionalism developed in the Party. It was spearheaded by the pro-Sheikh faction, which was led by M.A. Beg, a close associate of the Sheikh. But G.M. Bakshi, who had assumed power after the ouster of the Sheikh, had been able to maintain the dominance in the Party.

The State's new constitution was enforced on 26 January, 1957. The people of the State were to go to the polls for electing the legislature under the new constitution. There was, however, some dissatisfaction over the selection of the Party candidates. That led to the emergence of a new faction soon after the said election. This faction was led by G.M. Sadiq.

The dissension within the Party came into the open when the Sadiq faction nominated one G.R. Roengen for the Legislative Council in late 1957. This was resented to by the pro-Bakshi group. Besides this, the Sadiq faction had also been vehemently insisting on the inclusion of all the members of the previous government of Bakshi in the new government which he (Bakshi) was to form after the 1957 Assembly elections. But Bakshi was not favourably disposed to that suggestion. G.M. Sadiq and D.P. Dhar also accused G.M. Bakshi by levelling a number of charges against him. Later on, they resigned from the working committee and



defected away from the Party and then formed a new party, named the Democratic National Conference. However, with the intervention of the central leadership, Sadiq dissolved his party and again joined the National Conference. But the return of the faction did not lead to the true union of hearts<sup>38</sup>.

G.M. Bakshi's resignation from the state politics under the Kamraj plan led again to the emergence of the same old intra party factionalism. With the deliberate subverting of the election of G.M. Sadiq as the new party leader in October, 1963 by the Bakshi faction again pushed the Party into a worst kind of factional politics. Khawaza Shamus-ud-Din was, however, unanimously elected as leader of the Legislative Party and thus became the Prime Minister of the State.

The intra-party factionalism became more serious during Shamus-ud-Din's regime because of the theft of the Holy Relic from the Hazarat Bal Shrine (Srinagar). This led to a large scale arson, loot, and violence and ultimately to the handing over of power by Shamus-ud-Din ministry to G.M. Sadiq. Afterwards, the pro-Bakshi faction tried to topple the Sadiq ministry but in vain.

The factional politics, however, dragged on. When the Sadiq ministry decided to merge the National Conference with the Indian National Congress with a view to becoming a party of the mainstream of national politics,<sup>40</sup> the Bakshi faction made an abortive attempt to stop the move. Twenty pro-Bakshi members of the state legislature informed the Speaker that they would continue to belong to the National Conference. This phase of factionalism, however, ended with the death of G.M. Bakshi and the resultant disappearance of the faction.

On assuming power again in 1975 after a lapse of 22 years under the Indira-Sheikh accord, Sheikh Abdullah decided to revive the National Conference. In 1977 state assembly elections, the newly-revived National Conference returned to power with a comfortable majority. Again, the factional trouble emerged in the National Conference.

M.A. Beg, one of the most trusted and the closest lieutenants of Sheikh Abdullah, sponsored the candidature of his son-in-law for the state legislative council. The voting pattern revealed that some members (more than expected) of the ruling party had voted for Beg's son-in-law. At this, Sheikh Abdullah suspected the bonafides of M.A. Beg. In order to test his sincerity towards him, the Sheikh asked the members of the ruling party to take an oath of personal loyalty and allegiance to the party leader<sup>42</sup>, which step M.A. Beg did not approve of. Therefore Sheikh Abdullah relieved him from the post of the Cabinet Ministry.



It marked the climax of the factional crisis of this phase. Feeling humiliated, M.A. Beg defected from the National Conference and formed another party, named the Inqlabi National Conference. He and his few supporters started sitting separately in the State Assembly. There was also a danger of further defection in the National Conference as well as the Assembly. The latter, therefore, moved an Anti-Defection Bill and got it passed by the State Assembly.<sup>43</sup>

In the last days of his life, Sheikh Abdullah declared his son, Farooq Abdullah, as his successor and got him elected to the presidentship of the National Conference. This was resented by G.M. Shah, a Cabinet Minister and the son-in-law of the Sheikh, for he had considered himself as second in command in the Party and hence a legitimate successor of the Sheikh. The factional fight once again started in the Party. This time it was led by G.M. Shah.

After the death of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982, his son Farooq Abdullah who was the president of the National Conference at that time became the Chief Minister with the blessings of the central leadership.<sup>44</sup> Farooq did not include in his ministry even a single member of the erstwhile council of ministers, perhaps for the reason that most of the members of the previous cabinet were the supporters of G.M. Shah.<sup>45</sup> As a result, the Shah faction started organising itself and looking for an opportunity to topple the Farooq ministry. The factional rivalry between the two contenders for power (the then Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah, and his brother-in-law, G.M. Shah) did not abate even after the former's ascendancy to the coveted high office. Rather it had appened in its true colour as a factional fight between the ruling clique and the dissident group. In fact, Farooq found it difficult to fight against a faction, composed of several former ministers of Sheikh Abdullah's government, and the others owing allegiance to G.M. Shah. In some of the district level meetings of the Party, the rival groups had freely exchanged hot words and levelled serious allegations against each other. The ensuing dog-fight in the ruling party then had made the confusion worst confounded. Shah did not even hesitate to take the help of the Pradesh Congress through one D.D. Thakur who was a member of Sheikh Abdullah's last cabinet. The climax of this factional fight came on 22 July 1984 when 12 members of the Assembly belonging to the ruling party and one independent member accompanied Shah to the leader of Congress(I) Legislative Party, and pleaded that Farooq Abdullah had lost the confidence of the majority of the members of the Assembly and, therefore, had forfeited his constitutional as well as moral right to continue to be in office.<sup>47</sup> As for



Farooq, he wanted that loss of confidence be decided on the floor of the Assembly and if that was not somehow acceptable to others, that Assembly might be dissolved. The Governor, however, did not find any justification in accepting either of the two suggestions. Instead, he dismissed the ministry and appointed G.M. Shah as the Chief Minister of the State.<sup>48</sup>

The factional fight between the two groups - the National Conference (Khallida) and the National Conference (Farooq), further intensified and wriggled on until the end of the Shah ministry. When in the wake of the Farooq-Rajiv Accord, Farooq returned to power, the intensity of the fight lessened.

## V

### Electoral Alliances

Alliance in the electoral process, however, refers to one of those pre-poll strategies that political parties and individual candidates adopt by which they enter into mutual electoral arrangement with one another in order to win an election. These alliances are, therefore, formed, in terms of either explicit pact or implicit content avoidance.

The National Conference had contested most of the State Assembly elections without having alliance with any other party. It was in 1977 Assembly election that there took place talks, for the first time, for an electoral alliance between the National Conference and the Janata Party. But these talks ultimately failed and both the parties decided to go it alone. However, the Jamat-i-Islami (long accused of extra-territorial loyalties) made an electoral alliance with the Janata Party.<sup>49</sup> The Jamat-i-Islami did not sponsor its candidates where the Janata Party decided to put up its own candidates, and vice versa. Their alliance, however, could not break ice and the Janata Party captured only 13 seats and the Jamat-i-Islami only one.

It was in 1983 Assembly elections, that the National Conference president, Farooq Abdullah, reached an understanding with Mirwaz Maulvi Farooq. As a result, there emerged a clear-cut political polarisation between the two regions - the Hindu-dominated, Jammu and the Muslim-dominated, Kashmir. However, it may be wrong to conclude that both the parties had won seats on communal basis. A deeper analysis of the election result shows that both the parties had made deep inroads into each others strong-holds.



In 1985 parliamentary elections, the leaders of the National Conference (K) and the Congress (I) decided to contest elections jointly and to field candidates for all the six seats. In pursuance of that alliance, Mrs Khaleda Shah the president of the National Conference(K) declared that her party would work in close collaboration with the Congress (I). In fact, such a declaration was nothing but a re-affirmation of an earlier alliance between the two parties, forged in July, 1984 when, Pradesh Congress(I) legislative party had decided to extend support to thirteen members of the National Conference (K) in the State Assembly with a view to ousting Farooq Abdullah.<sup>50</sup> Accordingly, the National Conference (K) put up its candidates in two constituencies of the Valley - Srinagar and Baramulla, whereas the remaining four constituencies (Anantnag, Ladakh and two in the Jammu region) had been left for the Congress-(I) candidates.<sup>51</sup>

To counter the Congress(I) National Conference(K) alliance, Farooq Abdullah, president of the National Conference(F), had also made efforts to forge a united front among the opposition parties of the State. But when unity talks failed to mature on account of ideological differences among various parties and their divergent approaches to the major political issues, Begum Akbar Jahan, the widow of Sheikh Abdullah and the mother of Farooq Abdullah intervened and an alliance was forged among the National Conference(F), the Awami Action Committee, the Peoples' Conference and the Panther's Party. As a result, the National Conference (F) supported by its allies contested all the three seats in the Valley, one in Ladakh and one in Jammu. In the Udhampur constituency, it decided to give support to Bhim Singh, the president of the Panther's Party while in return the latter offered its support to the National Conference(F) candidate in the Jammu-Poonch constituency.<sup>52</sup>

The years to follow witnessed many developments on the chessboard of the State politics. The Farooq-Rajiv Alliance brought about a radical change in the existing power pattern, nullifying the older alliances and floating the new ones. To spell out, in the March 1987 Assembly elections the Indian National Congress again entered into an electoral alliance with the ruling faction of the National Conference which this time was not the one owing allegiance to Shah but to Farooq. Under the new alliance the National Conference(F) was to contest 45 seats out of a total number of 76 while the remaining 31 seats would be contested by Congress(I). The former fielded its candidates in 36 constituencies out of 42 in the Kashmir Valley and 8 out of 32 constituencies in Jammu. It also shared the two Ladakh seats with the Congress. Thus, the Congress contested 6 seats in the Valley, 24 seats in the Jammu region and one



in Ladakh.<sup>53</sup> This alliance was forged with a view to wining over the estranged forces and thereby bringing them into the mainstream.<sup>54</sup> On the other side, the National Conference (K) tried to seek an electoral alliance with the Muslim United Front. The Election Commission of India, however, registered the National Conference headed by Begum Khaleida Shah as a political party in the State and allotted to it the symbol of the 'rising sun, for the forthcoming Assembly election.'<sup>55</sup> The talks for the alliance between the National Conference (K) and the Muslim United Front ultimately failed. As a result, the former asked all its candidates to retire from the contest because the Party was not in a position to bear heavy poll expenses.<sup>56</sup>

The ruling alliance of the National Conference(F) and the Congress(I) however, secured an absolute majority in 76-member State Assembly.

## VI

### Electoral Performance and Voting Trends

Elections in a democracy are considered a process politics and may be regarded as a procedure for aggregating preferences of a particular choice.<sup>57</sup> It is the only accepted device to determine which party or parties be accorded the authority for governance for a defined period of time. Election is, therefore, not only the barometer of democracy but indeed its life breath.<sup>58</sup>

As already pointed out, the National Conference always secured a majority of seats in all State Assembly elections since Independence because of its progressive programmes, charismatic and dynamic leadership.

In the Consembly (Kashmir's) elections of 1951, the National Conference bagged all the 75 seats. As for the other parties, there was only one party in the opposition, named the Praja Parishad. It had a hold only in the Jammu region. It had boycotted the elections under protest and had levelled a number of serious allegations of malafide tactics against the ruling National Conference, such as not holding elections simultaneously in both provinces (Kashmir and Jammu); irregular delimitation; no provision for a general seat; out of the way polling stations; unwarranted rejection of 41(out of 65) nominations of the Praja Parishad candidates; undue favours to the National Conference candidates; and official interference. It charged that election had not been free and fair because of manipulation on the part of the persons involved in elections.<sup>59</sup> Refuting all these charges, the National Conference had maintained that the elections had been perfectly normal. Since the National Conference had



been the most popular party in both Jammu and Kashmir regions, it was bound to succeed.<sup>60</sup>

In manifestation of the mass satisfaction with the three years of developments during the regime of G.M. Bakshi, the National Conference got 56.52 per cent of the votes polled and captured 68 out of 75 seats in second Assembly election (1957)<sup>61</sup> and formed the government. Similarly, in the third Assembly Elections of 1962 the National Conference again came to power with 66.92 per cent of votes polled and captured 70 out of 75 seats,<sup>62</sup> perhaps because of a weak and fragmented opposition. In the fourth state Assembly elections (1967) when the National Conference merged with the Indian National Congress, it won a landslide victory and again maintained its dominance in the Assembly. In 1977 Assembly election, the revived National Conference under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah got 46.22 per cent of the votes polled and got 47 seats of the Assembly. In June 1983 Assembly election, the first post-Abdullah election, the National Conference got 46.17 percent of the votes polled and captured 47 Assembly seats.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, in 1987 Assembly election, the electorate reaffirmed its faith in the National Conference by returning it to power with a thumping majority.<sup>65</sup>

**The Percentage of votes Polled and Number of Seats Won by the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference in State Assembly Elections Since Independence**

Year of Election	Percentage of votes polled	Number of seats won
1951	--*	75
1957	54.38	68
1962	93.30**	70
1977	46.22	47
1983	41.46	46
1987		43

\* All the National Conference nominee returned unopposed. In Nabakadal and in Bar-amulla constituencies in Kashmir the polling scenes were set but the independent candidates at both places refused to contest in the end. There were two contests in Jammu region i.e. at Kanachak and in Akhnoor constituencies. But at both constituencies National Conference candidates won the seats.

\*\* After 1962 Assembly elections and before 1967 assembly Elections, National Conference had been merged with Indian National Congress. National Conference was however, revived in 1977.



The electorates in the State have strong commitment to socialism and democracy. The commitment to secularism is apparant from their outright rejection of the communal parties. The fact that a majority of the people in the State have demonstrated their firm faith in Indian democracy as also in the federal nature of the Indian nationalism, there does not exist any scope for secesionism. Whatever little of it existed in the Vally earlier, it has disappeared now. If regional aspirations of Kashmir sub-nationalism are not curbed, secessionism is not likely to raise its head again.

Another main issue in the elections in J & K State is Article 370 of the Constitution of India. The National Conference always cashed votes by exploiting this issue in Muslim dominant areas. The Muslims of the State are of the opinion that Article 370 is a safeguard to the Muslims of the State against the Hindu majority of India. They feel that the retention of Article 370 is necessary until and unless communalism exists in the country. The Hindu, on the other hand, regard this Article as an obstacle to national integrity. Thus, the choice to vote is always moulded by using this issue in all the elections in Jammu and Kashmir.

Another recent trend in Kashmir elections is the erosion of the phenomenon of one dominant party system. The National Conference though secured a majority of seats but, at the same time, the Congress (I) has emerged as a main opposition party in the State. Since 1983 the Congress-(I) and the National Conference have been locked in electoral contests and the election results attest this fact. The support-base of the BJP seems to have shifted towards the Congress(I). The voters do not appear to have changed their ideological loyalties, instead, they have changed their parties. They got the same thing in Congress (I) which BJS or BJP had promised them. The BJP is, thus, no more a threat to the Congress (I) in Jammu whereas the National Conference (F) is trying hard to build its support base in the region and to emerge as a viable opposition.

The voting trends in March, 1987, State Assembly elections were quite different from those of the previous elections. A glance over the election data reveals that vital changes had taken place in the political landscape of the State since the last elections in 1983. Politics then was polarised between the National Conference and the Congress. The Muslim United Front has now replaced the latter as the main challenger in the Kashmir Valley, pushing the Jamat-i-Islami to a marginal place. The Muslim United Front got four seats out of 42 in the Valley and 32 per cent of the valid votes. Thus, the Muslim United Front has emerged as



the main alternative to the ruling National Conference-Congress alliance in the Valley.

In the Jammu region, the position of the Congress(I) remained intact. All opposition parties proved to be negligible. The voting behaviour of the majority of sections of the population was influenced by the caste factor. The independent candidates for the first time got more votes than those of the opposition parties and got elected. The National Conference which contested seven seats in the region as an ally of the Congress improved its position and got 15.10 percent of votes. "Jammu thus emerged after the elections, as a fragmented personality, leadership and rudderless".<sup>66</sup>

## VII

### The Support Base

The National Conference has a broad base. It has been able to get support from all communities as well as all working classes. It is the most popular in the Kashmir region of the State. But in the Jammu region, the Muslim-dominated belts (Poonch, Rajouri, Bhawderwa, Doda etc) have invariably supported the National Conference. The Party, however, could not get a mass support in the Hindu-dominated belts of the Jammu region as well as in Ladakh which is dominated by the Buddhists.

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# REGIONALISATION OF INDIAN POLITICS AND POLITICS OF COALITION.

## AN ABSTRACT

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The Indian Federal System may be hailed as mosaic federation due to its heterogenous and pluralistic features of cultural identities. The characteristic of composite culture caused the division of country into states and Union Territories. Even though one can find several federal features within the existing federal units of Indian Union. Nevertheless, the formation of ~~federal~~ federal units was done under the circumstantial Political pressures and demands that evoked <sup>from</sup> time to time. But no serious endeavour was made by Indian Government in Organising the federal structure with regard to distinct cultural pluralities prevailing in different regions. It has ignored their regional aspirations, availability of natural resources, Economic condition and demographical diversity as well. As such there still exists a conflict over regional autonomy, demand for statehood, inter-regional rivalry within the state which not only poses a serious threat to national integrity and sovereignty but shows the lacuna of Federal adjustment.

Immediately after India's Independence the problem of accession of various princely states with Indian dominion ~~axx~~ and also the demand of independent state throbbled the conscience of constitution makers. A long discussion was held among the members of Constituent ~~axx~~ Assembly over the issues of federal administration, centre-state relation, revenue distribution etc.

Though the constituent assembly had completed its task much before 1950, yet the unquenched aspirations <sup>of</sup> various region still exist in Indian Polity.<sup>1</sup>

Till the Nehruvian age, the Indian Leaders were more enthusiastic and enterprising towards economic development of the nation. Various development projects and plans were launched during that period. However it gradually started showing results of development in the period of Green Revolution. Some states were more developed in comparision to others causing regional disparities. The euphoria of prosperity shattered with the reality of discontent. It prompted regionalism in such a way that some neglected or ~~less~~ less developed regions started demanding more autonomy or separted statehood. The regional parties of the respective region started capitalizing on the issue. They started political battle of power



with major national political parties. It provided a new turn in the power politics of Indian democracy! Regional parties have catalysed ~~regional~~ realignment of Political forces and their impact on the structure and process of Politics has been multi-directional and far reaching .2

The emergence of regional parties and <sup>their</sup> significant participation in political system brought the concept of regionalism in Indian politics .Advocating the significance of regionalism in national parties Yogesh Atal Says.

Regionalism advances the cause of participating culture. It helps people articulate their demands and provide inputs into the Political system. As long as language and relational ties do not terminate at a single point, regionalism is not insular in character .The regionalists continue to orient themselves to the National System.3

The competitiveness of regional parties was realised in the context of Indian electoral politics .When the Congress lost its majority in Eight States in Fourth General Election . Till 1967, the Congress had enjoyed unchallenged Supremacy throughout the country. The formation of Government by regional parties in many states shifted the hegemony of Congress from Indian Polity and consequently emerged the politics of ~~xxxxx~~ multi-parties and coalition politics in the electoral scene.

Party alliances and coalition government became the new trends in sharing of power in the parliamentary democracy of India .In many states the coalition governments were formed with the help of regional party.

Theoretically speaking, the coalition government is for running the government in alliance with number of minority parties on common agenda particularly in the situation when none of the political party <sup>can</sup> ~~could~~ get majority in the election.4. Then a coalition is formed among political parties in the Legislature.

<sup>These parties</sup> ~~House~~ , condescend their ideological conflict, to come together on a common platform sinking their broad differences and thereby form a majority which will enable them to form the government.

Though the practice of coalition politics started as early in 60's in number of states like Bihar, West Bengal , Madhya Pradesh, U.P., Kerla, Punjab, Orissa, Haryana, but a coalition government <sup>at the centre</sup> was formed only in 1977 .When Jana Sangh joined the

coalition inspite of certain reservation by other partners including Cong(0), the Socialist Party, BLD and CPD.



However the short span of Janta Party rule ~~and~~ broken their alliance and consequently the government fell.

The next coalition government was formed in 1989 with BJP supporting it from outside .However it again suffered ideological incongruity when BJP pulled out over the Mandal-Ayodhya issue .The Prime Minister V.P.Singh resigned and then Mr. Chandra Shekhar stepped in with the Congress support again from outside. Surprisingly the motive of Congress was explicit over the withdrawal of support, leaving Chandra Shekhar baseless.

In this contexts of coalition government, one can say that the homogeneity and consensus is not important and the motive of the dominant partner was suspected right from the ~~beginning~~ beginning .The ideological ~~was~~ coherence was not there to provide common platform for stability to the government.5

However the formation of present coalition government after eleventh Lok Sabha has created a debate over the prospects of coalition politics .Since the pre-election scenario was such that speculations were made <sup>about</sup> ~~for~~ Hung Parliament. Consequently mandate of people didn't provide a clear majority to none of the party. A.K. Roy <sup>in this context has</sup> pointed that, "in the present elections all parties have emerged losers on the point of forming a government and are sharing even in terms of power. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that while absence of <sup>m</sup> combination threatens existing of any government at the centre, the act of combination threaten existence of many parties in the states. So this is not a hung parliament but a hanged parliament with a very limited latitude for manoeuvring "6 This has created confusion and constitutional crises on the question of forming a government and it took a dramatic turn when B.J.P. Government led by Atal Bihari Bajpai could not prove ~~which~~ its majority on the floor of the House and fell after 11 days then H.D. Deve Gowda got the chance to form a ~~new~~ coalition government with Congress supporting it from outside.

For the first time large number of regional parties entered in this election arena which itself depicted the significance of these parties with regional demands topping their priority list and they were enthusiastically supported by the people.



When the United Front (U.F.) government was formed it included thirteen major national and regional parties together. These parties are I.D, CPI, (M) CPI, DMK, TMC, S.P., TDP(N), AGP, INC(T), FB, RSP, MPVO and KOP. The Congress decided to support the government from outside. A statistical data indicates that JD and SP jointly have 60 Members of Parliaments, other major parties contributed 65, left Front provided 53, other party and independent included support of 12 and the Congress has total strength of 135 Mps. In all the United Front having the aggregate of 325 seats in Lok Sabha. 7

~~Further~~ In order, to have ideological coherence the United Front government has planned out a Common Minimum Programme (CMP), selecting the commonalties from different manifestoes of its allied parties. This is a positive aspect of UF because such a consensus is imperative to run a coalition government. ~~As~~ Madhwa Limaya suggested that coalition can be based on concrete programme of common ideologies and not only on political opportunism or just for power.

In spite of this alliance of compromise of U.F. a confusion <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ felt over the nature of coalition politics and suspicion jolted on the stability of government, mainly suspecting the Congress support. Contrarily it is ~~the~~ clear that until there remains integrity in their alliance and Mr. Deve Gowda follows the populist programme of CMP by giving it concrete shape, the stability of United Front will not be in danger. However the Deve Gowda government is not independent in its policy matters as it is supplemented by decision making structure like steering committee of the U.F. Various Cabinet Committees representing majority of Congress Members are <sup>V</sup> ~~having~~ the chances of political manipulation. 9.

Contd/-5-



However it is evident after eleventh General Election that regional parties have<sup>ve</sup> acquired much legitimacy to represent the characteristic of federal mosaic of country. Earlier there were <sup>streaks of</sup> politics of regionalism now it has been transformed into regionalisation of politics. The sensitivity of pressure from regional straps could be imagined that Mr. Deve Gowda, Prime Minister, had to make promises of regional autonomy for Kashmir and separate statehood for Uttarakhand in his maiden ~~speech~~ ~~ix~~ address to the Nation delivered on 15th August from Red Fort.

The inferred argument is that the transformation in the political culture from national politics to regionalisation of Indian politics is product of ~~erosion~~ <sup>erosion</sup> of one party dominance. Till 1967 Congress Party had Pan-Indian presence and after that its integrity and legitimacy started dwindling considerably. The frequent defection in major national parties and emergence of regional politics have brought the phenomenon of coalition politics in prominence which needs to be developed in proper prospective as it represent the true federal character of India.



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# Ideological Election

## LITTLE VERSUS BIG

*Traditional American populism, says the author, "demanded that government intervene to protect little guys against big interests. Under Franklin D. Roosevelt (below, campaigning in drought-stricken North Dakota in 1936), it worked a revolution.*

By Richard Reeves

**G**OVERNMENT IS NOT THE SOLUTION TO our problem. Government is the problem." So says the President of the United States. What Americans think of that statement will, I believe, determine whether Ronald Reagan or a Democrat wins the 1984 election.

After almost four years of strong Reagan leadership, it is clear that the two parties are looking at the country from opposite ideological directions. There is a big difference between seeing a big, clumsy government as protector or as oppressor, as friend or as foe. The difference has not changed the governing of the United States — yet. In the next four years, though, it could be a different place, as it was after Franklin D. Roosevelt.


In 1936, a determined and effective Roosevelt had begun to redefine the relationship between citizen and central government — and each citizen had the chance to vote on whether to commit himself to the President's direction. Four years before, in 1932, millions of voters had chosen Franklin Roosevelt largely because he wasn't Herbert Hoover. By 1936, they knew what they were voting for.

Similarly, in 1980, polls indicated that, to many, Mr. Reagan was not much more than an alternative to Jimmy Carter. Not this time. American voters will be offered on Nov. 6 the clearest and perhaps most important political choice they have faced since 1936. President Reagan will try to frame it with words like these: "A defense of the individual was never more needed. And we will continue to mount it."

The little guy against the big guys. That may be the most powerful and enduring idea in American politics, going back to the image of a Minuteman leaving farm and family to stand against the British at the bridge in Concord. Thomas Jefferson, who never saw a settlement of more than a few houses until he was 16 years old, gave Americans a democratic philosophy based on farmers and townsmen guarding land and children against the evils of cities. Andrew Jackson went after the national bank on behalf of the rough men of the West. Debates on states' rights began before the signing of the Declaration of Independence and continue today. The Populists in the 1890's fought the banks and the merchants and the lawyers and the railroads. William Jennings Bryan and Franklin Roosevelt and George C. Wallace each mobilized millions of individuals against "elite" institutions like Wall Street.


That energetic politics of suspicion — the suspicion on the part of the little guy that he is getting a raw deal from somebody or something big — usually focused on "big business" as the enemy. But President Reagan got

*Richard Reeves, author and syndicated columnist, wrote "American Journey: Traveling With Tocqueville in Search of Democracy in America."*



FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT






**POPULISM REDEFINED**

Ronald Reagan (here at the meeting of National Religious Broadcasters in Washington last month) casts government as the enemy of "little guys."





### "FAIRNESS" AS THE ISSUE

*It has become a catch phrase for Republicans and Democrats. But what is fair to whom? Above, Jesse Jackson campaigns in Philadelphia last month.*

where he is today by redefining populism, selling the idea that "big government" was now the real enemy.

Ronald Reagan may have been elected because he wasn't Jimmy Carter, but Americans, as far as I can tell from my travels around the country, now know who he is and what he stands for, and they understand that voting for Mr. Reagan will be voting for a reduction of government's role as the arbiter and enforcer of fairness in the United States.

President Reagan's trick was a neat one, because populist leaders in the past usually demanded that government intervene in the economic life of the country to protect little guys against big interests. Populist energy, coming from the South and the West and intertwined with down-home evangelical Protestantism, has surged and eddied through American politics over the years, usually being absorbed and articulated by the Democratic Party.

George Wallace, as much as anyone, pointed out another way, though, when he rebelled against the racial liberalism of the national Democratic Party and against "pointy-headed" intellectuals and bureaucrats. The importance of Mr. Wallace's 1963 Presidential campaign to the future of the Republican Party was spotted by Kevin P. Phillips in his 1969 book "The Emerging Republican Majority." He predicted a coming "populist revolt" of new middle-class voters against new elites of "the corporate welfarists, planners and academicians of the liberal establishment."

But more often than not, Republicans had been the party of the economic elites. The fellows at the country club were unlikely inheritors of the political energy generated by the economic and cultural resentments and fears of God-fearing, debt-ridden farmers or workers.

A rich Republican with sure political instincts and help from thinkers like Mr. Phillips changed a lot of that in 1980. Ronald Reagan became a populist in 1980 by redefining populism; he convinced enough little guys that their economic oppressor was now big government. The new enemy was not the private sector, but the public sector. Bureaucrats. Planners. Waste. The problem was government.

There are, in fact, real similarities between the old populists and their new imitator. Except in economic theory, the populism that created much of America's political history has never been liberal about very much. With the exception of the more refined and positive attitudes of the Middle Western Progressives of the early 20th century, pre-Franklin Roosevelt populism seemed, variously, antieverything — antielite, anti-intellectual, antiurban, antiforeigner, antiblack, anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish. Populism was always nationalistic, often to the point of xenophobia. It was closely tied to religious fundamentalism and public apprehension over cultural differences and any cultural change — from public dancing and loose women to television kissing and liberated women.


**T**HERE IS A STRONG, STRAIGHT AND very American line running from George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, who feared that foreign entanglements were somehow evil, to Ronald Reagan, who seems to feel that there is no difference among South American countries and that the Soviet Union is an empire of alien evil. In between, the People's Party, in its platforms, demanded that "aliens" be prohibited from owning American land. And Abraham Lincoln celebrated his country as the last, best hope of mankind — a thought President Reagan repeated in his State of the Union Message last month as "this last, best hope of man on earth."

So, beginning with a strong, ideologically conservative base, which poll takers say amounts to more than 20 percent of the electorate, Mr. Reagan built a voting majority in 1980 by uniting traditional enemies — the capitalists and a lot of populists — by stressing old values of God, nationalism and family. At the same time, he concentrated their attention on the new enemy, big government. He created a political world populated by bureaucrats, the deserving rich and the truly needy, welfare cheats and other ne'er-do-wells, "the average American" and — somewhere out there — "the evil empire."

Most average Americans probably thought that was just campaign talk. But, as President, Mr. Reagan proved he meant it — he has tried to dismantle or disrupt much of the Government. For the first time in years, there really did seem to be a difference — a clear choice — between Republi-

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cans and Democrats, with the Democrats, returning to their own brand of populism, defining the issue as "fairness" — fair and equal treatment of each little guy.

In interviews with more than two dozen politicians, poll takers and analysts, I asked what they thought would be the difference between average Americans who will vote for President Reagan and those who will vote against him on Nov. 6. Almost all answered in demographic terms: Older white males like what the President has done; young black women don't — that sort of thing. But the answer that made the most sense to me came from William Schneider, a political scientist who analyzes polls for the American Enterprise Institute. He said, "I would say it depends on how someone answers this question: Do you think government is generally a force for good or for evil?"

**P**RESIDENT REAGAN HAS MADE A mockery of the conventional wisdom that the country was ungovernable. He has proved to be his own man, a strong leader. He put together an Administration capable of effecting real change in the Government — a government whose leader believed that the Government was the nation's principal problem. His opponents and, probably, many of his friends had assumed that a Reagan Presidency would be something like the Presidency of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford: conservative rhetoric, but liberal governance in the New Deal tradition. The Federal Government and its functions, it was supposed, would continue to grow (expensively) and the United States

would muddle through in its noisy worldwide competition with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Reagan proved to be much more than a communicator. He and his people *did* things, often with Democrats in Congress passively approving because they did not have alternate ideas and programs. The personal-income-tax structure was revised to provide the rich with more money for investment in the private sector. Corporate income taxes have been sharply reduced, and Mr. Reagan has indicated he would like them eliminated.

On the most important social issue in American history — racial equality — the Justice Department, the national enforcer of fairness, actually began to switch sides, going into courts across the country to argue against the discrimination and affirmative-action cases it had filed in the past. Huge chunks of the country, protected as national parks or preserves, were opened to enterprising reapers of timber, minerals and petroleum. And on funding for the military there seemed to be almost no limit — either in dollars or the Administration's determination to impose America's will in the world. The combination of military spending and tax cuts produced, predictably, a staggering Federal deficit, but that, to the ideologues in the White House, was preferable to increasing the revenues available to the Government in the future.

The new President was good with words, but better with dramatic gestures. A section on "Fairness to the Employer" in the 1980 Republican platform was not nearly as effective a statement as President Reagan's firing of illegally striking air-traffic controllers, a move followed by the disbanding of their union and the allocation of millions of Government dollars to train their replacements.

(Continued on Page 80)

## A QUESTION OF INDIVIDUALISM

*Democrats have tended to link it to social and cultural freedom; Republicans, to economic freedom. Walter Mondale, here campaigning in New Hampshire, regularly attacks President Reagan as the servant of "greed."*



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
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
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# ELECTION

Continued from Page 29



Andrew Jackson won votes in the rugged West by fighting the national bank.

It was a dramatic signal to American management about where the Government and all its agencies and lawyers would stand in future labor disputes. Could ultimatums to other unions at airports and factories be far behind? They weren't; the balance of power between management and labor was changing, radically—with direction from the top.

That man in the White House, it turned out, was backed up by committed cadres who moved into the upper and middle levels of the vilified bureaucracy of the executive branch and began to break up or gum up the works—deliberately and efficiently. The Republicans, it seemed, had developed a sort of government-in-exile. "Antigovernment-in-exile" would probably be the more accurate phrase. Conservative men and women who had been trained (and frustrated by their inability to control the bureaucrats) in the Nixon and Ford Administrations moved back into their old agencies—and this time they knew how things worked, where the files were buried. People and precedents were dismissed. Staffs, staff reports, regulations and violations were often ignored.

The "problem" was and is under attack. That is what Reaganism is: a determined, systematic effort to reduce the domestic functions of the Federal Government by choking off its revenues while at the same time diverting a greater proportion into the military. That will be the ideological agenda of America for a time at

least—as Roosevelt's restructuring was accepted after 1936—if Ronald Reagan is elected to a second term.

**D**EMOCRAT" AND "REPUBLICAN" are still the words most voters use to describe themselves—45 percent as Democrats and 25 percent as Republicans in recent Gallup Polls—and the great majority of those men and women will vote for the nominees of their party.

The rest of the voters—the Americans who will actually decide the 1984 election—are somewhere between the parties. The largest numbers of them are white Protestant Southerners, usually pulled away from Democratic roots by such phenomena as Mr. Wallace's insurgency or by Mr. Reagan, and skilled workers in the North, many of them Catholic, many of them former Democratic voters attracted to Mr. Nixon or Mr. Reagan or both. They are the children, the grandchildren, the great-grandchildren of the populist voters of 1892 and 1936. Average Americans.

The issue of the inherent good or evil of governmental control over individuals was at the very center of American political debate even before there was a United States Government. In the Federalist Papers, in 1787, "Publius"—two elitists named Alexander Hamilton and James Madison—countered populist arguments against any government beyond police functions by writing: "What is government itself, but the



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
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'The parties can no longer be defined as "isolationist" and "internationalist." The Republicans have become diplomatically isolationist and militarily internationalist. The Democrats are becoming the opposite.'

greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary." A few years later, the other side was argued by an aristocratic agrarian, Thomas Jefferson, in a populist voice: "Were we directed from Washington when to sow, and when to reap, we should soon want bread."

So, Mr. Reagan's antigovernment populism and the Democrats' populism of government as a great friend in need both have claims on the American experience. Democrats and Republicans now have already begun to push their respective views of government's relationship to its citizens. "The goals of our Government must be to restore fairness and opportunity," House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. said in response to Mr. Reagan's State of the Union Message. Walter F. Mondale, the Democratic Party's leading candidate to oppose the President, attacked Mr. Reagan as the candidate of "wealthy and powerful special interests," for giving tax breaks to the rich, and as the servant of "greed."

"Greed" — the question of who is getting too much — is central to populist rhetoric, and Mr. Reagan immediately hit back at the Democrats, calling for fairness to what he would call "producers," the creators of wealth. The Democrats, he said, "suggest our program favors the rich. ... As the political rhetoric heats up this year, there will be those trying to appeal to greed and envy."

**T**HIS ELECTION COULD BE decided by the issues of the day before — rising or falling interest rates, or triumph or disaster abroad — but the enduring debate of 1884 will be

the same one that has periodically dominated the American dialogue for 200 years: distinct views about the relationship of the private and public sectors, and, on an even more fundamental level, the nature of individualism. What is the relationship between the individual and the state? What is the relationship between each individual and others — and what is the role (or right) of government in influencing those relationships?

Government was discussed as a necessary and dangerous servant in the national dialogues, including the Federalist Papers, that led to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The debates still seem contemporary: Should the Government be nothing more than a policeman, protecting property and person, or should it actively seek to promote the general welfare?

Individualism — a word discussed by Alexis de Tocqueville in "Democracy in America" — came to mean freedom from restraint, but the argument continues about which restraints. Over the years, Republicans have tended to link American individualism to economic freedoms, while to Democrats it seemed to mean social and cultural freedom. Laissez faire versus live-and-let-live.

The first Reagan term sharpened those debates. Perhaps American voters in 1980 thought they were just hiring Ronald Reagan to trim the excesses of the liberal and generous welfare state that had developed in the aftermath of the Great Depression. But that was not the way the new President and his men saw it; mandates are in the eyes of beholders and the Republicans seized the moment as a mandate for the agenda of Reaganism.

The choice presented to voters has already been determined by the Reagan record. The President will run against government; his opponent will have to argue for it. The President will run against the Soviet Union and, in a different way, against the rest of the world; his opponent will have to argue, more or less, for international accommodation. The parties, it seems, can no longer be defined as "isolationist" and "internationalist." The Republicans, under President Reagan, have become diplomatically isolationist and militarily internationalist. The Democrats, I think, are becoming the opposite.

The Democratic candidate will argue, as Madison and Hamilton did 200 years ago, that men are not angels and that only government is capable of enforcing fairness in a complicated and competitive modern society — fairness in taxation, and in the regulation and treatment of the millions of Americans who, whatever they think of government, turn to it for food and medical care or for the guidelines and loans that give their children the opportunity to go to Harvard or Yale.

This is the way the parties looked at those processes in 1980:

"The Democrats have shunted the family aside," said the Republicans. "They have given its power to the bureaucracy."

"It is not only morally right, but also far less expensive, for government to assist children in growing up whole, strong and able," said the Democrats, "than to pay the bill later for children and adults with health, social and educational problems."

On national security and foreign policy, the Democrats called for

(Continued on Page 92)



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
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# ELECTION

Continued from Page 82



William Jennings Bryan rallied the voters against Wall Street.

arms-control negotiations. The Republicans vowed to accept no agreements while a military spending gap remained. The Democrats talked of sensitivity to the legitimate aspirations of the world's poor. The Republicans attacked "charitable ventures" in foreign assistance.

Those Republican words became national policy over three years, and before you could say "lack of Democratic alternatives" the opposition party was projecting fear as its campaign theme—fear of war, fear of what Ronald Reagan might do at home in a second term.

On the eve of this election campaign, the Democrats had done precious little to develop or unite behind policy alternatives, or to develop a new generation of leadership. There was a recession on and Reaganism seemed for a couple of years to be collapsing of its own ideological weight—the Reagan agenda, it seemed then, would be just too much for most American voters to go for twice in a row, especially when so many working people were being hurt by it.

Until the economy improved in 1983, it didn't seem likely that the President had the energy or the staying power to effect any fundamental restructuring of the attitudes toward government and politics of millions of Americans.

THE MAJORITY attitude of the nation during my lifetime was best summarized, I think, in statistical studies published in 1967 by Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, under the title "The Political Beliefs of Americans." National polls going back to 1936, they found, showed a simple, consistent pattern: "The majority of Americans remain conservative at the ideological level in the sense that they continue to accept the traditional American ideology, which advocates the curbing of Federal power. Yet, at the practical level of governmental operations, there has been an inexorable trend in liberal directions in the United States since the days of the New Deal."

In other words: Americans wanted to cut government spending, but approved of government social programs, beginning with Social Security. Louis Harris polls taken during the last year show the same pattern: A majority of 1983 respondents approve the idea of budget cuts, but three-quarters of those same people want no cuts (or want increases) in a range of expensive programs from Social Security and Medicare to direct aid for poor people.

That American contradiction was Ronald Reagan's target. The idea of Reaganism from the beginning has been to change the political

reflexes of a working majority of the nation, to get Americans to stop instinctively turning to government with their problems. The method of Reaganism has been as direct as some of the rhetoric: to strip government of the capacity to solve or even respond to those problems.

The 1980 election was only a beginning, a demonstration that a majority of the voting nation would accept Mr. Reagan's redefined populism as an alternative to an unpopular President and a drifting Democratic commitment to a social-welfare agenda voters first knowingly endorsed in 1936. An endorsement of a different agenda—or its rejection—is the choice this year.

The specific agenda of a second Reagan term would, to a certain extent, depend on events, controllable and uncontrollable, at home and abroad. But it seems more than just probable that the two items at the top of the list will be these: a new, "simplified" Federal tax structure which will reduce Federal revenues and taxes on high earnings in the name of generating private-sector investment capital; and massive weapons research and production in an attempt to achieve the kind of technological breakthrough—in space, perhaps—that would give the United States clear global military superiority.

The new tax system and a national-security crusade, which would become increasingly expensive if the Russians decided to respond in kind, as they almost certainly would, would put a tremendous squeeze on domestic governmental spending. (Whatever the political consequences, serious attempts would probably be made to reduce Social Security and Medicare programs in the next four years.) But that is exactly the idea: to attack government in the name of the people.

That is a rough definition of revolution. And through his public life, Ronald Reagan has relied on the rhetoric of revolutionaries. He has quoted Tom Paine, and I, for one, would not be surprised if he used the same line if there is a 1985 Reagan inauguration: "We have it in our power to begin the world over again."

First, however, the voters have the choice of whether they want to make Ronald Reagan's beginnings permanent, and whether they want to live in the world he sees so clearly. ■



PATRIARCHY, STATUS OF WOMEN AND ROLE OF MEDIA :  
A STUDY OF MEDIA'S ROLE IN CULTURAL  
REPRODUCTION IN INDIA

A Synopsis

Submitted to the  
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PATRIARCHY, STATUS OF WOMEN AND ROLE OF MEDIA :  
A STUDY OF MEDIA'S ROLE IN CULTURAL  
REPRODUCTION IN INDIA

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The status of women in modern India is a reflection of the different attitude towards male and female roles and this in turn is a legacy of the past. Though evil customs like sati practised in the past have been made punishable offences in the Constitution and widow remarriage has been largely accepted, women continue to be the exploited gender and crimes against them are still rampant. The different codes of behaviour for male and female, the discriminatory role division in society, the dependence of women upon the male members of the family in virtually all spheres - have all worked towards reinforcing the inferior position of women in society reducing her almost to a non-entity. The consequences of all this in the modern times is a women who is bogged down by the psychological strains of being a traditional housewife and a modern wage earner at the same time. This has attributed to the contrasting personality development, though women have largely continued to exhibit the traditional values of submissiveness, self-effaciveness and dependence. So deeply are the traditional norms ingrained in the personality of women, that they accept their traditional role as a way of life.



As far as the concept of role division in Indian patriarchal society and the different nature of roles for men and women is concerned, the socialisation process has been responsible for the formation of personality in conformity with the traditional role division. It is through this process that the inculcation of norms and values takes place, which are then remitted across generations in an imperceptible manner so that the values do not in any way seem to be 'thrust' or as artificial manifestations but those which conform to a way of life and are accepted, as natural. Therefore, it is 'natural' for a girl to learn to cook, sew and look after the house while the male child is brought up in a way to consider himself as the dominant lot.

The persistence of a patriarchal ideology and the associated idea that the two sexes should fulfil different roles and responsibilities is buttressed by institutions such as the family and transmitted from generation to generation through the socialisation process. Socialisation process is responsible to a great deal for role-perception, inculcation of norms and formation of value-oriented patterns. The continuity of behaviour patterns over time and place suggest that the individual has been modified in the course of his



development in such a way that he is likely to exhibit certain persistent behaviour apart from transcendent stimulation in his contemporary environment. One is naturally directed to the area of learning, more specifically to the socialisation of the individual, his learning of social patterns corresponding to his social positions as mediated through various agencies of society.

Socialisation is affected through a variety of agents like the family, peer groups, educational institutions, secondary groups, government and party agencies and 'Mass Media'. The Mass-Media i.e. the Radio, T.V., newspapers, magazines and the like are very important agents of socialisation. They provide a good deal of information and often add their own interpretation of things. They inform and so their role in socialisation cannot be ignored. The importance of mass media as an agent of socialisation, however, varies with the type of social setting and political system in which they operate. Modern technology, however, has vastly increased the out reach of media and made its centralised control possible. Media plays a crucial role in the functioning and change of any society. Both, the forces of change and opposition utilize different forms of media to suit their needs. Media tends to influence not only through direct reach but also



indirectly. By gradually shaping public opinion, personal beliefs and even peoples self-perceptions, media influences the process of socialisation and shapes ideology and thinking.

The Indian media reflects the Indian society's hypocritical attitude towards women - a vast reservoir of labour, a class of secondary citizens, confines to homes, sex objects, whether they like it or not, a weak and silent minority whose sorrows and shackles are depicted as jewels and consistently fantasised. This role assigned to women by the dominant sections of Indian society has been faithfully reinforced by the media, an effective tool of the dominant sections.

The approach of media towards women seems to be aimed at convincing them that it is a man's world. A woman must, therefore, accept her place as a housewife. If unmarried she must channelise all efforts towards self-grooming through dieting, use of cosmetics, etc. so as to get herself a rich husband. If she becomes a housewife her duty is to procreate and she must make all efforts to bring up her children effectively, cook, elaborate meals for her husband's family, be the perfect hostess, age gracefully and fade away into oblivion.

One striking feature about the way in which



women are portrayed in different medias, is the similarity in the images across the media, films, advertisements, popular magazines, newspapers and even childrens literature, thus, all carry common messages and images, viz., A women's place is in the home, the most important asset of a woman is physical beauty, a woman's energy and intellect must be directed to finding the right man and keeping him, the ideal woman is the traditional housewife, self-sacrificing, meak and pious, the modern woman who asserts her independence is either immoral or misguided and therefore, needs to be reprimanded and brought under male domination.

Such images condition our perceptions of ourselves and also of others and define how we should relate to one another. They project an ideology.

The ideological thrust of the media shaped by the ruling classes permeates the lives of all classes. Though shaped largely by men it strongly effects the women as well. Men are more directly exposed to media by virtue of their greater access be it higher male literacy rate, greater physical mobility and urban exposure, etc. On the other hand, in villages particularly, women's segregation and seclusion and their double work burden strongly, circumvents their access to media technology such as community T.V. sets.



As already noted, the media plays a crucial role in perpetuating stereotype roles. Most of the plans evolved, the laws formulated, legal judgements passed, jobs created are strongly doused by prevailing attitudes towards the roles considered appropriate for women in society. For instance the nature of the income generating schemes formulated for rural women by the planners since 1951 emphasise sewing and embroidery, pickle and papad making etc. This shows that our planners (predominantly male) are by no means immune to the dominant ideology with regard to the portrayal of women on TV. We see an evidence of ideological violence both through explicit scenes of wife-beating, rape and other forms of sexual harrassment wherein it is possible to project women as docile, self-suffering, naive and devoted. The advertisement medium on the other hand is very blatant and openly anti-women, treating her only as a sex symbol. Our feature films also we witness a rising thrust towards violence in general and violence towards women in particular. Thus we can see the importance of the role of the media in perpetuating stereotypes and status quo vis-a-vis the role specifications for men and women to the extent that women themselves absorb these images, internalise them and help reproduce their own oppression.

The present study will aim at analysing the



Nature of Patriarchial ideology and the role of media in reinforcing it. The study will explore the nature of Indian culture and tradition and the role of media in maintaining such culture and tradition. The study is based on the following hypotheses :

1. In spite of the legal constitutional changes regarding the status of women, women continue to suffer from social inequality because patriarchal ideology determines the basis of social structure.
2. Patriarchal ideology is reinforced by various forces operating in the existing Indian State and Society.
3. Media is an important agent of reinforcing patriarchal ideology.

A number of social scientists have studied the Nature of Patriarchal ideology and the role of the media in reinforcing the same. A great number of articles and books have been written or published. A list of some such articles and books has been included in the bibliography. It has been attempted here to review some of the more relevant and related books and articles.



Tara Ali Baig's India's Women Power<sup>1</sup>, presents a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the position of women in India. This book not only covers the position of women from historical perspective but deals with various dimensions effecting women's position, including religion, culture, economy, legislation and politics. The emphasis is on the social position of women in India.

Devaki Jain's edited Indian Women<sup>2</sup> is an excellent compilation of articles dealing with the several aspects of woman's life. Some of the articles worth mentioning are, Margaret Kalakdina's "The Upbringing of a Girl" and Imtiaz Ahmad's "Women in Politics".

Imtiaz Ahmad's article Women in Politics<sup>3</sup>, emphasizes upon the male domination in politics and the relatively subordinate position of Indian women and their dependence on male members.

Margaret Kalakdina's article The Upbringing of Women<sup>4</sup> gives a detailed analysis of the socialisation of the girl child and the formation of her psychic orientation.

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1. Tara Ali Baig, India's Women Power (New Delhi : S. Chand & Co., 1976).
  2. Devaki Jain (ed.) Indian Women (Delhi : Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1975).
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid.



Saroj Gulati in her book, Women and Society<sup>5</sup> records the writings of ancient scriptures as well as the notions held by society with regard to women. The book gives a historical account of the viewpoint regarding women as mentioned in the Vedas, Upanishads, Manusmriti, Naradasastea among others. Moreover, the book is mainly descriptive and lacks an analytical approach.

Kamla Bhasin and Bina Agarwal (ed.) Women and Media : Analysis Alternatives and Action<sup>6</sup> seek to analyse the status of women and the role of the media in strengthening the patriarchal ideology as well as the traditional role divisions which confine a woman to the four walls of the home.

Neera Desai and Maithreji Krishnaraj in their book, Women and Society in India<sup>7</sup>, deal with the position of women in society vis-a-vis their role in politics. A study of the legal provisions for women regarding dowry, rape, divorce is also attempted.

The methodology that is to be adopted for the

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5. Saroj Gulati, Women and Society (Delhi : Chankya Publication, 1985).
  6. Kamla Bhasin and Agarwal Bina (ed.), Women and Media : Analysis Alternatives and Action (Delhi : Kali for Women, 1985).
  7. Neera Desai and Maithreji Krishnaraj, Women and Society in India (Delhi : Ajanta Publication, 1987).



study will mainly be analytical. On the basis of primary and secondary sources a detailed analysis will be made regarding the 'Nature and Patriachial ideology, status of women and Role of Media.' Although the published material may provide important insight into the problem under study, yet a number of aspects might remain uncovered. For analysing the impact of media on the social perceptions regarding women, specialised study of various agents of mass media would also be undertaken. These include selective study of TV programmes, films, advertisements, documentaries, newspapers and women, magazines etc.



## CHAPTERISATION

### Introduction

- Chapter-I : Institution of patriarchy and status of women in India.
- Chapter-II : Cultural reproduction of patriarchal values : the agencies of cultural reproduction.
- Chapter-III : Role of Media.
- Chapter-IV : A case study of cultural reproduction through audio-visual media.
- Chapter-V : A case study of cultural reproduction through printed media.

### Conclusion



PANCHAYATI RAJ ELITES IN AN INDIAN VILLAGE\*

-Ramesh Kumar \*\*

Ever since the origin of the discipline 'Power' has been the central concern of enquiry in political science, the fact has been widely accepted by the political scientists that political aspect of a community can not be understood in its proper perspective without understanding the control and distribution of power in that community - the power structure. Power is always unevenly distributed in a community dividing the society in two strata - elites and masses. How do the elites acquire and maintain power position in a community and how does power influence the behaviour of elites and masses are the key questions around which the analysis of community power structure can be made and Indian community is no exception to it.

India is a caste, class, status hierarchy ridden society. Such a social milieu in India has increased the importance of the study of power structure and elites in both urban and rural setting. There is no doubt that the study of elites background would be of immense use in comprehending the political processes and realities of our community. For the progress and development of any community, elite or leader is considered to be an important factor. The more influential and dynamic the elite the more rapid the progress of the community is expected to be. An adequate explanation of the behaviour of elite can be obtained by making a close study of the environment in which they have grown up. The elite or leaders are the product of the society they are born and live in. This aspect of political behaviour has gained



considerable importance in recent years. In fact a person's values and personal convictions are heavily influenced by his environment. Knowledge of man's early life, group membership and identification are, therefore, essential to a full understanding of his<sup>1</sup> behaviour. The panchayati raj elites has assumed significance in the context of massive programme sponsored by the Government to achieve a better standard of life through the existing political system. The village panchayats are the agencies at the grass root level through which developmental works are carried out. If the elites or leaders are dynamic, articulate and far-sighted, it would go a long way in ushering the socio-economic life of rural India. The objective of the study is to cover the village in order to provide a proper perspective to panchayati raj elites. Moreover, changing socio-economic and political characteristics of community elite serve as an index to the changing distribution of power within a community. But some scholars refute it. They firmly held that as the process of political socialization is a continuing one, the attitude and behaviour of the elites are shaped and affected not only by one's socio-economic background but also by the multiplicity of other factors have significant role in understanding the process of recruitment of elites position and to ascertain the nature and character of elites in village panchayat.

This paper is an attempt to analyse the panchayati raj elites in India. For this purpose, one village was selected for our study. As it was<sup>1</sup>not possible to study the state as a whole, the case study method was adopted. Moreover, this method could be helpful in making an indepth study. village Shergarh was selected because this village represents the development tendencies of the state. It is



situated at a distance of 2 Kilometer away from Kaithal town in district Kurukshetra, one of the developed districts of Haryana in agriculture production. The other consideration of selecting the village was the researcher's acquaintance with the area. As no industry, no cultural centre, no educational institutions were there in the village, the only elite available was political elites. The study is confined only to the elected and coopted members of panchayat from the village since the introduction of panchayati raj. There were 28 members who had been elected and coopted members of panchayat of the village. Out of which only 21 were available for the interview because 7 of them were expired.

A questionnaire was administered to the elites. The responses were collected through interview regarding the socio-economic and political background of the respondents, which is being analysed in this paper.

As far as sex is concerned, there were only three women elite. All of the women had acquired elite position by cooption. The remaining 18 were men.

As far as marital status is concerned, 16 of the respondents were married, three were widowers and two were widows. This shows that all the elites were involved in family responsibilities and house-keeping activities and unmarried persons could not attain elite status. Both the widows were Jats and were coopted in the panchayat due to their family background. One was the widow of a faction leader Mr. Phula Ram Jat, who contested the election for the office of Sarpanch twice but could not succeed in becoming the Sarpanch, the other one was the widow of first panch from the village when there was a common panchayat of Shergarh and Doodkheri and at the same time



she<sup>1</sup>owned maximum land in the village. So their socio-economic status was responsible for their cooption in the panchayat.

Age determines to a large extent the behaviour and attitude of a person. The table reveals the age-composition of elites:-

TABLE-I  
AGE OF ELITES

<u>Age</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
31-40 years	7	33.33%
41-50 years	5	23.81%
51-60 years	4	19.05%
Above 60 years	5	23.81%
Total	21	100.00%

The data shows that all the elites were above the age of 30 years. Largest number of respondents 7 (33.33) percent were in the age group of 31-40 years followed by those who were in the age group of 41-50 years and 51-60 years. It clearly shows that person belonging to middle, upper middle and old age group have two third representation in the elite group. This indicates that age commands respect in rural India.

Caste plays a vital role in village politics. This is evident from the co-relation between caste composition of the village<sup>1</sup> and elite structure. The following table gives us the representation of various castes in the elite structure.



TABLE-2

REPRESENTATION OF VARIOUS CASTES IN THE ELITE STRUCTURE

Caste	Total Number/ Percentage	Number of Elite/Percentage
Jat	641 (76.58%)	17 (80.95%)
Brahmin	23 ( 2.75%)	-- --
Khati (B.C.)	15 ( 1.79%)	-- --
Balmiki (S.C.)	98 (11.71%)	3 (14.29%)
Chamar (S.C.)	60 ( 7.17%)	1 ( 4.76%)
Total	837 (100.00%)	21 (100.00%)

The above table indicates that the maximum number of elites 17 (80.85) percent belong to non-scheduled caste. Whereas only 4 (19.05) percent belong to Scheduled Caste. One thing may be noted here that maximum number of elites were from the Jat caste due to its numerical strength. Brahmin and Khati could not acquire elite status due to lesser strength of their caste. Balmiki had the largest number 3(14.29) percent elite in the scheduled caste group, while only one (4.76) percent Chamar become a panch. It can be stated that due to their numerical strength only Jats could capture all the positions in the panchayat ~~at~~. Scheduled caste people became panch not by contesting the election but by cooption<sup>2</sup> only.

Due to adult franchise, numerical strength of a caste become a factor for acquiring elite status in a village. People from majority caste constitute the main core of rural elite and dominate in the power structure. It may be pointed out it is not only the numerical strength of a caste - that is important. The amount of land held by it is also important. Jats who own 900<sup>3</sup> acres of land out of 914<sup>4</sup> acre dominate the power structure of the village. They are not



only numerical strong but economically also they are strong.

The ownership of land is an important basis of power structure in rural society, where agriculture is the major occupation. The table gives us the information about land holding of the respondents:

TABLE-III  
LAND OF THE ELITES

Land	Respondents	Percentage
Landless	4	19.05 %
Upto 5 Acres	3	14.29 %
Upto 10 Acres-15 Acres	2	9.52 %
Above 16 Acres	12	57.14%
Total	21	100.00 %

As stated in this paper, the total land of the village is 914 acres. 17 out of 21 respondents told at the time of conducting the interview that they owned 388 acres of land. They belong to the dominant caste i.e. Jat. Whereas the remaining 4 respondents had no land and belong to Scheduled caste. It means that the local politics was dominated by these families where the leaders came. These can be termed as local influential family. Four landless leaders were the member of panchayat because of the provision for the representation of the Scheduled Caste in Gram Panchayat Act. It mean who is economically weak could not get politically dominant position. The economic status is also reflected by their possession of Tractor, Cycle, Radio, Tape-Record, T.V., house and other luxurious items. Scheduled caste elite either work in the firdls of land owners - the Jats or go to the town for labour.



The occupational background of elite is also considered important for acquiring elite position. The table indicates the occupation of the elites.

TABLE IV  
OCCUPATION OF THE ELITES

Occupation	Respondents	Percentage
Agriculture	17	80.95%
Labour	4	19.05%
Total	21	100.00%

This is clearly visible from the table above that the power structure is dominated by agriculturist 17(80.95) percent. The labourers have relatively much less representation 4(19.05) percent. This is because agriculturists who own land have more economic power than labourers.

The level of income is regarded as an important factor in the attainment of elite status. The statements given by the respondents about their annual income were reliable upto a great extent. The table indicates their statements.

TABLE V  
ELITES ANNUAL INCOME

Income Range	Respondents	Percentage
Upto Rs. 5,000	2	9.52 %
Rs. 5,001 to 10,000	3	14.28 %
Rs. 10,001 to 15,000	7	33.33 %
Rs. 15,001 to 20,000	4	19.05 %
Above Rs. 20,000	5	23.81 %
Total	21	100.00 %

The table shows that 2 (9.52) percent respondents



told their income upto Rs.5000, both of them were Balmiki. 3(14.28) percent elite i.e. Balmiki-Chamar, Jat told their income between Rs.5001 to Rs.10,000; 7(33.33) percent elites stated it to be between Rs.10,001 to Rs.15000 and 4(19.05) percent were in the income group of 15,001 to 20,000 and the income of the remaining 5(23.81) percent was above Rs.20,000 per annum.

The family background has a significant bearing on acquiring the elite position. It would be interesting to find out the nature of their families. This can reveal whether joint family is more useful or nuclear family for acquiring elite status. The findings are given in this table:

TABLE VI  
FORM OF ELITES FAMILY

Form of Family	Respondents	Percentage
Joint Family	7	33.33 %
Nuclear Fa mily	14	66.67 %
Total	21	100.00 %

This table indicates that majority of the respondents 14(66.67) percent were members of nuclear families. This shows joint family system in rural area is discontinuing.

The educational background of a person is also considered to be a significant variable. Educated people have more chances to attain elite status. But this is also not supported by this study. The table gives the account of their responses:



TABLE VII  
EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF THE ELITE

Education	Respondents	Percentage
Illiterate	18	85.72 %
Primary	1	4.76 %
Middle	1	4.76 %
Under-Graduate	1	4.76 %
Total	21	100.00 %

As the table reveals only 3(14.28) percent out of 21 were formally educated. It shows that bulk of those who were able to enter the rank of elites had no education. Thus education is not an important variable in the power structure of this village. This may be explained by the fact that there were 110 literates<sup>5</sup> in the village. According to 1981 census, they comprise 15.45 percent of the total population of the village i.e. 712<sup>6</sup>.

INTEREST OF PARENTS IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS.

For getting elite status, it is important that the members of the family of those who wish to get elite status should take active part in community affairs. When the question was asked from the respondents about their families interest in the community affairs 12(57.14) percent of them said that their fathers<sup>9</sup> took active interest in community affairs. All of three women elites' husband were active in community affairs. One woman elite's husband was panch of the village and father Lamberdar of the village. The other woman elite's husband was a panch and Vice-Chairman of the Amargarh Cooperative Society, whereas the husband of third woman elite is Lamberdar and now her son is a Lamberdar (Sarbara) of the village. Father of one respondent was a panch while of the other was a Sapranh of the village. If we analyse the power being enjoyed in the



village we find only one group is dominating the village, power structure since the introduction of panchayati raj and the other group of the same caste could not get power till now.

SOCIO-CULTURAL ORGANISATIONS:

The membership of socio-cultural associations is generally accepted as an important channel for the recruitment of elites. However, the study does not lend support to this view. It may be pointed out that none of the respondents had any type of association with any socio-cultural organisation as a member or as an office-bearer.

After explaining the socio-economic background, it will be useful to analyse the political background of elites to identify the process of political socialization.

It would be interesting to find out at what age did the elites enter the field of politics, the table provides us the information.

TABLE VIII  
AGE OF ENTERING THE POLITICS

Age Group	Respondents	Percentage
21-30 years	11	52.38 %
31-40 years	4	19.05 %
41-50 years	6	28.57 %
Total	21	100.00 %

The table clearly shows that majority of the elites 11 (52.38) percent joined politics when they were young. 4(19.05) percent joined when they had entered \* middle age group. But 6 (28.57) percent entered politics after crossing 40 years of age. On the basis of this data,



it can be concluded that the enthusiasm of the young age attracts people in politics.

For understanding elite structure and their behaviour, it is necessary to find out who influenced them to join politics:

TABLE -IX  
REASONS RESPONSIBLE FOR JOINING POLITICS

Reasons	Respondents	Percentage
Under the influence some family members.	9	42.86 %
Under the influence of some movements.	-	-
Under the influence of some leaders.	-	-
Caste or factionalism	12	57.14 %
Total	21	100.00 %

Our data reveals that majority of the leaders 12(57.14) percent joined politics under the influence of caste or factionalism. This shows that the significance of these factors in political recruitment. The remaining 9(42.86) percent had been influenced by their families. No other factor was stated to be responsible for their joining politics. This indicates that influence of families is also an important factor. Although it is generally believed that most of the elites are influenced by leaders or some movements. But none of our respondents was influenced by these factors.

#### PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTION OF ELECTIVE BODIES

We also tried to examine whether the role of elite and extent of their participation in various elective bodies from panchayat to parliament. The membership of village panchayat is regarded as a stepping stone for higher offices.



But this is not proved by the study. None of the respondent had contested election for the state legislature or union parliament. None of them even contested election to Panchayat Samati except cooperative society.

#### Membership of Political Party.

Membership of political parties is also accepted as an important source of power. It is mostly those who are members of political party that are able to get elite status. But out of 21 respondents only 9 (42.86) percent were members of a political party. All of them were members of Lok Dal. The remaining 12 (57.14) percent had never been members of any political party. One thing is to be noted here that Scheduled caste or women elite had no membership of any political party. Nine leaders who were members of Lok Dal joined no party before. None of them had changed loyalty so far.

Since elites at local play an important role in mobilising support for different political parties, an attempt was made to find out the party preference of elites of Shergarh village. The table gives us the information about the preference of the elites: (Weight scoring 1 to Fourth preference, 2 to third preference, 3 to second preference and 4 to first preference).

TABLE- X  
POLITICAL PARTY OF PREFERENCE

Party	Preferences				Scoring
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	
Congress(I)	2(9.52%)	7(33.33%)	7(33.33%)	4(19.05%)	47
Lok Dal	19(90.48%)	2(9.52%)	--	--	82
Janta Party	--	5(23.81%)	8(38.09%)	7(33.33%)	38
Congress(J)	--	1(4.76%)	--	--	4
No Party but person	--	6(28.57%)	6(28.57%)	1(4.76%)	39
Total	21	21	21	21	--



The data clearly shows that only 2(9.52) percent leaders gave first preference to Congress(I). Both of them were Balmikis from Scheduled Caste group, whereas 19(90.48) percent gave first preference to Lok Dal. So far weighted scores are concerned, again Lok Dal preferred by the leaders followed by Congress(I) and Janta Party. Congress (J) was placed at number two and number four by two respondents. All the other parties were rejected by the respondents. Preference for Lok Dal may be due to two reasons. Firstly, Lok Dal has launched a popular movement named 'Nayaya Yudh' in Haryana and has mobilised the people specially from rural areas. Secondly, Lok Dal in Haryana is identified as a party of agriculturists and Jats they preferred Lok Dal.

#### Participation in Political Movements.

We also tried to examine the role of elite in various political movements both of pre-independence era and post independence era. The participation in political movements is an important agent of political socialization and political recruitment of elites. 14(66.67) percent respondents stated that they participated in the political movements launched by Lok Dal. One elite took part in both the pre-independence movement and post independence movements. The remaining three women elite and Scheduled Caste members did not participate in the movements.

It would be interesting to find out the perception of elites regarding the basis of exerting influence. This can be helpful in understanding their behaviour. When they were asked about the basis of <sup>influence</sup> ~~difference~~, the following picture emerged:



TABLE-XI  
BASES OF EXERTING INFLUENCE IN VILLAGE MATTERS

Bases	Preference			Scores
	1st	2nd	3rd	
Land	--	--	6(28.57%)	6
Education	2(9.52%)	--	1(4.76 %)	7
Numerical Strength	9(42.86%)	10 (47.60%)	2(9.52%)	49
Political linkage	--	2(9.52%)	2(9.52%)	6
Belonging to higher caste:	9(42.86%)	9(42.86%)	3(14.28%)	48
Family or good relations:	1(4.76%)	--	7(33.33%)	10
Total	21	21	21	

The data clearly indicates that the respondents interviewed considered numerical strength and higher caste background equally important in this context. They regarded land, education, political linkage and family or good relations relatively much less important for this purpose. When asked the respondents opined that higher castes have more influence in the village matters or development. It is true in this village that higher caste of the village due to its numerical strength dominates village politics and have more influence in panchayat.

When the respondents were asked about their links with M.L.A/M.P. all the respondents told that they had links contact or being their active during election campaign.

When the respondents were asked whether their relative were active politically in state politics or holding any administrative post. All of them told neither their relatives were active politically nor holding any administrative post.



On the basis of above analysis, it can be concluded that power structure is dominated by men. It is only the married persons who have acquired the elite status. Maturity in terms of age is also one of the consideration for acquiring elite status. Caste is a very important factor in the recruitment of elites. It is the dominant caste which dominates the power structure in rural India. Persons from higher income group dominate the power structure. Those who own more than ten acres of land are pre-dominant in the elite structure. The members of nuclear families have greater representation than members of joint families. Education has nothing to do for acquiring the elite position in this village. Those persons whose parents or other members of family take active interest in community affairs have greater chance of getting elite status. Membership of socio-cultural association is not an essential qualification. Those who enter politics at a younger age have more chances of recruitment than persons of middle and upper middle age groups. Caste or factionalism and family influence are important motivating factors of entering politics. The elites have no desire for getting higher office. Membership of political party is not an essential qualification for elites. Party preference is guided by caste consideration. Numerical strength of the caste and high status of family are considered important bases for power. All the elites have links with M.L.A. instead of state level leaders.

In summary, it can be said that the generalisations drawn on the basis of this study in this paper cannot be representative to the state as a whole, because these are based on the study of a very limited area. Besides, the village is located in the most developed district of the State. Lastly, in view of its peculiar political structure and geographical location, study of panchayati raj elites in this village is most likely to differ from that of other villages.



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- \*\* Ramesh Kumar, Research Student, Deptt. of Political Science, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra.
1. This information was collected by the researcher through a door to door survey of the village.
  2. There is a provision for the representation of Scheduled Caste and Women in village Panchayat through cooption by the elected members. See The Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 (as amended, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh, 1974)
  3. This information about land holding was collected from the records of village Patwari.
  4. District Census Hand Book - Karnal District. Director of Census Operations, Haryana, Chandigarh 1971, pp. 40-41.
  5. This information was collected by the researcher through door to door survey of the village.
  6. District Census Hand Book - Kurukshetra District. Director of Census Operations, Haryana, Chandigarh, 1981, p. 208.

+++++



Honourable Mr. Chairman the topic  
(1) of my Paper is —

4

The Suggestive measures to  
Combat Militancy in Kashmir —  
A critical analysis.

Mr. Chairman, Statesmen,  
Scholars, Experts on Kashmir affairs,  
Political parties & bureaucrats have  
suggested the various measures to  
combat militancy in Kashmir. The  
most vital of these are : —

1. Scrapping of Art. 370
2. Ruthless suppression
3. Handing over Valley to Army
4. Military solution
5. Plebiscite.
6. Independence of Kashmir
7. More economic development & more aid.
8. Granting of meaningful autonomy
9. Political Dialogue.
10. Triffication of the State.
11. Division of ~~Kashmir~~ State along  
the Actual line of control.



2. Division of Kashmir kept on  
along the lines of Actual line  
of Control;

d. A brief but a critical  
analysis of each of these is desirable  
before I propose my own <sup>point of view</sup> ~~solutions~~  
which to me is the only pragmatic  
solution.

1. Integrationists in the state and outside,  
are strongly pleading for the abrogation  
of Art 370, which is said to be responsible  
for not only creating but widening the  
gulf between the people of the state and  
that of rest of India.

They perhaps have forgotten  
that this provision is the only basis  
of Kashmir Constitutional relation with  
Indian Union. Moreover,  
95% of the Kashmiri muslims, irrespective  
of their political affiliations support  
the retention of this provision.



special circumstances prevalent at the time of framing the Indian Constitution. They are of the view that this provision is responsible for widening the gulf between the people of this state and the rest of India.<sup>3</sup>

( But the supporters of abrogation of Article 370 have perhaps forgotten that this provision is the only basis of Kashmir's constitutional relations with Indian Union. Moreover, 99% of the Kashmiri Muslims in the State, irrespective of their political affiliations support the retention of this provision. It may be pointed out that <sup>and</sup> (any attempt of altering and abrogating this provision) unilaterally would not only constitute a breach of the spirit and letter of the constitution. but ~~would further alienate the Kashmiri masses and may~~ invite still more serious consequences in the way of harmonious association of the state with Indian Union.) It may further be pointed out that all the attempts to nullify this provision since August 1953 till date could not bring Kashmiris closer to the rest of India rather provided support to the disruptive forces and the evil designs of Pakistan. Article 370 is,        an eye-sore only for those who supported the uniformity in centre-state relations <sup>also for</sup> and those who are the staunch supporters of the philosophy of 'Akhand Bharat'.

Moreover They perhaps have forgotten the fact that the  
1 Indian Constitution is studded with special provisions



like Article 371 with respect to regions of Maharashtra and Gujarat, Article 371-A Special status to Nagaland, Article 371-B to tribal areas of Assam, Article 371-C to Manipur, Article 371-D to Andhra Pradesh, Article 371-F Sikkim, Article 371-G provisions regarding Mizoram and Article 371-H to Arunachal Pradesh<sup>4</sup>. So it is invidious to pick on Article 370 only. <sup>therefore,</sup> Let us stop all talks about the abrogation of this provision in the interest of unity and integrity of this country.

## 2. RUTHLESS SUPPRESSION

Those who suggest ruthless suppression of the Kashmiri masses perhaps have not learnt lesson from the past history e.g. Pak Army in East Bengal, in Sind, Elochistan and NWFP. Suppression does not provide durable and permanent solution of any problem. In spite of the fact that 5480 militants including 235 foreign missionaries were killed, more than 8000 of them arrested, 3000 still in Jails, 979 security - persons, 3250 innocent persons lost their lives, and 2127 civilians killed in cross firing<sup>5</sup>, still                      normalacy could not return in the valley.

## 3. HANDING OVER VALLEY TO ARMY

Handing over valley to army will also not serve the purpose. It may add fuel into the fire. The



recent example of Pakistan handing over Sind to army and its consequences and Russian venture in Chychania are before us. It may further alienate the Kashmiri masses.

#### 4. MILITARY SOLUTION

Three wars have already been fought and the result is identical. We are, where we were in 1947. Another war may be more destructive but without substantial change in present boundaries because Pakistan is said to be far better prepared with latest war machinery and nuclear war heads. Moreover, military solution can only be desirable when India is far prepared to confront not only Pakistan but also the Chinese simultaneously. There may also be American, other Western nations, Muslim world and UNO's pressure against such a venture.

#### 5. PLEBISCITE

As Lord Mountbatten the first Governor General of Indian Republic in his letter of October 27, 1947 to Maharaja Hari Singh wrote, "It is my government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the state/<sup>accession</sup> should be settled by a reference to the people of Kashmir", quite a number of political elites inside and outside the state believe that Kashmiris have a right to self determination or plebiscite.



But, Professor Maurice Mendeson - a British expert in Pub. International Law points out that G.C. remarks were merely an expression of an idea and ~~this~~ have no legal binding. He had no right to make such a promise or lay down any condition while accepting the instrument of accession signed by the ruler of K<sub>a</sub>shmir. He, therefore, rightly points out that Kashmiris have no legal right to plebscite or self determination.

He further added that the people of the state had themselves confirmed this fact by voting overwhelmingly in favour of Sheikh Abdullah four years after he declared that the accession of J&K with India was final and complete.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, such a remark or any promise of plebscite made before 26th January 1950 i.e. before the enactment and enforcement of the Constitution of India becomes unconstitutional because the constitution does not accept the right to secession for any acceding state or<sup>a</sup> part of Indian Republic. However, holding plebscite to decide the Kashmir problem is also not at all possible. There were pre-conditions set by UNO subsequently under<sup>its</sup> Resolutions 1947-48, i.e. vacation of aggression by Pakistan and with drawing its army from Pak-occupied Kashmir including Gilgit and Baltistan. When these conditions were never met by Pakistan, its and Kashmiri outfits insistence on plebscite after 45 years, is unrealistic. Pakistan, on the other hand, had already



handed over some parts of the Kashmir territory to China. Moreover, no country can afford an option open for all the times to come and provide a slightest possibility of dismemberment of its territory. It also be kept in mind that those who would have participated in such a plebiscite more than four decades ago are no more alive. The new generation is entirely different both in outlook and practical life style. Even the people who made this commitment are no more. So much water has flown down under the river Jhelum and in Tawi that comparison of the people then with that of present one bears no resemblance.<sup>6</sup>

Thus the commitment then made can not be binding on the posterity. Those who committed blunders are no more and those who have voted then are also no more.

#### 6. INDEPENDENCE TO KASHMIR

Some of the outfits in the Valley like JKLF and a few groups outside, constantly demanding independence for Kashmir. They believe that it will be panacea for all evils and exploitation of the Kashmiris by India and Pakistan both in their respective areas. However, Sheikh Mohd Abdullah ruled out the possibility of independent Status ~~of~~ for Kashmir because of lack of goodwill for it on the part of its neighbours and other factors. Moreover, the independence for Kashmir is too not acceptable by Pakistan. <sup>Rather</sup> It wants entire Kashmir.



To pursue that goal it has with drew its support to JKLF and started supporting pro-Pak outfits. Independent Kashmir too cannot exist as a viable unit without foreign dependence. That is why China has categorically refused to accept Kashmir as an independent country. Even the British security experts are of the view that the option of independence for Kashmiris is unrealistic.

In addition independence for Kashmir may not be acceptable to the other regional units - Jammu, Ladakh, Gilgit and Baltistan. They may reject the domination of one region by another.<sup>3</sup> Those who demand independence for Kashmir should learn lesson from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Chechnya, where independence cause only destruction and devastation for the people.

Economically, too, an independent Kashmir would not be a viable as both parts at present depended on heavy subsidies<sup>4</sup> from India and Pakistan<sup>5</sup> respectively.

#### 7. MORE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MORE AIDS

Some of the critics are of the view that the present crisis in the state is due to the lopsided economic development. They are also of the view that benefits of the economic development in the state, so far, has gone to some sections of the society. But the majority of the people are still poor, illfed and ill-clothed. The unemployment of the educated youngmen is the serious problem. That is why, Kashmir youth became the easy prey of the false propaganda



-media and other fundamentalist and secessionist outfits in the valley.

But it may be pointed out that this state has received lavish grants from Centre since Independence. But the influence of the disruptive forces increased day by day. We also should not forget that greater dose of aids can not be a substitute for the satisfaction of political urges of the people. Rather it stimulate and provoke them if they suspect the motive of aid given. Moreover, it become counter productive if it causes corruption economic and political distortion.

One should also remember that the fiscal deficit which was close to Rs. 650 crores by the middle of the year 1992 was feared to rise to Rs. 1365 crores by the end of the same financial year.<sup>10</sup> Though the plan amount for the next financial year of 1993-94 was estimated to be Rs. 895 crores, it is feared that this amount too would be adjusted in the non-plan.<sup>11</sup>

Diversion of more resources for economic development in the state can not be possible as the state is facing fiscal crisis. Its economy has been in bad shape for the past so many years. The situation came to the lowest ebb last June when the state treasuries were found empty and the employees had to wait for salaries for quite a long time.<sup>12</sup>



8. MEANINGFUL AUTONOMY/PRE-1953 STATUS

A suggestion has been also made that granting of the meaningful autonomy like that of pre-1953 period would satisfy the Kashmiri masses and normalcy would return in valley.<sup>13</sup> They plead that majority of the political elites in the valley are now convinced that in the present day world, no state could purely operate on religious basis.

The state constitution has, however, been amended several times since August 1953 and number of central laws have also been extended to the State. It may not an easy thing to go back to pre-1953 position. Moreover, Pakistan would not accept it.

9. MAKING INDIA A GENUINELY FEDERAL STATE

Some of the political elites - particularly Communists suggest to make India as a genuinely federal state in which the states are not the vassal of whom soever gets into power in Delhi and can dismiss state governments even for petty reasons.<sup>14</sup>

But one should keep in mind that geographically culturally, racially, and ethnically India is not a homogeneous country. Being a multi-lingual, multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious state, it comprised of different regions which have distinct regional and political



personalities of their own. In fact political and emotional divergence between them have been growing over years. A loose federal structure may, therefore, not desirable in the interest of unity and integrity of this country. Moreover the past history of this country is an eye-opener for us. <sup>15</sup>

#### 10. POLITICAL DIALOGUE

The crisis in Kashmir can also said to be tackled and resolved through negotiations and dialogue, with misled Kashmiri militants. They are of the view that if there ~~were~~ negotiations for the release of Dr. Rubiya Sayed the daughter of Ex-Home-Minister, why there can not be dialogue and negotiation with all groups of militants to resolve the crisis. After all they are not aliens but our own nationals.

It is, therefore, proposed that all the groups of the militants should be invited for dialogue. If they do not come forward then all parties meet be ~~Convened~~ and an attempt should there be made to bring out a settlement within the Indian Constitutional frame-work. The supporters of starting dialogue are of the view that most of the political elites in the valley are now <sup>e</sup>convined that they have no future by acceding with Pakistan. They ~~also~~ also know that Bengali speaking people, Sindhis and the people of Frontier districts, ~~through~~ though muslims are not yet allowed



to maintain their separate identity. Even the Muslims migrated from India during 1947 are still treated as they are Magarins and/not only the target of violence but also discriminated and hatred. The complexity of the crisis, *therefore* requires several rounds of such dialogues both at official and non-official levels. The series of the visits of the central leaders to the valley are also suggested. As this process continuous, more view points would come out and this process alone can end cynicism and alienations of the Kashmiri masses.<sup>16</sup>

But some of the National Political parties like B.J.P. pleade that there should be no place for anti-national elements on the negotiating table.<sup>17</sup>

that  
They add / Though no hard and fast rules can be laid down to deal with terrorist acts. Yet what is the crucial is no and never negotiate with kidnappers, killers and looters. Experience of the world demonstrated that inflexibility may not be feasible in all circumstances. Rather a clear but stern policy lines would help in *tackling them*.<sup>18</sup>

Inspite of all, that the Indian leaders and Government did try from time to time to enter into dialogue with disgrunteled elements in the valley but failed miserably in this venture. Moreover, there are various militant groups active in the valley and some of them at dagger drawn with each other. Bringing all of them *on* one table for negotiations and dialogue is most difficult, in the present situation.



11. TRIFICATION OF THE STATE

A group of newly emerging political elites in Jammu are strongly advocating trification of the state and each of the three region - the Valley, Jammu and Ladakh be granted internal autonomy.

A similar proposal was once before the active considerations of the Basic Principles Committee of Consenbly of Jammu and Kashmir in 1953.<sup>19</sup> The idea was to give autonomy to different cultural units - of the state as it would resolve all the fears of domination of one unit over the other. According to Joseph Karbel the cultural units were named as the Valley, Jammu, Gilgit, Ladakh and a region consisting of the districts of Mirpur, Rajouri, Poonch and Muzaffarabad.<sup>20</sup> Three of these provinces - Kashmir Jammu and Poonch - Rajouri were to have each as Executive Head, a Council of ministers responsible to the provincial legislatures. As far as Ladakh and Gilgit were concerned, they were proposed to be administered by Regional Councils. The idea was to create "A Republic within a Republic".<sup>21</sup>

Even this proposal could not materialize. But the integrationists in and outside the state are not at all in favour of trification of the state.



They pointed out that though this proposal might reduce the possibility of regional imbalances, irritations and tensions, yet it will give further impetus to the diversive forces inside and outside the state to exploit the situation.

Like integrationists, the autonomists, pro-independent and even some of the secessionist outfits are not at all in favour of dismemberment of the state. They also desire to keep the state intact as it was during the time of Dogra Dynastic rule.

12. MAINTENANCE OF STATUS QUO i.e. PARTITION OF  
THE STATE AT THE ACTUAL LINE OF CONTROL

said

Acceptance of status quo is also to be the only solution of the Kashmir crisis and any attempt to force other option would prove destructive for the people on both sides of actual line of control. That is partition of the state between India and Pakistan on Actual Line of Control with minor adjustment here and there. Even Eisenhower/<sup>also</sup>suggested it in 1958.<sup>22</sup> It is also pointed out that there was a definite understanding between Z.A. Bhutto and Mrs. Indira Gandhi at Shimla (Shimla Agreement) that both the leaders would henceforth persuade their respective people to accept actual line of control as international border.<sup>23</sup>



But the integrationists as well as autonomists inside and outside the state may not accept this proposal.

13. ELIMINATE TERRORISM, RESTORE CONFIDENCE AND INITIATING POLITICAL PROCESS, THE ONLY PRAGMATIC SOLUTION.

This discuss shall, however, be incomplete if I fail to present my/<sup>own</sup> humble suggestion to combat militancy in Kashmir. I, therefore, suggest that as Kashmir problem is a multi-dimensional, a multi-dimensional solution is urgently needed to eliminate the root cause of terrorism in the state, thrown by different quarters. There should, therefore, be a comprehensive<sup>24</sup> strategy to meet the threat of terrorism which is definitely a police/military problem. The strategy should have two components - the short term and the long term.

The short term strategy should include putting strong and sustained pressure on the terrorists and their collaborators, denying them extra supply of oxygen in the form of foreign arms and money; publicity by human rights-bodies and undue press-publicity of local and outside; the flow of state resources and Indian money given for developmental activities, treating the situation in the valley as low-intensity war or a war by proxy, organising counter guerilla groups blocking their supply line,



identifying and removing subversive elements from state services and from semi-government organisations, providing an honourable line of return to misguided Kashmiri youths, launching a strong move through media to counter false and malicious Pak propoganda against India, educating the masses about the ultimate futility of violence, and exhibiting a united national will and maintaining a consistent line of action.

The long term measures should include the fundamental reforms of state administration. The present culture of superficiality, shallowness, softness and selfishness be replaced by the culture of constructivity, creativity and comparison.

The priority then should be given to the restoration of the confidence of Kashmiris, which they had exhibited in forties and early fifties, in Indian polity. The need of the time is, therefore, to stop all talks about scrapping Article 370, Masjid-Temple controversy, trification of the state, suppression of people's will by force etc.

Once it is done, the political process should immediately be started. Free and fair elections should be conducted and the power should



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be transferred to the elected members. All these processes should be started simultaneously but without delay.

In short, "Eliminate Terrorism, restore confidence of the people and initiate political process" is the only pragmatic solution of the current turmoil in the state which is not only known for its natural beauty but also its aged old religious tolerance and secular out look.

. . .



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THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN THE J&K STATE:  
A HISTORICO-SOCIO-POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS\*

By

Dr. Vidya Bhushan\*\*

"Women in the Central figure in our society which inspires confidence, inculcates and prepares children to pursue their goals relentlessly. History bears testimony to the fact that heights of patriotism, selflessness, fearlessness and determination are imbibed in children only through the persistent efforts of mothers. But unless woman is provided the pre-requisites of education for developing her vision, proper health care and social security, respect and status, her efforts are likely to fall short to accomplish the ultimate objective of a strong civilized and prosperous nation."<sup>1</sup>

Through their long history, the most beautiful Kashmiri Women witnessed varying fortunes. "At times women had risen to pinnacles of glory, distinguished themselves as rulers in their own right, as regents of minor princess, as powerful queen-consorts, as diplomats in peace and war, as commanders of the armies, as thrifty land-ladies, as builders and reformers, as protectors of the religious lore, as singing and dancing beauties and also earned names in keeping homes."<sup>2</sup>

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\*A paper being presented in National Seminar on social Policy, Law and Protection of Weaker Section of the Society organised by the Faculty of Law, University of Jammu to be held at Jammu from 11th - 13th February, 1984.

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By: Dr. Sheetal Gupta\*

"Women <sup>is</sup> the Central figure in our society which ~~inspires~~ <sup>inspires</sup> confidence, inculcates and prepares children to pursue their goals ~~reluctantly~~ <sup>relentlessly</sup>. History bears testimony to the fact that heights of patriotism, selflessness, fearlessness and determination are imbibed in children only through the persistent ~~efforts~~ <sup>efforts</sup> of mothers. But unless women <sup>is</sup> provided the prerequisites <sup>of</sup> freedom, dignity ~~of~~ education for developing her version, proper health ~~care~~ and social security, respect and status, her efforts are likely to fall short to accomplish the ultimate objective of a strong civilized and prosperous nation."

Women were held in high esteem during Vedic period. Even in ancient India their status was higher than that of men. A ~~in ancient India their status~~ woman was then regarded not only an embodiment of 'Shakti' and worshipped but also a symbol of fertility. But Manu and his derogatory statements later on like "a woman has to be dependent on her parents before marriage and after marriage on her husband," did a great damage to the position and status of women in Indian society. During twelve hundred years of foreign rule in India, the status of women reduced to the lowest ebb. A woman who "constitute a home-a happy home where ~~f~~ future citizens of the Country are given birth, <sup>nur</sup>ished and brought up to shoulder the ~~onerous~~ responsibilities of building a strong and a prosperous nation", began to be regarded as inferior and not worthy of respects. They were, therefore, excluded from various fields of religio-socio-politico-economic spheres of daily ~~life~~ <sup>life</sup>.

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The low status of women in contemporary India is the result of widespread contradictions existing in the society. The women in general and women of lower classes and castes in particular are the worst ~~hit~~ sections of our society, under the existing social set up.

However, through their long history, Kashmiri women witnessed varying fortunes. "At times women had risen to pinnacles of glory, distinguished themselves as rulers in their own right, as regents of minor princes, as powerful queen-consorts, as diplomats in peace and war, as Commanders of the armies, as thrifty land-ladies, as builders and reformers, as protectors of the religious lore, as singing and dancing beauties and also earned names in keeping homes".<sup>5</sup>

Historically speaking from early times down to the thirteen century A.D. Kashmiri women enjoyed remarkable freedom, wielded ample power and exercised responsibility, which gave them a high status in society. The happiest period for women was when the country came under the sway of Buddhism. However, with the establishment and consolidation of Muslim rule in Valley, women were gradually and increasingly deprived of these rights and privileges. Their sole meaning and purpose in life became to keep the houses, to gratify the desires of their husbands and to procreate. But in the wake of Afghan onslaught followed religious persecution, rapine and devastating. Purdah was more rigorously enforced, women were physically and spiritually shattered, their presence in every sphere of social activity was totally eclipsed, and they meekly submitted to the expropriation and exploitation. The Sikhs who succeeded the Afghans were no less tyrannical. ~~xxx~~ The Dogras, who took over from the



Maharaja Gulab Singh is known to have issued ordinance against Sati system as early as in 1825 "when he was a Raja of Jammu Jagir. Later he sent his representatives to attend the Social Reforms Conference held at Lahore in 1852 and got incorporated his ILLANS against infanticide and Sati. Ranbir Singh also issued strict orders for prohibiting Sati System and encouraged female education.

But at the whole at the close of last century Kashmiri women had sunk to a low level of destitution and ignorance. Because of exploitation and a low status in society, they lost refinement of their mind and self-confidence, spirit of revolt and sense of righteous indignation. In short, the 19th Century witnessed the most complete and degrading subjugation of women in the history of mankind.

The religious dogmas were also responsible for the pitiable conditions of women in our state. They were considered as secondary citizens with no independence of any sort. The religious laws governing the system of marriage, divorce, inheritance, polygamy, poliandry, dowry system, widow remarriage and debarring widows from performing certain social functions were yet another discrimination against women.

The feudal society, like the semi-feudal and semi-capitalistic system (of to-day) treated women as personal property of men. However, the waves of the western ideas opened a new era of progress and modernization in the State. And in the ferocious opposition of the government and superstitious elders of Hindu and Muslim communities, the foreign Christian



missionaries pioneered a movement for the betterment of Kashmiri women. The last Dogra Maharaja also tried his best to raise the percentage of literacy among the women and to ameliorate their socio-economic conditions.

The deterioration of socio-economic conditions and greater strain and stresses, which led to the economic insecurity of man in inter-war period and after, further increased subjection of women and degradation of their living and working conditions. Women were, thus, alienated from their families, from their native places, their jobs, from land and from human dignity. In addition to post-war emergence of new productive forces, the transformation of their ownership the changing productive relationship and impending super structures created distinct classes, new institutions and developed new laws which further relegated women's position to an unparalleled low relative to others in the social hierarchy and economic status. Hence larger number of women became increasingly poor before independence.

In spite of all these limitations, the Kashmiri women played an important role in the Freedom Struggle ~~against the Dogra~~ <sup>in</sup> Kashmir. ~~They suffered in their thousands, and passed into oblivion without any recognition of fame. Still, from all walks of life they came forward with redoubled enthusiasm to participate in the last phase of popular resistance (i.e., Quit Kashmir Movement of 1946), against the autocratic rule under the banners of National Conference.~~

The leadership of National Conference was, therefore, very much conscious of the deplorable conditions of women folk in the state. They were also aware of the fact that the inherent strength of women, if suitably channelised, could be directed towards National Development. That was why the party in its



blueprint for the Socio-Economic transformation of the State in Naya Kashmir programme of early 1944, among other things, promised to provide safe-guards for the protection of women's socio-politico-economic interests. Sec. 12 of Naya Kashmir Programme runs as follow: "Women citizens shall be accorded equal rights with men in all fields of national life, economic, cultural, political and in the state services.

These rights shall be realised by affording women the right to work in every employment upon equal terms and for equal wages with men. Women shall be ensured rest, social insurance and ~~mmu~~ education equally with men. The law shall give special protection to the interests of mother and child. The provisions of pregnancy leave with pay and the establishment of wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens shall further secure these rights. Moreover the Sec. 10 of Kashmir's Constitution of 1956, therefore provides the permanent residents of the state shall have all the rights guaranteed to them under the Constitution of India. The permanent residents obviously includes the women.

Besides the fundamental rights, the Kashmir Constitution also provides a list of Directive Principles of State Policy for the amelioration of the socio-economic status of women. Though these directives are not enforcable in the court of law, nevertheless these ~~directives~~ are to be the fundamental in the governance of the state and like the affirmative instructions to the Government to do certain things, are the instructions which give to the constitution a living spirit. In addition to others, one of the directives, which comprises a



fairly comprehensive moral code for the rights of women, provides "the state is directed to secure to all women and the right to equal pay for equal work, maternity benefits and medical care, reasonable maintenance to abandoned married women; full equality in all social, educational, political and legal matters, the special protection against discourtesy, defamation, hooligism and other forms of misconduct, to combat ignorance, superstition, fanaticism, communalism, racialism, cultural backwardness and to foster brotherhood and equality among all communities which includes women folk. The state, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, is directed to make effective provisions for securing for women, who are permanent residents of the state, right to work, i.e., the right to receive guaranteed work with payment for labour in accordance with its quality and quantity subject to a basic minimum and maximum of wages ~~xxx~~ established by the law, that the health and strength of working women are not abused and they were not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their sex, age or strength, to secure to every permanent resident including women right to free education up to the University standard.

Despite of the paucity of the financial resources, the successive popular governments in the State since independence have taken various progressive and radical steps ~~xxx~~ to make women equal to men in all walks of life and thus to enhance their social status. The major steps have so far been taken in this direction are providing women equal opportunities for employment; equal remuneration for equal work, enhancing the period of their maternity leave; opening of family welfare and family planning centres and sub centres, special nutritious to the the expected poor mothers, health care services to the women in

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~



rural areas, more facilities for women education with free text-books, stationery, uniforms, scholarships and other incentives more and more training facilities for them in various crafts be given them representation various district and block development boards to get their active participation in the developmental activities. Stillmore is needed to be done to protect women folk from social evils as well crimes against them.

The recent rise of militancy and perpetrating gun-culture in Kashmir have given a serious set back to this movement. All most all terrorists organisation activities in Kashmir are in indulging in commission of violent crimes against women in one way or the other. On the strength of their guns they have not only launched Pardha movement, levied a freedom tax on House hold but indulge in molestation, kidnapping, abduction of young girls, abduction after threatening to shoot rest of her family members xxxing handing over the them to their gang leaders as prize or present, held them as hostages for their male relatives forced marriages, rapping and gang rapping, and kxxx then killing them subsequently etc.

While, summing up, I may say that still much is needed to be done to change the male oriented and male dominated value system; subordination of women approach, the social controls on women restricting their public movements and appearance which are responsible for losing their self-confidence and initiative. There is need to counter the sense, the sense of insecurity, helplessness and physical weakness which have made women folk more subserviant and socially dependent.



should be made to impose effective checks against  
s, and dowry systems, which are the most derogatory  
tional practices being continued with renewed dimintions,  
increasing incidental demands of in-laws ~~after~~ after marriage,  
bride harassment and bride burning. The state should declare  
that death of every married women within five years of her  
marriage an essential case for police investigation and disposal  
of their dead bodies without postmortum under police supervision  
a penal offence.

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THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN  
IN J&K STATE: A HISTORICO-SOCIO-POLITICAL  
AND CONSTITUTION ANALYSES.

By Dr. Vidya Bhushan

" Women is the Central figure in our society which inspires confidence, inculcates and prepares children to pursue their goals relentlessly. History bears testimony to the fact that heights of patriotism, selflessness, fearlessness and determination are imbibed in children only through the persistent efforts of mothers. But unless woman is provided the pre-requisites of education for developing her vision, proper health care and social security, respect and status, her efforts are likely to fall short to accomplish the ultimate objective of a strong civilized and prosperous nation." 1

Through their long history, the most beautiful Kashmiri women



Woman constitutes a home - a happy home, where future citizens of the country are given birth, nursed and brought up to shoulder the onerous responsibilities of building a strong and prosperous nation. Women in the capacity of a mother is the first teacher of child and builds a sound base for building a strong super-structure of a civilized man equipped fully to fight the realities of life, and face the greater day-to-day challenges in life."

"Woman is the central figure in our society which inspires confidence, inculcates discipline and prepares children to pursue their goals relentlessly. History bears testimony to the fact that heights of patriotism, selflessness, fearlessness and determination are imbibed in children only through the persistent efforts of mothers. But unless woman is provided the pre-requisites of education for developing her vision, proper health care and social security, respect and status, her efforts are likely to fall short to accomplish the ultimate objective of a strong civilized and prosperous nation."

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THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN J&K STATE -\*  
A HISTORICO-SOCIO-POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Dr. Vidya Bhushan\*\*

" Kashmir known as the paradise on earth not only for its sun-lit, snow clad peaks, its shadow-kissed valleys, its lovely flowers, its green meadows, shady chinar trees, crystal-clear lakes, its rich luscious fruits and sweet-scented saffrons, its magnificent pleasure-parks, its floating gardens and glittering glaciers, and beautiful pine-mantled side valleys, but also for its most beautiful women and cherubic, rosy-cheeked children who seem to have walked out of some of the old European paintings of a flock of angels hovering around the Christ Child".

Through their long history, Kashmiri women witnessed varying fortunes. "At times women had risen to pinnacles of glory, distinguished themselves as rulers in their own right, as regents of minor princes, as powerful queens-consorts, as diplomats in peace and war, as Commanders of the armies, as thrifty land-ladies, as builders and reformers, as protectors of the religious lore, as singing and dancing beauties and also earned names in keeping homes".

Broadly speaking from early times down to the thirteen century A.D. Kashmiri women enjoyed remarkable freedom, wielded ample power and exercised a responsibility, which gave them a high status in society. The happiest period for women was when the country came under the sway of Buddhism. However, with the establishment and consolidation of Muslim rule in the Valley, women were gradually and increasingly deprived of these rights and privileges. Their sole meaning and purpose in life

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\* A paper being presented in National Seminar on Social Policy, Law and Protection of Weaker Section of the Society" organised by the Faculty of Law, University of Jammu to be held at Jammu from 11th to 13th February, 1984.

\*\*M.A., L.L.B., B.Ed., Ph.D. Reader in P.S. Department of Political Science, University of Jammu. Jammu-180001.



became to keep the houses, to gratify the desires of their husbands and to procreate. But in the wake of Afghan onslaught followed religious persecution, rapine and devastating. Purdah was more rigorously enforced, women were physically and spiritually shattered, their presence in every sphere of social activity was totally eclipsed, and they meekly submitted to the expropriation and exploitation. The sikhs who succeeded the Afghans were no less tyrannical and cruel. Dogras - the new masters, who were in the initial years busy in consolidation of their newly acquired kingdom, and annexation of the frontier areas lying in the north, evinced some interests in the moral and social uplift of the women.

Gulab Singh is known to have issued ordinance against Sati system as early as 1825 "when he was a Raja of Jammu Jagir. Later on he sent his representatives to attend the Social Reforms Conference held at Lahore in 1852 and got incorporated his ILLANS against infanticide and Sati. Ranbir Singh also issued strict orders for prohibiting Sati system and encouraged female education and the figure of girls attending schools was enhanced.

at  
But on the whole, the close of last century Kashmiri women had sunk to a low level of destitution and ~~ing~~ ignorance. Because of exploitation and a low status in society, they lost refinement of their mind and self-confidence, spirit of revolt and sense of righteous indignation. In short, the 19th century witnessed the most complete and degrading subjugation of women in the history of mankind.

The religious dogmas were also responsible for the pitiable conditions of women in our state. They were considered as secondary citizens with no independence of any sort. The religious laws governing the system of marriage, divorce, inheritance, polygamy, polyandry, dowry system, widow remarriage



and debarring widows from performing certain social functions were yet another discrimination against women.

The feudal society, like the semi-feudal and semi-capitalistic system (of to-day,) treated women as personal property of men. The male oriented and male dominated value system. Thus swayed the society throughout the history and subordination of women appeared in every walk of life. The social controls on women restraining their public movement and appearance also to a great extent accounted for their losing self-confidence and initiative. The insecurity, helplessness and physical weakness made women more subservient and socially dependent. The dowry, the bride price, which were the most cruel traditional practices, continued with newer dimensions and the increasing incidental demands of in-laws after marriage led to the further deterioration of women's conditions.

Violence or wife beating, found in several families irrespective of their social background was probably one of the most accepted crimes committed against women.

But the waves of the western ideas ~~spread~~ opened a new era of progress and modernization in the state, and in the ferocious opposition of the government and superstitious elders of Hindu and Muslim communities, the foreign Christian missionaries pioneered a movement for the betterment of Kashmiri women. The last Dogra Maharaja also tried his best to raise the percentage of literacy among the women and to ameliorate their socio-economic conditions. During his reign the number of educational institutions for girls increased, provisions were made to admit girls below 10 yrs in boys schools in localities where no separate girls schools existed; girl students were also admitted in the colleges of the state and 7 post-matriculation scholarships of Rs.40/-each were provided to girls desirous of pursuing college education in British India.



The deterioration of socio-economic conditions and greater strain and stresses, which led to the economic insecurity of man in inter-war period and after, further increased subjection of women and degradation of their living and working conditions. Women were, thus, alienated from their families, from their native places, their jobs, from land and from human dignity.

Moreover, the post-war emergence of new productive forces, the transformation of their ownership the changing productive relationship and impending <sup>super</sup> structures created distinct classes, new institutions and developed new laws which further relegated women's position to an unparalleled low relative to others in the social hierarchy and economic status. Hence larger number of women became increasingly poor before independence.

Despite of all these limitations, the Kashmiri women ~~pl~~ played an important role in the Freedom Struggle of Kashmir. They suffered in their thousands, and passed into oblivion without any recognition or fame. Still, from all walks of life they came forward with redoubled enthusiasm to participate in the last phase of popular resistance (i.e., Quit Kashmir Movement of 1946), against the autocratic rule under the banners of National Conference headed by a dynamic leader Sher-i-Kashmir, Sheikh Mohd. Abdulla.

<sup>Therefore</sup>  
The leadership of National Conference was very much conscious of the deplorable conditions of women folk in the state (as well as of the fact that the status of a woman, at whose breast humanity is nourished and in whose lap civilizations are credled, is a measuring rod of the civilization.) They were also aware of the fact that the inherent strength of women, if suitably channelised, could be directed towards National Development. That was why the party in its blueprint for the Socio-economic transformation of the State in Naya Kashmir



Programme of early 1944, among other things, promised to provide safe-guards for the protection of women's socio-politico-economic interests. Sec. 12 of Naya Kashmir Programme runs as follow:  
 "Women citizens shall be accorded equal rights with men in all fields of national life, economic, cultural, political and in the state services."

These rights shall be realised by affording women the right to work in every employment upon equal terms and for equal wages with men. Women shall be ensured rest, social insurance and education equally with man. ~~xxxxxx~~ The law shall give special protection to the interests of mother and child. The provisions of pregnancy leave with pay and the establishment of wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens shall further secure ~~xxx~~ these rights.

However, it is a known fact that Kashmir was the only one of the hundreds of the former princely states, which was given the right to have a separate constitution framed by its own Constituent Assembly. But it is regrettable to point out that from the females which constituted about half of the population of the state, were drawn only two women, i.e., 2.56 % of the total membership of the Consenbly, and their representation in the committees of the Consenbly was 4.35 % of the total membership of the Committees. The Consenbly of Kashmir which intended to shape the future destiny of the state and to implement the cherished objectives of Naya Kashmir Programme, also discussed and debated the question of protecting the interests and rights of women folk, and made certain proposals.

✓ The section 10 of Kashmir's Constitution of 1956, therefore, provides "the Permanent residents of the state shall have all the rights guaranteed to them under the Constitution of India. "The Permanent residence obviously includes the women."

Besides the fundamental rights, the Kashmir Constitution also provides a list of DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY for



the amelioration of the socio-economic status of women. Though these directives are not enforcable in the court of law, nevertheless these are declared to be the fundamental in the governance of the state and like the affirmative instructions to the Government to do certain things, are the instructions which give to the Constitution a living spirit. In addition to others, one of the directives, which comprises a fairly comprehensive moral code for the rights of women, provides, "the state is directed to secure to all women and the right to equal pay for equal work, maternity benefits and medical care, reasonable maintenance to abandoned married women; full equality in all social, educational, political and legal matters, the special protection against discourtesy, defamation, hooliganism and other forms of misconduct, to combat ignorance, superstition, fanaticism, communalism, racialism, cultural backwardness and to foster brotherhood and equality among all communities which includes women folk. The state, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, is directed to make effective provisions for securing for women, who are permanent residents of the state, right to work, i.e., the right to receive guaranteed work with payment for labour in accordance with its quality and quantity subject to a basic minimum and maximum of wage; established by the law, that the health and strength of working women are not abused and they were not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsulated to their sex, age or strength, to secure to every permanent resident including women right to free education up to the University standard.

These directives are not taken by the government as pious homiles but have been and are being implimented.

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It would not, however, be an easy task to survey the progress made by the government of Kashmir in the implementation of the directives relating to ameliorating the socio-economic



conditions of Kashmiri women. Nevertheless, a brief reference to some of the outstanding achievements made in this direction particularly during two and half decades since the promulgation of the present Constitution of Kashmir is as under:

For securing the right of women (Sec. 22) the State Govt. has taken different steps. Steps are also underway for enforcement of an Act which will ensure equal remuneration to women and men for the same work. There are a certain fields in which women are exclusively absorbed. e.g. women education wings and nursing profession. They are also given equal opportunities for employment in other ~~other~~ sectors. A good number of women are working in various government offices. In case of women employees the period of maternity leave admissible has been extended up to 90 days.

Each district hospital is utilizing 50 % of beds for the female including children. Each family welfare centre has one lady<sup>y</sup> doctor, one lady health visitor, one auxiliary mother, to render specialized service to the women folk. The number of family planning centres and sub-centres has gone up to 182, number of nurses to 532 and midwives to 1,105. Women are provided generalised health service under different schemes such as maternity and child Health and Family Welfare and Nutrition. A sum of Rs.15.8 lakhs has been earmarked for providing special Nutrition to 145 expectant mothers in Udhampur district only. Under RENBAR-I-SHAT PROGRAMME and Multipurpose Health Worker Scheme, health care services, are being provided to the women in the rural areas.

Over and above these facilities, one women's hospital has been set up at Srinagar where specialised medical services are available for women.

As ~~exine~~ education is the basic imperative for the women to be strong and healthy both in brain and brawn some measures



have also been undertaken to increase literacy among women. Kashmir state is the only state in Indian Union to have provided for free education to all right up to university level. There are 2586 Primary schools, 250 middle and 16 high and higher secondary schools being manned by over 11,000 female teachers. About 2.50 lakhs girls are receiving education. The separate colleges for women have also been opened to provide higher education to them. Because of recent economic constraints, the poorer families find no alternatives, but to send their girls to work to help their elders to earn livelihood. To educate them, 1735 partime educational centres have been opened in the state where more than 33,000 children including girls are being given primary education. The poor girl students are being provided free text books, stationary, uniforms, scholarships and other incentives. Moreover, number of centres of non-formal education for other girls, who could not go to formal schools have also been similarly increased. The number of adult education projects and adult literacy centres for women have also gone up. As a result, the literacy percentage of female has gone up to 15.82 in 1983. Women now enjoy right to vote. The state constitution provides for women to be nominated as members of the legislature, if they are not adequately represented. Women have also been given representation in the various district and block level development boards of the state to ensure their active participation in the development efforts.

For social upliftment of the women, the government has set up 120 welfare centres where women are imparted training in various crafts. There are 9 Nari Niketan and 'Fallah-i-Musturat' centres. In each centre 25 women are accommodated for training purposes and paid stipends. Centres for training facilities in cutting, tailoring, knitting embroidery have also been established.



Sewing machines are given to widows and destitutes. The rural women camps are being organised also. Under the District Industries Centres programme., several handicraft centres are being established for the economic uplift of the women especially in rural areas. An institution namely, 'Markaz-i-Behbudi-Khawateen has been started at Miskeen Bagh, Srinagar where 600 girls and women from poorer classes are accommodated for imparting training in six crafts which ultimately help in supplementing their income.

In spite of the paucity of financial resources, the state government has done, and is doing much for the betterment of women. However, whatever has been done so far to give them an equal status with men, has had very little effect on their life style. So far as unemployment, illiteracy, low ~~health~~ health standards are concerned, they are still more adversely circumstanced as compared to men. They still, thus, continue to face enormous problems in actual life.

The benefits of the above mentioned social legislations have not reached the majority of women. Most of them are still not aware of their rights. Even if some of them are aware of the rights, the legal redress is not availed of because it involves a time consuming and expensive process.

In order to improve their economic status, economic role-based organisations of women such as cooperative, trade union and self-employment enter-preneur groups should be organised particularly in rural areas, more and more training facilities should be provided to them for achieving higher productivity in agriculture, side jobs and family employment. There should be reservation for women in all training and professional colleges. More attention to be paid to population,



education and family planning as these are crucial to improve the status of women. Elementary education should primarily be entrusted to women at policy making, advisory, administrative and operative levels. The law and procedure of the state should be amended and modified to eradicate all the evil practices to change the thinking of menfolk about the fair sex and to simplify the procedure for redressing their grievances. Procedure relating to their arrest and remand in police station should not be ornamental in nature but productive in practice; laws relating to marriage, divorce inheritance, polygamy, polyandry, dowry, widow-remarriage, rape, assault, starving and wife-beating should be modified keeping in view the best interests of women-folk. The cases like rape, eve-teasing, kidnapping, abetment, bride burning, dowry death should preferably be investigated and adjudicated in camera by women. Severe punishments should be provided for heinous crimes like rape, kidnapping and abduction of women, their wrongful confinement and their being forced to indulge in immoral practices. There should be speedy disposal of such cases. The government should undertake steps for bringing about an entire change in the attitude of society towards fair sex and equip them to stand on their own feet. Hoodlums should not be provided political patronage.

Social pressure can also prove to be the most potent instrument for containing and preventing such crimes. The voluntary social organisations could be helpful in building up a proper social stance against such crimes, and extinguishing social prejudices against deserted wives, widows and widow remarriage.

In brief, a glance at the history of the position of women in Jammu and Kashmir state shows that vast strides



have been taken to ameliorate their conditions;  
to bring them as far as possible at par with men.  
However, the progress so far is only a first step  
which should lead to a heightened consciousness  
about the disabilities which one-half of human  
populations suffers in developing societies like  
ours. This can partly be done by passing suitable  
laws. But main emphasis should be on bringing  
about a change in social values and norms through  
education and community action.



Gandhiji's doctrine of satyagraha is, however, a type of generic non-violence. It generally means 'adherence to truth' or 'reliance on truth'.<sup>2</sup> He had developed it through his searchings and experiments in his personal life; and his efforts at combating social evils and building a better social order.<sup>3</sup> A satyagrahi, therefore, seeks <sup>not only</sup> to "turn the searchlight inward," and to improve his own life, so that he does no harm to others, but also seeks to combat evil in the world through his own way of life, constructive work, resistance, actions against what are regarded as evils and to convert the opponents through sympathy, patience, truthfulness and self-sufferings.<sup>4</sup>

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As Gandhiji believed that means must be ~~equally~~ equally pure, he regarded satyagraha as basically a matter of quality rather than quantity. When facing social-conflict, he stressed that satyagrahi's own inner condition is more important than the external situation.



When social evils demanded direct and active challenges, Gandhiji <sup>while</sup> pleading for peaceful resistance and non-violent direct actions, had provided a substitute for rioting, violent-revolution or war. Investigation, negotiation, publicity, self-purification, temporary work stoppages, picketing, boycotts, non-payment of taxes, mass-migration from the state, non-co-operation, civil disobedience, the fast etc. are the possible methods of Satyagraha. Satyagrahi should, however, be always ready to negotiate a settlement but not to compromise with basic principles<sup>5</sup>.

Gandhiji actually tried to unite philosophy with life, abstracts principles with concrete realities, religion with politics, ethics with a programme for social evolution.<sup>6</sup>

The theory of satyagraha, therefore represents an extension of one of the most basic and enduring concerns found in democratic thought — The politicalization of the individual as an autonomous moral agent. This objective underlies the institutionalisation of constitutional restraints, as well as the



(4)

introduction of popular participation. The Satyagraha in theory & practice is, thus, a part of the basic tendency of liberal democratic thought. Because, the politics of democracy represents an attempt to exclude violence from the coordination of social relationships. The doctrine of Satyagraha is not only an attempt to mediate between the conflicting pulls of political allegiance and private conviction, but also compatible with democratic political process as it is closely analogous to other methods like - communication with public, to sway the majority to a particular view, publicity and persuasion ~~as~~ etc. etc. generally considered the essence of modern democracy.

Grandhi ji wanted the subordination of political and social consideration to moral consideration. He stressed, "If the law of moral causation which is universal and ineluctable is worked with a will, man and his environment in this life and the future will be changed so as to secure the highest good of all."

The Grandhian solution for the present state of confusion in the internal and



(5)  
international politics and economic life of today is, thus, to work out a synthesis between individual and the group, between social, economic and political life<sup>10</sup>. He wanted that men should affirm the higher values within the social and political order and in the process reshape society as well as the State. He, therefore, generated an ethical concern in a manner which would define right action not in terms of withdrawal in pursuit self-perfection but in the individual concern for and involvement with the welfare of all.

Satyagraha is criticised on the plea that it contributes to breakdown of law and order. But Gandhiji justified it when other conventional means of redress had been exhausted. In other words attempts to reconcile the concept of Satyagraha with political obligation in a democracy have prohibited that it must be a tactic of last resort. It should, therefore, be employed only when political and legal channels prove unavailing or when there is a high probability



that resort to such means can produce not even moderately satisfactory results.

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According to Gandhi ji the use of satyagraha ~~however~~ carries with it many and varied implications. The man who adopts this weapon has to direct it against the evil, but not against the evil-doers. This is, therefore, very difficult thing to do without a continuous process of self-purification. Gandhi ji further stressed that a satyagrahi had to see that his act should not inflict violence on the other side; but he contented to invite sufferings, deliberately invited in support of a cause which one considers righteous, naturally purges the mind of satyagrahi of ill-will and remove the element of bitterness from the antagonist."

Gandhi ji believes that the efficiency of satyagraha depends upon the tenacity of to resist evil, which, while it abjures force, develops in the satyagrahi the faculty to face all risks cheerfully. Thus, the emphasis is transferred from



aggression by force to resistance by tenacity<sup>12</sup>.  
K.M. Munshi has rightly pointed out, "It is  
it is only, when these requirements are met  
that non-violent satyagraha becomes a mighty  
weapon of resistance both in the struggle  
for freedom as well as in self-realization<sup>13</sup>."

In short, satyagraha in some  
form or the other was adopted by various sets  
of people at different times in history. But  
it was left to Gandhi ji to perfect this  
technique by which mass resistance could  
succeed in achieving enduring results  
without resorting to force and with leaving  
a legacy of bitterness behind.

The critics of the satyagraha stress  
that a non-violent direct action is coercive  
and as such it is not a legitimate  
techniques in the democratic political culture.<sup>14</sup>  
Moreover, it imposes on the target a choice  
between two undesirable alternatives. "But" the  
difference between violent co-ersion in which  
deliberate injury is inflicted upon the  
opponent and non-violent co-ersion in which



injury indirectly results in a difference of such a great degree <sup>15</sup> that it is almost a difference in kind.

Grandhiji, ~~there~~ therefore, believes that Satyagraha is not a weapon of the strong and also not a cover for the cowardice of the weak.

— x —



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
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## State Politics In India-An Introductory Analysis

Dr. Vidhya Bhushan

Politics In India, which has embraced the parliamentary-federal constitutional system of the west, is highly dynamic. The dynamism, however, creates an image of insecurity because of the lack of conceptual clarity about what is happening and where we are heading. The confusion is marked particularly in the relations between the centre and the states.

The study of state politics in India, where states are large political units, and in terms of area and population, much bigger than most of the members of United Nations, has become an important but neglected subject in spite of the fact that there has already appeared many studies on each of the new states of Asia and Africa. The states in the Indian set-up operate as units of a federation rather than as independent or autonomous political entities. The very fact of the creation of federal structure in India implies the existence of heterogeneous units because of geographical, cultural, racial, lingual, religious, ethnic and socio-economic differences among the people of Indian states. All this leads the states to differ greatly in the degree to which they fit in the federal set up and in their politics. Moreover, there is powerful impact of national policies and parties on the form and behaviour of the states system. But the impact strikes different states differently. The heterogeneity, therefore, contributes to varying degree in the organisation and spirit of the state politics and one has to grapple here with one



pattern but with several pattern of state politics which are emerging."<sup>1</sup>

In their wholistic approach, most of the political scientists, engaged in this study of Government and politics of India, have examined the constitutional structure or political forces and processes at the state level with national perspective. Most of the case studies, which have recently been conducted on different aspects of state Government and politics, have described the formal, constitutional and legal aspects on the National pattern.<sup>2</sup> This is because of the fact that a single enacted, written and integrated constitution of India treated the country as an organic whole. Moreover, the fathers of the constitution really wanted to bring about a sort of a basic uniformity in the constitutional frame-work at the National as well as at the state level Political scientists. Therefore believed that each of the states of the Indian federation is a miniature of the structure and organization of the Union Government<sup>3</sup> As such political activities at the state level are not very much different from those of at National levels. They are of the view that the centralized structural arrangement in the Constitution over-shadows the issues at the state level or the state issues. They think national issues, national campaign and national parties project themselves into the affairs of the states. Moreover, one-party-dominant system is also a factor in frustrating an autonomous growth of state politics. The Central leadership too, not only directs its state party units from time to time, but also interferes in the sphere of state government and regulates the behaviour of its state leadership occupying the seat of power.<sup>4</sup> In short a host of studies of government and politics in the state view state politics from the National rather than from state perspectives. While trying to present a developmental profile of Indian polity, even Rajni Kothari accepts that the focus of his '*Politics in India*' is on the characteristic pattern and Inter-relationship that infom the operation of the Indian political system as a

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1. Narain, Iqbal. State politics in India. Meenakshi Prakashan Meerut, 1976, p. xvi.

2. Pandey, Jawaharlal : State politics in India. Uppal Publishing House New Delhi, 1982, p. x.

3. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. Indian : Government and politics of a Developing Nation, New York. Harcourt, Brnce and world Inc, 1970, p. 91.

4. Pandey, Jawaharlal : State politics in India, op. cit. p. xiii



whole, and not to be 'lost' in the estoric details of Its many Constituents \_2''<sup>5</sup> But Dr. Iqbal Narain points out that state politics in India begins with the confines of an enacted written and integrated constitution though obviously it does not end with it "<sup>6</sup>

### Framework of State politics for Analysis :

It is indeed a very difficult job to provide a theoretical fram-work for the study of state politics in India as it is still in the process of transition and thus the polarization of polltical forces has not freely taken place. However, an informal group, organized by Myron Weiner, under the auspices of the Commitree on South Asia of the Association for Asian Studies, perhaps for the first time, stressed the study of stafe politics in India from the state, rather than the national perspective.<sup>7</sup> This idea grew out of two seminars-one at the University of Chicage in April 1961 and another at the Messachastts Institute of Technology in late 1964.<sup>8</sup> Dr Iqbal Narain too, feels that the understanding of state politics is basic to an intelligent, meaningful anp critical understanding of Indian politics will, thus, lead to insights into those features of the political processes which are common to political phenonmena in general. No doubt India is a unitarised federal strucre, where states are the least autonomous and performity traditional functions, where exists uniformity in the constitutional frameworks of the Centre and the state, yet each state has been undergoing its own pattern of political development and facing Its own political issue and differs in respect of its politics and political belief. Dr. S.P. Verma also has pointed out, "working within the common frame-work of the national government, sharing a common legal system and common administrative structure, the diversity that they (states) display in their political processes is, indeed amazing. They seem to differ from each other not only in their emotional build up and mental outlook but also in their political affiliations. Some states are strong centres of leftist idelology; others are staunchly anti-leftists. In some states wo find greater political consciousness

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5. Kothari, Rajni : politics in India.

6. Narain, Iqbal : The State politics in India, op. cit, p. xvii

7. Weinei, Myron : State Politics in India. Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1968  
Preface.

8. Weiner, Myron : State Politics in India op. cit. Reference.



which leads to greater political participation, while in other states, the indifference and the apathy to politics is appalling. Some states appear to be homogeneous and integrated; others seem to be permanently suffering from great stresses and strains. In some of the states we find the ruling party in good shape and the opposition properly organized. In others, it is not only the opposition which is in general disarray but the ruling party itself is the victim of factionalism and internal squabbling. It would be interesting to examine how far these differences in character of state politics are due to the socio-economic environments prevailing in these states, how far they are connected with the composition and character of the ruling political party, and how far they are the result of the nature of political leadership."<sup>9</sup> Hence, any one, trying to have a vivid portrait of State politics in India and to make a useful and interesting analysis of Informal forces that shape the political process and political development in the states will have to approach his subject from state perspectives only.

In the later part of the fifties, and the first part of the sixties, the study of state politics in U.S.A. had re-entered the main stream of political research and experienced changes similar to those of other fields in political science.<sup>10</sup>

However, one conceptual framework in the U.S.A. was developed by V.O. Key, Jr.<sup>11</sup> The recent studies of the state politics in America tried to develop certain scientific techniques as well as conceptual framework of state politics. Some of the authors have applied comparative approach as they believed that American States provide ample basis of comparability, though they have sufficient differences, mass culture of the homogeneous society as well as of industrialised society.

But imported western tools cannot be applied to understand the problems in Indian states as these are heterogeneous units and have infra-structural diversi-

9. S.P. Verma : Perspective and Approaches in Iqbal Narain (Ed.) State Politics in India, p. 16.

10. Pandey, Jawaharlal : State Politics in India, op. cit., p. xiv.

11. Ibid p. xii. Mr. Pandey has referred V.O. Key Jr.'s three works i.e. V.O. Key Jr. Southern politics in State and Nation, New York Alfred A. Knoff Inc. 1949; his American State Politics-An Introduction, N York, Alfred A Knoff Inc, 1957 and An Autonomous State Politics, op cit



ties in terms of region, religions, languages, races, urbanization, industrialization and economy. Hence, as already pointed out, one has to grapple here not with one pattern of state politics but with the varieties of them, which are emerging, though none too steady, as there are pulls and swings and the process of flux and change in Indian Politics at the centre as well as state levels".<sup>11(a)</sup> There is therefore, as yet no such thing as a theory of state politics in India; at best there can be a theoretical framework.<sup>12</sup>

Myron Weiner<sup>13</sup> and Iqbal Narain,<sup>14</sup> however, made sincere efforts to develop a conceptual framework to be employed in the state politics in India.

Weiner prepared a framework for the authors who contributed to his book - *State politics in India*. He expected that it would permit each of the authors to analyse the political processes within his state as well as also enable him to explore a set of themes comparatively.<sup>15</sup> His approach, therefore, treated each state as a constituent unit within large system but nonetheless a separate political system.<sup>16</sup> The approach tried to describe and analyse the political process in a single state and to relate it to the social and economic environment in which politics occurs; and the performance of government.<sup>17</sup> His framework, thus, reflected a distinct bias towards the "systems' Approach" but with an explicit difference".<sup>18</sup>

In order to evolve his analytic frame work for the study of state politics in India, Iqbal Narian draws heavily upon the 'systematic approach' but, at the same time, adds quite a few relevant dimensions.<sup>19</sup> He rightly pointed out,

11a. Narain, Iqbal : State Politics in India, op. cit., p. xvi.

12. Singh, Balbir : State Politics in India. MacMillan India Limited, New Delhi, 1982, p. 2.

18 Weiner, Myron : State Politics in India, op. cit., pp. 6—9.

14. Narain, Iqbal : State Politics in India op. cit., pp. xix—xl.

15. Weiner, Myron : State Politics in India, op. cit., p. 7.

16 Weiner. Myron, Ibid.

17. Ibid

18 Pandey, Jawaharlal : State Politics in India, op. cit., p. xix.

19. Narain, Iqbal : State Politics in India. op. cit. p. xl.



"A framework is needed to identify and articulate the points of study and research; to provide for a sensitive refracting structure for observing the changing political phenomena and locating the 'Constants' and 'Variables' in the Panorama of state politics; to serve as a basis of comparison between one pattern of state politics and another; and to encourage scientific investigations into the labyrinth of state politics, which may ultimately lead to the emergence of a possible theory of state politics in India"<sup>20</sup> For building a theoretical framework, he refers the five determinants - Institutional, Physiological, Levels of Politics, Socio-Economic and Political and Elite Structure <sup>21</sup>

Institutional determinant implies that state politics operates within the constitutional framework provided by the fathers of the constitution that is an identical framework for all the states with a strong centre, occupying a pre-eminent position.

Physiological determinant signifies that the states are in themselves both a 'Whole' and a 'Part' - both an individual political person and a member of a bigger political family and are facing a conflict between 'Loyalty to self' and 'Loyalty to the family'.

Levels of politics determinant indicates Indian Political system as a three-tier system - with the state standing in between the centre and the local government. "The inter-locked character of state politics, which resembles a sort of inter-growth between the central and local tier; with the former, by and large, opening into, it and the latter expected to 'open out' to it, particularly since the establishment of panchayat Raj at the grass roots level".

Socio-economic and political determinant implies that the centripetal forces - i.e. planning and one party dominance and centrifugal forces - i.e. democratic decentralization, regionalism, linguisticism and states, quest for self identity

20. Ibid, p. xvi.

21. Ibid, pp. xvii — xix

22. Ibid, p. xviii



and self assertion sharpen the edge of their interaction, influence the state politics and creates an element of competitiveness in the Indian politics in general and in state politics in particular. Myron Weiner would call it as "Politics of Scarcity".

Elite structure determinant points to the fact that the king - pin of socio - economic and Political determinant is the Elite Structure which governs a state. In other words the governing Elites play a critical role in the inter-action between culture, society and economy on one hand and polity on the other.

Prof. Iqbal Narain, thus, concludes that Political system of a state in India has got to be viewed as a point of confluence of national, state and local politics; as a system of inter-connection and inter-action between governing Elite structure, political Institutions, processes and politics, as a traditional society struggling on its way to modernity through somewhat self-neutralizing processes of continuity and change; as a split political person in quest of self-identity as also fighting against its own self-alienation; and, in sum, as a miniature replica of a state's life in its totality".<sup>23</sup>

He then constructed a three-dimensional framework consisting of contextual, structural and operational factors. In contextual dimension, he includes the following components.<sup>24</sup>

1. History of a state, i.e., historical identity of the state, its pre-independence political status; its role in the freedom struggle and its impact of integration of princely states or of linguistic reorganization,
2. The geographical locale which gives strategic importance to a state even in political system.
3. Infra-structure which manifests itself in social pluralism.

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23 Ibid, p. xix.

24. Ibid, pp xx—xxx.



4. The level and pattern of economic development - which implies 'the resource potential, the level of economic growth, pace of industrialization, and crystallisation of class consciousness of a state shaping the form and substance of its politics on the one hand and the pattern of its relations with other states and centre on the other.'
5. Human resources - particularly in its quality aspects.
6. The level of education - i.e. the role of education in articulating people in making them ardent defenders of their interests and in converting them into a potential pressure group in the field of state politics; and
7. Urbanization - which is the cumulative result of economic development, spreading of education, modernization of agriculture, mobility, migration from rural to urban areas and possible correlation between urbanization and politicisation.

The structural dimension consists of formal constitutional structure i.e., the office of the governor, the office of the Chief Minister; the Ministry and the Legislature; political Institution and process, political parties, pressure groups, elections, and administrative framework.<sup>25</sup>

So far as operational dynamics are concerned, he refers the role of orientation of the actors, political behaviour and functional dimensions having a distinctive job connotation.<sup>26</sup>

### Limitations of these frameworks

Each of the above mentioned frameworks suffers from limitations. The framework by Myron Weiner is primarily meant for describing and analysing some pre-conceived aspects of a single state. In spite of the fact that he expected that the framework would simultaneously enable him to compare set of themes, yet it

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25. Ibid, pp. xxxii—xxxvii.

26. Ibid, pp. xxxvii—xl.



was too slopsided "to have in its compass the full-blown portrait of state polittics.<sup>27</sup> Weiner himself admits"..... it seemed to both editor and authors that it would be inappropriate at this stage of research .....to impose a common framework.<sup>28</sup>

Dr. Iqbal Narain, on the other hand, thought he was the first to recommend on all encompassing analytic framework yet its application by different authors contributing to his volume failed to clarify some of the funamental analytic problems in this area; While referring to the limitations, he himself, frankly admitted that the framework could not be uniformly applied because the data and information on all its dimensions had not been easy to obtain; tendency among scholars to be drawn more to the unique than to common aspects of political reality in the states of India; and the analytic framework had been rather ambitious in its scope. He further stressed that several studies were needed before it could yield meaningful and comparable generalizations for theory - building.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the studies conducted on the outline of this framework "give, in the main, a political aerial survey rather than a penetrating study of the forces operating at the state level."<sup>30</sup>

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27. Pandey, Jawaharlal : State Politics in India, op. cit , p xx.

28, Ibid.

29. Narain, Iqbal : State Politics in India. op. cit., p. 590.

30. Rudolf d' Mellous, "Review of Iqbal Narain's State Politics in India, Seminar : 28 April, 1978, p. 43.







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Conflict and tension in South Asia—Major irritants, issues and disputes  
—A Gandhian view-point

Anurag Gangal

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# Conflict and Tension in South Asia : Major Irritants, Issues and Disputes A Gandhian View-point

Anurag Gangal

International conflicts and intraregional tension in South Asia are apparently not as intense and explosive as they are in the Gulf, West Asian and South East Asian regions. Yet, the nature of South Asian conflicts is threateningly grave enough to need special, urgent and meaningful, positive, effective and creatively deeper attention, especially, in the light of its significant location due to :

- (i) South Asian proximity to the oil rich Gulf region and ASEAN or Asia pacific nations.
- (ii) its mineral/oil rich Indian ocean continental shelf, and
- (iii) nuclear/naval power and mobility potential of Indian Ocean concerning rapid deployment of nuclear warheads by an interested major superpower in the Gulf, West Asian, South-West Asian, South Asian, Asia-pacific, South African and South-East African regions.<sup>1</sup>

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- (1) S. D. Munř, "Regans South Asia Policy : The Strategic Dimension", *IDSA Journal* (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi), volume XVI, No. 2, October-December 1983, pp. 132-148; D. Banerjee, "External Powers" Interests and Role in South-east Asia", *Strategic Analysis* (IDSA, New Delhi), Vol. XI. No. 11, February 1988, PP.1279-1292. As such, South-East Asia is threatened not only by an intense cold war between two super powers, namely US and USSR but also by a likely nuclear warfare or "suicide". However, as of today, the nuclear vulnerability of South Asia from within is not as volcanic as in Southeast Asia. See also Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and other, *The Regional Imperative : The Asministration of US Foreign Policy Towards South Asian States under Presidents Johnson and Nixon* (New Delhi : 1980) P. 27.



As such, South Asia is of primary concern to United States, Soviet Union and big powers like United Kingdom and France. Most of the current South Asian conflicts, threats to its peace, political stability, self-sufficiency and socio-political cohesion owe their existence and perpetuation to deliberate involvement, interference and overt or covert colonial and neo-colonial prowesses of the industrial and military giants and erstwhile colonial powers.

The South Asian conflicts and tensions can be resolved even in a world threatened by a likely nuclear warfare and increasing superpower dominance today. However, what we need in this context is to go sincerely into the real motives behind superficial manifestations of mutual regional incompatibility. Only such an attempt at motivational analysis of regional conflict and their resolution a true Gandhian understanding or framework of international politics.<sup>2</sup>

### The Gandhian Conflict Analysis

Before moving on to analyse various conflicts in South Asia from a Gandhian perspective, we may again remind ourselves the most fundamental aspect of the Gandhian analysis in regional or international politics. It is none other than tackling first the mainspring of conflict in a given context for, this done, other things will fall in line by themselves. Clearly, it is the time tested Gandhian logic of good means leading to good ends and good intentions bringing in their wake better prospects of mutuality and friendship.

Nevertheless, the foremost and constant hurdle to South Asian peace and stability appears to be the India-Pakistan conflicts. Hence, they may be, first, put to the test of the Gandhian logic and analysis.

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- (2) See Anurag Gangal, "Cooperation and Conflicts in South Asia : A Gandhian Analysis", *The University Review : Jammu University Research Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. VI. August, 1988 no. 16-18 PP. 123-125. See also M. K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj* (Ahmedabad : 1939), PP. 51-52, Chs XVI on "Brute Force", D.G. Tendulkar, *Mahata* (Delhi : 1960, Reprint 1969), Volume I, PP. 106, 107; S.C. Gangal, *Gandhian Thought and Techniques in the Modern World* (New Delhi ; 1988), PP. 10-12; Lewis Mumford, *The Human Prospect* (Boston : 1955), p. 248.



### 1. Indio-Pakistan Conflict

The Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan is often treated as the real bone of contention. This however, is just an outward manifestation of India-Pakistan rivalry.<sup>3</sup> Since, it is known the Quaidey Azam of the Nation of Pakistan himself could not reconcile with the original demand for Pakistan at the initial stage, the real threat to South Asian peace—apart from China's search for leadership—comes from Pakistan's endless search for identity and her internal political instability.

Mahatma Gandhi perhaps foresaw not only this identity-complex inherent in the creation of Pakistan but also its escalation into various conflicts between India and Pakistan. May be for this reason, Gandhi could never really agree to give his heart to the partition of India.<sup>4</sup> With the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, yet another knot is knit into the web of conflict in the Indian subcontinent. The creation of Bangladesh has resulted in : first, a weaker and smaller Pakistan ; secondly, emergence of a new, smaller and weak independent State ; thirdly, India having five weak neighbouring States instead of four ; fourthly, duplication and extension of India-Pakistan conflicts in the form of another suspicious State nurtured in anti-Indian ethos ; fifthly, greater number of weaker States succumbing to more foreign pressures and interference in the South Asian region. India's

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- (3) United Kingdom, British Parliament's Minutes of evidence given before the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Session 1932-33), Vol. II, P. 1796 as highlighted in Sangant Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Delhi : 1970), pp. 3-4, in this context see also pp. 55, 56, 57-70, where it is shown that Choudhary Rahmat Ali a post graduate student of Emmanuel College, Cambridge University, put forward, apparently at the behest of Britishers, the original demand for Pakistan in 1930s and Mohammad Ali Jinnah described his plan as "a crazy scheme". As such, Jinnah considered himself "Indian first and every-thing else afterwards". To Choudhary Rahmat Ali, Pakistan meant Punjab, Afgania, (North-West Frontier Provice), Kashmir, Iran, Sind (inculding Kutch and Kathiawar), Turkistan, Afganistan and Baluchistan. See Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan* (Lahore ; 1963), P. 30.
- (4) D. G. Tendulkar, Op. cit. n. 2. see also volume VIII. pp. 11-12, 24-25, 279-280.



misplaced foreign policy priorities appear to be more responsible for this state of affairs in the region. India should have played a more creative and mature role in regional politics, especially, as a larger and more responsible of the South Asian policy.

It is in the light of the above mentioned bold and self-searching attitude that resolution of mutual conflicts and disputes among South Asian nations should be attempted. This cannot be done by merely entering into puerile functional cooperation and agreements without resolving mutual sense of misunderstanding and conflicts first. Exclusive spirit of cooperation can be generated only when mutual regional cooperation helps resolve conflict. International or regional cooperation neglecting conflicts is like a full before a more damaging storm.

We need here a systemic dynamism of the Gandhian philosophy which implies a positive relationship between conflict and cooperation. Accordingly, these two activities do not run in a parallel direction where the "twins shall never meet". Instead, it is their creative communion that results in an eternal search for ever new avenues of mutual attraction of cooperation. As such, the "twins" may meet and become one.

How, indeed, this Gandhian dynamic linkage between cooperation and conflict can be useful in real political terms with special reference to India-Pakistan conflicts and mutual regional tensions and suspicions? To answer this question, various dimensions of South Asian conflicts must be understood.

First, conflict between India and Pakistan are mainly the legacy of their colonial past and partition. The communal (religious) basis of the origin of Pakistan has created not only nation-to-nation but also people-to-people mutual mistrust and apprehensions. National and regional integration as well as development has suffered on this account in South Asia. Secondly, general Indian reluctance to accept partition on religious basis in 1947 is yet another cause of anti-Indian Pakistani psyche. Thirdly, emergence of the erstwhile east-Pakistan as an independent nation with active Indian military and moral support generates in Pakistan a strong sense of deprivation and loss of face in international community. Fourthly, the Pakistani identity-crisis and fear redoubles when she glooms over India's expanding size, power-potential and relative political stability in South Asia. Fifthly, these four factors together unfortunately further contribute to Pakistani



political instability when, time and again, restless dictators in Pakistan grope for almost an overnight political stability through their "barrel of the gun". Power, with smoke around it, then, flows from the barrel. The result is smog all over the political horizon.<sup>5</sup> One can only pray for a longer lasting spell of present day democracy in Pakistan under her first woman Prime Minister.

Sixthly, the Pakistan psyche is closely linked to four-fold dispute over Kashmir with India : (i) the Azad Kashmir claimed by India as Indian territory currently under Pakistani occupation since 1947 ; (ii) Siachin glacier claimed by Pakistan again in northern Kashmir ; (iii) Pakistan's agreement with China on 2 March 1963 to cede about 2050 sq. miles (from Indian point of view it is about 13,000 sq. miles) of territory to China running south and south-eastward from Khunjerab Pass to Karakoram Pass in Sinkiang area belonging to (India) Kashmir (central-northern) ; (iv) the general plebiscite issue in the entire Kashmir region to finally decide the fate of Kashmir in favour of India or Pakistan. Seventhly, Pakistan's claim that in the Ran of Kutch (Gujrat) about 3,500 sq. miles territory roughly running along 24th parallel is a disputed stretch (while for India, there is no such dispute—but for 73 sq. miles area—as this portion belongs to India as a well established historical fact since ages).<sup>6</sup> Eighthly, constant real or

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- (5) See for these five factors, K. Subramanyam, "Indias Relations with her neighbours". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XI, No. 12, March 1987, pp. 1357-1373 ; R. G. Sawhney, "Indo-Pak Relation, Volume IX, No. 1, April 1985, PP-1-10, Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh*, (London: 1975), PP. 9-14, Baljit Singh, *Indian Foreign Policy* (Bombay : 1975), PP. 62-72, Hugu Tinker *India and Pakistan : A political Analysis* (London : 1967), P. 69.
- (6) Government of India, *Indo-Pakistan Border Agreement* (New Delhi : 1960), PP. 9-12, 26-27, United Nations, *Security Council Official Records*, (New York:) July, August and September 1965, PP. 22-31 : A Appadoroi(ed), *Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy 1947-1972, Volume-I* (Delhi ; 1982), PP. 137-143, 171-164, 186-215, 329-333, 387-393, 425-429 ; United Nations, *Resolutions and Decision of the Security Council*, (New York : 1948), PP. 2-3



presumed military threat to Pakistan in view of two major defeats of the latter in 1965 and 1971 wars helps create a manipulative national defence policy or planning. Ninthly, Pakistan's presumed nuclear threat from India's peaceful nuclear programme and vice-versa is still another dimension of mutual tension and mistrust.<sup>7</sup> Tenthly, vast and voluminous military foreign aid to Pakistan is one

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- (7) "India maintains a broad based, energy oriented programme which envisions a three stage effort involving i) natural uranium fueled reactors, ii) a fast breeder reactor programme fueled with plutonium from the first phase and iii) a thorium-uranium fuel cycle utilizing India's large reserves of thorium sands. Except for the use of plutonium produced by a small research reactor to conduct its nuclear test in 1974, the Indian effort is not overtly geared to a weapons programme." while Pakistan has sizeable quantities of "Yellow-cake" to obtain a steady source of fissile material for producing atom bomb with the help of irrigating fuel rods. See Richard P. Cronin, "Prospects for nuclear proliferation in South-Asia", *Middle-East Journal*, Autumn, 1983, PP. 594-616; Pradyot Pradaha, "People's Republic of China : A Security threat to India," *Strategic Analysis*, January 1988, PP. 1202-1203; Abha-Dixit, "Sino-Pak Relations and their Implications for India", *Strategic Analysis*, December 1987, PP. 1075-1079; Ravi Shastri, "Pakistan Nuclear Programme and US policy," *Strategic Analysis*, January 1988, PP. 1211-1223; Brij Mohan Kaushik, "Nuclear Equation in South Asia", *Strategic Analysis*, October, 1985, PP. 669-674; United States, US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Analysis of Six issues About Unclear Capabilities of Iraq, Libiya and Pakistan*, prepared for the Sub-committee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environments by the Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 97 Congress, 1st Session, January 1982 (USGPO, Washington : 1982).



more aspect in India-Pakistan mutual rivalry.<sup>8</sup> Last but not least, Pakistan's

(8) U.S. Foreign Assistance to Pakistan-Data Millions)\*

	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86 (est)	FY87 (req)
Development Aid	—	—	—	50.0	24.0	25.0
(Loans)	—	—	—	(37.8)	(2.5)	(—)
(Grants)	—	—	—	(12.2)	(21.5)	(25.0)
Other economic aid	2.7	2.9	3.4	3.00	3.5	2.9
(Loans)	—	—	—	—	—	—
(Grants)	(2.7)	(2.9)	(3.4)	(3.0)	(3.5)	2.9
Food aid	97.1	75.8	79.0	59.0	50.0	50.0
(Loans)	(47.5)	(47.5)	(47.5)	(59.0)	(50.0)	(50.0)
Grants	(50.0)	(28.3)	(31.5)	(—)	(—)	(—)
ESF	100.0	200.0	225.0	200.0	293.3	250.0
(Loans)	(34.0)	(67.0)	(75.0)	(45.2)	(84.5)	(92.0)
(Grants)	(66.0)	(133.0)	(150.0)	(154.8)	(154.8)	158.0
Military aid	0.6	260.8	300.8	326.0	311.9	341.1
(Loans)	—	(260.0)	(300.8)	(325.0)	(311.0)	(340.0)
(Grants)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(1.4)
Total	200.8	539.5	608.2	638.0	628.6	669.3
(Loans)	(81.5)	(374.5)	(422.5)	(467.0)	(448.0)	(482.0)
(Grants)	(119.3)	(165.0)	(185.7)	(171.0)	(180.6)	(187.3)
Total U.S. aid FY 46-86	\$8,639.42 million (current*)					
	\$20,700.72 million (constant 1986*)					

Pakistan's rank among U.S. aid recipients :

FY85 — 4th (after Israel, Egypt).

FY86 — 4th (and Turkey)

Other aid donors	1982	1983	1984	1985
Intil Agencies	555.6	581.1	643.4	1,983.2
Western countries	363.6	249.3	n/a	n/a
OPEC countries	99.0	80.00	n/a	n/a
Communist countries	—	27.7	n/a	n/a

\*US Foreign Assistance and other aid donors data were taken from Agency for International Development and from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publication ; Reproduced from John Kaniyalil, "Junejo's visit to USA and Islamabad-Washington Ties".

*Strategic Analysis* December 1986, PP. 1054-1055.



clandestine support to terrorist activities in India is one of the most recent irritants in India-Pakistan relations.<sup>9</sup>

However, not only the very nature of India-Pakistan conflicts but also their endless perpetuation draw major thrust or direction from somewhat myopic vision of South Asian leaders, especially, the Indian and Pakistani leadership, towards understanding historical, political reality and real motivating forces behind mutual mistrust and misperception.

As such, it will be in india's security and development interest to observe following suggestions concerning India-Pakistan equation : (i) take bold non-violent, non-aggressive regional and bilateral steps restoring and securing political stability among neighbouring countries without interfering with their political sovereignty, integrity and independence ; (ii) rationally accept and recognise socio-political realities inherent in mutual and bilateral South Asian rivalries conflicts, suspicion and their geo-strategic dimensions ; (iii) launch a regional and bilateral cultural movement for South Asian socio-religious integration beginning from the grass-root levels; (iv) enter into larger regional and bilateral measures of economic cooperation for solving basic problems of poverty, hunger, shelter, malnutrition and unemployment etc. ; (v) begin a regional and bilateral political movement for drastically cutting down expenditure on armaments production and import/export with the ultimate aim of doing away with armaments and armies ; (vi) develop national, bilateral and regional predominantly peace oriented and non-violent police force to deal with social exceptions to general societal cohesion; (vii) develop and launch just one regional nuclear peace oriented research programme (if nuclear centre for research and peaceful uses of nuclear energy is needed at all) instead of national programmes for peaceful or other uses of nuclear energy ; (viii) introduce unrestricted regional and bilateral exchange of people, personalities and ideas etc. through mutual opening up at the levels of masses and experts alike;

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(9) Ibid. PP.1048-1049 ; also reported by numerous Indian Newspapers, Magazines and regular Doordarshan News Bulletins from time to time. Of course all such reporting can be biased against Pakistan. However, more interesting is Indian government's alleged claim to have ample proof to prove her claim.



(ix) try for a synthesis between regional, bilateral and national interests, especially, in view of perceptible Western neo-colonial threat to South Asian security, independence, self-sufficiency and socio-political as well as cultural integration.<sup>10</sup>

From a long term perspective, the aforesaid measures must be brought forward within the larger framework of the Gandhian philosophy of Sarvodaya and Satyagraha.<sup>11</sup>

## 2. India and China and South Asian States : Nature and Variety of Conflicts.

There are quite a number of different though manifest or latent, as it were, zones of conflict among South Asian States, namely (i) predominantly bilateral

- (10) Gandhi of course could not have spoken about conflicts among South Asian nations in the present-day context. Moreover, one does not really need a Gandhi to explicate upon these nine points. Yet, this is none other than a logical extension of the Gandhian way to resolution of conflicts. See Jawaharlal Nehru's script addressed to John V. Bendurant's "Gandhian Stayagrah and Political Theory : An Interpretation" reproduced in Joan V. Bendurant, *Conquest of Violence : The Gandhian philosophy of Conflicts* : (Bombay : 1959), pp. IX-X, 196-197 (It is essential here for all parties involved in a conflict that they *all* should "suffer" and "sacrifice". As such, they should be ready to sacrifice though they must never yield. *The Gandhian stress naturally is on "how to give what, when and how" and not on "how to get what, when and how"*. Such an act of giving must never be imposed from without. Instead it should be a voluntary act. See M.K. Gandhi's speech at a public meeting in Rangoon in 1929 as reported by *Amrii Bazar Partika*, 10 March 1929, M. K. Gandhi *Hind Swaraj*, (Ahmedabad : 1939), Chs. XIII-XX; Pyarelal, "Gandhian Analysis of the causes of International Tension and War", K. P. Misra and S. C. Gangal (eds), *Gandhi and the Contemporary world : Studies in Peace and War* (Delhi : 1981) PP. 103-110.
- (11) For Gandhi's philosophy of *Satyagraha* and *Sarvodaya*, see Gopinath Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* : (Ahmedabad : 1957), chs. VII-X; M. K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha (1910-1935)* (Allahabad : 1935), also by M. K. Gandhi *Satyagraha in South Africa* (Ahmedabad : 1950); and *Sarvodaya—its Principles and Programme* (Ahmedabad-1954).



conflicts, (ii) extra-regional immediate factors in conflict escalation, (iii) regional ethos of conflicts. Accordingly under the first zone of conflict fall India-China, India-Bangladesh, India-Nepal, India-Sri Lanka, India-Bhutan and India-Maldives relations. Then, there are extra regional involvements effecting South Asian realm more directly than other international political equations. Here, the cases in point are the China-Pakistan and the Afgan-Pakistan and USSR factors disturbing the South Asian geo-political and strategic balance, status-quo and peace including a few bilateral matters between India and China. Last but not least is the emergence of a peculiar regional momentum of conflict forging ahead a somewhat concerted anti-India stance in the form of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

#### **(i) Predominantly Bilateral Conflicts**

These are such conflicts which do not independently affect any other South Asian country directly but for only those two nations who are clear cut parties to a mutually conflicting claim or proposition. It certainly does not mean that bilateral conflicts may have few regional dimension. Instead, conflicts of this type often, tend to pollute regional climate. Bilateral conflicts are, thus, likely to develop wide ranging implications of very serious nature, especially, when one stronger extra-regional neighbouring power like China ambitiously counters the internationally acclaimed non-aligned leadership of a peace loving regional power like India who is also susceptible to subversive machinations of complex ridden weak regional neighbours playing into the hands of super powers and big powers. As such a regional boycott of China and the super powers is a must for South Asia peace and development. For this purpose, India must befriend all her regional neighbours with all her sincerity and care as well as a few bold and dedicated initiatives in this direction.

#### **(a) India-China Conflict**

China's over ambitious and ambivalent foreign policy clearly appears to be the real motive behind India-China rivalry. The Sino-Indian border dispute is again merely an outward manifestation of China's search for her regional and world leadership. For China, India's peaceful policy of non-alignment



presents an unparalleled challenge to Chinese global ambitions.<sup>12</sup> In this context, even Sino-Indian border disputes are likely to remain unresolved as long as India refuses to accept China as the protector and real mentor of the so-called third world and non-aligned nations. The South Asian nations have already yielded a lot to China's egotist attitudes.<sup>13</sup> Why should they yield more? They should instead, come together to dissuade China, US and USSR from exploiting their weaknesses and thus, pressurising them.

#### (b) India-Bangladesh Conflict

Lack of sincere political will, identity crises and ego-complexes of the political leadership of Bangladesh and India alongwith their shared though mutually incompatible colonial past and partition are a few root causes for rivalry between India and Bangladesh. However, the outward manifestation of India-Bangladesh conflicts can be seen in the influx of Bangladeshi tribals in India, Ganga water disputes and the Moor Island controversy.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, India and Bangladesh conflicts are also underlined with the former East-Pakistani anti-India up-bringing of the present-day Bangladeshi youth and leadership. All these factors combined with internal political instability of Bangladesh have forced Bangladesh to put aside and forget India's timely

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- (12) Z. A. Bhutto, *The Third World : New Directions* (London : 1977), P. 19 where China's support to Bhutto can be taken for granted in order to create a wedge between NAM or Third World Nations so that the two may not be treated as almost synonymous to one another. Moreover, it is a known phenomenon in international politics that China wants to be the leader of the "Third World" or "Third Froce". See also Sujit Dutta, "Sino-Indian Relations : Some issues", *Strategic Analysis*, February 1988, PP. 1260-1264.
- (13) For Z. A. Bhutto's letter (in this context) as Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources to President Ayub Khan written on 11 November 1959, see *Dawn* (Karachi), 31 October 1976.
- (14) *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 02 and 03 October 1988 for India-Bangladesh conflict on bilateralism versus multilateralism and the establishment of Indo-Bangladesh task-force to control floods. See also *Hindustan Times*, 30 September 1988; Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Records* (New



help and quite positive a role in the creation and independence of Bangladesh. Under the circumstances, greater devotion, dedication, and required on the generosity to the cause of South Asian peace, stability and development is part of India in general and with special reference to her relations with Bangladesh and Pakistan in particular.

### (c) India-Nepal Conflict

Nepal is peculiarly placed between two of her powerful neighbours, namely China on the North and India in the South. Such a sandwiched Nepal is

Delhi), volume XXII, No. 4, April 1976, P. 7; *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), 06 November 1979; *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 13 October 1977; *Times of India*, (New Delhi), 10 May 1976; *The Hindu* (Madras), 19 March 1979; Government of India, *Lok Sabha Debates* (New Delhi), Volume-XII, No. 29, 03 April, 1980, columns 254-257; S. S. Bindra, *India and Her Neighbours : A Study of Political, Economic and Cultural Relations and Interactions* (New Delhi : 1984), PP. 159-175.

However, to highlight a few major conflicts between India and Bangladesh, S. S. Bindra's explanation may suffice which is broadly speaking, as follows . i) Anti-India propaganda even during Mujib's "reign" despite his own aversion to it, ii) about 80% illiterate population of Bangladesh succumbing more easily to anti-India propaganda, especially among other things concerning construction of 7,229 feet long Farraka barrage with 108 spans by India, iii) Diversion of 40,000 cusecs of water from Ganga into Bhagirathi-Hoogly river during dry season resulting in shortage of irrigation water in Bangladesh, iv) Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) unprovoked firing on Indian Border Security Forces Director General and Jawans, v) BDR's attempt to scare away Indian cultivators from Indian border areas, vi) Bangladesh illegal tribal infiltration into Assam and Tripura to the tune of several thousands in number, vii) The New Moor island controversy about jurisdiction either of India or Bangladesh (This island is about 5.2 kms from nearest Indian main land coast and about 7.5 kms from Bangladesh's nearest coast. As such, New Moor is situated in the Bay of Bengal.



actually a buffer zone between two known rivals. Moreover, Nepal is also a landlocked country. Nepal's access to international trade routes through China and India is necessary. Accordingly, Nepal is having generally friendly relations both, with India and China by taking recourse to a foreign policy of neutrality.

Yet, for the present, four major irritants are there between India and Nepal who otherwise are "the best of friends".<sup>15</sup> First Kathmandu's latest decision to ask Teriwalas or originally Indian inhabitants of Nepal's Terai region to seek work permits like other foreigners in the country (this decision violates India-Nepal treaty of 1950); secondly, the border dispute involving about 3,200 acres of land in the Narasahi-Susta area on Nepal-Bihar border (or the Susta disputes); thirdly, Nepal's advocacy of declaring South Asia a nuclear weapons free zone of peace<sup>16</sup>; and lastly, the latest Nepal's decision to buy arms and anti-aircraft weaponry from China; as well as the non renewal of India Nepal treaty of trade and transit.

Here, from a regional development perspective, India must allay all fears of Nepal which the latter may have from the former (larger) country. Otherwise, Nepal may fall prey to Chinese ambitions, media propaganda and double standards in international politics. Hence, with a view to improve South Asian political climate and enhance greater bilateral and regional cooperation for purposeful development. India must keep in mind the following suggestions while resolving her conflicts with Nepal in particular : first, Nepal is a landlocked country; secondly, her geo-political location is precarious even otherwise; thirdly Nepal's monarchy is more sensitive to Indian democratic set up than to the Chinese brand of socialism, communism and modernisation; fourthly, Nepal is a much smaller country and, last but not least, a self-sufficient strong Nepal can be an asset to larger Indian security vis-a-vis China.

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(15) *Hindustan Times*, 30 September, 1988; Leo E. Rose, *Nepal : A Strategy for Survival* (Bombay : 1971), PP. 257-262; *Peking Review*, 11 July 1969, P. 29; Harvir Sharma, "Power Politics in the Himalyas", *Strategic Analysis*, July 1986, PP. 494.

(16) While all non-aligned nations are already party to the United Nations (UN)



#### (d) India-Sri Lanka Conflict

Apart from the Sri Lanka-Pakistan-Israel military and intelligence (Mossad) exchanges and cooperation, the ethnic conflict has always burdened the Sri Lankan national politics. These two aspects have bothered India also. The Sri Lankan ethnic crisis is, however, of greater concern to India for it relates to Sri Lankan Tamils (of Indian origin) fight for their rightful survival against institutionalised discrimination by Sinhala majority people and the government alike. In retaliation, several militant Tamil revolutionary groups like Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) etc. came up.

To deal with the Tamil demand for more autonomy, citizenship rights in Sri Lanka, Tamil terrorist violence in the Jaffna peninsula, former president Jayewardena entered into an agreement with the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi in June 1987.<sup>17</sup> The "state terrorism" of Lankan government, could, thus be replaced by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) against the Tamil terrorist or militant groups.

No doubt, such an agreement calls for a great deal of sacrifice from Indian soldiers. Yet, it is a case of adopting wrong means for a good cause. Indeed,

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General Assembly resolution (of 16 December 1971) declaring the Indian Ocean "for all time as a zone of peace". The Lusaka Conference of the nonaligned earlier adopted a declaration in September 1970, "calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great power rivalries and competition as well as bases.....either army, navy or airforce bases, are excluded. *The Area Should be free of nuclear Weapons*", See B. Vivekanandan, "The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace : Problems and Prospects", *Asian Survey*, December 1981, PP. 1137-1138, emphasis added : As a logical corollary of these declarations, South Asia and the Indian Ocean are not only to be construed as constituting a peace zone but also nuclear weapons free peace zone. *Hence for India, any further declaration in this regard will be more or less unnecessary repetition.*

- (17) See various Indian Newspapers from 1 October 1988 to 27 October 1988 concerning latest Jaywardene Government's conferring of citizenship on



India should have known that age old problems of mutual ethnic discrimination and exploitation in Sri Lanka were not likely to be solved by the magic wand of an overnight military alternative and excursion.

The questions of autonomy and citizenship to a large number of Sri Lanka Tamils of Indian origin in the Jaffna peninsula, and the Tamil's demand to end all Sinhla domination over Tamils carry at least one and a half century old history behind them (apart from the mythological origins of Sinhalese and Dravidians or Tamils from 700 to 150 B. C. alike).<sup>18</sup> However, the British colonial South Asian history lays the modern genesis of this ethnic confrontation in Sri Lanka with the beginning of migration of persons of Indian origin to Cylone in 1830s to work as plantation workers. Most of these plantation workers were Indian Tamils.

Indeed, the latest IPKF venture in Sri Lanka has put the Indian sincerity of motives and intensions at stake. Neither Tamils in general nor Sinhalese in particular have shown to welcome Jayewardene-Rajiv accord or IPKF operations. By all means, this accord is a bold initiative on India's part although a misguided one. Any such Indian military venture—national, regional or international—is likely to damage Indian image as well as Indian credentials of a peace loving nation. Moreover, such military involvement goes against the philosophy of nonalignment. Above all, Indian military experiments or involvements in 1962, 1965, 1971, 1987 and 1988 (in Maldives) have proved to be economically unsound propositions for larger national economic self-sufficiency. Instead of extravagant military exercises, India should try her best to allay Sri Lankan

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- almost all stateless Tamilians of Indian origin in Sri Lanka to the tune of about 360,000 inhabitants (largely due to ensuing presidential elections of 1988) in Srilanka. See *Hindustan Times*, 21 October 1988 to 27 October 1988.
- (18) Lalit Kumar, *India and Srilanka : Srimavo-Shastri Pact* (New Delhi : 1977), PP. 11-46; Gannath Obeysekera, "The Vicissitudes of the Sinhali-Buddhist Identity through Time and Change", Micheal Roberts, (ed), *Collective Identities, Nationalisms and Protest in Modern Srilanka* (Colombo : 1979), PP. 279-313 puts forward the Sinhalese case while, in this Michael Robert's edited work itself, S. Arasaratnam, "Nationalism in Sri Lanka and the Tamils" presents the case of Tamils in Srilanka, PP. 500-522.



fears concerning India by analysing the motives behind Sri Lankan sense of insecurity clearly related to their close military relations with China, Pakistan, Britain, United States and Israel.<sup>19</sup>

#### (e) India-Bhutan Conflict

Bhutan, like Nepal, is just another landlocked country very strategically located between India and China. On the eastern side of Nepal, it is generally considered a protectorate of India. On the other hand, "The history of Bhutan from 1616 shows that the Bhutanese (despite remaining a British protectorate) were always masters of their own affairs and that no foreign power ever exercised any control over them. Bhutan conducted its foreign relations independently of Tibet and China and Britain. Bhutan always remained neutral in the wars of ... (her) neighbours."<sup>20</sup>

Despite India-Bhutan treaty of 1949, Bhutan has not only shown but also asserted her independence in international politics and foreign relations largely due to her liberal interpretation of the 1949 India-Bhutan treaty and India's prudent attitude to such explanations.<sup>21</sup>

The India-Bhutan treaty of 1949 allayed initial Bhutanese doubts about India's intentions, for India not only agreed to pay Bhutan a subsidy of five lakh rupees per year but also returned 32 sq. miles of territory, namely Dewangirir.<sup>22</sup>

An independent and sovereign Bhutan, thus, became a member of the United

(19) K. Vikram Sinha Rao, "Militarisation of Srilanka : A Tabular Study", *Strategic Analysis*, March, 1987, PP. 1456-1460.

(20) Ram Rahul, *Modern Bhutan* (New Delhi : 1971), P. 49.

(21) It is apparent from : Bhutan's neutral stand on Sino-Indian border dispute, her support to Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea at various international fora, and Bhutan's Foreign Minister's statement, ".....the advice given to Bhutan by India in foreign policy matters is entirely optional and it is upto Bhutan to follow it or not." See Manorma Kohli, "Bhutan's Changing Strategic Perceptions," *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), Volume XVII, No. 2, April-June 1986, PP. 147-151.

(22) See Ram Rahul, op. cit. n. 20, P. 157.



Nations in 1971 and joined NAM in 1973. Alongwith India's economic development aid and trade relations with Bhutan, Bhutan is having an independent multifaceted trade and diplomatic relations and aid links with world bank, EEC, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands, Bangladesh, Singapore, Hong Kong, United States and China etc.

Moreover, since 1984 Bhutan-China border talks, the border issue between them is no more to be dealt with within the larger Sino-Indian border negotiations.<sup>23</sup>

Despite Chinese provocations to the contrary, Bhutan is having closest friendly relations with India. The Indian President Ramaswamy Venketraman and the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi have just visited Bhutan in October 1988 in connection with the launching of the Chukha Hydel project in Bhutan. This underground Chukha project is one of the largest ones in the world.

Yet, may be due to Sikkim's fate Bhutan is equally suspicious of India and China. Like Nepal, Bhutan also balances her two powerful immediate neighbours through neutrality.

#### (f) India-Maldives: relative isolation and cooperation

Maldives generally follows a policy of non-participation in international politics. It is also a non-aligned country. Internal politics of the nation before Maumoon Abdul Gayoom was mainly dominated by the periodic survival of one coup de tat after another. Yet this archipelago and its people are in a habit of living mostly a peaceful life. However, M. A. Gayoom, despite having 95 per cent votes of the 1,00,000 populace of the island in September 1988, has survived three coup attempts. He has now secured a third term for himself in the Maldivian Parliament. As such, Maldives is a Republic under the leadership of its president Gayoom. Maldives is not as much a known country of South Asia region as other like India and Pakistan are, internationally speaking. Nevertheless, Maldives is a member of the United Nations, Asian Development Bank, World Health Organisation (WHO) and the NAM. India, for quite sometime now, replaced Sri Lanka as a major support for the islands economy.

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(23) Op. cit. n. 21, PP. 151-152.



Of late, India, following good neighbourly policy and showing sincere concern for South Asian peace, had to respond to a SOS call from the Maldivian President M. A. Gayoom on 3 and 4 November 1988 when about 400 mercenaries suspected to be the LTTE men running away from IPKF in Sri Lanka to find out a hideout and regular supply link—attacked to overthrow lawfully elected government. India then responded to Maldivian SOS and sent about 700 paratroopers who very promptly saved Maldives from going into some unknown foreign hands.<sup>24</sup>

Lately, India has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Maldives in October 1988 to construct a 200 bed hospital and to train Maldivian doctors initially; India is also extending cooperation in archaeological repair or construction work.<sup>25</sup>

Despite a cooperation oriented relationship with India, Maldives is relatively a lesser known country for Indian and South Asian public. Greater interest and research in this context is needed. India-Maldives relations, moreover, provide an excellent opportunity to firmly establish and further expand their primarily cooperation dominated inter-action.

Maldives also shares with all other South Asian countries the historical facts and traditions of religion, culture and prolonged colonial exploitation under British

- (24) *Hindustan Times*, 12 October 1988, 24 October 1988, 4 November 1988, and 5 November 1988; Philip M. Allen, "Republic of Maldives," *World Encyclopaedia of Political System*, Volume-II (New York : 1983), PP. 1245-1246, S. C. Ganga, *Indian Foreign Policy : A Documentary Study of India's Foreign Policy since The Installations of the Janata Government on 24 March 1977* (New Delhi : 1980), PP. 278-279, 456; Government of India, *Lok Sabha Debates*, (New Delhi), Sixth Series, Volume-IV, No. 29, 14 July 1977, columns 133-134; Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Records* (New Delhi), December 1978, PP. 362-363.
- (25) *Hindustan Times*, 12 October 1988 : India in this context, has agreed to construct a 200 bed hospital in Maldives alongwith managing it and training its medical and administrative personnel initially. See also *Hindustan Times*, 24 October 1988.



colonialism. Maldives' islands, spread over 500 sq. miles in the central Indian Ocean, got independence from British control on 26 July 1965. It became a British protectorate in 1870 and was controlled only indirectly through Sri Lanka. Every atoll among 200 inhabited islands of Maldives has a mixed population of Sinhalese, Dravidians, Arabs, Africans, Buddhist and Sunni Islamic majority plus Bohra Islamic minority unified through Divehi (Sinhalese) language. National Parliamentary politics is dominated by Islamic Shariah or law. Clearly, the Indian cultural influence—as in every other South Asian Nation—is markedly perceptible even in Maldives.

(ii) **Immediate extra-regional factors in conflict escalation in South Asia : China-Pakistan and Afghanistan-Pakistan-US-USSR equations.**

Pakistan's identity crisis and threat perception subserves the Chinese and American (US) interests in South Asia more willingly than any other nation. China and US both, knowing the Pakistani psyche, 'aid' and 'assist' the nation accordingly in the light of their global and regional interests. However, as a logical corollary of China-Pakistan-US axis, this aid and assistance ultimately turns out to be more in terms of arming and expanding Pakistani military (army, navy, air force) and nuclear weapons programme than meaningful national development and self-sufficiency. Upto 1977-78, Pakistan diverted most of her national resources and foreign aid "package" to develop and modernise her armed forces mainly on the pretext of an Indian threat to her security and territorial integrity. However, after Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the foreign military presence and "communism" in Kabul provides another impetus to Pakistan's search for armaments by the erstwhile Zia regime. Such diversion of national and international resources to procuring and production of armaments can be regarded as an important factor behind continued political and economic instability of the Pakistani national mainstream. Clearly, Pakistani leadership has misguided priorities and preferences. As such, the Pakistani mind is being diverted from real national and regional problems of poverty and political instability, especially, through media indoctrination and political predilections. Pakistan, despite all her limitations, is playing into the US hands and getting herself involved in training and extending clandestine armed support to Mujahideen guerrillas against Soviet backed Najibullah's government inspite of the Geneva Accord between Pakistan and Afghanistan through UN Secretary General, Perez De Cuellar's mediation with US and USSR



as guarantors. This Geneva accord, as we know, was signed on 14 April 1988. However, Soviet Union has now suspended the troops pullout operation from Afghanistan midway as "violations of the Geneva Accord.....have taken place" apparently on the part of Pakistan.<sup>26</sup> With first phase of the withdrawal of Soviet troops (100,000) from Afghanistan completed by 15th May 1988, the second phase was to end by 15 February 1988 resulting in total withdrawal of Russian troops.<sup>27</sup> The latest Pakistani violations of the Geneva Accord have, indeed, prolonged the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan which, certainly, is not in larger South Asian regional interest. However, Pakistan may still get and accept a few more packages of either "peanuts", or "dryfruits" from the United States as a result of 'continued danger' to Pak economy and security from pertinacious Soviet presence or interests in Afghanistan.

China and United States, both are taking Pakistani fear psychosis for a ride. China has gained the most from Sino-Pakistani, as it were, marriage. Apart from the 1963 Border Agreement between them, China gained sympathy of the larger Islamic world, greater access into South Asia and, probably, the Sino-American reproachment also. On the other hand, the Americans have also gained their greater access to South-West Asia, South-Asia, Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean from their Pakistani clientele. What Pakistan has mainly got from China and US is greater dependence upon foreign powers.

On India's part, Pakistan may further be extended a warmer hand of friendship with sincere depth on an even vaster scale so as to put aside all Pakistani fears and misperceptions.

### iii) Anti-India regional cooperation<sup>28</sup>

The peculiarly pervasive Indian historical, cultural, linguistic, religious and

(26) *Hindustan Times*, 29 September 1988.

(27) Ibid.

(28) M.D. Dharamdasani (ed), *Politics in Contemporary South India*, (Varanasi : 1988) ; V.D. Chopra (ed.) *South Asia Pacific Region : Emerging Trends* (New Delhi : 1988) ; Srikant Paranjape - *US Non-proliferation policy Action : South Asia* (New Delhi : 1987), Dharamdasani, *Dynamics of Foreign Aid in South Asia* (Varansi : 1988) ; M. Mohmood, *Regional Integration in South*



ethnic intrusiveness all over the South Asian region and India's size, relatively superior resources, manpower and richer political and natural resource potential have created a great sense of deprivation, smallness and constant danger among countries of the Indian subcontinent. These deprivations and awareness about them is further aggravated by the vested foreign interests in the region. Moreover, India is yet to take—despite the latest Sri Lankan and Maldivian military experiments by India—any sincerely creative effort in the direction of establishing a non-exploitative, non-violent, non-expansionist image of a trustworthy friend among her South Asian neighbours. Indian military help alone is likely to become an additional source of perceived prospective threat from India to other South Asian nations, especially, under the present day complex of conflicts and mutual suspicions in South Asia.

These aforesaid regional factors and forces have, in a way, culminated into institutionalisation of the functional spirit of regional cooperation in the form of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) at Kathmandu in November 1987 and at Islamabad in December 1988. Such institutionalisation and superficial cultural and economic regional cooperation signifies mainly a common urge to show united anti-India stance in a regional international forum where India may be forced to keep a low profile due to isolation.

However, the very basis of SAARC is lost the moment it becomes a cluster of nations against another nation. The Kathmandu Summit has made this anti-India stance even clearer.<sup>29</sup> Such regional cooperation can seldom prosper.

The Kathmandu Summit in particular and earlier SAARC Summits in general, all bear the burden of going against the letter or spirit of the Article 2 of the SAARC Charter in as much as bilateralism versus multilateralism issue has often disturbed the SAARC deliberations.<sup>30</sup> But for India, other countries—especially,

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*Asia : Perspective and Prospects* (New Delhi : 1987) ; Rohitaswar Dubey, "Indophobia as the Ailment of SAARC, *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Volume XLIX, No. 1, January - March 1988. pp. 71-82.

(29) Malini Parthasarthy, "SAARC" Enter Bilateralism," *Frontline* (Madras), Volume 4, No. 23, 14-27, November 1987, pp. 106-111.

(30) Ibid.



Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal—want multilateral settlements and levels of cooperation to entreat South Asian cooperation in the region.

Moreover, India has suggested regional cooperation in trade, industry and finance. Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal have supported this proposal. They alongwith Pakistan are, however, in favour of external financing of regional cooperation efforts. India is against such foreign financial influence in the region. The Kathmandu Summit, nevertheless, agreed to establish a South Asian Food Reserve alongwith a Convention on Terrorism although India had shown initial reluctance to sign the convention on Terrorism.

Pakistan harps upon a different note altogether at the regional Summit. For Pakistan, the American policy perspective must be included in the SAARC activities by (i) establishing contacts with the ASEAN nations and (ii) having a regional nuclear test ban and non-proliferation treaty in South Asia.<sup>31</sup> These Pakistani assertions, however, remain unheeded as yet.

The prevailing South Asian atmosphere is not at all conducive to a more meaningful experiment in regional cooperation other than the SAARC. The SAARC venture is also too limited in scope. Any such regional exercise with more depth and wider breadth of cooperation needs better understanding through deeper sense of mutual faith, friendship and accomodation devoid of foreign interference of any sort.

For the present, the fundamental bilateral manifestations often prove to be major hurdle in larger regional cooperation. The Kashmir issue, fears for India's dominance and bilateralism versus multilateralism have all blurred the hopes of functional as well as creative regional cooperation in South Asia. Above all, mere functional nature of the SAARC has further delimited the scope of creative cooperation for development and resolution of conflicts.<sup>32</sup>

The basis of all these conflicts, however, lies in the South Asian history of domination and colonialism and various colonialist socio-political, cultural and reli-

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(31) Ibid.

(32) *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 10 December 1985 ; *Hindustan Times* 11 December 1985 ; *Times of India* (New Delhi) 15 February 1985.



gious exploits. This history, is then suffixed by shortsightedness of national political leaders in the region, especially, their attitudes concerning foreign aid, assistance and mutual conflicts. As such, the larger regional political instability is bringing in its wake vaster destruction, under-development and poverty, for example, among other things, through the Sikh, military, Kashmir Liberation Front, Tripura National Volunteers, Tamil, Sindhi and Baluchi terrorism and violence spread all over the South Asia. Other sectors of life in South Asia also suffer on account of misplaced priorities and pervasive misperceptions of development, security, conflict and cooperation.

This situation, apparently, cannot improve until the South Asian approach to regional peace and cooperation in general and Indian attitude in particular turns a new leaf with a proper flip in the right direction. The current SAARC effort at regional cooperation is ignoring real and serious conflicts in South Asia. The grass-root people-to-people understanding is necessary for improving the regional political climate. This is clearly missing. The SAARC, in a way, has come into existence with little ground-work or properly laid foundation at grass-root levels. Indeed, the SAARC may succeed only when bilateral nation-to-nation and people-to-people-regional framework of cooperation is cemented first.<sup>33</sup>

#### **Ratiocinating the Gandhian Perception of Conflict and Resolution of Conflict in South Asia : A Programme for Peace, Development and Civilised man : <sup>34</sup>**

The foregoing analysis of conflicts in South Asia offers us an opportunity to formulate an exclusive and concise Gandhian framework of resolution of conflicts in the region. This can be possible by focussing on three broad categories, namely :

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- (33) See (especially in the context of "one step is enough," as it were, doctrine of Mahatma Gandhi) Raghvan Iyer (ed.), *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi : Civilization, Politics and Religion*, Volume I (New York) : 1986) PP. 21-23.
- (34) "*Hind Swaraj*", Raghvan Iyer, Ibid, PP. 199-287; *Harijan* (Ahmedabad), 19 May 1946; M. K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, op. cit. n. 11, P. 172. Krishan Lal Shridharani, *War without Violence* (New York : 1939), PP. 5-42; M. K. Gandhi, *Non-Violence in Peace and War*; volume II, (Ahme-



- The Fundamental Gandhian notion of conflict,
- The short term measures in the Gandhian way to resolution of conflicts, and
- The long term Gandhian framework for resolution of conflicts.

### 1 The Fundamental Gandhian Notion of Conflict

i) Despite there being enough repulsions, wars, struggles, contradictions, opposition and conflicts in South Asia, conflict is neither a ceaseless process or a pervasive phenomenon of subcontinental (or international) politics because Nature lives by attraction in as much as every conflict is just another opportunity for its “creative resolution”, cooperation, development and peace.

ii) Each conflict stands in an interesting relationship with peace and development.

iii) This “interesting relationship” rests in the “creative resolution” of conflicts for more sincere efforts towards cooperation, peace and development.

iv) Neither conflict, cooperation nor peace and development exist in isolation to one another. They are closely interlinked. The moment perception of this link is denied, the very logic of human existence and purposeful survival is negated or challenged.

v) The Darwinian notion regards conflict as the sole cause of Evolution. This notion persists even today. For Gandhi, it is not true. The reality for Gandhi lies in the ‘creative linkage’ between conflict and cooperation. This denotes the dynamics of creativity in human mind and action.<sup>35</sup>

vi) The above mentioned five points inheret a self-regulated and creative system of assured cooperation for peace and development.

### 2. Short Term or Immediate Measure in the Gandhian way to Resolution of Conflicts

i) Until a creative regional (and global) perspective on conflict develops fully, a few other options may be pursued at national, regional (and international) levels:

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dabad : 1949), Ch. IV, P. 187; M. K. Gandhi *For Pacifists* (Ahmedabad : 1949), P. 64; M. K. Gandhi, *Socialism of My Conception* (Bombay : 19)57, P. 71; H. J. N. Horsburg, *Nonviolence and Aggression : Study of Gandhi's Moral Equivalent to War* (London : 1968) 175-176.

(35) Anurag Gangal, op, cit. n. 2, PP. 113-126.



a) current and prospective escalation of conflict must be foreseen and prevented;  
 b) fuller realisation of regional self-sufficiency through genuine mutual equality, understanding and closer and direct contact in cultural, social, political, economic agricultural, technical and educational fields :

c) developing a new regional political culture with people-to-people contact through South Asian Regional Education Plan emphasising upon oneness of humanity and unity of purpose;

d) free intra-regional rights to people for going freely from one nation to another;

e) bold, nonviolent, creative, peaceful, bilateral and contextual resolution of border disputes;

f) cooperation for resolution of basic problems of starvation, illiteracy and unemployment etc.;

g) no outside aid or assistance with political and exploitative strings should be opted for.

ii) Effective dissemination through media and living examples of the Gandhian non-violence of the brave in order to project a Gandhian way of life among individuals and nations alike in South Asia.

iii) India must take initiative in the direction of Gandhian programme for regional cooperation, peace and development because first the entire South Asia is generally identified as the Indian sub-continent due to obvious geo-historical Indian-intrusiveness; secondly India, is a larger nation in the region; and thirdly, greater responsibility for peace and development rests upon stronger and more powerful shoulders of India.

iv) The real motivational and historical causes of a conflict must be understood in order to deal with the very essence of conflict in South Asia.

v) Resolution of serious conflicts among South Asian nations must be taken up first so as to begin really meaningful and persistent pattern of cooperation instead of the present-day functional precept and practice of regional and international cooperation. It is under the functional model of cooperation that a



conflict is seldom over powered by its resolution. Instead, it is simply mellowed for a little while in view of the expediency of the 'politics' of cooperation (A glaring example of this functional limitation in international politics is clearly available in the continuing cold war and detente between super-powers. As such, the twins (cold war and detente) may run parallel to one another but they shall never meet in any meaningful terms) ;

vi) Bold, non-violent, non-aggressive, mutually equal, bilateral and regional cooperation for political stability in South Asia. Such cooperation must not interfere with national sovereignty, independence and integrity.

vii) Realisation of regional social-political realities inherent in the geo-strategic dimensions of present-day border disputes. It can be realised by giving to others what they have already integrated into the mainstream of their national sovereignty.

viii) Grass-root movements for socio-religious unity.

ix) Regional social and political movement for widespread and indepth awakening of drastically cut expenditure on armament's production, procurement and export. This should be combined with simultaneous proportional diversification of armament's expenditure to other and more meaningful areas of cooperation, peace and development. The ultimate aim, here, should be total or near-complete disarmament.

x) A predominantly non-violent police force at national, and regional levels.

xi) Greatest possible national and regional decentralization in political, economic and administrative fields.

xii) If at all required, developing common regional avenues for peaceful uses of nuclear energy with due care to environment, protection and continued peaceful and more healthy survival of human life in South Asia.

xiii) Technological development limited to one machine helping one man reduce his burden of over-work and improve his efficiency without being displaced from employment.

xiv) Regional education movement for stressing value oriented philosophical and spiritual foundations and ways of human life instead of the modern acquisi-



tive and ruthlessly competitive attitudes.

xv) Greater and more sincere attempts at national and regional levels to realise one's own civilisation roots and cultural ethos. In this regard, a regional synthesis may also be attempted by free exchange of researchers in social sciences and philosophy of science.

xvi) Wider exchange of information and ideas through, as far as possible, direct people-to-people contact. People directly should become the source and object of information. In this way, a new and more creative role for newspapers and media may emerge. Personal, man-to-man 'leisurely' channels of information may be encouraged so that modern media may not waste their time in the satisfaction of superficial news hunger.

### 3 The Long Term Gandhian Framework for Resolution of Conflict in South Asia :

i) Bringing alive hitherto untouched or sidetracked philosophy in regional and (international) politics, namely, philosophy of Satyagraha for Sarvodaya. In this context, the basic aspects of this philosophy are : <sup>36</sup>

a) Man does not live by repulsions, conflicts and destruction alone. Mutual love, regard and cooperation among individuals composing nations provides real cohesive force to human existence and regional, national or international politics.

As such, there prevails a fundamental unity of the universe despite several puerile differences of variety and details.

Clearly, conflicts are neither irreparable nor inevitable.

Gandhi does not deny the existence of conflicts.

A constructive and creative outlook towards conflict must be developed.

Each conflict is an opportunity for more interaction and cooperation in the form of a challenge to resolve it.

The dynamics of peaceful change for a better, happier and more cooperative life are inherent in every conflict. These are simply needed to be grasped and

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(36) op. cit. n. 11 and 34.



understood.

Prevailing norms of violence in South Asia (and the world) have, however, turned a blind eye to inherent cooperative dynamism in the present-day conflicts.

On the other hand, practical possibilities and success of non-violence and non-violent action in politics has often been proved.<sup>37</sup>

b) There is a clear-cut link, interdependence and intimate relationship between conflicts at international, regional, bilateral, national, social and individual levels.

c) The question of war and conflict must consider the role of individuals and their ways of life towards conflict generation for, in the final analysis, it is the individual who operates or wields the instruments of conflict, tensions and war.

Various modern values pursued by individuals today represent violent and acquisitive manifestations of human mind leading towards conflict among individuals and nations alike.

e) All inhuman inequalities and exploitation are instances of violence against humanity.<sup>38</sup>

f) Modern technology and technological assistance are also examples of violence against national and regional independence, self-sufficiency and self-rule.

g) Most of the modern nations for development and modernisation—including the exponents and protagonists of the so-called North-South dialogue, New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) etc. reflect primarily Westernised explicative and inherently violent parameters of an industrialised, mechanised and almost wholly rototised national and regional life styles.

(37) Joan V. Bondurant, op. cit. n. 10, PP. 189-232, Gene Sharp, "Technique of Non-violent Action," Adam Roberts (ed.), *The Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-violent Resistance to Aggression* (London: 1967), PP. 98-104; D. G. Tendulkar, *Gandhi in Champaran* (New Delhi: 1957).

(38) John Galtung, "Wither Technical Assistance: On the Future of International Development Assistance," an undated paper prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency most probably in or around 1977 from the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo, Norway, Paper No. 60, PP. 2,5,7,8,9,15-16.



h) Unless the world adopts non-violence as a way of life, the spell of technological violence and exploitation will continue to dominate the development of human mind.<sup>39</sup>

i) An education plan to this effect (as in 'h' above) is needed from the lowest to the highest levels.

j) Self-discipline of individuals and their leaders in particular is necessary through the precept and practice of Satya (truth), Ahimsa (non-violence), Asteya (non-stealing) and Aparigraha (non-possession or self-sacrifice).

k) Self-employment and self-learning through handicraft-centered and agriculture oriented education and economy.

l) Effective inculcation of non-violent and non-exploitative political, social and economic norms at individual, village, local, national and regional levels to pave the way towards the emergence of non-violent regional and (world) federation of nations.<sup>40</sup>

m) The resolution of conflicts and ultimately the emergence of a non-violent regional and (world) federation is possible only when root-motives of various conflicts are grasped and effectively treated within a non-violent Gandhian framework of mutual love and faith.<sup>41</sup>

n) The present-day regional and global peace spectrum—resting on 'a peculiar balance of terror', 'mutual assured destruction' and a 'functional balance of power model' does not satisfy, in the least, the non-violent conception of peace in the Gandhian mould of Satyagraha and Sarvodaya.

o) The present-day weapons of destruction and instruments of exploitation must

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(39) D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi*, Volume VI (New Delhi : 1969), PP. 142-150, S. C. Gangal, *The Gandhian Way to World Peace* (Bombay : 1960), PP. 58-70; G. N. Dhawan, op. cit. n. 11, PP. 103-125.

(40) G. N. Dhawan, Ibid, PP. 188-190, S. C. Gangal, Ibid, PP. 88-152.

(41) Government of India, *Gandhian Outlook and Techniques* (New Delhi : 1953), P. 274; S. C. Gangal, Ibid, PP. 100-103.



be renounced.<sup>42</sup>

p) For purposes of disarmament, one nation should gather courage of conviction to disarm itself unilaterally and unconditionally.<sup>43</sup>

q) A few conventional methods of resolution of conflicts such as arbitration and bilateral or multilateral negotiations through firmness, mutual love and accomodation are permissible in the Gandhian framework of conflict and cooperation.

r) The conventional peaceful methods of resolution of conflict can succeed only when all relevant facts, as far as possible, are accumulated, clear-cut objectives, for a fruitful discussion are determined, opponent is given every opportunity to present his/her case, and mutual accomodation and acceptance through a peaceful and non-exploitative synthesis of interests and purposes of mutual welfare are taken care of.

s) Rational persuasion through self-suffering or self-sacrifice to be used as instruments of peace and development.

t) Non-violent direct action is resorted to when all else fails. Such direct action involves trained group action, active propoganda and demonstrations, economic boycott and picketing, complete non-cooperation, and civil disobedience to such laws and norms which actually escalate conflicts.

u) Village based economy in South Asia.

v) Non-profiteering regional associations for mutual cooperation through love, truth, faith, love of physical labour, non-violence, non-possession, tolerance and equality. The ultimate aim of such cooperation is to be a self-reliant economy.

(42) Harijan, 14 April 1946.

(43) S. C. Gangal, op cit. n. 39, P. 11 M. K. Gandhi, *Nonviolence in Peace and War*, Volume I (Ahmedabad : 1948), P. 28; G. N. Dhawan, op. cit. n. 39, P. 36, It is indeed significant to know that "the Latin American region already has one example of a nation (Jamaica) which has foresworn the use of conventional arms and decided that it can do without a standing army." See Homer A Jack, "Gandhian Unilateralism Revisted," *Gandhi Marg* (New Delhi). Volume 4, Nos. 2 and 3, May-June 1982, P. 330; emphasis added; Romesh Thaper, "Unilateral Disarmament", *Gandhi Marg*. Volume 4, Nos. 2 and 3, May-June 1982, PP. 412-413.



w) National and regional industrialisation and technologicalisation only to the extent that the basic needs of the poor are satisfied. Moreover, industrialization must not interfere with long-term preservation of natural resources and the question of general ecological balance.

x) Movement for encouraging local and village level decision-making concerning relevant political, economic and social problems of cooperation, development, peace and self-sufficiency. Financial resources can seldom be a problem once every individual decides to move in this direction.

### The question of Validity of the Gandhian Framework

Indeed, the Gandhian way to resolution of conflicts and Gandhi's indepth belief in the efficacy of non-violence are often subjected to severe criticism on account of their practical impossibility. The Gandhian philosophy has often been termed as basically "against the (modern) age".<sup>44</sup>

However, such objections to the Gandhian way of life do not hold ground in any logical sense. In this regard Quincy Wright and Karl Mannheim can enlighten us further. For instance, in reply to a question, "Do you hold there are present in human nature ineradicable instinctive factors that make war between nations inevitable?", "346 members of American Psychological Association (APA) out of 478 members i. e. about 91% psychologists said "no" or answered in the negative."<sup>45</sup> Mannheim further says, "Even if one agrees that it (aggression or conflict) is a primary drive breaking through under all circumstances, there is so much scope in it for metamorphosis that there is no need to build up a social order on the basis of aggression (conflict) and combat... Indeed, there is nothing in the so called fighting instinct which makes for war. Its existence only explains why, when the social structure presents us with certain situations, our psychic instrument enables us to fight, or in some circumstances even forces us to indulge in aggression. Once the very basis of social order is so built as to avoid war (and conflict), it can by the

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(44) Ganesh Prasad, "Elasticism in Modern India", *Indian Journal of Political Science*, July-September 1960, P. 241.

(45) Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, Volume I, (Chicago: 1942), PP. P. 277; Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society* (London : 1942), PP. 107, 122-123.



control of education, prevent the forming of warlike attitude.”<sup>46</sup> Modern Indian sociologists like V. K. Unnithan and Yogendra Singh say... “it would be evident that peace and harmony as tendencies have more pervasive, stable and universal foundation in social psychology of man...”<sup>47</sup> As such, the objection concerning practical impossibility of the Gandhian ideas does not represent the reality of social and political existence of man. What is lacking is the courage of conviction to try practice the Gandhian notion.

For Gandhi, individual is the basic factor in social, political and economic causation: Unless there are patterns of centralised exploitation and warlike notions in the minds of individuals composing nation-states, there cannot be any social, political and economic injustice, violence or exploitation.

“The State represents violence in a concentrated and organised form. The individual has a soul, but as the State is a soul-less machine, it can never be weaned (away) from violence to which it owes its existence.”<sup>48</sup> In this sense, a non-violent society and a predominately non-violent state of the Gandhian type have little room for the centralism of State against the decentralised autonomy and self-sufficiency of the individual. “Centralism is inconsistent with the non-violent structure of society.”<sup>49</sup>

The Gandhian emphasis on the individual and basic transformation of the individual, however, do not neglect the larger social structure. Instead its reconstruction is called for in the Gandhian framework.<sup>50</sup>

As it is apparent, the Gandhian emphasis on bilateral resolution of conflicts in South Asia is also a natural corollary of his preference for autonomy, self-sufficiency and decentralization, where matters of relationship between nations, and individual

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(46) Karl Mannheim, Ibid, PP. 122-123, emphasis added.

(47) *Sociology of Nonviolence and Peace : Some Behavioural and Attitudinal Dimensions* (New Delhi : 1969), P. 3.

(48) N. K. Bose, *Selections From Gandhi* (Ahmedabad : 1948), P. 42.

(49) Harijan, 18 January 1942.

(50) S. C. Gangal, *Gandhian Thought and Technique in the Modern World* (New Delhi : 1988) P. 11.



*vis-a-vis* State are concerned. No doubt there could be some complex matters which may need multilateral resolution due to multi-party involvement. Yet, all primarily bilateral matters must preferably be resolved through negotiations between the two concerned parties or nations.

Otherwise, conflicts will further escalate with cooperation remaining as purile and subdued as it is today in South Asia. Hence, it is none other than the Gandhian option open for South Asia.













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# ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF KASHMIR IMBROGLIO - IN

DONATED BY ITS HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

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Kashmir, whose borders touch Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Russia and China has enthralled poets, emperors, warriors, sages and saints by its talismanic charms which has been bestowed on it in abundance. It is not only because of its art and culture, natural beauty and panoramic landscapes that Kashmir is famous in the world but it is well known because of its geographical, military and political importance in this whole region, particularly in the sub-continent.

The present State of Jammu and Kashmir - comprising of the three regions - Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh - is a home of various races and hence its ethnic composition is complex. The various ethnic groups here belong to different regions having their areas of high concentration which sometime transcend <sup>regions</sup> ~~requires~~ and provide the political power base. Both Hindus and Muslims of Jammu religion belong to the same race. The Muslims are mostly the converts from Hinduism. The overwhelming majority of the people of the valley progress Islam, the people of Ladakh called Ladakhis are also mixture of different races of which two more important are Dards and Tibetans. Shia Muslims are a distinct sub-cultural entity within Ladakh and are concentrated in Kargil district.

The ethno-religious composition has a deep rooted impact on the politics of the State in pre as well as post independence.

The State was a Muslim majority State ruled by a Hindu Dogra Maharaja. The Hindu, who only formed a small

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minority, got all the loaves and fishes of the State in pre-independence era. Economically and materially, they were better off than the Muslims who were grinding under revolting poverty, wide spread illiteracy and exploitation. Enrolments in Government job were generally denied to them. The educated few struggled hard for State employment but they were generally refused. It culminated in the great rising of 1931. This movement proved to be the starting point of the great political awakening in the State. It made people politically alive and raised them their age-long slumber of lathargy and inactivity.

It was felt necessary to bring all Muslims of the State on one common platform in organised manner. Sheikh Abdullah, therefore, founded 'The All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference in 1932. Its primary aim and objective was to fight for the rights of the Muslims on the communal basis. The Muslim Conference then launched a movement for civil rights, services and political reforms. The party demand the immediate implementation of the recommendations of Glancy Commission, the proprietary rights of the land for peasants and abolition of Bagar. Sheikh Abdullah emerged as force behind this movement.

From 1935 onwards, Sheikh Abdullah devoted his energies to change communal character of his party. Sheikh and his other colleagues in Muslim Conference over the years realised that they should fight for the rights of all those were oppressed and being exploited and not for Muslims only. This powerful urge led to the rise of need for United action against autocratic Hindu Maharaja and transfer of power to the people. The mid-June 1939, therefore, witnessed the transformation of the All J & K Muslim

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Conference into 'The All J & K National Conference.

Soon after independence the State accession with India which Pakistan opposed because its leadership claimed accession of State with her as it was Muslim Majority State. The National Conference assumed office and Sheikh Abdullah became the Prime Minister.

The popular sentiments in Jammu region believing the Hindu Dogra Maharaja as a symbol of their security against the majority population of the State, however, sided with the Maharaja in <sup>his</sup> ~~sub~~ attempt to retain more and more power in pre-independence. It then seemed to Dogra Hindus that prospect of Democracy in the State would be nothing more than being exposed to the whims of permanent majority of the State and its leadership.

Soon after assuming powers, the National Conference leadership started accusing the Hindus of Jammu for massacring their Muslim brotherns in Kathua, Udhampur, Reasi and Jammu in 1947 without expressing even a word in the sympathy of Hindus massacred in Mirpur, Bhimber, Rajouri, Kotli and other places during that period.

However, the open and repeated condemnation of the Dogra Hindu rule and its ruler in the State, with whom the Hindus of Jammu ~~are~~ had ~~an~~ix sentimental attachment by the National Conference leadership, not only hardened distrust of Jammu masses against them but also caused growing resentment in Jammu. In addition the masses of Jammu complained the step motherly treatment to their region in the matter of economic development and deliberate denial of sharing of political power.

Contd....4



The politics of the State then began to experience a new dimension the politics of Autonomy versus complete integration with the rest of India.

In April, 1949, Sheikh Abdullah was reported to have given an interview to Michael Davidson and Ward Prince opting for an independent Kashmir as the best solution of the Kashmir problem. He demanded an immediate withdrawal of the forces from State.

Sheikh Abdullah, in order to remove the fear of life, however, property and the sense of <sup>m</sup> security about the future of Muslims of the State and to ensure future security and protection of his co-religionists, publically voiced for limited accession of State to India. The National Conference leadership was of the view that 'The freedom loving people of Kashmir joined India on the condition that the State of Jammu and Kashmir must have a special status and the fullest autonomy so that the Muslim majority in the State might feel assured that Hindu dominated India was not going to interfere in their internal affairs. The Kashmir leadership also succeeded in incorporation of Art. 370 in Indian Constitution which granted a special Status to the State with the power to have its own assembly and to frame its own constitution etc. Sheikh Abdullah relentlessly advocated for the principle of right of self determination for the Kashmir to decide their future, made National Conference not only ~~subject to~~ suspect in the eyes of Jammu Hindus but further aggravated the <sup>disturb</sup> harden<sup>d</sup> between Jammu Hindus and Kashmir in the valley. All the anti-Jammu policies of the National Conference were vehemently criticised and opposed by Hindus of Jammu. The people of Jammu, therefore, decided to organise themselves to fight for their own



rights and to safeguard their interest-economic and political.

In short, the strain and stressed of the fast moving political events in 1947 and just after, the shift of political power from Jammu to valley, a reaction to the aggressive trends in the local nationalism in Kashmir, a protest of a region which felt politically ignored and condemned not only hardened distrust of Jammu but gave rise to a proper movement in Jammu region. Dogra Hindus of Jammu believing their greater security to be within Indian Union, demanded full integration of Jammu and Kashmir State with India. A largely Hindu dominated political party - the All J & K Praja Parishad came into being and demanded full integration of the State with India and application of the Constitution of India in the State in its entirety.

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The tussle between Jammu Integrationists and the Kashmiri Autonomists and their reaction in India and its counter-reaction in the valley led to the Constitution crisis of August 1953 and the subsequent arrest of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.

*against Kashmiri leadership and their policies*

There was a deep resentment in Ladakh also and events have taken somewhat similar turn as in Jammu. Mr. Kushak Bakula, the Head Lama, voiced the feelings of the people of Ladakh when he declared that in the event of Kashmir drifting away from India the Ladakhis would break their connection with the State and merge with the Indian Union.

The arrest of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was followed by a great mass upheaval in the valley. All the anti-India, Muslim fundamentalist, pro-Pak and secessionist forces once again joined hands and created a law and order problem and launched a prolonged public protest in the entire valley. Long processions

Contd...6



were organised which also joined by hundreds of men from the Police, Military and the Home Guards. The processionists burnt the ancestral house of G.M. Bakshi and Regal Cinema owned by his brother. Several Government Offices and vehicles were also burnt down. The entire city of Srinagar was handed over to the Army who started firing. A number of party leaders, political workers, legislators, doctors, lawyers, official and businessmen were arrested. In fact the valley lived without any law and order situation for about a month. The 9th of every month was observed as 'Black Day' or 'Abdullah Day' on this day, people organised public meetings and demonstrated against Indian occupation. The Indian secularism was ridiculed as fake one. The August 9, 1953 gave rise to <sup>the</sup> organisation <sup>of a party</sup> called Plebiscite Front. Its programme and policies envisaged a new liberation movement for the right of self-determination in the future politics of the State.

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad deliberately kept alive, the Muslim fundamentalists; pro-Pak and anti-India forces in the valley. He knew that if these elements turned weak, it would result in weakening his power which could end also. Conscious of it he kept on financing, though secretly, people of Plebiscite Front, and political conference. Some other Muslim fundamentalist groups too received liberal financial help from him. He told many times "existence of such elements was necessary otherwise New Delhi will do anything here it liked."

The Holy Relic Movement during December, 1963 once again provided a golden opportunity to Islamic fundamentalists groups to reorganise themselves and extend their influence in Kashmir region in general as well as in Muslim dominated belt of Jammu in particular.



On the other hand Mr. G.M. Sadiq, being a progressive and national leader, steadily moved toward the State's fuller integration with India and regarded Art. 370 as a tunnel or a bridge between the State and Union. But he soon realized that his policy was alienating the people from his fold. He thus embarked upon a policy of liberalization.

The communal trouble raised its ugly head when Buddhists supported the demand for the settlement of Tibetan refugees in Ladakh district. But the Muslim Action Committee vehemently opposed it as it feared that such a move would upset the ethnic balance in the region. The Buddhists, on the other hand, also feared that they would be reduced to minority because of the increasing incidents of conversion of Buddhist girls to Islam on the encouragement of Anjuman-i-Islam, a fundamentalist organisation, which was providing the Muslim youngmen money to lure Buddhist girls to embrace Islam. As a result cordiality between both communities of the region no longer existed and one started doubting the bonafides of the other. The fire was ignited when the news of an alleged desecration of the Buddhist flag by the members of other community at Saboo village floated into the air. A movement was started in Ladakh and marked with extreme violence and destruction and generated a worst type of communal tension in the region where communalism was quiet unknown till then.

Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, which was founded in 1941, to serve the cause of Islam in India, extended its activities in J & K in 1952. Its main aim was to promote Islam as an ideal way of life for the entire State of J & K. By 1973, the party had

Contd...8



not only consolidated its position in the State but it also had prepared its well trained, dedicated and trustworthy cadres for political purpose. It believes in establishment of a truly responsible Government in the State on the principles of Islam. It is of the opinion that J & K State is a disputed State. The accession of the State to India is temporary and as such subject to the satisfaction by the people. In the quest of achieving its goal of capturing political power, it entered into an alliance <sup>with</sup> of like minded religious groups operating in the valley. The outcome of the alliance was the formation of U.M.F. in September, 1986, which was later on became M.U.F. under the Chairmanship of Qazi Nissar. The March, 1987 assembly election in the State was declared by M.U.F. as a contest between 'Islam and Secularism.'

The popular discontentment generated among Kashmiri Muslims in the wake of Holy Relic episode also led to the emergence of an other Muslim political outfit 'Awami Action Committed' headed by Moulvi Farooq. It is pro-Pakistan and anti-India party and outrightly favours J & K accession with Pakistan. The party has pockets of influence in down town area of Srinagar and other major town of Kashmir valley. In the similar circumstances emerged an other Islamic outfit Jamaat-i-Tulba with pro-Pakistan and anti-India ideology.

However, during June, 1983 to June, 1984 the fundamentalist and sessionist parties and groups not only extended their influence and became more popular but a few new groups like Al-Fateh, people League, Islamic students League etc. also emerged.



Meanwhile, Chief Minister G.M. Shah's faulty policies led to the eruption of maladministration, corruption, nepotism in the State administration as well as communal violence in the valley. The fundamentalist, secessionists and pro-Pak groups became very vocal and powerful. The possibility of secession of J & K State became prominent once again. Moreover, the growth of communal scenario in the country as a whole and in the neighbouring State of Punjab in particular had added fuel into the fire and inspired the fanatic forces in the valley to form a United Front.

The youth in Kashmir were, therefore, left bewildered or these sudden waverings of their political leaders, causing them deep confusion and frustration. Unable to trust their political commanders anymore, the innocent youth took arms to achieve the objective of self-determination and independence of Kashmir by resorting to violence. Obviously Pakistan and other fundamentalist and secessionist forces capitalized on these developments and boosted the courage of young Kashmiri militants through promises of money and material.

There was enough evidence to believe that arms and ammunition began to flow into the State right from 1980 when the trouble in Punjab was at the peak. The law and order situation was also deteriorating, fundamentalist and secessionist forces were <sup>arming</sup> ~~ariving~~ themselves with the help of Pakistan and the ~~influx~~ induction of arms and infiltration into the valley continued. There had been growing strength of the secessionist forces, widening influence of the fundamentalist organisations and deepening communal distrust all over the State. A virulent

Contd...10



propaganda campaign was started among the Muslims in the entire valley as well as the Muslim majority districts of Jammu region that the time had arrived for 'Jahad' against India for the liberation of the State and for preparing youths for it. The Jamait-e-Islamia cadres were inducted into the management bodies of the mosques and anti-India as well as anti-Hindu propaganda was initiated in the Muslim missionary schools. There was also going a rapid shift in the local press in favour of Muslim fundamentalism. The recitation of National Anthem and hoisting of National Flag in the Schools and other public places were discontinued. The following sermon was broadcasted on the public Address System of the Mosques in Srinagar on January 27-28, 1990.

"The aim of the Jihad is Azadi and it is enjoined by Almighty on all followers of Tauheed to participate in the Jihad. The crusade is for the establishment of Kashmir into an Islamic Society. The heretics can only live in Islamic society if they accept the Islamic laws. The non-Muslims have always helped the userpers from outside to enslave the Muslim masses in Kashmir. For them, therefore, the only way is to quit this 'Pak Sarzameen' the scared land.

We have always protected the non-Muslims and they have always indulged in espionage. Now they are bewilatered because the day of reckoning is on their head".

Hizib-ul-Islam issued the following handout in 1998 :

"Islam is one aim; Quran is one Constitution, Jihad is our path; war till victory. God is great. The war 6ry

Contd...11



of Hizib is Allah-a-Akbar, the cry of Hizib-ul-Islam take heed India.

1. Muslim brotherhood in Kashmir has risen in arms against the userpers of its freedom, which has been snatch in 1947, and ever since. Muslim youth in the cities and towns and in the villages are to receive training in the use of arms to engage the Indian security forces.
2. There is no going back the armed struggle begins. ~~X~~ The Jihad is invincible. We demand our right to freedom, which has been recognised by the U.N.O. in 1947, and the British Government which ruled India then.
3. An all round attack has to be launched on the State administration which has run the Indian Colonial administrative machine in the State, the Indian security forces, at whose hands thousands of Mujahids have attained martyrdom and the enemies of the freedom of the Muslim brotherhood in Kashmir.
4. The brotherhood of Kashmir is an integral part of the Islami-the Muslim Nation of the world, - which can no more be divided by any boundaries. There is no boundry between Kashmir and Muslim Common Wealth, of Pakistan, except that imposed by Indian imposters which at present divides the Muslim of Kashmir.
5. Traitors to the cause of Islam will alone shirk the

Contd...12



responsibility to serve the cause of Islam and they will receive the punishment that they ought to be given. All servants of Allah are enjoined to do whatever is in their power to wreak the Government from inside and outside, harass, demoralise and destroy Indian security personnel, eliminate the enemies of the revolution, propagate Muslim <sup>laws</sup> have and Muslim code of life, which is supreme law in Kashmir and participate in mass resistance to Indian oppression.

The Community of Pandits, in Kashmir, which has in it the treacherous agents of India, has no option other than submit to the law of Islam as a supreme law of Islam in Kashmir or leave Kashmir.

Youth is proposed to fight the Indian military with the support of the great Islamic Mujahidin of Palestine and Afghanistan, they will achieve victory and liberate the Muslims here from the clutches of an oppressive and crafty userper. Muslims have always fought for freedom and won it.

Jehad is victorious."

Hizab-ul-Mujahidin then issued following ultimatum to Kashmiri pandits in April, 1990.

"Pandits, responsible for having perspeterated oppression and atrocity on the Muslim should quit in two days." They believed that behind the oppression and all persecution of the Muslims, pandits had a hand and they had become the instruments of Indian imperialism. A spokesman of Hizib-ul-

Contd....13



Mujahidin said that pandits had received training in arms outside the valley and had drawn up plans to form a disturbance of a serious nature. He also added that pandits had a hand in the arrest of Mujahidin as well as the raids on their quarters.

While summing up I may say that ethno-religious factors and forces not only responsible for injecting and spreading out communal tensions, fundamentalisation of politics, gun culture, infiltration of arms and ammunition fomenting turbulence and turmoil in J & K State but also created a favourable conditions for Pakistan to infiltrate foreign missionaries and militants and wage a proxy war in which thousand<sup>of</sup> men and women have lost their lives. A decades long militancy in J & K has not only caused a colossal destruction of men and material but also turn Kashmir - a paradise on the earth - into the hell.

Contd: - 14.



The recent episodes ambushing Police columns and killing of high ranking armed force official along with injuring another Brigadier prove that peace cannot come soon in Kashmir as it is being thought off. The Pakistan's sponsored and spawned militancy has attained alarming proportion with no possible end looking in sight. Pakistan itself has landed in the tightest possible corner. Taliban from Afghanistan have joined in and have taken over the control of the Jihad/terrorist camps. ~~Pakistan~~ Pakistan has no check on them. They have brought with them KASHMIKONS of all series, machine guns, mortars, rocket launcher, hand grenades, automatic <sup>grenade</sup> launcher etc. etc. Their method is massacre when everything seems to be going smoothly for shock <sup>up</sup> effect; bombing at public places to remain in news; an ambushing to ensure that the morale factor amidst their leaders remain high; stupefying <sup>cruelty</sup> ~~cruelity~~; lack of any mercy; cold and unhesitating murders in the name of JEHAD. They have the ability to carry out complex operations. All Fidayeen hits have been quality strikes. Every strike is planned in great details. Various squads of Taliban deployed in Kashmir. One squad smuggles weapon, other plan the operation and yet another carry on the job. No ~~sq~~ squad comes in direct contact with another. Thus, terrorists seemed to have attained a professional edge. They do not believe in politics, which they regard as a ~~difficult~~ different ball-game. 'Live to fight' is their motto and their prayer is 'Oh Allah let us die for Jihad so that we may live for ever in the paradise.

In such a situation how does General Musharraf talk of peace in Kashmir and India continued to go in for a unilateral ceasefire.



The present system of taxation is a very old one and has been in existence for many years. It is a system which has been evolved over a long period of time and has been adapted to the needs of the country at different stages of its development. The system is based on the principle of equity and justice and is designed to ensure that the burden of taxation is distributed fairly among the different classes of the community. The system is also designed to ensure that the revenue collected is sufficient to meet the needs of the government and to provide for the welfare of the people. The system is a very important one and it is essential that it should be maintained and improved from time to time.



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
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26 SEP. 1995



# COALITION TERMINATION AND THE STRATEGIC TIMING OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

ARTHUR LUPIA and KAARE STRØM *University of California, San Diego*

Cabinet coalitions in multiparty parliamentary democracies lead a precarious existence. Legislative majorities can typically dismiss the cabinet at will and can sometimes force early elections through parliamentary dissolution. Since coalition termination can have substantial political consequences, it is important to understand when and why such decisions are made. To this end, we develop a model of coalition bargaining in a legislature with dismissal and dissolution powers. We use the model to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for both coalition termination and parliamentary dissolution. In contrast to several widely held maxims, we find that coalition terminations need not be the automatic consequence of exogenous shocks. Nor do opportunistic parties with favorable electoral prospects always dissolve parliament to enhance their power. Instead, decisions to terminate coalitions or call new elections result from party leaders' rational responses to the constraints of legislative and electoral institutions and the anticipated feelings of the electorate.

Coalition governments in parliamentary democracies lead a precarious existence. Typically, they can fall on any given day, sometimes with little or no warning. The circumstances surrounding coalition termination vary greatly, occasionally producing great drama. Some politicians are forced from their cabinet offices in a daze, never knowing what hit them. Others choose their date of departure and leave with smirks on their faces. Some alliances go down in fiery spectacles of backroom infighting and betrayal, whereas others take their struggles "to the country" and leave the judgment to the voters.

Why do governments fall at the precise moments that they do? Quite often, the causes of coalition terminations seem obvious in one sense—as when they follow a dissolution of parliament or a legislative vote of no confidence. "Explanations" of this kind direct our attention to two important and common legislative powers. In most parliamentary democracies, simple legislative majorities have *dismissal power*, that is, the power to recall the cabinet at any time. In many parliamentary democracies, legislative majorities also have *dissolution power*, that is, the power to dissolve parliament and force early elections. Once we recognize the availability of such powers, the more interesting questions become when and why parliamentarians use them.

We shall explain the causes and consequences of coalition termination in a legislature endowed with dismissal and dissolution powers. We pursue these questions because decisions to terminate coalitions, call new elections, or leave the government as it is, constitute dramatic events with nonobvious causes and politically important consequences. Such consequences may be direct or indirect. The best-known direct consequence is the sizable reallocation of legislative power that can follow a change in government. Indirect consequences include the effects of commonly held beliefs about the likelihood and aftermath of an upcoming termination on the present

bargaining powers and negotiating strategies of forward-looking parliamentarians. All else equal, participants in a seemingly viable government may have much greater bargaining power than those whose partnership is expected to collapse soon. If such beliefs are sufficiently common or their implications large enough, then they can affect parliamentary decision making decisively and long before the cabinet's predicted demise.

To identify causes and consequences of coalition termination, we develop a model of parliamentary bargaining in the presence of a preexisting governing coalition. In the model, an external event gives rise to commonly held expectations concerning the outcome of a potential election. We use the model to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for three collectively exhaustive types of outcomes: (1) coalition termination followed by a nonelectoral reallocation of power (either reallocations between existing coalition members or reallocations involving a new set of coalition members); (2) coalition termination followed by parliamentary dissolution and new elections; and (3) no coalition termination (i.e., the governing cabinet coalition survives the crisis completely intact). The predominant theme of our results is that coalition terminations are not automatic responses to external events. Instead, the causes and consequences of coalition terminations are reasoned and negotiated responses to a variety of changing circumstances. Furthermore, we find that popular opinion, strategic interaction, and institutional features of both legislative and electoral institutions each have systematic effects on the dynamics of coalition termination.

What value such insights provide is partially revealed by three conclusions, each of which allows us to reinterpret a widely held maxim concerning cabinet formation or termination. Our first conclusion suggests thinking anew about the maxim that "parties terminate cabinets when they expect electoral gains" (e.g., Grofman and van Roozendaal 1994,

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158). We conclude that *favorable electoral prospects are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for either coalition termination or parliamentary dissolution*. Rather, the anticipation of good electoral fortunes gives a party a bargaining chip that it can exploit by either renegotiating the balance of power within an existing coalition, forging a more attractive coalition with new partners, forcing dissolution and new elections, or protecting the existing cabinet.

Our second conclusion amends the maxim that in three-party legislatures, "the governing coalition will comprise the largest and smallest legislative parties" (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Baron 1991). We conclude that *the bargaining advantages often attributed to a party's size are also the result of various other factors*, such as its electoral prospects or the policy and office-driven gains from trade that it can offer potential coalition partners. So while a political party's size and bargaining power can be positively correlated, we identify a wide range of circumstances under which they are not.

The third affected maxim is that governing coalitions are toppled by exogenous shocks that are "random and unpredictable events" (e.g., Browne, Frensdreis, and Gleiber 1986; Cioffi-Revilla 1984). We conclude that *whether a particular crisis leads to both coalition termination and parliamentary dissolution, just coalition termination, or neither depends heavily on the electoral cycle*. For example, the same external event that causes no dissolution early in a parliament's term could well do so later.

In sum, our research provides a new way to understand parliamentary decision making in regimes where coalitions can be terminated at almost any time. It also proposes a new way to think about the relationship between legislative institutions, electoral considerations, and parliamentary decisions.

We begin our analysis by describing two important, but unremarkable, coalition terminations. These cases' shared characteristics are emblematic of factors that generally influence coalition termination. They provide the empirical grounding for our theoretical analysis. Then we briefly evaluate the existing literature on the causes of coalition termination and stockpile the wisdom it imparts. Next, we develop a noncooperative, game-theoretic parliamentary bargaining model and use it to identify the causes and consequences of coalition termination. We supplement our results with a short series of simple numerical examples. Finally, we offer concluding remarks and, in the Appendix, provide a series of proofs.

## A TALE OF TWO COALITIONS<sup>1</sup>

We aim to facilitate a general understanding of coalition termination's dynamics by building a theoretical model upon empirically verifiable premises. To motivate our premises, we briefly chronicle two actual coalition crises. What makes these crises particularly illustrative for our purposes is that they represent milestones in the political histories of their

respective countries. Their real-world significance is therefore indisputable, and the events are relatively well known. Yet these cases are by no means exceptional. We believe they are representative of many similar events.

Please note that each case contains five features that are common to coalition crises and serve as the building blocks of our own theoretical model. First, *coalition crises typically arise with changes in the political environment, and specifically when party leaders gain new information*. Party leaders are more likely to terminate coalitions or call early elections in the wake of major unexpected events beyond their control. But what makes such events critical is the new expectations they convey. Second, *coalition crises can produce any one of a number of possible outcomes*. Sometimes, the result is simply a cabinet reshuffle, a renegotiation of the "contract" between the existing coalition members. At other times, a new coalition may form between parties that were not previously partners. One extreme resolution of a coalitional crisis is, perhaps, the best known—the decision to dissolve parliament and call early elections. At the other extreme is the possibility that the crisis passes with the initial coalition and parliament intact. Third, *intensive party deliberations and negotiations often precede coalition termination*. That is, coalition realignment does not typically take the form of an immediate response to an exogenous shock. Instead, coalition bargaining is often protracted and hard-nosed. Fourth, *parliamentarians often conduct such negotiations in the shadow of elections*. That is, the strategies of party leaders are critically influenced by their anticipation of elections and by their expectations concerning voter preferences. Fifth and finally, *party leaders often pay a price when they abandon their previous commitments*. For example, politicians often encounter resistance from their own parties when they advocate changing coalition partners.

### Germany, 1982

The seventeenth of September 1982 marked the most complete turnover in the German government since World War II. After 13 years of coalition government, the leadership of the Free Democratic party (FDP) decided to terminate its cooperation with the Social Democrats (SPD). An economic downturn had put the coalition partners at odds and lessened the value of the alliance to the FDP. With a ballooning budget deficit, the gulf between the FDP's commitment to fiscal discipline and the Social Democrats' Keynesian policies had gradually led to coalitional friction. At the same time, the coalition parties faced a new electoral challenge in the Green party, which had ridden the crest of peace protests and heated debates over the death of the German forests to electoral success. The Greens had drawn more than 5% of the vote in recent state elections (Bremen and Baden-Württemberg), success that if replicated at the national level, would land them in the Bundestag (the German parliament) for the first time.



The Green success stood in direct contrast to the FDP's electoral fortunes. The FDP had lost support in five of the six state elections held since 1979 and by 1982 was out of government in all but two states, an unprecedented low. Opinion polls showed a steady decline in the proportion of German voters intending to vote for the FDP. From 12% at the beginning of the 1981, this figure had dropped to about 7% by the middle of 1982. One poll in the summer of 1982 put FDP support as low as 5.3% (Søe 1985, 151). If this trend were to continue, the Free Democrats would be in danger of falling below the 5% threshold in the next scheduled Bundestag election in 1984. These grim forecasts, combined with the Green ascendancy, threatened to end the pivotal role that the FDP had played in virtually every postwar government.

The Free Democrats had several difficult choices to make. One option was to leave the coalition with the SDP in favor of one with the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU). Some FDP leaders felt that such a switch would help their electoral standing in the longer run. Other elements within the FDP feared the electoral repercussions of "betraying" the commitment to the SDP, on which the party had contested the previous Bundestag election. Polls showed most FDP voters opposed to any change of partners, and Free Democrats committed to the SPD-FDP coalition felt that any change of coalition should be approved by the voters *ex ante*. While some FDP members favored asking President Carstens to dissolve the Bundestag and hold early elections, others, conscious of the FDP's declining electoral fortunes, foresaw early elections driving the party out of parliament.

The conflict came to a head when FDP economics minister Otto von Lambsdorff called for austerity measures affecting social services, only to be publicly rebuked by Schmidt and other SPD officials (Søe 1985; 1982 *Keessing's Record*, 31,774). On 17 September, after Schmidt rejected Lambsdorff's proposals, all four FDP cabinet ministers announced their resignation. Schmidt then allowed his cabinet to be voted down and unsuccessfully sought a parliamentary dissolution. Instead, on 1 October Helmut Kohl's CDU/CSU-FDP coalition was voted into office in the first successful application of Germany's constructive vote of no confidence. Several months later, Kohl engineered a parliamentary dissolution, leading to elections in March 1983.

For the FDP, the short-term fallout of coalition change was severe. Günter Verheugen, the party's secretary general, resigned in protest. Thousands of activists and several prominent leaders (including Verheugen) then left the party, which failed miserably in three state elections between late September and December of 1982. However, the six-month delay of the Bundestag election appears to have allowed the Free Democrats to recoup some of their public support. While the FDP, as expected, lost ground electorally, it did surpass the 5% of the March vote necessary to survive as a parliamentary party and coalition partner (see Poguntke 1993).

## Ireland, 1987

A few years later, an era in Irish coalition politics came to an end. On 20 January 1987, the Irish Labour party withdrew from the two-party coalition that had governed Ireland for the major part of the period since 1973. Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Garret FitzGerald of the Fine Gael, reduced to the head of a minority cabinet, promptly requested a dissolution of the Dail (the Irish parliament).

Labour's withdrawal from the third Fine Gael-Labour coalition had been long in the making. Though the two parties wasted little time in reaching agreement after the November 1982 election, the coalition soon encountered rough waters. Lingered economic recession in the mid-1980s led to increased unemployment, emigration, and industrial relations confrontations. FitzGerald's neoliberal economic policies succeeded in bringing down inflation but were unpopular among working-class voters (Girvin 1987). In addition, the government struggled with touchy issues such as abortion and divorce.<sup>2</sup>

The emergence of a new political party, the Progressive Democrats (PD), complicated the electoral picture. The party, founded in 1985 as a splinter group from Fianna Fail, quickly surpassed Labour in the polls to become Ireland's third largest party. Somewhat surprisingly, the PD proved to draw more support from disaffected Fine Gael voters than from Fianna Fail. Yet the problems of the coalition were particularly visited on the Labour party. From 9.4% of the vote in the November 1982 election, opinion polls showed support for the party slipping to 7-8% by the end of 1984 and all the way down to 4% by 1986 (Marsh and Mitchell 1992, 14).

In response to this alarming slippage, Labour party leaders attempted to "toughen up" their bargaining position vis-à-vis Fine Gael. Whereas their efforts yielded some policy victories, Labour leaders failed to improve their standing with the electorate and came under increasing pressure to resign from the coalition. Labour leader Dick Spring originally favored a continuation of the coalition with Fine Gael, but his position within the party gradually eroded. A Labour party electoral commission, reporting in September 1985, identified coalition participation as the greatest cause of the party's decline and advocated going into opposition. The alternative, it was suggested, "may be no party at all" (Marsh and Mitchell 1992, 15).

There was ambivalence about the coalition within the Fine Gael as well. While Prime Minister FitzGerald hoped to keep his coalition alive until a June 1987 election, he realized that Labour's government participation made it difficult to reach the budgetary goals on which he had staked much of the party's reputation. To shore up the party's shaky support, he hoped to fight the next election on the theme of fiscal integrity. At the 1986 party conference, he therefore left the door open for an abandonment of the coalition in the next parliament (Girvin 1987, 9-10).

A cabinet reshuffle in February 1986 failed to infuse any new blood into the coalition, and disgruntled



backbenchers defected from both coalition parties. At its annual conference in November, the Labour party adopted a resolution that ruled out participation in any coalition after the next election (1987 *Keating's Record*, 35,084). That the main opposition party, Fianna Fail, steadfastly maintained a "no coalition" policy implied that no other option was feasible.<sup>3</sup> In response to growing internal pressure and the unprecedented unpopularity of the coalition, Spring disowned the coalition in September, declaring that he looked forward to a life in opposition.

Four months later, Labour found a rationale for withdrawal in the government's proposed cuts in social welfare, health, and education (Farrell and Farrell 1987; Marsh and Mitchell 1992, 16). These measures were critical to both parties' electoral credibility. The fact that the Fine Gael had forced these measures on the cabinet despite Labour opposition set in motion the events that led to Labour's 20 January withdrawal. The subsequent elections resulted in losses for both Fine Gael and Labour, while Fianna Fail captured the executive branch.

## COALITION TERMINATION AND ITS CAUSES

As coalition terminations go, neither the German or Irish case is unusual. However (and despite their strong similarities), the existing literature on coalition government does not provide us with a general understanding of why parliaments resolve coalition crises in such distinct manners.

To facilitate such an understanding, we follow a respected list of political scientists who have long recognized the importance of executive stability in democracies and have sought to identify its determinants (Bryce 1921; Lowell 1896; Powell 1982). Over time, this literature has branched off into three distinct schools. One venerable tradition seeks the causes of coalition termination in the *structural attributes* of the coalition itself (Blondel 1968; Duverger 1954; Strøm 1985; Warwick 1979) or the larger regime in which coalition politics is played out (Grofman 1989; Lijphart 1984; Lowell 1896; Powell 1982). A second and more recent literature stresses the destabilizing effects of exogenous *critical events* (Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber 1986; Cioffi-Revilla 1984; King et al. 1990; Warwick 1992a; Warwick and Easton 1992).<sup>4</sup> The final and still incipient tradition in the study of cabinet stability grew out of the structural attributes tradition. It focuses on *strategic interaction* between (and possibly within) parties as the key to coalition dynamics (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988, 1990; Baron 1989, 1991; Dodd 1976; Laver and Shepsle 1990; Riker 1962; Schofield 1992). What distinguishes work in this tradition is the employment of game-theoretic solution concepts as a guide to coalition stability. The analytical and empirical application of such tools to the question of coalition termination was first seriously pursued by Dodd (1976).

We build on the most promising lessons of all three approaches. For instance, the strategic interaction school inspires us to develop a rigorous and plausible behavioral foundation for the study of coalition termination. Adopting such an approach requires that we explain coalition termination as a result of the deliberate and often complex bargaining that goes on between party leaders. It also allows us to satisfy the desire of King and his colleagues, who "agree with Browne, Frendreis and Gleiber (1988, 934) that there is as yet no fully developed micropolitical theory of cabinet durability within the rational choice tradition" and "agree with Strøm that such an approach is essential to an understanding of cabinet durability" (1990, 868-69).

We draw from the structural attributes tradition the insight that institutions matter. As Laver and Schofield stress: "A single institutional feature can make two otherwise similar coalition systems as different as chalk and cheese. Particular constitutional constraints, the German constructive vote of no confidence for example, were even designed with the specific intention of having an impact upon the politics of government formation. To ignore such matters would clearly be to stick our heads in the sand" (1990, 214).

We believe that the institutions most likely to affect coalition termination are those that most directly impinge on party bargaining over executive coalitions and legislative dissolution. Dismissal and dissolution powers are good examples of such institutions, as are electoral laws and party rules that affect the costs of negotiations and electioneering. Therefore, our theoretical model explicitly defines not only dismissal and dissolution powers but also the rules that enable parties to make or accept deals concerning coalition participation.

While we draw from the "critical events" perspective as well, our approach is also a critique of this literature. Critical events scholars teach us that we cannot anticipate the entire political life of an executive coalition at its inception: from time to time, shocks occur that affect the outlook of the governing parties. As Strøm have previously noted, however, "an adequate critical events theory of cabinet dissolution has to meet the following criteria: events must (1) enter the utility calculations of the players in the governmental game; (2) be defined and observed independently of government resignations; and (3) be allowed to vary in their (a) exogeneity and (b) sufficiency as causes of government resignations" (1988, 929).

In other words, we need to think carefully about what makes events "critical" and how they affect coalition bargaining. Our problem with the critical events approach is that it does not authoritatively describe the specific nature of critical events. In fact, a key point often made by critical events theorists is that such events are random and unpredictable.<sup>5</sup>

By contrast, we believe that events such as wars, scandals, and economic shocks are not inherently critical. Instead, events *become* critical through their



effects on parliamentary bargaining. Thus what makes an event critical is the behavioral response it occasions among the bargaining parties. To put it bluntly, potentially critical events are meaningful only if they affect politicians' abilities to achieve their legislative and electoral goals.

In sum, common features of actual coalition crises and the existing literature on coalition dynamics lead us to propose a theory based on the premise that strategic behavior, institutional constraints, electoral motivations, and external events could figure prominently among the causes of coalition termination. The most novel feature of our theory is the inclusion of electoral motivations. Up to now, such motivations have played only a very modest role in the theoretical literature on coalition termination.<sup>6</sup> The previous absence of such motivations was noted by Laver and Schofield, who stated that "the problem for coalition theory, therefore, is that it has up until now been essentially static, assuming implicitly that politicians do not look forward to the next election when they bargain" (1990, 59). The benefit of including such motivations will soon become manifest.

## THE MODEL

We identify causes and consequences of coalition termination by modeling coalition bargaining, in a parliament with dismissal and dissolution powers, as a game between three unitary actors called *parties*.<sup>7</sup> We develop a three-party model, as opposed to an  $n$ -party model, because it provides the simplest formal framework for examining the bargaining dynamics of coalition government. For expositional simplicity, we describe the case where all players share a common knowledge.<sup>8</sup>

The game begins at some point during parliament's term, after an initial governing coalition has been installed and soon after a potentially critical shift in public opinion occurs.<sup>9</sup> During the game, parties react to this "event" by either maintaining the existing coalition, negotiating a new one, or dissolving the legislature and calling new elections. We use the *subgame perfect Nash equilibrium* solution concept to draw deductively valid conclusions about party actions and bargaining outcomes (for a description of this concept, see Ordeshook 1992, 86–88).

We shall now provide a complete description of the game. For simplicity, we first describe the parties and their objectives absent a potentially critical event. We then describe the opportunities and new incentives that the event provides.

### Parties and Their Objectives in the Absence of an Event

We call the three parties the *first party*, the *second party*, and the *out-party*. Each party's name indicates its relationship to the initial governing coalition. We describe the case where the first and second parties are members of the initial governing coalition, the

out-party is not, and any two parties can form a majority coalition.<sup>10</sup> The only substantive distinction between the first and second parties, upon which none of our results depend, is that the first party reacts to the event before the second. More importantly, we do not assume that a party's name necessarily indicates its relative size. Thus neither the first nor the second party need be the largest.

Absent a potentially critical event, each party's objective is to maximize the value it derives from its role in parliament. We make three basic assumptions about these objectives:

**ASSUMPTION 1.** *Parties care about controlling seats in parliament.* Let  $s_i \in \mathbb{R}^+$  be the subjective value to party  $i$  of the seats that it controls, where  $i \in \{1, 2, o\}$ , the subscript 1 refers to the first party, the subscript 2 refers to the second party, and the subscript  $o$  refers to the out-party. Since elections that determine seat shares must occur before a parliament's term commences, and since the beginning of the game occurs after such commencement, we assume that the initial values of the  $s_i$  parameters, as well as the initial values of all other game-relevant parameters, are determined exogenous to (prior to) the play of this game. For expositional simplicity, we describe the case where the subjective value of seats to party  $i$  is equivalent to the percentage of seats that party  $i$  holds ( $s_i \in [0, 1]$ ,  $\sum_{i \in \{1, 2, o\}} s_i = 1$ ).

**ASSUMPTION 2.** *Parties value power within a governing coalition.*  $c_i \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $\sum_{i \in \{1, 2, o\}} c_i = 1$ , denotes party  $i$ 's share of power in the initial governing coalition; where  $c_1 + c_2 = 1$  and  $c_o = 0$ .  $c_i$  represents the currencies—such as portfolios (i.e., cabinet appointments) or patronage—by which the power from governing is derived, held, and transferred.<sup>11</sup> If we think of what a governing coalition does as dividing a valuable pie, then  $c_i$  represents the size of the pie slice that party  $i$  receives.

**ASSUMPTION 3.** *Parties can value some potential coalition partners more than others.*  $g_i^j \in \mathbb{R}^+$  represents the value to party  $i$  that a coalition with party  $j$  could produce.  $g_j^i \in \mathbb{R}^+$  represents the value to party  $j$  of the same coalition, and  $g_i^i$  need not equal  $g_j^j$ . In other words, if we think of one of the things that a governing coalition does as making (and then dividing) a valuable pie, then  $g_i^j$  represents the common expectation of the *total* (pre-division) value to party  $i$  of the pie that it and party  $j$  would make.  $g_j^j$  represents the value of the same undivided pie to party  $j$ .

We use  $g_i^i$  to represent the benefits of membership in a particular governing coalition. Such benefits derive from the similarity in policy preferences and/or the complementarity of office preferences among coalition members. For instance, a coalition containing parties with similar policy agendas is likely to generate greater utility for its members (all else constant) than would a coalition containing parties with


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FIGURE 1

The Model's Extensive Form (Game Tree)



1, 2 and Out = the names of the parties.  
 1-Out = a coalition between the First and Out parties.  
 2-Out = a coalition between the Second and Out parties.  
 New 1-2 = original coalition survives, power is reallocated.  
 VC = Vote of Confidence—means a dissolution and new elections if it fails.  
 SQ = Status Quo—original government survives with no power reallocation.

conflicting policy agendas. Equivalently, a coalition of parties with different preferences over cabinet appointments can have greater value to its members than one in which all parties covet the same portfolios. One advantage of our coalition-specific value concept is that we can assume that parties are goal-oriented without making a general (and controversial) assumption about the extent to which parties are interested in patronage, policy outcomes, or the prestige of holding office.<sup>12</sup>  $c_i \times g_i^j$  is the utility that a coalition with party  $j$  offers party  $i$ .<sup>13</sup>

In sum, we assume that party  $i$ 's utility from its role in parliament can generally be thought of as a function  $F_i(s_i, c_i \times g_i^j)$ .<sup>14</sup> Because we want parsimoniously to highlight the distinct effects of party size, coalition partner value, and governing power on coalition termination, we describe our model using a simple example of such a function: the case where party  $i$  derives utility  $s_i + (c_i \times g_i^j)$  from its role in government.<sup>15</sup>

### Party Objectives and Opportunities in the Presence of an Event

Having just described the benefits that parties derive from governing, we now describe a sequence of events that may lead the parties to cast these benefits aside. We describe this sequence of events as a game that has two periods: period 1 (the present), in which parties take actions, and period 2 (the future), in which parties realize the consequences of their period 1 actions. Figure 1 depicts the extensive form of the first period, which begins at some point during a parliament's term, after an initial governing coalition has been installed and soon after a potentially critical event occurs.

### A Potentially Critical Event

An event (represented by a poll that credibly signals public opinion or a set of shared past experiences that



informs electoral expectations) provides all parties with information about what would happen to them if an election were to be held in period 1. What this event reveals is  $b_i \in \mathfrak{R}$ , the expected utility of a period 1 election to party  $i$ .  $b_i$  represents all of the game-relevant information about party  $i$ 's postelection well-being.<sup>16</sup>

While elections can provide benefits, calling them can also impose several types of costs. There are *opportunity costs* to calling elections, (e.g., the forfeiture of the policy-making opportunities or rent collection opportunities made possible by holding valuable offices) and *transactions costs* (e.g., those involved in election-related intraparty negotiation, campaigning, and electioneering). For each party, we assume that the relevant opportunity cost is the utility it currently draws from its role in government  $s_i + (c_i \times g_i)$ .  $E_i \geq 0$  represents party  $i$  election-related transactions costs (i.e., the cost of achieving the benefits,  $b_i$ , revealed by the event). We do not assume that such transactions costs are the same for all parties. Together, our assumptions about the event and election-related transactions costs imply that party  $i$  expects a period 2 utility of  $b_i - E_i$  from a period 1 election. For reference purposes, we display the game's relevant parameters:

Control of seats	$s_i \in \mathfrak{R}^+$
Initial share of power	$c_i \in [0, 1], c_1 + c_2 = 1, c_o = 0$
Postnegotiation shares of power	$\sum_{i \in \{1,2,o\}} c_i = 1$
Value of coalition partner $j$ to $i$	$g_i^j \in \mathfrak{R}^+$
Postelection prospects	$b_i \in \mathfrak{R}$
Transactions costs	
Election-related	$E_i \in \mathfrak{R}$
Negotiation-related	$K_i \in \mathfrak{R}$

Party  $i$ 's utility from a period 1 election =  $b_i - E_i$ .

Utility from current role in government: (also election or negotiation-related opportunity cost) =  $s_i + (c_1 \times g_1^i)$ , for the first party,  $s_2 + ((1 - c_1) \times g_2^i)$  for the second party, and  $s_o$  for the out-party.

### Reactions to the Event

After the event occurs, each coalition member has one opportunity to offer a reallocation of power to any other party. An example of such an offer is the following: "If you, party  $i$ , will coalesce with me, party  $j$ , then you shall receive share of power  $c_j^i$ , and I shall receive share of power  $c_i^j = 1 - c_j^i$ ." For expositional clarity, we denote offered power shares with superscripts representing who power is shared with (e.g.,  $c_j^i$ ). Initial power shares have no superscripts (e.g.,  $c_i$ ).<sup>17</sup>

Recall that we describe the case where any two parties can coalesce and form a government. Thus the consequence of an accepted offer will be either a redistribution of power among members of the initial governing coalition or the formation of a new governing coalition. The first party has the first opportunity to make such an offer.<sup>18</sup> If it does so, then the

party to whom the offer is made can either accept or reject it. If it is accepted, then the game ends and the allocation of power that the first party proposed determines period 2 payoffs. If the first party either fails to make an offer or has its offer rejected, then the second party has an opportunity to make an offer. If it is accepted, then the game ends and the allocation of power that the second party proposed determines period 2 payoffs.<sup>19</sup>

If no party is willing to make an offer that another is willing to accept, then there exists the possibility of a vote of confidence. The requirements for such a vote to occur are (1) that no offer is made and accepted and (2) that a parliamentary majority wants such a vote. If the vote is held, and parties controlling a majority of seats vote *no*, then parliament is dissolved, new elections are held, the game ends, and party  $i$ 's period 2 utility is  $b_i - E_i$ . Otherwise, the initial governing coalition survives intact, the game ends, and party  $i$ 's period 2 utility is  $s_i + (c_i \times g_i)$ .

### Simplifying Assumptions

Three assumptions allow us to simplify the exposition with only a minimal loss of generality. First, we assume that a failed vote of confidence is necessary and sufficient for dissolution and new elections. To be certain, such a focus simplifies the actual dissolution procedures found in some parliamentary democracies. For instance, some constitutions severely constrain or even prohibit early dissolution (e.g., Norway, Switzerland). Most parliamentary democracies, however, permit early dissolution on terms similar to those assumed here. For simplicity and generality, we abstract away from the discretionary power sometimes vested in the head of state (e.g., as in Germany). Notice, however, that the extension of our findings to many of these cases is straightforward. For instance, in the case where dissolution requires a head of government's or head of state's approval, dissolution is at least marginally more difficult to accomplish. We can represent such difficulty as an election-related transactions cost (by raising  $E_i$ ). To represent cases where the person vested with the power of dissolution has a partisan bias, we can raise some  $E_i$  more than others. To represent the case where early dissolution is prohibited, we can make  $E_i$  prohibitively high for all parties. In sum, we assume that in all cases where dissolution is possible, every moment of a coalition's existence rests on the passage of at least an implicit vote of confidence.<sup>20</sup>

Second, we assume that each player has a minimal preference for stability, which manifests itself as a tie-breaking rule for the case where the expected utility from two distinct activities is equal. If all else is equal, then we assume that a party will act to preserve the initial governing coalition. If such an outcome is not possible but all else remains equal, then we assume that a party will act to preserve the current parliament. Simple alterations to this tie-breaking rule affect our findings in a minimal and straightforward fashion.



Third, we assume that making offers may involve a transactions cost. We represent such a cost by assuming that an offering party must pay  $K_i \in \mathbb{R}$ . Our motivation for  $K_i$  is the party-specific costs of formulating an offer to redistribute power. These costs include the effort required to obtain the approval of party members and constituents.<sup>21</sup> As was true of electoral costs, we assume these negotiation costs may be different for different parties. We also recognize the existence of negotiation-related opportunity costs, such as the policy-making opportunities or rent collection opportunities that parties squander when they engage in coalition bargaining. As we did with election-related costs, we assume that each party's negotiation-related opportunity cost is the utility it currently draws from its role in government  $s_i + (c_i \times g_i^j)$ .

## RESULTS

We now use the model to provide a deductively valid conclusion to the question of primary interest: What are the causes and consequences of coalition termination? Our conclusion is presented as three theorems and a corollary. We prove the first theorem in the Appendix. The validity of the other theorems follows from similar logic (twelve lemmas presented in the Appendix).

We begin by presenting conditions A, B, and C. These conditions are derived from eight lemmas in the Appendix and prove to be critical in the identification of coalition termination dynamics.<sup>22</sup> The Appendix includes a formal statement of each condition.

**CONDITION A.** *There is a majority that prefers an election to leaving the governing coalition exactly as it was.*

Condition A is satisfied only if either (1) the first and second parties hold a majority of seats and both anticipate higher utility from an election than they do from maintaining the status quo; (2) the first and out-parties hold a majority of seats and both anticipate higher utility from an election than from the continuance of the status quo; or (3) the second and out-parties hold a majority of seats and both anticipate higher utility from an election than from the continuance of the status quo.

**CONDITION B.** *All offering parties prefer an election to the best acceptable offer they can make.*

Condition B is satisfied if and only if each offering party finds itself in a situation equivalent to the following: the first party anticipates receiving higher utility from an election than it does from either making the offer that both maximizes its own utility and provides higher utility for the second party than an election or making the offer that maximizes its own utility and provides higher utility for the out-party than an election.

**CONDITION C.** *No offering party prefers the best acceptable offer it can make to leaving the governing coalition exactly as it was.*

Condition C is satisfied if and only if both the first and second parties prefer the status quo to a coalition between the out-party and itself in which the offering party retains nearly all governing power.

Theorem 1 characterizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for a potentially critical event to lead not only to coalition termination but also to dissolution.

**THEOREM 1.** *The event leads to dissolution if and only if A and B are true.*

Theorem 1 tells us that not every potentially critical event leads to dissolution. For dissolution to occur, there must exist a set of parties that collectively have a parliamentary majority and individually prefer an election to the status quo. Each party that can make an offer must also prefer the anticipated consequences of new elections to the most favorable and acceptable offer it can make.

This result leads us to qualify an important insight offered by Grofman and van Roozendaal, who argue that "anticipation of future electoral gains may cause a certain party or a group of parties to seek to bring down the cabinet at a moment when their anticipated electoral success will be greatest" and hypothesize that "parties terminate cabinets when they expect electoral gains" (1994, 158). Our model suggests that this insight is only partially correct. In coalitional circumstances, a party with favorable electoral prospects will also consider the option of extracting advantages through nonelectoral means (e.g., bargaining with parties that have less favorable prospects). Such renegotiation is particularly likely if some member of the existing coalition has a strong desire to avoid elections. Furthermore, even in noncoalitional two-party systems, where a single governing party can call elections at will, high election costs can suffice to preclude such an action. In sum, it is simply not true that favorable electoral prospects for any particular party are sufficient to cause a parliament's downfall.

Having established that a potentially critical event, by itself, does not cause dissolution, we now offer a corollary that describes the conditions under which dissolution is most likely. The validity of corollary 1 follows directly from theorem 1 and the straightforward application of simple comparative statics.

**COROLLARY 1.** *When it affects whether or not dissolution occurs, an increase in any party's expected postelection utility ( $b_i$ ) or negotiation costs ( $K_i$ ) OR a decrease in any party's election costs ( $E_i$ ), subjective value of seat control ( $s_i$ ), or subjective value of coalition membership ( $g_i^j$ ) leads to dissolution. In addition, such changes never prevent dissolution where it otherwise would have occurred.*

Corollary 1 tells us that dissolution is most likely when there exist parties that (1) expect large benefits from an election, (2) face small election costs, (3) face large costs for negotiating nonelectoral transfers of power, (4) derive little value from the seats they currently control, and (5) derive little value from the other coalitions they could enter.

Corollary 1 also suggests a possible interactive effect between time elapsed since the last election and



whether a specific event will be critical. To see this effect, first note that most parliamentary democracies possess constitutionally mandated limits on the maximum length of a parliament's term.<sup>23</sup> Before the mandated time is reached, calling new elections is merely an option. However, when this upper bound is reached, new elections must be held.

Now consider this comparative static: if early elections mean that parties sacrifice greater policy-making opportunities and rent collection opportunities than later elections do, and if all else is constant, then as the parliamentary term approaches its upper bound, election-related opportunity costs should decrease. That is, all else constant,  $g_i^j$  should be relatively high early in a parliament's term, should decrease continually over that term, and should reach its minimum when parties have no other choice but to hold an election. If this relationship between  $g_i^j$  and time holds, then (following corollary 1) an event that does not cause dissolution early in a parliament's term could do so later.<sup>24</sup>

Theorem 1 and corollary 1 imply that the extent to which a particular event is "critical" is extremely context-dependent. For instance, if the opportunity costs of having an early election are high, then dissolution requires a large event. Thus if these costs decrease over time, then dissolution requires smaller events as a parliament ages.

Such conclusions run counter to the generally untested assumption of a constant hazard rate (or survival likelihood) that is prevalent in empirical, stochastic models of cabinet stability (Browne, Frensdreis, and Gleiber 1986; Cioffi-Revilla 1984).<sup>25</sup> Interestingly, Warwick (1992b) finds impressive cross-national evidence that the hazard rate for executive coalitions increases over time. This is precisely what our model predicts, and we know of no other persuasive behavioral account of this regularity. At a minimum, future attempts to estimate empirically the determinants of cabinet duration should include a component that increases continuously as the constitutionally mandated parliamentary term limit approaches.<sup>26</sup>

We now describe necessary and sufficient conditions for a potentially critical event to have absolutely no effect on the initial governing coalition.

**THEOREM 2.** *The status quo is maintained if and only if A is false and C is true.*

Theorem 2 first tells us that the current governing coalition's and cabinet's complete survival requires that every parliamentary majority must include at least one pivotal party that prefers the status quo to an election. Theorem 2 also reveals that a coalition's survival requires that each offering party must prefer the status quo to a coalition (with the out-party) in which it retains nearly all governing power. If either requirement is not met, then the current cabinet does not survive—either a nonelectoral reallocation of power between existing coalition members, a coalition-changing nonelectoral reallocation of power, or dissolution and new elections will occur.

Our second theorem implies that coalitional stability is possible in the presence of either favorable election prospects or parties who are able to offer each other greater shares of power than they currently have. Simple comparative statics reveal why this is true: low electoral benefits (low  $b_i$ ) decrease the threat of an election and a sufficiently unattractive out-party (low  $g_1^0$  and  $g_2^0$ ) or high negotiation costs decrease the threat of a nonelectoral reallocation of power. Absent both threats, offering parties have little bargaining power and generally cannot persuade other parties to accept meaningful changes to the status quo. Therefore, we conclude that stability is fostered by either a dearth of alternate utility-generating opportunities for potential coalition partners or factors that make party-specific negotiation costs or election costs high.

In all circumstances except those identified in theorems 1 and 2, the event leads to some type of nonelectoral reallocation of power.

**THEOREM 3.** *The event leads to a nonelectoral redistribution of power if and only if either (1) A is true and B is false or (2) A and C are false.*

While it is beyond our scope here to discuss, in depth, the conditions under which particular types of coalitions will form, we can address several widely held notions about coalition reformation.<sup>27</sup> For example, several recently published formal theories of coalition formation in a three-party legislature predict that the governing coalition will comprise the largest and smallest legislative parties (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Baron 1991).<sup>28</sup> Our findings imply that the validity of this prediction is not robust to the introduction of parties who look forward to the next coalition termination or election when they bargain. A further implication is that the size and bargaining power of political parties need not be positively correlated.

To see this, notice that a necessary condition for the "largest-smallest" prediction is that the party to whom an acceptable offer is made must control either the smallest or the largest number of seats. Now consider the general case where the largest party,  $i$ , is in the position to make an offer and there exists a disparity between the value of potential coalition partners,  $j$  and  $x$  to it ( $g_i^j \neq g_i^x$ ). All else constant, the offering party should prefer to coalesce with the more valuable coalition partner. If all else is not constant, however, then the offering party must consider the trade-off between the value of a coalition partner (the value of different pies) and the size of the power share that it can retain (the share of each pie that it would receive). If the disparity is sufficiently large (e.g., if one party is a virtual pariah), then the offering party could choose to coalesce with the larger party (it will opt for a smaller piece of a more valuable pie).

In sum, we agree with formal political theorists that if an offer is made, then it will be made to the party whose bargaining power is weakest. However, such behavior does not require the formation of a coalition between the largest and smallest parties. Instead, if an offer is made, then it will be made to the weakest party, where the weakest party is the one that faces

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FIGURE 2

## The Relationship between Conditions and Outcomes

(A) The vote of confidence will fail

(C) Status quo beats best offer (not C) Best offer beats status quo	(B) Election beats best offer	(not B) Best offer beats election
	Dissolution & new elections	Non-electoral reorganization
	Dissolution & new elections	Non-electoral reorganization

(not A) The vote of confidence will succeed

(C) Status quo beats best offer (not C) Best offer beats status quo	(B) Election beats best offer	(not B) Best offer beats election
	Status quo survives	Status quo survives
	Non-electoral reorganization	Non-electoral reorganization

the most utility-damaging combination of (1) bad electoral prospects, (2) high election costs, (3) high negotiation costs, (4) low-value coalition partner alternatives, and (5) highly valued seats or coalition-related power (that must be forfeited as a result of coalition termination or parliamentary dissolution). Similar distinctions can be drawn between our "weakest party" dynamic, Riker's (1962) prediction concerning minimum winning coalitions, and Axelrod's (1970) prediction of connectedness.<sup>29</sup>

Figure 2 shows the ultimate relationship between our three conditions and the different types of outcomes described in the theorems.

## AN EXAMPLE

We now present numerical examples that place our results in a more concrete setting. Some readers have found these examples to be very helpful in understanding which contexts trigger (or fail to trigger) coalition terminations. Others can treat this section as optional reading.

The example's critical assumptions are that the first party controls 45% of the seats ( $s_1 = .45$ ), the second party holds 15% of the seats ( $s_2 = .15$ ), the out-party holds 40% of the seats ( $s_o = .40$ ), the first and second parties have equal shares of power in the initial governing coalition ( $c_1 = c_2 = .5$ ), and all possible coalitions generate the same value for each party ( $\forall i, j: g_i^j = 1$ ). The example's potentially critical event reveals that if election costs are zero, then new elections make the first and out-parties better off—and the second party worse off—than the status quo:

$$b_1 = 1 > .95 = s_1 + c_1 g_1^1$$

$$b_2 = .09 < .65 = s_2 + c_2 g_2^1$$

$$b_o = .91 > .4 = s_o.$$

The variables in our example are the negotiation transactions costs,  $K_1 \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $K_2 \in \{0, 1\}$ , and election transactions costs,  $\forall i: E_i \in \{0, 1\}$ .

In our example, the  $s_i$  and  $c_i$  add up to one, while the  $b_i$  add up to two. What motivates this set of parameters is the example-specific assumption that the source of beliefs about postelection benefits ( $b_i$ ) are expectations about postelection seat and power shares.

$$\sum_i b_i = 2 = \sum_i s_i + \sum_i c_i g_i^j.$$

In sum, we choose this particular set of parameter values only because they allow us quickly to show how simple variations in electoral or legislative institutions might moderate the effect of a potentially critical event on coalition termination.

*Example 1a.* Negotiation and election costs are zero.

The outcome of the game is a redistribution of power between members of the initial governing coalition. To see why this is true, notice, in the example's initial assumptions, that the first and out-parties prefer an election to the status quo. Therefore, if no offer is accepted, then new elections are held.

To see why such elections do not take place, we move to the next to last stage of the game, the second party's opportunity to make an offer. The first party requires no less than

$$c_1^2 = \frac{b_1 - E_1 - s_1}{g_1^2} = .55$$

as a prerequisite for coalescence, as such an offer would make it indifferent between acceptance and



new elections [ $s_1 + (c_1^2 g_1^2) = 1 = b_1 - E_1$ ]. For similar reasons, the out-party requires no less than

$$c_0^2 = \frac{b_0 - E_0 - s_0}{g_0^2} = .51.$$

Since making either offer leaves the second party better off than it expects to be after new elections ( $b_2 - E_2 = .09$ ), since all coalitions are equally valuable to the second party (all  $g_i^j = 1$ ) and since the second party benefits by making the smallest offer that another party will accept, the best move for the second party at this stage of the game is to offer  $c_0^2 = .51$  to the out-party [ $s_2 + ((1 - c_0^2) \times g_2^2) - K_2 = .64 > s_2 + ((1 - c_1^2) \times g_2^2) - K_2 = .6 > .09 = b_2 - E_2$ ].

To see why the outcome of the game is not a new coalition between the second and out-parties, we move to the previous (and first) stage of the game, the first party's opportunity to make an offer. We now know that if the first party fails to make an acceptable offer, then the second and out-parties will coalesce. As a result, the second and out-parties will not accept any offer that leaves them worse off than will their prospective coalescence. Thus the out-party demands no less than  $c_0^1 = .51$  as a prerequisite for coalescence, while the second party demands no less than  $c_2^1 = .49$ .

If the first party makes no offer, then it will be excluded from the period 2 coalition and will receive utility  $s_1 = .45$ . If it makes the smallest offer that leaves the out-party at least as well off as a coalition with the second party, then it receives no more than  $s_1 + ((1 - c_0^1) \times g_1^1) - K_1 = .94$ . Similarly, an acceptable offer to the second party would leave the first party with a payoff of no more than  $s_1 + ((1 - c_2^1) \times g_1^1) - K_1 = .96$ . Therefore, the first party makes the smallest acceptable offer,  $c_1^1 = .49$ ; the second party accepts; and the game ends. Notice that *example 1a is the only case in which the largest and smallest parties choose to make a new coalition.*

*Example 1b.* Same as 1a, except that the first party's negotiation cost,  $K_1$ , increases from 0 to 1.

The outcome is now a new coalition between the second and out-parties. To see this, notice first that the dynamics of this example are the same as example 1a up to the point where we consider the situation faced by the first party.

Now consider the first party's dilemma. The increase in  $K_1$  makes it prohibitively expensive for the first party to make an acceptable offer to either of the other two parties. In other words, if the first party makes no offer, it will be excluded from the period 2 coalition and will receive utility  $s_1 = .45$ ; if it makes an acceptable offer to the out-party, it will receive no more than  $s_1 + ((1 - c_0^1) \times g_1^1) - 1 = -.06$ ; and if it makes an acceptable offer to the second party, it will receive  $s_1 + ((1 - c_2^1) \times g_1^1) - 1 = -.04$ . Therefore, the first party makes no offer, the second party offers  $c_0^1 = .51$  to the out-party, the out-party accepts, and the game ends. Notice that *example 1b represents the only case in which the minimum winning coalition forms.*

*Example 1c.* Same as 1b, except that the second party's negotiation cost,  $K_2$ , increases from 0 to 1.

The outcome is now dissolution and new elections. To see why this is true, notice first that the dynamics of this example are the same as example 1a up to the point where we consider the second party's opportunity to make an offer. Next notice that the increase in  $K_2$  makes it prohibitively expensive for the second party to make an acceptable offer. Since the first party's negotiation cost is also prohibitively high (see example 1b), neither party makes an offer, the vote of confidence is held, and its failure leads to an election.

*Example 1d.* Same as 1c, except that each party's election cost increases from 0 to 1.

The outcome is now the status quo. To see this, notice first that the increase in election costs leads each party to prefer the status quo to an election.

$$b_1 - E_1 = 0 < .95 = s_1 + (c_1 \times g_1^1)$$

$$b_2 - E_2 = -.91 < .65 = s_2 + (c_2 \times g_2^1)$$

$$b_0 - E_0 = -.09 < .4 = s_0$$

This reversal in preferences means that a vote of confidence would pass if held. Therefore, if no offer is accepted, then the status quo is maintained.

Now consider the situation faced by the second party. Because the consequence of no accepted offer is the status quo, neither the first nor the out-parties will accept any offer that provides them with a smaller share of power than they currently have. Thus the first party requires no less than  $c_1^2 = .5$  as a prerequisite for coalescence while the out-party will accept an offer that includes any positive share of power. While the second party could have nearly all of the power by coalescing with the out-party, the magnitude of  $K_2$  leads the second party to prefer the status quo to any offer it could make [ $s_2 + ((1 - c_0^2) \times g_2^2) - K_2 = .15 - \epsilon < .65 = s_2 + (c_2 \times g_2^2)$ ], where  $\epsilon > 0$  and very small. Therefore, the best move for the second party is to make no offer. Since the situation faced by the first party is nearly identical to that faced by the second, it also makes no offer. Therefore, neither party makes an offer, and the game ends with the initial governing coalition intact.

*Example 1e.* Same as 1d, except that the first party's negotiation cost,  $K_1$ , decreases from 1 to 0.

The result is a new coalition between the first and out-parties. The dynamics of this example are the same as example 1d up to the point where we consider the first party's offer. The out-party will accept any positive share of power as a prerequisite for coalescence while the second party requires no less than its current share of power,  $c_2 = .5$ . If the first party makes no offer, then the outcome of the game will be the status quo, and it will receive utility  $s_1 + (c_1 \times g_1^1) = .95$ ; if it makes an acceptable offer to the out-party, the most utility it could receive is  $s_1 + ((1 - \epsilon) \times g_1^1) - K_1 = 1.45 - \epsilon$ ; and if it makes an acceptable offer to the second party, the most utility it could



receive is  $s_1 + ((1 - c_1^1) \times g_1^2) - K_1 = .95$ . Therefore, the first party offers the smallest possible share of power to the out-party, the out-party accepts, and the game ends.

## CONCLUSION

Our primary conclusion is that external events can deeply affect—but do not wholly determine—the dynamics of coalition bargaining. The effects of external events depend critically on the context in which they take place, the bargaining power of the various parties, and the constraints each party faces. For example, the 1980s breakups of the German and Irish coalitions were not the necessary and automatic outcomes of any environmental shock. On the contrary, they resulted from careful and deliberate adaptation to changing circumstances.<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, and as McLean anticipated, "One vital factor brought out by none of the coalition theories is that there are two overlapping games going on all the time in parliamentary bargaining. There is coalition-building on the basis of the (known) result of the last election; and bargaining in anticipation of the (unknown) result of the next one. Immediately after an election, the first swamps the second, which gradually increases in relative importance until just before the next election" (1987, 113-14).

Of course, other institutional or organizational features ("structural attributes") may be just as important. The costs that individual parties incur while making or considering coalitional offers are one such factor. The leaders of the Irish Labour party, for example, faced major internal organizational constraints on their ability to negotiate with Fine Gael or any other party. These organizational rules imposed bargaining costs on the Labour party, as well as on any party (e.g., Fine Gael) that attempted to negotiate with it. The precise nature of such institutional constraints is well worth more intensive exploration in future research.<sup>31</sup>

The key implication of our findings is that scholars who want to understand parliamentary decision making need to pay greater attention to the specific nature of critical events. We suggest that information concerning anticipated voter behavior can serve as a gauge of a particular event's critical potential. Though this information need not be critical events' only metric, we believe that previous neglect of electoral incentives may have prevented us from obtaining a more adequate understanding of parliamentary decision making, especially as it regards coalition termination. While politicians cannot always "go to the country," the anticipated voice of the people is never far from the forefront of their concerns. In legislatures vested with dismissal and dissolution powers, expected electoral impact is often what makes a political event "critical" to cabinet stability.

Parliamentary government, the most common

democratic regime type, depends on effective delegation of power along a single chain of command. We argue that changes in the control of these governmental shocks. Instead, they are both a reflection of deliberate responses to such events and a reaction to the anticipated feelings of the electorate. The virtues of democracy hinge on precisely such interactions.

## APPENDIX

We first present our findings about party behaviors, then we present our findings about the nature of coalition termination. We use the *subgame perfect Nash equilibrium* solution concept to derive our findings. This concept provides deductively valid conclusions and requires that we proceed by backward induction on the extensive form depicted in Figure 1. Thus we begin by characterizing behaviors at the end of the game.

**LEMMA 1:** The vote of confidence. *The event leads to the dissolution of the parliament and new elections if and only if the first and second parties fail to make an offer that ends the game and there exist parties  $i, j$ , and  $x \in \{i, j, \emptyset\}$ , such that  $s_i + s_j > .5$  and  $b_i - E_i > s_i + c_i g_i^x$  and  $b_j - E_j > s_j + c_j g_j^x$ .*

In words, Lemma 1 says that if the game advances to its final stage; if there exists a set of parties that together control a majority of seats; and if at least one of these sets contains only parties for whom an election is better than the status quo, then the outcome cannot help but be a lost vote of confidence. Given the assumptions that any majority can force a vote of confidence, and that a lost vote of confidence is a sufficient condition for dissolution and new elections, the validity of Lemma 1 is obvious.

The next-to-last stage of the game involves the reactions to any offer that the second party might make. Lemmas 2 and 3 describe these reactions.

**LEMMA 2.** *The out-party accepts the second party's offer, call it  $c_0^2$ , if and only if the first party fails to make an accepted offer and either (1) rejection leads to an election and*

$$c_0^2 \geq \frac{b_0 - E_0 - s_0}{g_0^2}$$

*or (2) rejection leads to the status quo and  $c_0^2 > 0$ .*

**LEMMA 3.** *The first party accepts the second party's offer, call it  $c_1^2$ , if and only if the first party fails to make an accepted offer and either (1) rejection leads to an election and*

$$c_1^2 \geq \frac{b_1 - E_1 - s_1}{g_1^2}$$

*or (2) rejection leads to the status quo and  $c_1^2 > c_1$ .*

The proof of Lemma 2 reveals the insight as to why these particular reactions take place. The proof of Lemma 3 is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.

*Proof of Lemma 2.* From the extensive form, it follows that if the out-party accepts the second party's offer, then it must be the case that the first party failed to make an accepted offer. In what follows, we consider only the case where the first party experiences such failure. From Lemma 1 and the common knowledge, the out-party can deduce whether its refusal of the second party's offer will lead to an election or the status quo. If rejection leads to an election, then the out-party receives  $s_0 + c_0^2 g_0^2$  if it accepts the offer and  $b_0 - E_0$  if it does not. Thus the out-party should accept the offer if and only if the offer is made and  $s_0 + c_0^2 g_0^2 \geq b_0 - E_0$ . Subtracting  $s_0$  from each side of the equation and then dividing each side by  $g_0^2$  produces the requirement that

$$c_0^2 \geq \frac{b_0 - E_0 - s_0}{g_0^2}$$



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## Capitalism and morality

JAMES Q. WILSON

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WENTY-FIVE years ago, the two founding editors of this magazine published important essays on the cultural and moral status of capitalism.<sup>\*</sup> Irving Kristol worried that the most intelligent contemporary defenders of capitalism were now mostly libertarians who praised the market because it produced material benefits and enhanced human freedom but who denied that markets had anything to do with morality. Friedrich Hayek, for example, had written that "in a free society it is neither desirable nor practicable that material rewards should be made generally to correspond to what men recognize as merit." It is not practicable because one can supply a non-arbitrary definition of merit (or justice); it is not desirable because any attempt to impose such a definition would create a despotism. Kristol worried that people would not support any economic order in which "the will to success and privilege was severed from its moral moorings."

<sup>\*</sup> *The Public Interest*, Number 21, Fall 1970.

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Capitalism could not survive if, quoting George Fitzhugh, "none but the selfish virtues are in repute" because in such a society "virtue loses all her loveliness" and social order becomes impossible.

In the same issue, Daniel Bell published his famous essay on "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism" in which he suggested that the bourgeois culture—rational, pragmatic, and moral—that had created capitalism was now being destroyed by the success of capitalism. As capitalism replaced feudal stagnation with material success, it replaced tradition with materialism; as privation was supplanted by abundance, prudence was displaced by prodigality. Capitalism created both a parvenu class of rich plutocrats and corporate climbers and a counterculture of critical intellectuals and disaffected youth. The latter began to have a field day exposing what they took to be the greed, hypocrisy, and Philistinism of the former.

### Capitalism's great test

Both Kristol and Bell were amplifying on a theme first developed by Joseph Schumpeter: Contrary to what Marx had taught, capitalism would be destroyed not by its failures but by its successes. Their views did not go unchallenged; a decade later George Gilder, in *Wealth and Poverty*, launched a frontal attack on the Schumpeterian theory (and its development by Kristol and Bell) by arguing that capitalism was, in fact, a highly moral enterprise because it "begins with giving" and requires "faith."

However one judges that debate, it is striking that in 1970—at a time when socialism still had many defenders, when certain American economists (and the CIA!) were suggesting that the Soviet economy was growing faster than the American, when books were being written explaining how Fidel Castro could achieve by the use of "moral incentives" what other nations achieved by employing material ones—Kristol and Bell saw that the great test of capitalism would not be economic but moral. Time has proved them right. Except for a handful of American professors, everyone here and abroad now recognizes that capitalism produces greater material abundance for more people than any other economic system ever invented. The evidence is not in dispute. A series of natural experi-



Reviewed by Eliza Van Hollen

Anyone who has wrestled with the Kashmir problem—a seemingly endless and insoluble source of hostility between India and Pakistan—will appreciate the masterful dissection of its multiple complexities in this highly analytical study. Focusing mainly, but not exclusively, on recent history and the current deadlock, Professor Wirsing provides sensible suggestions to lessen the ongoing violence.

Wirsing highlights the multidimensional nature of the Kashmir dispute by analyzing three separate clusters of issues. In Part I, "The Boundary Problem," he reviews India and Pakistan's conflicting claims to Kashmir and their disagreement over its boundaries. He also considers the strategic context of the dispute, particularly emphasizing China's active participation. Part II, "The Separatist Problem," is a detailed portrayal of the Kashmiri Muslims' uprising against India, which the author dates from 1988. Wirsing shows how both Pakistan and India fuel the fighting and continue to commit human rights abuses—Pakistan, by supplying cross-border assistance to the militants, and India, by daily increasing Kashmiri alienation through a repressive counter-insurgency campaign. He also describes the obstacles, including India's internal politics, that have hampered India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's efforts to find a political solution. Part III, "The Problem of Settlement," explores the potential for differing formats and formulas to resolve the dispute. All attempted formats, such as multilateral (United Nations) initiatives, third party involvement (the Soviet Union at Tashkent in 1966), and bilateral talks between India and Pakistan, have ultimately failed. Wirsing believes that the common basis of numerous proposed formulas—converting the current Line of Control (LOC) between India and Pakistan into an international boundary—is an unacceptable starting point for both Pakistan and the Kashmiris. (The LOC is the internal boundary that divides Indian- and Pakistani-held sectors of Kashmir, delimited

The book's final section is devoted to the author's own recommendations. He suggests focusing, for the indefinite future, on demilitarizing the LOC border, thus bypassing the emotional and essentially unanswerable questions regarding who has the greater claim to Kashmir. He also advocates renewing Indo-Pakistani bilateral negotiations to disengage from a costly confrontation on the Siachen Glacier in north-eastern Kashmir. The 1986–92 Siachen talks demonstrated that, at the time, both sides considered the issue to be negotiable.

*India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute* is a valuable addition to the literature on Kashmir. The comprehensive coverage of the on-going Kashmiri uprising and the Siachen Glacier dispute is based overwhelmingly on interviews with a wide range of Indian, Kashmiri, and Pakistani participants and on personal observation. The analysis of existing literature on the entitlement issue, focusing on whether a controversial partition boundary award (determined in August 1947 by the Punjab Boundary Commission, chaired by Sir Cyril Radcliffe) was deliberately intended to facilitate Kashmir's accession to India, is incisive and interesting. Wirsing's policy recommendations appear eminently practical. As he points out, however, even his relatively limited goal of pacifying the LOC boundary will be unattainable until India and Pakistan themselves summon the requisite political will.

Despite the breadth of this book, some additions would be beneficial. A detailed map of the Siachen Glacier area would help illuminate the text, including Wirsing's intriguing disclosure that erroneous official US maps may have exacerbated the tension that eventually led to India's military move onto the glacier in 1984. The author's greater emphasis on the impact of domestic Indian politics on developments in Kashmir is logical. The relative influence of Pakistan's various political players on Islamabad's Kashmir policy, however, needs amplification. Also, while the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars are covered briefly in the very useful chronology in Appendix I, their discussion in the narrative text would help highlight their relevance to regional perceptions of the Kashmir problem. Finally, in reference to Pakistan and the US "terrorism list"



military elite, an elaborate black market, or a set of non-cash perks. Between unconstrained market inequality and the lesser inequality achieved by some redistribution, there is much to discuss and decide, and so the welfare-state debate proceeds. Participants in this debate sometimes forget that the only societies in which such a debate can have much meaning are those that have produced wealth that can be redistributed and that have acquired a government that will do so democratically—in short, capitalist societies.

Similarly with respect to the environment: Only rich (that is, capitalist) nations can afford to worry much about the environment, and only democratic (that is, capitalist) nations have governments that will listen to environmentalists. As with inequality, environmental policies in capitalist systems will vary greatly—from the inconsequential through the prudent to the loony—but they will scarcely exist in non-capitalist ones. If anyone doubted this, they were surely convinced when the Iron Curtain was torn down in 1989, giving the West its first real look at what had been hidden behind the Berlin Wall. Eastern Europe had been turned into a vast toxic waste dump. Václav Havel explained why: A government that commands the economy will inevitably command the polity; given a commanding position, a government will distort or destroy the former and corrupt or oppress the latter.

To compel people engaged in production and exchange to internalize all of the costs of production and exchange without destroying production and exchange, one must be able to make proposals to people who do not want to hear such proposals, induce action among people who do not want to act, and monitor performance by people who do not like monitors, and do all of this only to the extent that the gains in human welfare are purchased at acceptable costs. No regime will make this result certain, but only democratic capitalist regimes make it at all possible.

Capitalism creates what are often called “post-material values” that lead some private parties to make environment-protecting proposals. Capitalism, because it requires private property, sustains a distinction between the public and the private sphere and thereby provides a protected place for people to stand who wish to make controversial proposals. And capital-



ism permits (but does not require) the emergence of democratic institutions that can (but may not) respond to such proposals. Or to put it simply: environmental action arises out of the demands of journalists, professors, foundation executives, and private-sector activists who, for the most part, would not exist in a non-capitalist regime.

### Capitalism and the good life

Many readers may accept the view that capitalism permits, or possibly even facilitates, the making of desirable public policies but reject the idea that this is because there is anything moral about it. At best, it is amoral, a tool for the achievement of human wants that is neither good nor bad. At worst, it is an immoral system that glorifies greed but, by happy accident, occasionally makes possible popular government and pays the bills of some public-interest lobbies that can get on with the business of doing good. Hardly anyone regards it as moral.

People with these views can find much support in *The Wealth of Nations*. They will recall the famous passage in which Smith points out that it is from the "interest," not the "benevolence," of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner. An "invisible hand" leads him to promote the public good, though this is "no part of his intention." Should they study the book more carefully, they will come across passages predicting the degradation of the human spirit that is likely to occur from the division of labor, the incessant seeking after monopoly benefits and political privilege that will follow from the expansion of manufacturing, and the "low profligacy and vice" that will attend upon the growth of large cities. The average worker employed in repetitive tasks will become "stupid and ignorant," the successful merchant living in a big city will become personally licentious and politically advantaged.

Karl Marx, a close student of Smith's writings, had these passages in mind (and, indeed, referred to them) when he drew his picture of the alienation man would suffer as a consequence of private property and capitalism. But Marx (and, in some careless passages, even Smith) had made an error. They had confused the consequences of modernization (that



is, of industrialization and urbanization) with the consequences of capitalism. The division of labor can be furthered and large industrial enterprises created by statist regimes as well as by free ones; people will flock to cities to seek opportunities conferred by socialist as well as capitalist economies; a profligate and self-serving elite will spring up to seize the benefits supplied by aristocratic or socialist or authoritarian or free-market systems. Show people the road to wealth, status, or power, and they will rush down that road; many will do some rather unattractive things along the way.

Among the feasible systems of political economy, capitalism offers the best possibility for checking some, but not all, of these tendencies toward degradation and depravity. When Smith suggested that the increased division of labor would turn most workers into unhappy copies of Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times*, he thought that only public education could provide a remedy. Because he wrote long before the advent of modern technology, he can be forgiven for not having foreseen the tendency of free markets to substitute capital for labor in ways that relieve many workers of precisely those mindlessly repetitive tasks that Smith supposed would destroy the human spirit.

Urbanization is the result of modernity—that is, of the weakening of village ties, the advent of large-scale enterprise, the rise of mass markets, and an improvement in transportation—and modernity may have non-capitalist as well as capitalist sources. Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Moscow have long been among the dozen largest cities in the world, but, until quite recently (and still quite uncertainly), none of these was located in a nation that could be fairly described as capitalist. They were state-dominated economies, either socialist or mercantilist, and Smith would have had no use for any of them. And, being non-capitalist, most of these states were barely democratic (the USSR not at all). Lacking either a truly private sector or a truly democratic regime, reformist and meliorist tendencies designed to counteract the adverse consequences of massive urbanization were not much in evidence. Americans who rightly think that high rates of crime are characteristic of big cities, but wrongly suppose that this is especially true of capitalist cities, need to spend some



time in Moscow, Rio, and Mexico City.

Capitalism creates privilege; socialism creates privilege; mercantilism creates privilege; primitivism creates privilege. Men and women everywhere will seek advantage, grasp power, and create hierarchies. But to the extent that a society is capitalist, it is more likely than its alternatives to sustain challenges to privilege. These arise from economic rivals, privately financed voluntary associations, and democratically elected power-holders; they operate through market competition, government regulation, legal action, and moral suasion. But they operate clumsily and imperfectly, and, in the routine aspects of ordinary morality, they may not operate well enough.

### Capitalism and the morality of everyday life

By this point, I may have persuaded a few readers that a system of rival interests has some beneficial moral effects, at least in comparison to statist economies in which the playing field is tilted by one set of greedy actors having decisive power over another. But nothing I have said is inconsistent with the view that capitalism rests on greed and therefore with the view that, at best, capitalism is amoral.

This was not, I think, the view of either Smith or many of the other earlier defenders of capitalism. In *The Wealth of Nations*, he certainly gives an unflinchingly honest account of how self-interest drives economic decisions. But, as Albert Hirschman has suggested, eighteenth-century thinkers did not divide human motives into reason and interests, they divided them into reason, *passions*, and interests. Having seen the failures of unaided reason and the perils of unguided passions, they hoped that calm interests would inform reason and temper passion.

This was the argument about the beneficial effects of *doux commerce*—sweet (or gentle) commerce—and it was implicitly taken up by the American Founders when they made their case for a commercial republic. It has been repeated of late by the British anthropologist and philosopher Ernest Gellner who, in reflecting on the failure of European communism, observes that no society can avoid finding a way to channel the desire men have to advance themselves. In traditional and in statist societies, the way to attain wealth is first to attain



power, usually by force. But, in market societies, "production becomes a better path to wealth than domination."

Critics of capitalism argue that wealth confers power, and indeed it does, up to a point. But this is not a decisive criticism unless one supposes, fancifully, that there is some way to arrange human affairs so that the desire for wealth vanishes. The real choice is between becoming wealthy by first acquiring political or military power or by getting money directly without bothering with conquest or domination. Max Weber put it this way: All economic systems rest on greed, but capitalism, because it depends on profit, is the one that disciplines greed.

In the process of imposing that discipline, capitalism contributes to self-discipline. It encourages civility, trust, self-command, and cosmopolitanism by first making these traits useful and then making them habitual.

Smith alluded to this when he observed that "commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals ... who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours and of servile dependency upon their superiors." Lest Smith be interpreted as arguing in favor of central government, he makes clear in other places that the beneficial effects of free and orderly commerce operate chiefly on the character of individuals, especially would-be lords and conquerors now converted into merchants. Nor is he, in the passage quoted above, contradicting his account of the baleful effects on ordinary people of an extreme division of labor; capitalism may bring liberty and security, but it also brings temerity, narrowness, and profligacy. To Smith, sweet commerce was sweet-and-sour.

Smith's ambivalence reflected his analysis of the class structure of society. Commerce would create a middle class whose new members would mostly be decent people. "In the middling and inferior stations of life," he wrote, "the road to virtue and that to fortune ... are, happily, very nearly the same." Among people engaged in middle-class occupations, "real and solid professional abilities, joined to prudent, just, firm, and temperate conduct, can very seldom fail of success." In this circumstance, the proverb that "honesty is the best



policy" proves true. But matters are very different in "the superior stations of life," in part, because the rich and well-born live in a self-constructed world of privilege that isolates them from the effective judgment of ordinary (and ordinarily decent) men, and, in part, because merchants and manufacturers will move to cities where they will have countless opportunities to acquire political privileges—monopolies, loopholes, and subsidies—that insulate them from fair market judgments about their products, services, and practices.

Smith's worries, so often quoted, about the affluent few detract, I think, from the much more important impact of capitalism on the not-so-affluent many. An economic system that provides many alternative suppliers for any desired product or service creates an incentive for each supplier to act as if he or she cared about the interests of the customer. Everyone has heard enough stories about surly waiters in Soviet restaurants to acknowledge that communist managers never took customers as seriously as they took commissars, but perhaps this was simply the extreme result of doing business in a pathological society. I doubt that. There has been comparable evidence available in the United States for many years. Until recently, most big airports supplied food to travelers by giving an exclusive franchise to a single vendor. Of late, many airports are giving franchises to several rival vendors—McDonald's, Burger King, Taco Bell, and the like—to offer food competitively in airports. Without question, the quality of food and service has gone up.

A skeptic will rejoin that competition merely requires suppliers to act as if they cared about the customer. But, as any economist will note, a firm's reputation has a capital value (it is sometimes measured on the balance sheet as good will) and so business executives who wish to maximize that value will devote a great deal of effort to inculcating a service ethic in their employees. One cannot do that cynically. "If you can fake sincerity, you've got it made," someone once said. That may be true for a few individuals, but organizing such fakery on a large scale is impossible—the teaching will be unconvincing, and the lesson will be ignored.

But acting as if one cared has more than economic significance. Our characters are formed, as Aristotle observed, by



the process of habituation. Any process that makes a personal disposition habitual is character forming. Parents know this, which is why they teach good manners to their children by means of constant small reminders and an insistence on routine observances. Though I am aware of no evidence bearing on it, there is little reason to suppose that habituation ends with adulthood or cannot occur outside the family. Are young people who have worked for three years at McDonald's and been taught to parrot learned phrases ("How may I serve you?" "Will that be all?" "Thank you.") more likely on leaving for better jobs to be civil than are similar youngsters who worked in a company that attached no value to civility? I don't know, but I think so.

When Smith wrote that the "understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments," he was worrying about the harmful effect on the mind of dull and exhausting labor. But the shortened work day and the use of machinery have made this effect much less likely than it was in the eighteenth century. Today, it may be that it is the manners of people that are formed in part by their daily employment.

### Capitalist virtues

Capitalism requires some measure of trust. In any economic system, buying and selling occurs, but voluntary buying and selling on a large scale among strangers requires confidence in fair dealing that cannot depend on one party having much detailed knowledge about the other. Routinized exchanges present some of the same problems as a "Prisoner's Dilemma" in which both participants have an incentive to cheat if they assume they will only play the game—or engage in the exchange—once. The solution to the dilemma lies in repeating the game in conformity with this rule: do to the other party what he has just done to you ("tit for tat," in political scientist Robert Axelrod's phrase), but make your first move a "nice" one in order to encourage the other party to do the same. In some societies, mainly Western ones, this rule is enforced by contract law; in others, notably Eastern ones, by group affiliations. Capitalism takes advantage of this rule in order to create large, permanent markets among strangers that can oper-



ate without incessant recourse to retribution. In so doing, it strengthens conformity to the premise on which it depends: some minimum level of trust. This is a moralizing activity even though every customer knows that another rule—*caveat emptor*—also operates.

In a recent paper, John Mueller of the University of Rochester has observed that price haggling—once a common feature of most markets and still characteristic of some—has been abandoned even though it conferred short-term advantages on the seller. (This was true because sellers, knowing more about their wares than customers, had an advantage over most casual shoppers.) But some sellers discovered that, in the long run, they did more business by setting attractive, fixed prices. This practice lowered transaction costs for customers, thereby enlarging the number of customers.<sup>1</sup> Mueller notes that, as early as 1727, businessman-turned-novelist Daniel Defoe argued against haggling because it encouraged both parties to lie. The rise of fixed-price dealing has shifted misrepresentation from price to quality (or at least to advertising about quality).

Another premise on which capitalism depends is self-command. Smith understood that investment was required for capital to be accumulated and that investment, in turn, required that some people be willing to postpone immediate gratification for later (and larger) benefits. Smith did not explain why we should assume that the number of savers will be sufficient to produce the necessary investment. He observed that "prodigality," the result of a "passion for present enjoyment," will diminish the capital available for economic growth, and so it will be necessary for the "frugal man" to save enough to spare the rest of us from the consequences of our own prodigality. But will this occur? Smith predicts that "the profusion or imprudence of some" will be "always more than compensated for by the frugality and good conduct of others." Why? Well,

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<sup>1</sup> Why, then, does price haggling still occur in the sale of automobiles? In part, it is because the purchaser, as well as the dealer, has something to sell. The purchaser usually has a used car to trade in and has little incentive to set a fixed price for it. He bargains over what the trade-in is worth and so the dealer must bargain over what the new car is worth. Even here, however, some dealers are experimenting with fixed-price sales.



the desire to save comes from an innate desire to better our condition. But, since only a few save a lot, the desire must be limited to a few. Will they be too few?

People differ in their degree of self-command but are alike in the high regard in which they hold people who display self-command (provided the display is not excessive, as it is with personalities that are miserly or rigid). Self-command is, in short, regarded (up to a point) as a virtue, one that is essential to capitalism and that capitalism strengthens to the extent that it induces more and more people to think about the future. (Indeed, economic growth requires that people have a concept of a secular future, a notion that may well have been absent or meaningless in feudal Europe.) The recent decline in the rate of American private savings corresponds to a period in which self-indulgence has been conspicuous. I have no idea what to make of this parallel except to suggest that a complete understanding will almost surely require a cultural, as well as economic, analysis. If all that mattered were net yields on savings, the Japanese would not be saving anything. Their banks pay very low interest rates, yet their customers save at world-record rates.

Finally, capitalism contributes to cosmopolitanism. This remark will be laughable to any reader who, when hearing the word "capitalist," conjures up an image of George Babbitt or Henry Ford. Capitalism, having been linked by artists to bourgeois culture, has forever been linked to narrow Philistinism. But, long ago, Gary Becker explained why markets are the enemy of racial or ethnic discrimination. Prejudice is costly: It cuts a supplier off from potential customers and an employer off from potential workers, thus reducing sales and raising factor costs.

Embedded in a thoroughly racist community, capitalism can easily exist side by side with prejudice because there are no competitive disadvantages to acting on the basis of prejudice: Since white workers and customers will not mingle with black workers and customers, all employers are on the same footing. But let a crack develop in the unanimity of racist sentiment; let some workers and some customers become indifferent to the racial identity of their colleagues; let nationwide enterprises discover that some customers dislike racism and will



make their purchasing decisions on that basis; let this happen, and market pressures will swiftly penalize employers who think that they can, without cost, cater to prejudice.

None of this is to deny the important role played by law, court order, and the example of desegregated government agencies. But imagine rapid desegregation occurring if only law, order, and example were operating. It would be slow, uneven, and painful. Public schools desegregated more slowly than hotels and restaurants not only because white parents cared more about who their children went to school with than about who was in the next hotel room or at the next cafe table but also because school authorities lacked any market incentive to admit more or different pupils. Indeed, a statist economy would not only resist desegregation, it would allocate economic benefits—franchises, licenses, credit—precisely on the basis of political, class, ethnic, or racial status.

### **Capitalism against slavery**

In a remarkable essay, historian Thomas L. Haskell of Rice University has connected capitalism to the attack on slavery in a bold and new way. The conventional view among historians of the social-control school has been that reform efforts, including the attack on slavery, were intended to further the hegemonic interests of the bourgeoisie. When abolishing slavery was the most rational way to insure the docility of the workers and enhance the legitimacy of the bourgeoisie, slavery was abolished.

This argument is not crudely Marxist; sophisticated control theorists do not necessarily say that businessmen stood to benefit immediately and materially from an end to slavery. They are even prepared to concede that the business classes deceived themselves about what they were doing. But, what they insist upon is that the bourgeoisie could not really have acted out of altruistic motives. And it does seem strange to think that they might have done so. After all, British capitalists were practicing profitable large-scale agriculture in the West Indies. They had many allies, including customers, in London. Then, all of a sudden, slavery was ended after a public debate that rested almost entirely, as far as I can tell, on humanitarian principles. Control theorists suggest that it came about



because the capitalists wanted to enhance their legitimacy by abolishing slave labor so that labor for slave wages would not be suspect. As David Brion Davis put it, the abolitionist movement "helped clear an ideological path for British industrialists" that, by exaggerating the harshness of slavery, "gave sanction to less barbarous modes of social discipline."

Haskell finds this a somewhat tortured argument. Can capitalist opponents of slavery, notably the successful Quaker businessmen of the late eighteenth century, really have thought that their "ideological hegemony" (whatever they thought that might be) would be enhanced by attacking the slave system, and that this was more important to them than what they repeatedly and eloquently *said* was their motive—namely, the horror they felt toward involuntary servitude?

In place of the social-control theory, Haskell suggests that capitalism supported, and was wholly consistent with, the religious convictions of the Quaker abolitionists. As capitalism spread, it carried with it a universalistic message. An important part was the new, high value attached to keeping promises and the concordant development and enforcement of contract law. As commerce spread, promise keeping and contract writing were increasingly carried on with strangers and foreigners, including Jews, heathens, and Levantines. Capitalism sharpened one's sense of, and commitment to, the future, and it equipped its more skillful practitioners with experience in dealing with contingencies. Successful capitalists learned to deal fairly with distant strangers and thus learned to attach greater importance to individual reliability than to group membership.

Commerce across cultures can be profitable, but it is risky. In coping with the risks, capitalists learned ways of dealing with remote circumstances. They acquired, in Haskell's phrase, "recipes for intervention," or what a social scientist would call a sense of efficacy. By this route, some came to believe that it was possible, as well as desirable, to challenge slavery. Haskell does not argue that capitalism was inherently a moral argument against slavery, only that it was a cultural, as well as economic, movement that contained within its assumptions and practices certain preconditions—beliefs, experiences, recipes—for expanding the humanitarian sensibility to strangers. This



cultural change made possible, in about the length of one man's life, the abolition of a practice supported by custom, profits, argument, and property rights.

### Capitalism and bureaucracy

Capitalism is a system of action, but it is also one in which large-scale institutions operate. Like politics, economics creates bureaucracies, and bureaucracies have a logic different from that of either markets or politics. A large enterprise, whether private or public, tends to generate commitments to co-workers and subunits rather than to the enterprise as a whole, to separate employees from the customers or citizens affected by employee actions, and to operate on the basis of standard operating procedures that seem instrumentally rational even when they are substantively irrational. In short, bureaucracy diffuses or displaces the sense of personal responsibility. Firms differ from government agencies in many important respects, but this does not mean that they are free from the vices attendant on large-scale organization. There may be economic returns to scale, but not moral ones.

With all the talk about white-collar crime, we have remarkably little information about what kinds of organizational arrangements stimulate or impede misconduct. Big firms probably are more likely than smaller ones to obey certain laws and regulations because they have a more visible reputation to protect and the financial resources to hire specialists to do the protecting (for example, by discovering and complying with government rules). But big firms may be less inclined to right conduct of a different sort—that is, fair play in the most general sense.

One meaning of fairness is the Golden Rule: Treat customers, workers, and suppliers as you would wish to be treated under the same circumstances. That rule, however, will operate differently when the other party is dealt with at second or third hand, invisibly and impersonally, than when he is confronted personally. Even when we deal with a person face to face, we often find it quite easy to invent rationales for discounting their interests or rejecting their claims: "This guy is (take your pick) different, insincere, or unworthy." But it is much easier to conceive of other people as convenient ab-



stractions when they are known only by labels, words, or numbers, as is likely the case when we are members of a large organization.

Fairness can also be defined as receiving rewards proportional to effort. In face-to-face transactions, effort is the product delivered or the service rendered, and rewards are the cash received or the thanks expressed. In impersonal transactions, effort may be the skill displayed at currying favor from one's superiors and rewards the promotions and preferment that result from successful currying. Bureaucratization not only insulates some parts of a firm from market forces but also isolates them from human forces. Bureaucratization involves specialization that often implies encapsulation, reducing the proportion of workers who deal intimately and regularly with other specialists. (In sociological jargon, there is a decline in boundary-spanning roles.)

Bureaucratization also requires measures of employee achievement that are poor proxies for market success. In a firm, a successful accountant, lawyer, or personnel officer is rarely the one who has increased profits or sales for the enterprise (managers rarely can know whether these people have materially helped or hurt profits); it is the person who has best conformed with higher-level expectations as to how an accountant, lawyer, or personnel officer is supposed to behave (and these may be reasonable, unreasonable, or self-serving expectations).

Robert Jackall, in his book *Moral Mazes*, explores how managers in two large corporations define the rules, and thus implicitly the moral requirements, of their jobs. In both firms, he found struggles for status and dominance, perceived gaps between reward and merit, and a preoccupation with the maintenance of good public relations over sound policy. Managers seeking advancement had to keep their eye out for "the main chance," and that, in turn, meant, among other things, "unrelenting attentiveness to the social intricacies of one's organization." The tone of Jackall's book suggests that he is no friend of corporations, but his detailed observations cannot for that reason be ignored.

Corporate executives are aware that they live at a time when great attention is paid to "corporate responsibility" and



"business ethics." Observers who are well-disposed toward capitalism and suspicious of elite fads may dismiss these preoccupations as mere catering to a hostile media. That would be a mistake. Though much of this talk may be fatuous or superficial, the problem of imbuing large-scale enterprise with a decent moral life is fundamental. Chester Barnard made this clear nearly 60 years ago in *The Functions of the Executive*. However ready people are to comply with the self-regarding demands of a group and conform to the narrow culture of an organization, most people know the difference between doing things they are proud to tell their children about and things they hope their children never find out about.

Serious executives know this and worry about it. The emergence of codes of corporate ethics and the emphasis on fashioning a defensible corporate culture are not, I think, merely public relations (though they are sometimes just that). They are, at their best, a recognition that people want to believe that they live and work in a reasonably just and decent world. Americans are gloomy about the decency of their culture and the justice of their politics; it may be one of the supreme ironies of our time that they are often more satisfied with their employer than with their community. If true, Marx has been stood squarely on his head: Life has become more alienating than work.

As Michael Novak has observed, the corporation is an important mediating structure that stands, like the family and the church, between the individual and the state. It constitutes not simply a utilitarian arrangement but a community of sorts that shapes human conduct. People, of course, know the difference between a profit-making firm, on the one hand, and a child-rearing family or a soul-comforting church, on the other. They have different expectations from each. But no economist should suppose that since firms are about profits, that is all they are about, anymore than he should imagine that because families are about sex, that is all they are about. Corporations are not vehicles for realizing the ideal society; one of their good features, as Paul Johnson has noted, is that they attach little value to Utopian causes. But they are systems of human action that cannot for long command the loyalty of their members if their standards of collective action



# PEECHES *and* STATEMENTS

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## PRESS CONFERENCE OF M. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AT THE END OF HIS STATE VISIT TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN (ISLAMABAD, 21 FEBRUARY 1990)

THE PRESIDENT - Since our arrival in Pakistan, quite apart from the diplomatic demarches, some very interesting achievements we were given the opportunity to look at and substantive discussions on the future of our relations, we reached some agreements in the economic and industrial cooperation spheres. On this paper I see a whole series of signed protocols: some for French firms implementing TECHNIP, some involving CIT ALCATEL, others ALSTOM and the list is far from complete.

Moreover, at the same time, the Minister of Agriculture was continuing conversations which have themselves culminated in a series of special agreements of which you will be informed.

What do they concern? Enlarging cement works, polychloride supplies, delivery of 80,000 telephone lines and energy projects in many spheres (I shall leave aside for the moment everything to do with nuclear energy or nuclear power plants) where energy is proving necessary in Pakistan. We also discussed cultural questions, archeological schemes and a Science and Technology Institute, whilst the Secretary of State for Humanitarian Policy met the non-governmental organizations of which, as you know, there are a large number of extremely dedicated ones in this country, above all on the borders with Afghanistan.

A 170 MF financial agreement has been signed, the last part of the 1989 protocol, as has a university cooperation convention between the Institute of Oriental Languages and the Islamabad National Modern Languages Institute. From this, on our side, we are hoping for progress in the teaching of our language.

As everyone knew, the nuclear energy problems were scheduled to be the main issue in our conversations. A five-point text will be distributed to you.

The first of these points says that France considers it necessary to help Pakistan secure her economic development. She is fully aware of this country's substantial energy needs.

Secondly, France is ready to help Pakistan in this effort, and will propose to her in the next few weeks the conclusion of an agreement specifying the spheres (agriculture, medicine, industry, energy, etc.) in which that cooperation might take place.

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Thirdly, in the context of that cooperation, France undertakes to authorize French companies, possibly in collaboration with one or more foreign partners, to present with all due speed a technical and commercial offer for the sale of a nuclear power plant to Pakistan.

Fourth point, that offer will be drawn up in compliance with international standards and particularly the controls and safeguards that apply to any export of nuclear equipment.

The fifth point refers to all that has happened in the past as France and Pakistan have agreed to seek an amicable agreement on the issue of the reprocessing plant. Vague disagreements were dragging on, there will be mutually agreed compensation. This is a problem that is not linked to the first in law or in principle, but to which a solution can be found in the general context of what has just been decided.

I have announced those things straight away to enable you to condense your questions. I just want to thank the Pakistani authorities, particularly the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister for the way they have received the French delegation, the consideration they have shown and the quality of the conversations that have enabled us to achieve a certain number of results which you will be able to appraise. So I want to make a point of expressing these thanks. And now the field is clear for your questions.

Q. - (on the Afghan problem)

THE PRESIDENT - I'm going to reply straight away and without the slightest difficulty. France has supported all the demarches that were supposed to bring about the foreign armies' evacuation of Afghan territory. Again and again France has expressed her wish to see Afghanistan decide for herself through her citizens' self-determination and thus through free elections, in order to achieve a system enabling her, I repeat, to be sovereign and non-aligned. France has voiced her views within the Security Council, quite apart from making statements in a purely national capacity. So there's no mystery. From the outset she has supported the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, who was particularly familiar with this problem having had to deal with it when he was Assistant Secretary-General and as Secretary-General he has shouldered his responsibility in a remarkable way. We are still supporting these efforts and I do not see what I can add unless you ask me more specific questions.

Q. - France has announced the reopening of her embassy in Kabul. Yet on 22 February the embassy is still deserted. What role is France going to be able to play in the calming process which the European Community seems still to be ignoring. Does she not consider that the cease-fire ordered by all the parties together is a vital first stage?

THE PRESIDENT - France didn't leave Afghanistan at any time in the diplomatic and political sense of the term. She did not break off



her diplomatic relations with the country represented by the government in Kabul. In doing in what she has done, she has acted like most of the other countries. She withdrew her chargé d'affaires because it was dangerous when there was shelling going on. It has ceased, the staff are due to return. As far as I know, there is therefore no new recognition, no new political factor. I believe France will not be the only country to act in this way. It's bound to be a bit complicated. But there are those who would like us to rush into the arms of Mr. Najibullah's government and those who would like us to have nothing at all to do with the government. We are not taking sides, we have diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, we are maintaining them.

There is a danger for the staff. We are taking our precautions; there's less danger so we are returning: that doesn't commit us politically in any way and in no way signifies a choice which would be misunderstood because our choice is free elections, self-determination, United Nations' supervision and finally a free sovereign and non-aligned country. What else do you want me to say?

Q. - You began with a statement on that nuclear plant, you are an experienced statesman, but you spoke relatively vaguely. (...) Are we going to have the nuclear power station and reprocessing plant?

THE PRESIDENT - You're so insatiable that we shall never get through this conversation. I don't know where you have seen a vague text. In the one handed to the Prime Minister, France undertakes to authorize French companies, (this authorization is essential for anything nuclear in France), possibly in collaboration with one or more foreign partners to present with all due speed a technical and commercial offer for the sale of a nuclear plant to Pakistan. It's not for the government to decide in the place of the companies on the commercial, financial terms which are going to be discussed, given, of course, that the political decision has been taken. Logically, the fact that this political decision has been taken means that the French Government will follow the technical and commercial negotiations closely to ensure they are successful.

Q. - I should like to know if the decision was taken before leaving Paris or if it was the discussion with the Pakistani leaders and particularly with Mrs. Bhutto that led to this step being taken.

THE PRESIDENT - The discussion with Mrs. Bhutto could not fail to be useful and hers was a distinguished role. As for knowing what I thought before, when I have completed my memoirs which I very probably won't write, you will find out.

Q. - Do you support the consensus of the Pakistani people whereby Kashmir ought to be given the right to self-determination ....?

THE PRESIDENT - I don't support any Pakistani claim any more than any Indian one. I am ready to support the Kashmiris' claims. In fact, the Pakistani authorities have at no time viewed it in the first

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place as a Pakistani matter. They have always considered that the Simla agreement should be implemented and measures taken on the international level - not simply between regional partners - so that the people of Kashmir could decide for themselves. I believe it was a commitment accepted in 1949 and that on the Indian side it was made by Mr. Nehru. From that point of view, and at the international level, without anyone, above all France, wanting to complicate or worsen a situation which isn't easy, there is a legal basis to which I just have to call attention. I have not come here to fan the flames; on the contrary, I want France to be helpful in encouraging the various parties involved to seek agreements in this conflict which has taken a sudden new turn. But any settlement must be based on law and this legal basis has been established. I haven't invented anything new, that's not my job.

As for the actual problem of the rights of individuals, often raised by the press and particularly the Pakistani press, it is important for those wishing to find out what is happening over there and so make a correct assessment, without implicating anyone or criticizing anyone a priori, to go there, see what the situation is and report back to us.

Q. - Just now the Pakistani reporter was talking about a reprocessing and not a nuclear power plant. Has Pakistan undertaken to comply with all the different international controls you spoke about in your text and in your opinion isn't the Indian Government's decision to suspend the Airbus contract a first reaction of ill humour to your visit here and the prospect precisely of selling a nuclear power plant?

THE PRESIDENT - Generally, reactions come afterwards not before. From my knowledge of the French language, it's very difficult to react against something that hasn't happened. I make no connection between the two decisions, particularly as several days have already elapsed since the failure to communicate to Airbus information about the accident that occurred in India, and, from what I know about the Indians with whom we maintain good relations, I can't see them interfering in France's affairs to the extent of forbidding her leaders to travel abroad and visit the countries of their choice. So far no foreign Head of State has asked me for permission to go anywhere. I think you would perhaps like to liven up this press conference, but I don't believe your question is warranted.

Q. - India had said that the Kashmiris have the right to self-determination, but now they are threatening us with war and threatening the Kashmiris too, so in that context I should like to know what decisions France is going to take and whether or not she will raise this matter at international level, at the United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT - This problem has already been raised. I have already recalled the international guarantee on the agreements in question. Don't ask France to inflame the situation, that's not her role. I note the prudence of the other governments who are concerned precisely to avoid that conflict degenerating. An armed conflict

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benefits no one. If it's a matter of upholding the law, France will be present in the international bodies and particularly, when necessary, in the Security Council.

Q. - In your initial remarks regarding the problem of compensation for the reprocessing plant, you said this would be agreed mutually. This is a question I am asking both of you, are you closer to an agreement than you were last time on the last offer of compensation?

THE PRESIDENT - The discussion is still going on: I didn't come to discuss those things down to the last comma, I didn't come to negotiate a commercial agreement. The political problems are referred to me. It had become one between Pakistan and France. But it is the Ministers of Foreign Affairs who have to work out the amount and above all the procedure France ought to follow as a consequence of this dispute and they are right in the middle of doing so. There is agreement, there will be no sudden new development in this issue over the following months.

Q. - For weeks disorder has been growing in the Soviet Union's Moslem republics. Don't you think these Moslem republics quite simply don't want any more to do with the Russian Communist Party?

THE PRESIDENT - It might be that. It might be something else. Quite apart from your writing skills, you are a very good reporter, allow me to give you a piece of advice: even if you deprive me for a time of your presence, go over there and then please be good enough to report back to me with your impressions. In that way, when the next person asks me the question, I shall know what to say.

Q. - What role do you see for France in the year 2000, given the great changes that have taken place around France, your relations with your great neighbours in Europe and the repercussions these changes will have on the third world?

THE PRESIDENT - You know, I usually tell people who talk to me about this that all these changes in Europe are welcome. These peoples are reconquering their freedom and exercising their sovereignty in full. And all this at the Soviet leader's instigation. So they're very far-reaching developments.

France's role is an ancient one. People ask me what will happen with a unified Germany, the unification of the two States and Berlin. I answer, if the Germans want it, they have the right of self-determination like any other people. But this self-determination, if it is to lead to unification, will involve a great many repercussions - security, alliances, frontiers and goodness knows what else, which directly concern us. So I have always made a point of asserting France's right to be involved in defining them. They are simple. The frontiers: they must be respected. Security: it must be discussed. The alliances: we'll look at them in the course of time. And the discussions will take place. There is a body known by its initials CSCE, Cooperation and Security in Europe, that brings



together thirty-five countries which have come of age and are perfectly capable of determining the terms of their security, particularly as they are already working on achieving disarmament.

No, France is used to these things, her country is one of those with the largest number of inhabitants in Europe. If the Germans are to have more, well the Germans will have more. If that happens, as most of the commentators predict, there will be seventy-five million Germans all together. And then there will be fifty-six or fifty-seven million French people. We've been in this situation before. Since Bouvine, I believe it was in 1214, we had Charles Quint, and then there was Spain too. There was Bismarck, I'll stop there. By that I mean it is not a problem for France. Moreover something very important has happened: since the last conflict Germany has been a democratic country. She belongs to a Community of which we are a member and we even have special agreements with her. So I am optimistic for France in the years ahead.

Q. - You talk of democracy and there's democracy throughout the world. And our Prime Minister has proposed having an organization of democratic countries. Being the President of a democratic country, are you going to do something along these lines?

THE PRESIDENT - Yes, at all events I am ready for anything in this sphere, we did not talk about creating a league together, but if people suggest to me discussions between democratic States, that would be an excellent thing. Moreover, I want to say, in reply to earlier questions, that we have extremely active relations with India. Moreover, we are cooperating, I myself took the decision in 1982, with India in the nuclear sphere. So I don't see how it would be a scandal to sell a nuclear power plant to Pakistan. If it's a problem of law, you can't settle it like that, and even on a practical level it's quite correct to treat parties the same way. (...)


Q. - What reasons led France unilaterally to cancel an agreement to supply Pakistan with a reprocessing plant? Was it simply American pressure? Secondly, does the agreement you have just announced regarding nuclear cooperation with Pakistan demonstrate French confidence that Pakistan's nuclear intentions are both peaceful and legitimate?

THE PRESIDENT - If Pakistan's request had been illegitimate, we would not have responded. The problem, I repeat, is simple, France has an advanced nuclear industry. In many parts of the world people are calling on her technology and wanting to buy nuclear power plants with international safeguards and in any case that is the permanent French condition for producing nuclear electricity. So we have sold plants, as I have already said, to various countries including China, South Korea and in the future Pakistan. It is not for us to choose. I think that technological developments and international law are in 1990 far more refined than they were fifteen years ago. At all events, under my responsibility, that's the case: we have in fact decided to trust Pakistan.

For the problem previously discussed, that is on Kashmir, there is a contract which governs the parties and we French are not one of them. From what I myself know about the agreements signed at the time between India and Pakistan, the Kashmiris should be consulted. That's all. It must not be internationalized, I don't want it to be. That's the purpose of the law, but quite a few of you have been asking me throughout this visit what France intended doing. France does not intend taking the place of the parties. We want a legally solid settlement and agreements between the two countries concerned, which are always preferable to conflict. That is all I can say on that. France is not party to that discussion./.



CARTE 1. — LE CACHEMIRE



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Depuis 1990, c'est sur le Cachemire indien que se polarise l'attention, car aux vagues d'agitation du passé ont désormais succédé une large revendication d'autodétermination et un nouveau terrorisme qui, inspiré par les événements du Moyen-Orient, recourt non seulement aux attentats et extorsions de fonds, mais également aux prises d'otages suivies d'assassinat (y compris de coopérants étrangers).

La guerre froide passée, le monde extérieur prête alors plus d'attention aux revendications des Cachemiris et se fait l'écho de violations des droits de l'homme perpétrées par des forces de sécurité indiennes énervées par la situation de guérilla à laquelle elles sont confrontées<sup>3</sup>. Le cycle violences/répression aveugle ne pouvant qu'aliéner des fractions croissantes de la population et conduire à une multiplication des groupes armés<sup>4</sup>, le gouvernement central indien semble maintenant s'être enfermé dans le type de situations inextricables que provoquent souvent les mouvements de libération : selon *India Today*<sup>5</sup>, l'importance des forces paramilitaires indiennes est passée de 36 compagnies en 1990 à 300 actuellement et, en trois ans, 3 438 civils avaient été tués<sup>6</sup>. Cela correspond à une extension des attentats à des régions du Jammu jusque-là épargnées. Ainsi le district de Doda est désormais en proie à un terrorisme aussi inquiétant que celui de 1988-1989 à Srinagar — par lequel tout a commencé.

Dans ces conditions, l'idée que l'opinion se fait de la situation sur place est façonnée par les protestations nécessairement alarmistes des victimes de la répression. D'autant plus que celles-ci sont orchestrées par les solidarités islamistes et par les rapports établis par des organisations de défense des droits de l'homme (indiennes autant qu'étrangères, rappelons-le) d'autant plus sourcilleuses que les cas de violation portés à leur attention se sont accrus.

Il n'en demeure pas moins que, depuis l'été 1992, de nombreux groupes insurgés, notamment les groupes pro-pakistanaïes, se sont largement déconsidérés par une criminalisation de leurs activités et des représailles envers les éléments prêts au dialogue avec l'Inde qui valent bien les excès des forces armées régulières.

3. Voir les rapports d'Amnesty International entre 1991 et 1993 — notamment « India, Torture, Rape and Deaths in Custody », *Amnesty International*, Londres, mars 1992. Certains des témoignages recueillis demanderaient à être corrigés au vu des enquêtes menées ensuite par le gouvernement indien, mais il ne fait pas de doute que la situation justifie pleinement le soin que ce même gouvernement met actuellement à essayer d'y remédier. Parmi ces efforts : l'institution d'une Commission nationale des droits de l'homme indépendante des autorités, et la définition par l'armée de nouvelles directives sur lesquelles fonder l'entraînement des troupes.

4. Parmi les groupes les plus connus, le Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, fondé en 1965, est séculariste et socialisant. Il a commencé à opérer à partir du Pakistan et, un temps plus radical, est maintenant considéré comme relativement modéré. Divers autres organisations gravitent autour de lui. Le Panthers Party est également acquis à l'indépendance. Le Hizbul Mujahideen, la Muslim Student Federation et le Islami-Jammiat Tubba sont des émanations pro-pakistanaïes du Jammat Islami i Kashmir, le plus ancien parti fondamentaliste de l'État. Les Allah Tigers (qui se réclament aussi de Gulbuddin Hekmatyar), la Jammu and Kashmir People's League et le Al Jihad sont d'autres organisations pro-pakistanaïes.

5. Numéro daté du 31 mai 1993.

6. Le chiffre a continué à s'alourdir, au rythme d'une dizaine de morts par jour ; mais tous ne sont pas civils : l'armée indienne compte des pertes parmi ses officiers.



Mais pour paternalistes — et sans doute excessives — qu'elles soient, les déclarations faites en mai 1993 par des porte-parole du gouvernement américain, selon lesquelles l'intervention d'envoyés du gouvernement Bush aurait, de justesse, évité une guerre indo-pakistanaise en 1990, ne sont donc pas plus à prendre à la légère que le risque d'escalade nucléaire qu'elles expriment. En effet, une situation déjà critique lorsque les armées des deux pays s'affrontaient seulement au Ladakh, dans le glacier de Siachen<sup>7</sup>, a été rendue bien plus explosive par les dérapages spontanés qu'a facilités la démolition de la mosquée d'Ayodhya en décembre 1992. (Sur les derniers développements au Cachemire, voir le post-scriptum.)

Tout cela démontre essentiellement que le problème du Cachemire est bien plus complexe qu'il n'y paraît et que la situation interne, qui s'est certes détériorée par suite des maladresses de plusieurs gouvernements indiens, ne peut s'analyser sans référence aux relations indo-pakistanaïses et aux aspects internationaux du conflit. Tout effort d'appréciation rigoureuse doit donc prendre en compte aussi bien la nature du problème à son origine que la complexité des sédiments historiques et des composantes sociologiques qui en expliquent les véritables contours. Le contexte étant bien délimité, on comprendra mieux les raisons, internationales et purement indiennes, de l'évolution enregistrée et comment elles contribuent autant à fausser notre perspective qu'à rendre hypothétiques des solutions qui, de loin, peuvent paraître s'imposer.

### 1. Une complexité méconnue : la mosaïque ethno-culturelle

Autant que le différend indo-pakistanaïse, la grande diversité de l'ancien État explique la longue gestation et les contours de l'actuel problème de l'Inde au Cachemire.

Découpé en quatre (voire cinq<sup>8</sup>) régions ethno-culturelles par les montagnes qui le traversent, cet État princier était de création récente. Après avoir été (en partie) soumis à des souverains ou chefs hindous, bouddhistes, moghols, afghans, sikhs, il avait été conquis par la Grande-Bretagne et rétrocédé, par le traité d'Amritsar de 1846, à un prince hindou autrefois vassal des Sikhs. Celui-ci, alors, régnait déjà sur le Jammu comme, depuis 1830, sur le Ladakh. Le royaume avait vassalisé, au nord-ouest, une série de principautés (actuellement regroupées dans les Territoires du Nord sous contrôle pakistanaïse) dont certaines, le Hunza notamment, payaient également tribut à la Chine. Surveillant de près la zone frontière entre son empire, l'Afghanistan, l'Union soviétique et la Chine, la Grande-Bretagne avait aussi,

7. L'Inde a lancé, en 1984, une opération militaire dans le glacier de Siachen, au Ladakh, dans la zone au pied de laquelle s'arrête la ligne de contrôle entre les deux Cachemire, en invoquant le fait que le Pakistan était sur le point de s'en emparer. Depuis lors, des affrontements continuent à se produire. La dernière tentative de solution bilatérale du problème, en date de novembre 1992, a échoué et la réunion des secrétaires des Affaires étrangères n'a, en la matière, débouché sur rien.

8. Si l'on tient compte des diversités religieuses entre musulmans de Poonch et musulmans de la vallée du Cachemire.



## LE SÉPARATISME CACHEMIRI. DU RÉGIONALISME À L'IRRÉDENTISME ?

en 1935, repris (à bail) l'administration de la région de Gilgit, devenue, avec le Hunza et quelques autres territoires, une « agence » autonome. Au nord-est, c'est par suite d'une politique d'avancée territoriale menée par le maharajah à titre personnel<sup>9</sup> qu'une certaine ambiguïté a pu demeurer concernant les frontières du Ladakh et la situation, ultérieurement disputée entre la Chine et l'Inde, du plateau de l'Aksai Chin qui le prolonge. Enfin, la région de Poonch, au sud-ouest, avait été rattachée au royaume en 1936, grâce à un héritage.

Sur ses 222 236 kilomètres carrés, la géographie de l'ancien État princier<sup>10</sup> isole nettement un centre — l'autrefois « riche » vallée du Cachemire proprement dit —, carrefour culturel marqué par un islam sunnite hétérodoxe. Sur son pourtour, on trouve, au sud-ouest, la région de Poonch, de souche afghane ; au nord-ouest, les régions tribales (peuplées de chiites et d'ismaïliens) de la « zone tribale » proprement dite, de Gilgit, du Hunza et du Baltistan ; au nord-est, le Ladakh, largement bouddhiste ; et, au sud, le Jammu, surtout hindou (carte 2). La population est en outre divisée par les langues parlées dans les diverses régions<sup>11</sup> et par l'habitat : les quatre districts constituant la vallée du Cachemire et la plaine de Kathua-Jammu en regroupent la grande majorité. En 1947, 80 % des 4 millions d'habitants étaient musulmans et le pourcentage atteignait 94 % dans la vallée.

L'absence d'intégration, encore manifeste malgré la révolte que les musulmans ont engagée dès les années trente<sup>12</sup> (et malgré l'identité cachemirienne qu'invoque l'actuel mouvement de rébellion), est l'une des raisons pour lesquelles l'Inde a pu — au moins jusqu'en 1990 — garder en son sein, sans troubles majeurs durables, la partie la plus enviable d'un État revendiqué par le Pakistan.

Ainsi, malgré des incidents de parcours, la période 1947-1988, qui, après deux guerres portant spécifiquement sur le Cachemire<sup>13</sup>, a vu un gel apparent du conflit, a été très dominée par le différend indo-pakistanaïs.

9. La Grande-Bretagne, embarrassée, n'avait pas désavoué les fonctionnaires qui s'y étaient prêtés.

10. Pour un maximum d'informations en matière d'histoire et de géographie humaine, voir le livre d'Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir. A Disputed Legacy 1946-1990*, Hertingfordbury, Roxford Books, 1991.


11. Le cachemirien est surtout parlé dans la vallée. L'ourdou est également parlé par certains musulmans tandis que des hindous du Jammu parlent le dogri, les habitants du Ladakh, le ladakhi, et que d'autres langues coexistent avec celles-ci.

12. Tous les témoignages écrits font état aussi bien d'une autocratie particulièrement rigoureuse du maharajah hindou que de la discrimination pratiquée à l'encontre de ses sujets musulmans. Malgré la flambée de troubles intercommunautaires que certains États princiers ont connue à partir de 1930, ce phénomène ne caractérisait en rien l'ensemble de l'Inde des princes car il entraînait dans leur rôle traditionnel de protéger toutes les religions et beaucoup de meilleurs l'ont longtemps fait très efficacement.

13. Celle de 1947-1948 et celle de 1965. En 1971, la guerre indo-pakistanaise avait été provoquée par les événements du Bangladesh. Les opérations qui ont eu lieu à l'ouest ont été vite interrompues.



CARTE 2. — LA MOSAÏQUE ETHNO-RELIGIEUSE AU CACHEMIRE





## 2. Un insoluble conflit international

### Une conséquence de la partition

Aucune des règles qui ont présidé au découpage de l'ancien Empire des Indes n'impliquait le rattachement du Jammu et Cachemire au futur Pakistan. En effet, ceux des États princiers qui disposaient d'une certaine souveraineté avaient à choisir, si possible en fonction de la géographie, entre l'Inde et le Pakistan. Dans le cas du Cachemire, convoité par l'Inde comme berceau culturel et considéré par la Ligue musulmane comme une partie essentielle de son territoire, le dilemme était crucial : un maharajah hindou régnait sur une majorité de musulmans. violemment contesté depuis 1931 par un mouvement (dirigé par le cheikh Abdullah, héros de la vallée, et la Conférence musulmane, plus populaire dans la région de Poonch —, le maharajah Hari Singh rêvait d'indépendance<sup>14</sup>. C'est pourquoi il se contenta de signer un accord de *statu quo* avec le Pakistan<sup>15</sup> — par lequel passaient tous ses principaux moyens de communication. Les choses se compliquèrent en octobre 1947, avec le déferlement de bandes armées pathanes venues des territoires du Nord-Ouest (proches de l'Afghanistan) soutenir une des multiples révoltes dont les musulmans de Poonch avaient le secret. « Solidarité naturelle » et mouvement spontané pour les uns, cette invasion passe en Inde pour avoir été concertée avec la bénédiction d'autorités pakistanaises<sup>16</sup>. Quoi qu'il en soit, la combinaison

14. Par sa taille, sa richesse et sa situation stratégique, le Jammu et Cachemire apparaissait comme l'un des rares États princiers intrinsèquement viables. En revanche, le sort du maharajah était aussi mal assuré dans une Inde démocratique, dont le Premier ministre était un ami personnel du cheikh Abdullah. Après la scission de la première Conférence musulmane, ce lien entre Nehru et Abdullah avait facilité le rattachement de la Conférence nationale à l'aile du Congrès opérant dans les États princiers, la All-India States's Peoples Conference.

15. L'Inde refusa d'en faire autant pour le contraindre à prendre une décision.

16. Voir notamment B.L. SHARMA, *The Kashmir Story*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1967, dans lequel l'auteur, journaliste ayant couvert ces événements, cite plusieurs faits corroborant cette interprétation et, parmi eux, la plaidoirie en justice du khan de Mamdot, ancien Premier ministre du Pendjab, qui aurait fait allusion à un paiement de 20 000 Rs fait dans un but secret ne pouvant être dévoilé (en 1949) sans nuire aux intérêts du Pakistan. Cf. également les contributions d'Ashustosh VARSHNEY et de Pervaiz IQBAL CHEEMA (Islamabad) dans le livre de Raju THOMAS (*op. cit.*) : Cheema écrit notamment, p. 103, que les forces pakistanaises n'ont pas pénétré au Cachemire avant le début mai 1947. Le soulèvement de Poonch datant du mois d'août, cela semble corroborer des témoignages à l'occasion recueillis par la pression indienne selon lesquels ce soulèvement lui-même avait été orchestré dans l'« opération Gulmarg » par des forces pakistanaises. Cela tempère le point de vue, notamment, d'Alastair Lamb qui, selon l'interprétation britannique officielle, voit dans le déferlement des Pathans sur la vallée le simple jeu de solidarités culturelles. Le « contre-argument » pakistanais (cf. Iftikhar H. MALIK, « The Continuing Conflict in Kashmir Regional Detente in Jeopardy », *Conflict Studies*, n° 259, mars 1993) selon lequel l'Inde avait dès le début cherché à s'attacher le Jammu et Cachemire n'est pas convaincant : Malik invoque le fait que le maharajah de Patiala, dont l'armée était théoriquement déjà intégrée dans celle de l'Inde nouvelle, avait envoyé des forces au Cachemire dès le mois de septembre. Or, d'une part, l'intégration des forces armées des États n'était pas encore réalisée en pratique — les milieux princiers indiens sont précisément assez fiers de ce que leurs forces aient ensuite servi une cause nationale en aidant à repousser les envahisseurs ; d'autre part, il n'y avait rien de symptomatique à ce que, dans le



de la rébellion et de l'invasion allait l'emporter quand le maharajah fit appel à l'Inde. Celle-ci accepta d'envoyer des troupes à condition que l'État adhère à l'Union indienne et permette l'arrivée au pouvoir d'un gouvernement populaire.

L'adhésion à l'Inde et la formation d'un gouvernement dirigé par le cheikh Abdullah ayant été acquises, l'Inde repoussa les envahisseurs ; le problème aurait pu être résolu si, en janvier 1948, des troupes régulières pakistanaises n'étaient entrées en ligne. Au même moment, l'Inde portait le problème devant les Nations unies et, fait oublié, elle le faisait en exprimant son souhait de voir confirmer le rattachement par un plébiscite. Ce n'est qu'à partir de 1953-1954, lors de l'extension au Jammu et Cachemire de la compétence des institutions fédérales de l'Inde — et, plus spécifiquement, à partir de 1956 (voir *infra*) — que l'Inde a très explicitement tourné le dos au plébiscite.

### L'impuissance des Nations unies

Le Conseil de sécurité allait s'attacher surtout aux aspects communautaires et négliger la complexité des arguments juridiques avancés par l'Inde. L'intervention de l'ONU — et les réticences des généraux britanniques encore en fonction dans les deux pays — limita l'extension de la guerre sans rien régler et, le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1949, déboucha sur un cessez-le-feu coupant le pays en deux.

Deux résolutions du Conseil de sécurité en date de janvier 1948 avaient simplement appelé à un cessez-le-feu. Entre cette date et celle, charnière, de 1954<sup>17</sup>, une série d'autres initiatives s'employèrent en vain à trouver des modalités d'organisation d'un plébiscite qui soient acceptables par les deux pays. Si dépassées qu'elles paraissent, elles doivent être prises en compte par quiconque veut juger du problème en toute équité. On en trouvera un résumé dans le tableau ci-après, présentant les résolutions de l'ONU et les initiatives de médiation ayant échoué jusqu'en 1957, date à laquelle l'Union soviétique a, pour la première fois, usé de son droit de veto en faveur de l'Inde.

Le blocage est né de la combinaison de plusieurs facteurs : en premier lieu, une incontestable intransigeance d'un Pakistan très soupçonneux à l'égard de l'Inde<sup>18</sup>, mais très écouté

climat de l'époque, marqué par de nombreux affrontements entre sikhs et musulmans, les troupes de l'État sikh du maharajah de Patiala, personnalité connue pour son sens politique et ses initiatives personnelles (autant que pour une vie « typiquement princière »), volent au secours de celles d'un État autrefois conquis par les sikhs et dont le prince avait été, suivant notre terminologie, leur « vassal ».

17. Année de l'extension au Jammu et Cachemire du champ d'application de la Constitution indienne (en d'autres domaines que ceux — Défense, Affaires étrangères et Communications — déjà couverts par l'adhésion de l'État à l'Union indienne).

18. En un renversement des stratégies datant du début des années quatre-vingt, le Pakistan paraît désormais plus accommodant. Cependant, dans les années cruciales qui ont suivi la résolution de l'ONU en date du 13 septembre 1948 — qui demandait un cessez-le-feu après retrait des tribus et forces pakistanaises —, il a refusé de retirer ses troupes de l'Azad Kashmir tant que l'Inde, alors prête à accepter un retrait à peu près simultané, n'aurait pas retiré le gros de ses forces de la partie qu'elle contrôlait. Ce qu'on a pu reprocher à l'Inde tient aux mesures dilatoires

LE CACHEMIRE À L'ONU — PREMIÈRES MESURES, PREMIER VETO SOVIÉTIQUE

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<i>Résolution du 13 septembre 1948</i>	Engage l'Inde et le Pakistan à conclure un cessez-le-feu. Le Pakistan doit obtenir le retrait des tribus et organiser celui de ses troupes régulières. Le pays sera provisoirement administré par le gouvernement de l'État (celui du cheikh Abdullah) sous le contrôle de la Commission. L'Inde retirera ses troupes après évacuation des autres forces armées.	Après bien des réticences de part et d'autre, les deux pays acceptent. L'Inde ne le fait qu'en ayant l'assurance que le Pakistan devra d'abord retirer ses troupes de l'État.
<i>Propositions de la Commission du 11 décembre 1948</i>	Renonciation à l'idée de gouvernement intérimaire. L'administrateur du plébiscite sera nommé par l'ONU en accord avec gouvernements indien et pakistanais.	Accord des deux pays. Engagement de cessez-le-feu le 1 <sup>er</sup> janvier 1949.
<i>Résolution du 5 janvier 1949</i>	« Plébiscite libre et impartial », nomination d'un administrateur du plébiscite.	L'amiral Chester Nimitz (américain) nommé administrateur. Fait face à un problème : le Pakistan refuse de retirer ses troupes si le retrait n'est pas simultané pour les deux pays.
<i>Décembre 1949</i>	Le général Mac Naughton (canadien) nommé médiateur. Propose une médiation entre le gouvernement Abdullah et le gouvernement de l'Azad Kashmir.	Proposition repoussée par l'Inde.
<i>Mars 1950</i>	Nomination de sir Owen Dixon (australien). Organise sans succès une rencontre des Premiers ministres de l'Inde et du Pakistan.	Démission de sir Owen qui présente un plan de partage
<i>Février 1957</i>	Premier veto soviétique.	Gel durable de la situation.



des pays occidentaux qui commençaient à élaborer avec lui des traités d'alliance ; le jeu complexe des forces internes qui, de part et d'autre, avaient intérêt à nourrir le différend<sup>19</sup> ; et, enfin, une subtile évolution de la politique indienne. En fait, dès 1950, l'Inde, tout en parlant encore de plébiscite, préparait les moyens de s'y dérober. Car certains Indiens étaient inspirés par la vision stratégique d'une époque où les principales menaces prenaient la forme d'invasions terrestres<sup>20</sup> ; convaincue de la mauvaise volonté du Pakistan, elle cherchait déjà à se préserver d'une éventuelle menace chinoise en institutionnalisant sa possession du Ladakh, dont le contrôle compensait en partie la perte de Gilgit.

La période 1950-1953 fut donc bien celle des occasions manquées. Dix ans plus tard, une autre occasion fut perdue lorsque, à la suite du court rapprochement indo-américain provoqué par la guerre sino-indienne de 1962<sup>21</sup>, des suggestions américaines tendant soit au partage définitif de l'ancien Jammu et Cachemire selon la ligne de cessez-le-feu, soit à un condominium indo-pakistanaï suscitèrent des conversations entre Nehru et le général Ayub Khan — qui était alors tenté d'accepter toute forme de solution honorable<sup>22</sup>.

### Intégration dans l'Union indienne et gel du conflit

La marge d'autonomie dont bénéficierait le Jammu et Cachemire a longtemps fait l'objet de controverses entre la Conférence nationale et les autres partis, et il est significatif que le

auxquelles elle a recouru ensuite pour retirer le gros de ses forces et à une certaine ambiguïté d'une politique officiellement encore axée sur le plébiscite (cf. tableau). Maintenant, au contraire, l'Inde déclare l'adhésion du Cachemire irrévocable tandis que le Pakistan se déclare prêt à négocier la solution du conflit international. Cependant, en excluant les territoires du Nord du cadre d'un plébiscite, le Pakistan indique bien que lui non plus n'admet pas de modification de statut de régions placées sous son contrôle, ce qui soulève des questions relatives à l'authenticité de son soutien aux mouvements d'autodétermination.

19. L'intérêt des ressortissants de la partie occupée par le Pakistan se situait évidemment dans la poursuite des buts initiaux des dirigeants de la rébellion. En revanche, on peut imaginer que le cheikh Abdullah, au départ honni du Pakistan, ait d'abord eu intérêt à consolider sa position au sein d'un Cachemire « indien » pour mieux s'imposer aux deux pays et, par la suite, revendiquer plus d'autonomie si nécessaire. Telle est un peu la vision des nationalistes hindous. Cependant les tendances à l'autonomie qui l'ont fait arrêter, fin 1953 (pour six ans), pour « complot [avec l'étranger] » — après une rencontre avec le secrétaire d'État américain Adlai Stevenson — s'expliquent aussi par la campagne d'agitation menée en 1952-1953 par les nationalistes hindous (du Praja Parishad, du Jana Sangh et du Hindu Mahasabha) en faveur d'une intégration pure et simple du Jammu et Cachemire à l'Union indienne.

20. Cf. Alastair LAMB, *op. cit.*, 1991.

21. On a craint alors que le Pakistan ne profite de la situation pour attaquer l'Inde au Cachemire.

22. L'ensemble des ouvrages traitant du problème du Cachemire n'évoque l'origine de ces schémas que sous forme allusive. Ils m'ont été révélés pour la première fois par le (défunt) biographe de Gandhi, Louis Fischer, au cours d'un entretien à Princeton en 1966. Louis Fischer, ami de nombreux dirigeants indiens, avait participé, en tant qu'intellectuel, aux réflexions américaines sur la question. La question est spécialement discutée dans un article de l'ancien gouverneur du Jammu et Cachemire, JAGMOHAN, publié dans l'*Organizer* (hebdomadaire des nationalistes hindous) « Kashmir Special 1993 », qui dit qu'un séminaire d'intellectuels américains et cachemiris réuni en janvier 1993 à Washington a repris, en substance, ce même schéma comme la base de propositions qui pourraient être soumises au président Clinton.



rattachement du Cachemire à l'Inde par extension à cet État de la Constitution indienne soit devenu effectif en février 1954, après l'arrestation du cheikh Abdullah. En Inde, cette arrestation et l'intégration qui suivit ne furent nettement critiquées que par des socialistes. C'est que, par ailleurs, toutes les formes apparentes de la démocratie furent longtemps respectées. Certes, plusieurs chefs de gouvernement issus de la Conférence nationale furent successivement écartés du pouvoir par un gouvernement central indien qui, consentant des efforts financiers exceptionnels en faveur du Cachemire<sup>23</sup> — au moins du vivant de Nehru —, surveillait de près les évolutions internes. Mais ces décisions furent prises comme sanctions de leur corruption et jamais sans motifs. L'assise donnée à la Conférence nationale par une réforme agraire progressiste, un relatif mieux-être économique et le pouvoir de patronage des dirigeants ont assuré la stabilité en dépit d'élections parfois controversées.

### Un nouvel ordre politique : les subtilités constitutionnelles

L'Assemblée constituante cachemirienne<sup>24</sup> s'était réunie pour la première fois en 1952. Elle abolit la monarchie héréditaire et élut Karan Singh, fils du maharajah, comme nouveau chef de l'État avec le titre de *Sadr-i-Riyasat*. Par ailleurs, elle vota une résolution qui permit ensuite au gouvernement central indien d'élargir, par le décret présidentiel de 1954, les domaines dans lesquels la Constitution indienne s'appliquerait à l'État.

Le statut actuel de l'État — dérogatoire au droit constitutionnel en vigueur dans le reste de l'Inde — ne vit le jour qu'en 1956 lorsque l'Assemblée constituante adopta une Constitution propre au Jammu et Cachemire<sup>25</sup> qui établissait clairement le rattachement du Cachemire à l'Inde. L'article 370 de la Constitution indienne fut modifié en conséquence, imposant notamment au gouvernement indien de s'assurer l'accord du gouvernement cachemirien pour appliquer à l'État certaines décisions prises pour l'Inde.

Par la suite, l'Inde put assimiler ce vote à une consultation populaire et objecter aux demandes de plébiscite que sa Constitution ne permettait pas à un État de faire sécession.

### La toile de fond internationale

L'Inde put maintenir cette position parce que son hostilité à la constitution de l'Organisation du traité de l'Asie du Sud-Est de 1954 et à l'établissement de l'Organisation du traité de l'Asie centrale (CENTO) de 1955 avait éveillé un nouvel intérêt pour elle en Union sovié-

23. Cf. Raju THOMAS, *op. cit.*, p. 142. Selon Riyaz Punjabi, le gouvernement central indien aurait financé jusqu'à 97 % des dépenses d'équipement de l'État sous le troisième plan (1956-1961).

24. Prévue par l'accord d'adhésion de 1947 comme modalité d'institutionnalisation d'un gouvernement populaire.

25. Altérée par la pratique institutionnelle et l'accord de 1975, cette Constitution, à laquelle l'article 370 de la Constitution indienne donne une valeur juridique opposable à l'Inde et aux citoyens indiens (qui, rappelons-le, ne peuvent s'établir librement au Cachemire), n'a pas été abrogée. C'est la raison pour laquelle les nationalistes hindous demandent la suppression de l'article 370 de la Constitution indienne.



tique. Après une visite en Inde du maréchal Boulganine et de Nikita Krouchtchev en 1955, l'URSS appuya l'Inde et, à partir de 1957, usa pour elle de son pouvoir de veto à l'ONU.

Au plan international, trois conflits allaient peser sur la question du Cachemire, élément crucial des relations indo-pakistanaïses : la guerre sino-indienne de 1962, qui engendra des craintes de collusion pakistano-chinoise, la double guerre indo-pakistanaïse de 1965<sup>26</sup>, et la guerre de libération du Bangladesh de 1971.

La guerre de 1965 eut une configuration en quelque sorte inverse de celle de 1962 puisque la Chine lança un ultimatum à l'Inde pour soutenir le Pakistan. En revanche, terminée grâce à la collaboration des grandes puissances et à une médiation soviétique lors de la conférence de Tachkent en janvier 1966, elle aboutit surtout à geler le problème.

Bien que la guerre de 1971 n'ait pas porté principalement sur le Cachemire<sup>27</sup>, certaines de ses conséquences furent nettement plus marquées que celles de la guerre de 1965. Ayant cristallisé une nouvelle situation — marquée par les liens privilégiés entre l'Inde et l'URSS et la prépondérance de l'Inde dans une Asie du Sud désormais éclatée —, elle porta en effet un coup aux mouvements autonomistes du Cachemire. Ainsi, malgré sa conclusion — un arrêt de la progression indienne au Pakistan occidental après la victoire au Bengale oriental —, la guerre de 1971 consolida la position de l'Inde. Après les accords de Simla de 1972, signés par l'Inde et le Pakistan, elle déboucha sur des ajustements mineurs de la ligne de cessez-le-feu (désormais appelée ligne de contrôle) et sur l'engagement des belligérants de résoudre leur différend par voie bilatérale.

Le fait décisif fut cependant le retour au pouvoir d'un cheikh Abdullah désormais moins enclin à revendiquer l'autonomie. Mais ce retour fut l'aboutissement d'une évolution interne qu'il faut reprendre plus en amont.

### 3. Du malaise aux mouvements armés

En 1953, l'arrestation du cheikh Abdullah ne résolut durablement aucun des problèmes liés à la tension entre les pressions assimilatrices du mouvement nationaliste hindou<sup>28</sup> et le par-

26. La première « guerre » ne fut qu'une campagne limitée au sujet du Rann de Kutch, territoire de la péninsule de Kathiawar. Sur le conflit majeur de 1965, voir l'ensemble d'articles paru dans la *Revue française de science politique*, décembre 1966, ainsi que Ch. HURTIG, « La fin de la guerre indo-pakistanaïse de 1965, épuisement ou impasse ? », *RFSP*, avril 1974, p. 309-328.

27. Née à la fois du soutien indien au mouvement du Pakistan oriental contre le refus (par l'élite pendjabie du Pakistan occidental) d'accorder à la Ligue Awami du cheikh Mujibur Rahman les fruits de sa victoire électorale, de la répression organisée au Bengale oriental et de l'afflux sur le sol indien de réfugiés bengalais, la guerre de 1971 a donné lieu à une avancée indienne au Cachemire, mais son issue rapide a interrompu cette progression.

28. Lors de la campagne d'agitation qu'il avait inspirée en 1952-1953, le fondateur du Jana Sangh, Shyam Prasad Mookerjee, venu en 1953 soutenir le Praja Parishad (parti hindou local), s'est fait arrêter en vertu des lois qui, au Cachemire, établissent un contrôle sur l'entrée et l'établissement des citoyens indiens. Il est mort en prison quelques mois plus tard.

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### *Corruption interne et ambi*

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29. C'est à la suite de l'arrestat  
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tution indienne, cf. les deux artic  
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30. Voir note 24, *supra*.

31. Avec notamment le rempl  
autres États indiens.



ticularisme cachemiri. Au contraire, elle suscita la formation d'un « Front du plébiscite ». Cependant, le rôle dominant de la Conférence nationale ne fut pas ébranlé. Actuel objet de la vindicte nationaliste hindoue, l'article 370 de la Constitution indienne, qui garantissait l'autonomie du Jammu et Cachemire, n'était pas respecté à la lettre, mais constituait quand même un butoir sur lequel s'arrêtaient les tendances à l'intégration<sup>29</sup>.

### Corruption interne et ambitions concurrentes

La corruption croissante d'une nouvelle élite, enrichie par une utilisation assez personnelle de la manne indienne et par le système de patronage sur lequel reposait une lente mais sûre érosion de fait des traits « semi-autonomistes » du statut du Cachemire, entretenait un certain malaise.

L'opposition au *statu quo* se manifestait par de grands mouvements sociaux qui, généralement, retombaient — comme ce fut le cas en 1955 ou en 1957-1958 quand l'agitation provoqua une libération temporaire du cheikh Abdullah : les troubles furent de courte durée parce que, à peine relaxé, le cheikh aligna son langage sur celui, plus radical, du Front du plébiscite et fut à nouveau incarcéré.

Au début des années soixante, une relative amélioration des relations indo-pakistanaïses suscita quelque temps l'espoir d'un règlement<sup>30</sup>. Cependant, fin 1963, un an après la défaite infligée par la Chine à l'Inde, l'annonce d'une plus grande intégration de l'État à l'Union indienne<sup>31</sup> et le vol d'un poil de la barbe du Prophète conservé dans la mosquée d'Hazratbal, à Srinagar, provoquèrent des violences intercommunautaires. Le calme ne revint, en 1964, qu'après un changement de gouvernement et une libération, cette fois encore provisoire, du cheikh Abdullah. Celui-ci fut à nouveau incarcéré l'année suivante malgré la prudence avec laquelle il s'était prononcé en faveur de l'autodétermination des Cachemiris et en dépit de ses efforts de médiation entre l'Inde et le Pakistan. Car, entre-temps, Nehru, mort en mai 1964 (et dont le point de vue semble avoir évolué dans les derniers mois de sa vie), avait été remplacé par Lal Bahadur Shastri. Celui-ci, plus ouvert aux nationalistes hindous et bientôt acculé à la guerre par la faiblesse même qu'on lui prêtait, allait surprendre par sa fermeté.

29. C'est à la suite de l'arrestation du cheikh Abdullah qu'un décret du président de la République proclame que l'autorité du gouvernement indien s'étendrait aussi au Jammu et Cachemire. Pour plus de détails sur ce point important et les controverses sur la portée réelle de l'autonomie garantie au Jammu et Cachemire par l'article 370 de la Constitution indienne, cf. les deux articles de A.G. NOORANI, « Article 370 », dans *The Statesman* (16-17 juin 1992), et les réponses de Ram GOPAL, « Azad Kashmir », *The Statesman*, 23-24 septembre 1992. Selon Noorani, puisque l'article 370 stipule que toute mesure de ce genre nécessite l'accord du gouvernement cachemiri et doit être ratifiée par l'Assemblée constituante du Jammu et Cachemire qui s'est dissoute en 1956, la gestion des affaires de l'État du Jammu et Cachemire actuellement en vigueur est illégale.

30. Voir note 24, *supra*.

31. Avec notamment le remplacement du chef de l'État par un gouverneur aux fonctions analogues à celles des autres États indiens.



### Échec des tentatives de subversion, mais persistance des tensions

Concernant la politique interne de l'État, la guerre de 1965 fut remarquable par l'échec de la tentative de subversion qui l'accompagna : en fait, les troupes indiennes furent avisées par des bergers cachemiris d'« infiltrations » pakistanaises destinées à provoquer un soulèvement que le Pakistan appuierait.

L'agitation, vive mais très minoritaire, qui fut menée à l'époque par un « conseil révolutionnaire du Cachemire » et par un groupement de plusieurs partis qui incluait le Front du plébiscite avait pour but essentiel la libération du cheikh Abdullah. Tandis que, avec Indira Gandhi, Karan Singh, ancien *Sadr-i-Riyasat*, devenait ministre du gouvernement central indien, la solution du problème semblait passer par une nouvelle libération et une « intronisation » du cheikh.

Une solution politique ne se profila en Inde qu'au lendemain de la guerre de 1971. Dès 1972, des pourparlers secrets furent engagés avec le cheikh et, en 1975, un accord était conclu entre Indira Gandhi et lui. Il organisa son retour au pouvoir dans le respect de l'autonomie de l'État que permettait la Constitution indienne.

### Le second « règne » du cheikh, son héritier Farooq Abdullah, et la montée de la crise

Le second « règne » du cheikh fut caractérisé par une corruption et un népotisme croissants. Des plaintes émanèrent des communautés non musulmanes, bouddhistes du Ladakh et hindous du Jammu. Mais rien ne suffit à entamer son pouvoir. Après sa mort, survenue en fin 1982, son fils Farooq put donc lui succéder.

Nourri de l'expérience du cheikh et personnellement ami de Rajiv Gandhi, Farooq Abdullah, à peine parvenu au pouvoir, déclara que l'adhésion du Cachemire à l'Inde était irrévocable.

Malheureusement, F. Abdullah participa aux réunions d'un regroupement de mouvements régionaux et d'opposition contre la centralisation pratiquée à Delhi. Or, au même moment, l'État du Jammu et Cachemire était travaillé par quelques ferments islamistes liés à la guerre d'Afghanistan comme à un effet de diffusion de la révolution iranienne. La coloration de son gouvernement s'en ressentait et, en 1984, le gouverneur du Jammu et Cachemire organisa des « défections » au sein du groupe parlementaire de la Conférence nationale pour faire tomber Farooq et pour introniser son beau-frère, G.M. Shah, dans les fonctions de chef du gouvernement de l'État<sup>32</sup> ; le véritable pouvoir passant pour être entre les mains de la begum Abdullah, veuve du cheikh, l'affaire paraissait jouable.

Mais, alors qu'émergeaient de nouveaux groupes, G.M. Shah parut lui aussi trop faible et fut à son tour écarté. Rajiv Gandhi — devenu Premier ministre en novembre 1984 — devait

32. F. Abdullah fut, plus tard, à titre de justification *a posteriori*, accusé d'intelligence avec des éléments dits « antinationaux ».



en tirer les conséquences et étendre au Cachemire la politique d'accords inaugurée au Pendjab en août 1985. En 1986, un accord conclu avec Farooq Abdullah pourvut donc à l'organisation de nouvelles élections sur la base d'une alliance entre le Congrès et la Conférence nationale. Compte tenu de la montée de sentiments anti-indiens, rien ne pouvait mieux saper la popularité de F. Abdullah. Tandis que se constituait une alliance de groupes islamistes, le Front musulman uni, qui préconisa le boycott des élections, de nombreux dirigeants de l'opposition étaient arrêtés, parfois molestés. De nombreuses autres irrégularités furent enregistrées et le résultat des élections (36 sièges pour la Conférence nationale et 24 pour le Congrès) ne put qu'accroître l'aliénation des jeunes Cachemiris, dont beaucoup passèrent alors la frontière. Le gouvernement qui fut formé ensuite donna un poids démesuré au Congrès. Une révolte latente gagna du terrain avec la corruption, l'inefficacité gouvernementale et l'érosion nationale du pouvoir central<sup>33</sup>.

### Le nouveau terrorisme

L'État a commencé à susciter de graves préoccupations à partir du printemps 1988, dans la foulée d'un mouvement revendicatif. Au départ, un nouvel esprit de défi engendra des violences isolées. Mais, dès cette époque, des arrestations effectuées par les forces de l'ordre ont permis de mettre l'agitation au compte d'hommes entraînés de l'autre côté de la ligne de contrôle. Cette constatation semblait justifier une politique de fermeté qui, en fait, déclencha les passions et engagea le processus répression/nouvelles violences.

Lorsque le gouvernement (centriste) du Front national de V.P. Singh parvint au pouvoir à New Delhi en fin 1989, le Premier ministre souligna l'importance qu'il accordait à la situation au Cachemire en nommant comme ministre de l'Intérieur un musulman cachemiri, Mohammed Sayeed<sup>34</sup> qui, bien que ne comptant plus parmi les personnalités les plus influentes de l'État, y conservait une certaine base politique. Toute solution qu'il aurait pu contribuer à mettre au point fut cependant torpillée par l'enlèvement de sa fille, avant même que le gouvernement soit entré en fonctions et que M. Sayeed soit effectivement nommé ministre de l'Intérieur.

Rubaya Syaeed fut libérée moins d'un mois après son enlèvement à la suite de tractations secrètes qui, conduisant à la libération de cinq terroristes, privèrent le gouvernement central de toute autorité<sup>35</sup>, notamment auprès du gouverneur de l'État. Celui-ci contribua à inquiéter l'élite brahmanique des Pandits du Cachemire qui entreprirent un exode massif. Ayant perdu le contrôle des événements, Farooq Abdullah finit par démissionner en janvier 1990

33. C'est à cette époque que le mouvement organisé par V.P. Singh prit corps autour d'une lutte contre les scandales qui atteignaient le gouvernement fédéral de Rajiv Gandhi.

34. Après avoir été le principal dirigeant congressiste de l'État, Mohammed Sayeed était passé au Janata Dal quand le Congrès avait conclu un accord avec Farooq Abdullah qui, en contrepartie, avait demandé le « sacrifice » de M. Sayeed.

35. Cf. le témoignage de George Fernandes dans le livre déjà cité de Raju THOMAS.



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C'est alors que l'État, qui connaissait un nombre croissant d'enlèvements et de violences, a été placé sous la férule du gouverneur et donc sous administration directe du gouvernement central<sup>36</sup>.

Provoquant un tollé au sein du parti nationaliste hindou qui soutenait le gouvernement, l'exode des Pandits sapait les efforts politiques de George Fernandes, ministre (socialiste) du gouvernement central qui, par son amitié avec un certain nombre de Cachemiris, paraissait plus à même d'engager le dialogue et fut spécialement chargé de trouver une solution.

Sa politique entrant en conflit avec celle qui était impulsée par le ministère de l'Intérieur, il renonça lui aussi à sa mission peu avant l'assassinat, en mai 1990, d'un chef religieux très populaire, le mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq, l'un des rares interlocuteurs possibles pour la recherche d'un compromis. Ensuite, et jusqu'au début de l'année 1993 environ, tous les gouvernements indiens ont continué à hésiter entre dialogue et fermeté. Depuis le printemps 1993, un ministre ami de feu Rajiv Gandhi, Rajesh Pilot, recherche systématiquement une issue politique. Mais celle-ci est, jusqu'à présent, restée bloquée par le changement de caractère que des éléments extérieurs comme les mercenaires afghans ou libanais impriment au mouvement des Cachemiris, notamment au sein du Hizbul Mujahideen<sup>37</sup>. La prise en main des affaires de l'État par le gouvernement indien a été prolongée de six mois à compter du 3 septembre 1993.

Actuellement, c'est l'absence de légitimité de l'administration et des dirigeants politiques acceptables pour l'Inde, l'impasse constitutionnelle d'une administration par le centre et la pression de l'opinion internationale qui imposent vraiment la recherche d'une solution politique. Une telle solution est-elle encore possible alors que le gouvernement indien est pris entre ceux qui dénoncent l'effet corrosif qu'un statut particulier exerce sur l'État indien tout entier et les défenseurs permanents des minorités et des droits de l'homme, qui suggèrent des solutions inacceptables pour la majorité des Indiens ? Elle supposerait en tout cas que cesse la pression constamment orchestrée, à partir du Pakistan, quelquefois par les services secrets de ce pays, souvent par ses forces politiques — d'autant plus populistes qu'elles se sentent mal assurées.

Le Pakistan peut-il, en période électorale, aller au-delà des preuves de bonne volonté qu'il a, par trois fois, données en empêchant, au dernier moment, le franchissement massif de la ligne de contrôle par les volontaires qu'il avait laissés se rassembler en Azad Kashmir à l'appel du Front de libération du Jammu et Cachemire (un Front, il est vrai, indépendantiste) ? Le jeu ambigu qui est le sien et le sentiment croissant, chez les Cachemiris, qu'ils ne sont que des pions sur un échiquier peuvent-ils suffire à donner des chances à une solution politique impulsée par une Inde particulièrement inquiète de la montée du fondamentalisme islamique

36. Le statut particulier du Jammu et Cachemire permet la prise en main des affaires de l'État selon une procédure distincte de celle appliquée dans le reste de l'Inde.

37. L'assassinat systématique de tous les occupants hindous d'un autobus, à la mi-août 1993, témoigne de la volonté de transformer le mouvement en conflit intercommunautaire.



## LE SÉPARATISME CACHEMIRI. DU RÉGIONALISME À L'IRRÉDENTISME

au Cachemire ? Personne ne saurait l'affirmer — d'autant moins que les mouvements islamistes gravitant autour du Hizbul Mujahideen sont de plus en plus influents et actifs au détriment des courants laïques comme celui du Front de libération du Jammu et Cachemire. La situation est, en tout cas, assez préoccupante pour que la Commission des relations étrangères du Sénat américain ait, au début septembre 1993, équilibré ses remarques relatives aux violations des droits de l'homme par un souhait exprès de voir disparaître le soutien pakistanais aux terroristes.

En tout état de cause, deux faits paraissent certains : 1) le maintien pacifique du Jammu et Cachemire dans une Union indienne qui parviendrait — condition indispensable à ce maintien — à restaurer le caractère séculariste qui l'a longtemps caractérisée pourrait être un coup d'arrêt à la montée des fanatismes religieux et intercommunautaires dans le sous-continent 2) si aucune solution politique n'est trouvée, toute accalmie sera provisoire. Or, l'amélioration de la situation au Cachemire conditionne la paix du sous-continent et la paix est elle-même nécessaire au succès des efforts de l'Inde pour se repositionner dans le monde. Car c'est bien en ces termes que s'analysent sa nouvelle politique économique et une politique étrangère tendant à équilibrer ses ouvertures à l'Ouest par la recherche d'une meilleure intégration de l'Asie du Sud et des progrès dans la normalisation de ses relations avec la Chine.

### Post-scriptum (décembre 1993)

Lorsque, en octobre-novembre 1993, l'armée indienne, apparemment informée de la présence d'agents des services secrets pakistanais (aux côtés de militants du Front de libération du Jammu et Cachemire et agissant sur la foi de rumeurs de profanation du reliquaire) a assiégé la mosquée d'Hazratbal, de nouvelles craintes d'un glissement vers une confrontation ont été accréditées par des accrochages indo-pakistanaïes et des rumeurs de concentrations de troupes. Mais, après près d'un mois de siège, les autorités indiennes ont obtenu la reddition des insurgés après avoir réussi à couper leurs communications avec l'extérieur. La gravité de la crise a, en fait, suscité une promesse de reprise du dialogue indo-pakistanaïes. Enregistrée à la conférence du Commonwealth tenue à Chypre fin octobre, cette décision — *a fortiori* s'agissant du Cachemire — est fortement encouragée par la Grande-Bretagne (dont le Premier ministre, John Major s'est rendu en Inde au début novembre 1993) et les États-Unis. Toute une diplomatie d'arrière-plan, et des initiatives internes à l'Inde semblent maintenant œuvrer en vue de la solution d'un problème qui, par ailleurs, continue à retenir l'attention prioritaire de diverses organisations de défense des droits de l'homme.



## Subject in brief

Reply on page 2085  
the Journal  
Officiel).

status of Hindus who  
have become French  
citizens. (Reply on  
page 2329 of the Jour-  
nal Officiel).

the new agreement  
entered into between  
the French Govern-  
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## List of Questions and Miscellaneous References to India

203

Question Number	Date	Journal Page No.	Officiel Member who posed question	Subject in brief
28		2059	Mr. Luc DURAND REVILLE	Departure of the French government servants belonging to the erst-while French Establishments in India. (Reply on page 2322 of the Journal Officiel).
178		941	Mr. Jules CASTELLANI	Professional promo- tion for an ex-member of Parliament who had taken the stand for secession of a terri- tory to India.
857	12.02.57		Mr. Jules CASTELLANI	Proposal to organise a referendum under the control of UNO and in case Government of India refuses, to take the matter to the Gen- eral Assembly of the UNO. (Reply on pages 1052-1053 of the Jour- nal Officiel dated 14th May 1957).
7730		1890	Mr. Luc DURAND REVILLE	Declaration made by the French Ambassa- dor in New Delhi.
			1958	
46		161	Mr. Jules CASTELLANI	Retification of the Treaty transferring the French Establishments in India.



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## CONCLUSION

It would be presumptuous to try to present any definite conclusion in a complex and complicated area of this nature. Parliamentary references are but one of the many areas indicating interest and interaction between two countries. However a perusal of the references to India in the French Parliament does show a genuinely deep interest in this country. What is really impressive is the range and depth of information on various aspects of India that is presented before the Parliament and discussed.

An indication of the interest taken in India is also reflected by the large number of Parliamentary Delegations that have visited India in the span of about 40 years that this study has covered. It is worth mentioning that most of these visits have been of long durations. These are of course besides the visits of the Presidents of the French Republic, French Prime Ministers, Ministers and a large number of official delegations.

These visits of Parliamentary Delegations have also succeeded in giving a clearer picture about India to these members of the French Parliament. See how a road journey from Agra to Jaipur dispelled the notion that there is nothing but poverty and misery in India:

"Journey in a car nearly 300 kilometers between Agra and Jaipur also gave your Delegation the opportunity to cross the countryside, perfectly cultivated and irrigated; and to pass through peaceful villages where life moves in a slow rhythm like the buffalo drawn carriages. The fact that more than 80% of the Indian population lives in a rural milieu, singularly moderates the traditional image of most of the population leading a miserable existence" <sup>(1)</sup>

(1) See page 136 of this study.



Similarly India's economic stability is succinctly brought out:

"...some members of the Delegation who had earlier visited India had noticed the relative stability of the currency since the rate of rupee, as compared to the Franc is more or less the same as it was about 20 years back."<sup>(1)</sup>

Some of the references to India touch the nostalgic chord while others are philosophical while still others show a genuine concern for the poor of India. Of course one also comes across nationalistic rhetoric. However on the whole the references to India show the characteristic French sense of fair-play and honesty of views.

Unfortunately not many in India have been aware of the deep interest in India as reflected in the French Parliamentary debates. Non availability of information in English has been the major constraint. It is hoped that the present study would give a glimpse of the vast reservoir of French interest and goodwill for India.

(1) See page 137 of this Study

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of extensive irrigation works. Congress curtailed the activities of the Irrigation Survey in 1885, but Powell continued with the mapping of water resources, and he trained specialists who later, in 1902, staffed the Bureau of Reclamation.

Powell lobbied diligently for the creation of a federal department of science with Cabinet rank and for concepts remarkably similar to those incorporated eventually in the National Science Foundation. He believed that the federal government should be involved in the scientific and technological interests of the nation and patronize its institutions of research. He also believed in the social function of science and would not divorce it from the development of pure science. This was consistent with his belief that there is an inevitable and gradual process of concentration or centralization of authority and powers in all social institutions. He thought that in modern society there should be a continuing combination of similar institutions ("corporations"), whether they be governmental, industrial, religious, or scientific. Paradoxically, he believed in extreme individualism.

Late in life Powell assembled his diversified thoughts into a trilogy, only the first volume of which, *Truth and Error* (1898), was published. It contained a strange mixture of material and fared badly at the hands of reviewers, although it embodied many of Powell's keen observations on man and evolution.

It is difficult to assess Powell's influence. He was a man of action, a skillful organizer and administrator. Many regard him as one of the most successful of the government servants who have determined the role of government in science. His personal influence upon his associates, for example on Lester Ward and especially on those in the Geological Survey, was remarkable.

Many academic and professional honors were showered upon Powell, although he cared little for them. He died at his summer home at Haven, Maine, and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

WILLIAM C. DARRAH

[Other relevant material may be found in CONSERVATION; INDIANS, NORTH AMERICAN; SCIENCE, article on SCIENCE-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS.]

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- (1875) 1964 *Canyons of the Colorado*. New York: Argosy Antiquarian. → First published as *The Exploration of the Colorado River of the West*.  
(1877) 1880 *An Introduction to the Study of Indian Languages*. 2d ed. Washington: Government Printing Office.

- (1878) 1962 U.S. GEOGRAPHICAL AND GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION *Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States*, by John Wesley Powell. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.  
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## POWER

(In approaching the study of politics through the analysis of power, one assumes, at a minimum, that relations of power are among the significant aspects of a political system. This assumption, and therefore the analysis of power, can be applied to any kind of political system, international, national, or local, to associations and groups of various kinds, such as the family, the hospital, and the business firm, and to historical developments.)

At one extreme, an analysis of power may simply postulate that power relations are one feature of politics among a number of others—but nonetheless a sufficiently important feature to need emphasis and description. At the other extreme, an analyst may hold that power distinguishes "politics" from other human activity; to analysts of this view "political science, as an empirical discipline, is the study of the shaping and sharing of power" (Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, p. xiv).

In either case, the analyst takes it for granted that differences between political systems, or profound changes in the same society, can often be interpreted as differences in the way power is distributed among individuals, groups, or other units. Power may be relatively concentrated or diffused; and the share of power held by different individuals, strata, classes, professional groups, ethnic, racial, or religious groups, etc., may be relatively great or small. The analysis of power is often concerned, therefore, with the identification of elites and leadership, the discovery of the ways in which power is allocated to different strata, relations among leaders and between leaders and nonleaders, and so forth.)

Although the approach to politics through the study of power relations is sometimes thought to postulate that everyone seeks power as the highest value, analysts of power generally reject this as-



sumption as psychologically untenable; the analysis of power does not logically imply any particular psychological assumptions. Sometimes critics also regard the analysis of power as implying that the pursuit of power is morally good or at any rate that it should not be condemned. But an analysis of power may be neutral as to values; or the analyst may be concerned with power, not to glorify it, but in order to modify the place it holds in human relations and to increase the opportunities for dignity, respect, freedom, or other values (Jouvenel 1945; Lasswell & Kaplan 1950; Oppenheim 1961, chapters 8, 9).

Indeed, it would be difficult to explain the extent to which political theorists for the past 25 centuries have been concerned with relations of power and authority were it not for the moral and practical significance of power to any person interested in political life, whether as observer or activist. Some understanding of power is usually thought to be indispensable for moral or ethical appraisals of political systems. From a very early time—certainly since Socrates, and probably before—men have been inclined to judge the relative desirability of different types of political systems by, among other characteristics, the relations of power and authority in these systems. In addition, intelligent action to bring about a result of some kind in a political system, such as a change in a law or a policy, a revolution, or a settlement of an international dispute, requires knowledge of how to produce or “cause” these results. In political action, as in other spheres of life, we try to produce the results we want by acting appropriately on the relevant causes. As we shall see, power relations can be viewed as causal relations of a particular kind.

It therefore seems most unlikely that the analysis of power will disappear as an approach to the study of politics. However, the fact that this approach is important and relevant does not shield it from some serious difficulties. These have become particularly manifest as the approach has been more earnestly and systematically employed.

### Origins

The attempt to study and explain politics by analyzing relations of power is, in a loose sense, ancient. To Aristotle, differences in the location of power, authority, or rule among the citizens of a political society served as one criterion for differentiating among actual constitutions, and it entered into his distinction between good constitutions and bad ones [see ARISTOTLE]. With few exceptions (most notably Thomas Hobbes) political theorists did not press their investigations very far into cer-

tain aspects of power that have seemed important to social scientists in the twentieth century [see HOBBS]. For example, most political theorists took it for granted, as did Aristotle, that key terms like *power*, *influence*, *authority*, and *rule* (let us call them “power terms”) needed no great elaboration, presumably because the meaning of these words was clear to men of common sense. Even Machiavelli, who marks a decisive turning point from classical–normative to modern–empirical theory, did not consider political terms in general as particularly technical. Moreover, he strongly preferred the concrete to the abstract. In his treatment of power relations Machiavelli frequently described a specific event as an example of a general principle; but often the general principle was only implied or barely alluded to; and he used a variety of undefined terms such as *imperio*, *forza*, *potente*, and *autorità* [see MACHIAVELLI].

From Aristotle to Hobbes political theorists were mainly concerned with power relations within a given community. But external relations even more than internal ones force attention to questions of relative power. The rise of the modern nation-state therefore compelled political theorists to recognize the saliency of power in politics, and particularly, of course, in international politics (Meinecke 1924).

Thus political “realists” found it useful to define, distinguish, and interpret the state in terms of its power; Max Weber both reflected this tradition of “realism” and opened the way for new developments in the analysis of power [see WEBER, MAX]. “Power” (*Macht*) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber [1922] 1957, p. 152). This definition permitted Weber to conclude that “the concept of power is highly comprehensive from the point of view of sociology. All conceivable . . . combinations of circumstances may put him [the actor] in a position to impose his will in a given situation” (p. 153). It follows that the state is not distinguishable from other associations merely because it employs a special and peculiarly important kind of power—force. In a famous and highly influential definition, Weber characterized the state as follows: “A compulsory political association with continuous organization (*politischer Anstaltsbetrieb*) will be called a ‘state’ if and in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (p. 154).

In his well-known typologies and his analyses of political systems, however, Weber was less con-



cerned with power in general than with a special kind that he held to be unusually important—legitimate power, or authority.

Later theorists, practically all of whom were directly or indirectly influenced by Weber, expanded their objectives to include a fuller range of power relations. In the United States attempts to suggest or develop systematic and comprehensive theories of politics centering about power relations appeared in books by Catlin (1927; 1930), an important essay by Goldhamer and Shils (1939), and numerous works of the Chicago school—principally Merriam (1934), Lasswell (1936), and, in international politics, Morgenthau (1948). In the decade after World War II the ideas of the Chicago school were rapidly diffused throughout American political science. [See MERRIAM.]

### Elements in the analysis of power

Power terms evidently cover a very broad category of human relations. Considerable effort and ingenuity have gone into schemes for classifying these relations into various types, labeled power, influence, authority, persuasion, dissuasion, inducement, coercion, compulsion, force, and so on, all of which we shall subsume under the collective label power terms. The great variety and heterogeneity of these relations may, in fact, make it impossible—or at any rate not very fruitful—to develop general theories of power intended to cover them all.

At the most general level, power terms in modern social science refer to *subsets of relations among social units such that the behaviors of one or more units (the responsive units, R) depend in some circumstances on the behavior of other units (the controlling units, C)*. (In the following discussion, R will always symbolize the responsive or dependent unit, C the controlling unit. These symbols will be used throughout and will be substituted even in direct quotations where the authors themselves have used different letters.) By this broad definition, then, power terms in the social sciences exclude relations with inanimate or even nonhuman objects; the control of a dog by his master or the power of a scientist over "nature" provided by a nuclear reactor would fall, by definition, in a different realm of discourse. On the other hand, the definition could include the power of one nation to affect the actions of another by threatening to use a nuclear reactor as a bomb or by offering to transfer it by gift or sale.

If power-terms include *all* relations of the kind just defined, then they spread very widely over the whole domain of human relations. In practice,

analysts of power usually confine their attention to smaller subsets. One such subset consists, for example, of relations in which "severe sanctions . . . are expected to be used or are in fact applied to sustain a policy against opposition"—a subset that Lasswell and Kaplan call power (1950, pp. 74–75). However, there is no agreement on the common characteristics of the various subsets covered by power terms, nor are different labels applied with the same meaning by different analysts.

Despite disagreement on how the general concept is to be defined and limited, the variety of smaller subsets that different writers find interesting or important, and the total lack of a standardized classification scheme and nomenclature, there is nonetheless some underlying unity in the various approaches to the analysis of power. In describing and explaining patterns of power, different writers employ rather similar elements (compare Cartwright 1965). What follows is an attempt to clarify these common elements by ignoring many differences in terminology, treatment, and emphasis.

**Some descriptive characteristics.** For purposes of exposition it is convenient to think of the analysis of power in terms of the familiar distinction between dependent and independent variables. The attempt to understand a political system may then be conceived of as an effort to *describe* certain characteristics of the system: the dependent variables; and to *explain* why the system takes on these particular characteristics, by showing the effects on these characteristics of certain other factors: the independent variables. Some of the characteristics of a political system that analysts seek to explain are the *magnitude* of the power of the C's with respect to the R's, how this power is *distributed* in the system, and the *scope*, and *domain*, of control that different individuals or actors have, exercise, or are subject to.

**Magnitude.** Political systems are often characterized explicitly or implicitly by the differences in the "amounts" of power (over the actions of the government or state) exercised by different individuals, groups, or strata. The magnitude of C's power with respect to R is thought of as measurable, in some sense, by at least an ordinal scale; frequently, indeed, a literal reading would imply that power is subject to measurement by an interval scale. How to compare and measure different magnitudes of power poses a major unsolved problem; we shall return to it briefly later on. Meanwhile, we shall accept the assumption of practically every political theorist for several thousand years, that it is possible to speak meaningfully of differ-



ent amounts of power. Thus a typical question in the analysis of a political system would be: Is control over government highly concentrated or relatively diffused?

*Distribution.* An ancient and conventional way of distinguishing among political systems is according to the way control over the government or the state is distributed to individuals or groups in the systems. Aristotle, for example, stated: "The proper application of the term 'democracy' is to a constitution in which the free-born and poor control the government—being at the same time a majority; and similarly the term 'oligarchy' is properly applied to a constitution in which the rich and better-born control the government—being at the same time a minority" (*Politics*, Barker ed., p. 164). Control over government may be conceived as analogous to income, wealth, or property; and in the same way that income or wealth may be distributed in different patterns, so too the distribution of power over government may vary from one society or historical period to another. One task of analysis, then, is to classify and describe the most common distributions and to account for the different patterns. Typical questions would be: What are the characteristics of the C's and of the R's? How do the C's and R's compare in numbers? Do C's and R's typically come from different classes, strata, regions, or other groups? What historical changes have occurred in the characteristics of C and R?

*Scope.* What if C's are sometimes not C's, or C's sometimes R's, or R's sometimes C's? The possibility cannot be ruled out that individuals or groups who are relatively powerful with respect to one kind of activity may be relatively weak with respect to other activities. Power need not be general; it may be specialized. In fact, in the absence of a single world ruler, some specialization is inevitable; in any case, it is so commonplace that analysts of power have frequently insisted that a statement about the power of an individual, group, state, or other actor is practically meaningless unless it specifies the power of actor C with respect to some class of R's activities. Such a class of activities is sometimes called the range (Cartwright 1965) or the scope of C's power (Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, p. 73). There is no generally accepted way of defining and classifying different scopes. However, a typical question about a political system would be: Is power generalized over many scopes, or is it specialized? If it is specialized, what are the characteristics of the C's, the elites, in the different scopes? Is power specialized by individuals in the sense that  $C_a$  and  $C_b$  exercise power over different

scopes, or is it also specialized by classes, social strata, skills, professions, or other categories?

*Domain.* C's power will be limited to certain individuals; the R's over whom C has or exercises control constitute what is sometimes called the "domain," or "extension," of C's power (Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, p. 73; Harsanyi 1962a, p. 67). Typical questions thus might be: Who are the R's over whom C has control? What are their characteristics? How numerous are they? How do they differ in numbers or characteristics from the R's not under C's control?

Given the absence of any standard unit of measure for amounts, distributions, scopes, domains, and other aspects of power, and the variety of ways of describing these characteristics, it is not at all surprising that there is an abundance of schemes for classifying political systems according to some characteristic of power. Most such schemes use, implicitly or explicitly, the idea of a *distribution of power over the behavior of government*. The oldest, most famous, and most enduring of these is the distinction made by the Greeks between rule by one, the few, and the many (see Aristotle, *Politics*, Barker ed., pp. 110 ff.). Some variant of this scheme frequently reappears in modern analyses of power (e.g., Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, p. 218). Often, as with Aristotle himself, the distribution of power is combined with one or more other dimensions (e.g., Dahl 1963, p. 38). Rough dichotomous schemes are common. One based on "the degree of autonomy and interdependence of the several power holders" distinguishes two polar types, called autocracy and constitutionalism (Loewenstein 1957, p. 29). American community studies have in recent years called attention to differences between "pluralistic" systems and unified or highly stratified "power structures" [see COMMUNITY, *article on THE STUDY OF COMMUNITY POWER*]. In one study that compares four communities the authors developed a more complex typology of power structures by combining a dimension of "distribution of political power among citizens" with the degree of convergence or divergence in the ideology of leaders; the four types of power structures produced by dichotomizing these two dimensions are in turn distinguished from regimes (Agger et al. 1964, pp. 73 ff.).

Some explanatory characteristics. Given the different types of political systems, how are the differences among them to be explained? If, for example, control over government is sometimes distributed to the many, often to the few, and occasionally to one dominant leader, how can we account for the differences? Obviously these are



ancient, enduring, and highly complex problems; and there is slight agreement on the answers. However, some factors that are often emphasized in modern analysis can be distinguished.

*Resources.* Differences in patterns or structures of power may be attributed primarily, mainly, or partly to the way in which "resources," or "base values," are distributed among the individuals, strata, classes, and groups in different communities, countries, societies, and historical periods. This is an ancient, distinguished, widespread, and persuasive mode of explanation, used by Aristotle in Greece in the fourth century B.C., by James Harrington in seventeenth-century England, by the fathers of the American constitution in the late eighteenth century, by Marx and Engels in the nineteenth century, and by a great many social scientists in the twentieth century. A central hypothesis in most of these theories is that the greater one's resources, the greater one's power. Although explanations of this kind do not always go beyond tautology (by defining power in terms of resources), logical circularity is certainly not inherent in this mode of explanation. However, there is no accepted way of classifying resources or bases. Harold Lasswell has constructed a comprehensive scheme of eight base values which, although not necessarily exhaustive, are certainly inclusive; these are power (which can serve as a base for more power), respect, rectitude or moral standing, affection, well-being, wealth, skill, and enlightenment (Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, p. 87). Other writers choose more familiar categories to classify resources: for example, in trying to account for the patterns of influence in one community, the author described the patterns of social standing; the distribution of cash, credit, and wealth; access to legality, popularity, and control over jobs; and control over sources of information (Dahl 1961, pp. 229 ff.).

*Skill.* Two individuals with access to approximately the same resources may not exercise the same degree of power (over, let us say, government decisions). Indeed, it is a common observation that individuals of approximately equal wealth or social status may differ greatly in power. To be sure, this might be accounted for by differences in access to other resources, such as the greater legality, bureaucratic knowledge, and public affection that fall to any individual who is chosen, say, to be prime minister of Britain or president of the United States. Another factor, however, one given particular prominence by Machiavelli, is political skill. Formally, skill could be treated as another resource. Nonetheless, it is generally thought to be

of critical importance in explaining differences in the power of different leaders—different presidents, for example, as in Neustadt's comparison of presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower (1960, pp. 152 ff.). However, despite many attempts at analysis, from Machiavelli to the present day, political skill has remained among the more elusive aspects in the analysis of power.

*Motivations.* Two individuals with access to the same resources may exercise different degrees of power (with respect to some scope) because of different motivations: the one may use his resources to increase his power; the other may not. Moreover, since power is a relationship between C's and R's, the motivations not only of the C's but also of the R's are important. One person may worship authority, while another may defy it. A number of writers have explored various aspects of motivations involved in power relations (e.g., Lasswell 1930; Rogow & Lasswell 1963; Cartwright 1959).

*Costs.* Motivations can be related to resources by way of the economists' language of cost—a factor introduced into the analysis of power by a mathematical economist (Harsanyi 1962a; 1962b). In order to control R, C may have to use some of his resources. Thus C's supply of resources is likely to have a bearing on how far he is willing to go in trying to control R. And variations in C's resources are likely to produce variations in C's power. C's *opportunity costs* in controlling R—that is, what C must forgo or give up in other opportunities as a result of using some of his resources to control R—are less (other things being equal) if he is rich in resources than if he is poor in resources. In concrete terms, to a rich man the sacrifice involved in a campaign contribution of \$100 is negligible; to a poor man the sacrifice entailed in a contribution of \$100 is heavy. C's willingness to use his resources to control R will also depend on the value to C of R's response; the value of R's response is, in turn, dependent in part on C's motivations. The relationship may also be examined from R's point of view. R's opportunity costs consist of what he is then unable to do if he complies with C. In R's case, as in C's, his supply of resources and his motivations help determine his opportunity costs. Thus a power relation can be interpreted as a sort of transaction between C and R.

#### Problems of research

Like all other approaches to an understanding of complex social phenomena, the analysis of power is beset with problems. At a very general



level, attempts to analyze power share with many—perhaps most—other strategies of inquiry in the social sciences the familiar dilemma of rigor versus relevance, and the dilemma has led to familiar results. Attempts to meet high standards of logical rigor or empirical verification have produced some intriguing experiments and a good deal of effort to clarify concepts and logical relationships but not rounded and well-verified explanations of complex political systems in the real world. Conversely, attempts to arrive at a better understanding of the more concrete phenomena of political life and institutions often sacrifice a good deal in rigor of logic and verification in order to provide more useful and reliable guides to the real world.

There are, however, a number of more specific problems in the analysis of power, many of which have only been identified in the last few decades. Relevant work is quite recent and seeks (1) to clarify the central concepts, partly by expanding on the analogy between power relations and causal relations, (2) to specify particular subsets that are most interesting for social analysis, (3) to develop methods of measurement, and (4) to undertake empirical investigations of concrete political phenomena.

**Power and cause.** The closest equivalent to the power relation is the causal relation. For the assertion "C has power over R," one can substitute the assertion, "C's behavior causes R's behavior." If one can define the causal relation, one can define influence, power, or authority, and vice versa (Simon [1947-1956] 1957, p. 5).

Since the language of cause is no longer common in the formal theoretical language of the natural sciences, it might be argued that social scientists should also dispense with that language and that insofar as power is merely a term for a causal relation involving human beings, power-terms should simultaneously be dispensed with. But it seems rather unlikely that social scientists will, in fact, reject causal language. For the language of cause, like the language of power, is used to interpret situations in which there is the possibility that some event will intervene to change the order of other events. In medical research it is natural and meaningful to ask, Does cigarette smoking cause lung cancer and heart disease? In social situations the notion of cause is equally or even more appropriate. What makes causal analysis important to us is our desire to act on causes in the real world in order to bring about effects—reducing death rates from lung cancer, passing a civil-rights bill through Congress, or preventing the outbreak of war.

To interpret the terms *power*, *influence*, *authority*,

etc., as instances of causal relations means, however, that the attempt to detect true rather than spurious power relations must run into the same difficulties that have beset efforts to distinguish true from spurious causal relations. Some analysts have confronted the problem; others have noted it only to put it aside; most have ignored it entirely, perhaps on the assumption that if social scientists tried to solve the unsolved problems of philosophy they would never get around to the problems of the social sciences. Yet if power is analogous to cause—or if power relations are logically a subset of causal relations—then recent analyses of causality must have relevance to the analysis of power.

In the first place, properties used to distinguish causation also serve to define power relations: covariation, temporal sequence, and asymmetry, for example. The appropriateness of these criteria has in fact been debated, not always conclusively, by various students of power (e.g., Simon [1947-1956] 1957, pp. 5, 11, 12, 66; Dahl 1957, p. 204; Cartwright 1959, p. 197; Oppenheim 1961, p. 104).

Thus, the problem whether A can be said to cause B if A is a necessary condition for B, or a sufficient condition, or *both* necessary and sufficient, has also plagued the definition of power-terms. Some writers have explicitly stated or at least implied that relations of power mean that some action by C is a necessary condition for R's response (Simon 1953, p. 504; March 1955, p. 435; Dahl 1957, p. 203). Oppenheim has argued, however, that such definitions permit statements that run flatly counter to common sense; he holds that it would be more appropriate to require only that C's action be sufficient to produce R's response (1961, p. 41). Riker has suggested in turn that "the customary definition of power be revised . . . to reflect the necessary-and-sufficient condition theory of causality" (1964, p. 348). However, Blalock in his *Causal Inferences in Non-experimental Research* has shown that defining cause in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions leads to great practical difficulties in research. "In real-life situations we seldom encounter instances where B is present if and only if A is also present" (1964, p. 30); moreover, specifying necessary and sufficient conditions requires the researcher "to think always in terms of attributes and dichotomies," whereas "there are most certainly a number of variables which are best conceived as continuously distributed, even though we may find it difficult to measure them operationally in terms of a specified unit of some kind" (p. 32). "The use of 'necessary and sufficient' terminology . . . may work well for the logician but not [for] the social scientist" (p. 34). Blalock's criticism, and indeed his whole effort to



explore problems of causal inference in nonexperimental research, are highly relevant to the analysis of power.

Aside from these somewhat rarefied philosophical and definitional questions, which many social scientists are prepared to abandon to metaphysicians or philosophers of science, the analogy between power and cause argues that the problem of distinguishing cause from correlation, or true from spurious causation, is bound to carry over into the analysis of power. And indeed it does. The difficulty of distinguishing true from spurious power relations has proved to be quite formidable.

The most rigorous method of distinguishing true from spurious causation is, of course, experimentation, and this would be the most rigorous method for distinguishing true from spurious power relations, provided the proper experimental conditions were present. Unfortunately, however, as in many areas of the social sciences, so too in the analysis of power, experimental methods have so far been of limited value, and for similar reasons. In non-experimental situations the optimal requirements for identifying causal relations seem to be the existence of satisfactory interval measures, a large supply of good data employing these measures, and an exhaustive analysis of alternative ways of accounting for the observations (Blalock 1964). Unfortunately, in the analysis of power, existing methods of measurement are rather inadequate, the data are often inescapably crude and limited, a variety of simple alternative explanations seem to fit the data about equally well, and in any case the complexity of the relations requires extraordinarily complex models.

The shortage of relevant models of power may disappear in time. In fact, the causal analogue suggests that the development of a great array of carefully described alternative models to compare with observations is probably a prerequisite for further development in the analysis of power. Again, the analogy between power and cause readily reveals why this would seem to be the case. In trying to determine the cause of a phenomenon it is of course impossible to know whether all the relevant factors in the real world are actually controlled during an investigation. Consequently, it is never possible to demonstrate causality.

It is possible to make causal *inferences* concerning the adequacy of causal models, at least in the sense that we can proceed by eliminating inadequate models that make predictions that are not consistent with the data. . . . [Such] causal models involve (1) a finite set of explicitly defined variables, (2) certain assumptions about how these variables are interrelated causally, and (3) assumptions to the effect that outside varia-

bles, while operating, do not have confounding influences that disturb the causal patterning among the variables explicitly being considered. (*ibid.*, p. 62)

If power relations are a subset of causal relations, these requirements would also be applicable in the analysis of power.

In analyzing power, why have analysts so rarely attempted to describe, in rigorous language at any rate, the alternative causal models relevant to their inquiry? There seem to be several reasons. First, students of power have not always been wholly aware that distinguishing true from spurious power relations requires intellectual strategies at a rather high level of sophistication. Second, the crude quality of the observations usually available in studying power may discourage efforts to construct elegant theoretical models. Third, until recent times the whole approach to power analysis was somewhat speculative: there were a good many impressionistic works but few systematic empirical studies of power relations. Of the empirical studies now available most are investigations of power relations in American communities undertaken since 1950. These community studies have provoked a good deal of dispute over what are, in effect, alternative models of causation. So far, however, investigators have usually not described clearly the array of alternative models that might be proposed to explain their data, nor have they clearly specified the criteria they use for rejecting all the alternatives except the one they accept as their preferred explanation.

Theories about power relations in various political systems are of course scattered through the writings of a number of analysts (e.g., Pareto 1916, volume 4; Mosca 1896, *passim*; Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, chapters 9, 10; Mills 1956; Dahl 1961; Rossi 1960; Polsby 1963; Parsons 1963a; 1963b). But a straightforward presentation of an empirical theory of power relations in political systems is a rarity. A notable exception is offered by March's formulation of six models of social choice that involve, in some sense, relationships of power.

The analogy between cause and power calls attention to one further point: any attempt to develop an empirical theory of power will run headlong into the fact that a causal chain has many links; that the links one specifies depend on what one wishes to explain; and that what one wishes to explain depends, in part, on the theory with which one begins. In causal analysis, it is usually

. . . possible to insert a very large number of additional variables between any two supposedly directly related factors. We must stop somewhere and consider the theoretical system closed. Practically, we may choose to stop at the point where the additional variables are



either difficult or expensive to measure, or where they have not been associated with any operations at all. . . . *A relationship that is direct in one theoretical system may be indirect in another*, or it may even be taken as spurious. (Blalock 1964, p. 18)

Some of the links that a power analyst may take as "effects" to be explained by searching for causes are the outcomes of specific decisions; the current values, attitudes, and expectations of decision makers; their earlier or more fundamental attitudes and values; the attitudes and values of other participants—or nonparticipants—whose participation is in some way significant; the processes of selection, self-selection, recruitment, or entry by which decision makers arrive at their locations in the political system; the rules of decision making, the structures, the constitutions. No doubt a "complete" explanation of power relations in a political system would try to account for all of these effects, and others. Yet this is an enormously ambitious task. Meanwhile, it is important to specify which effects are at the focus of an explanatory theory and which are not. A good deal of confusion, and no little controversy, are produced when different analysts focus on different links in the chain of power and causation without specifying clearly what effects they wish to explain; and a good deal of criticism of dubious relevance is produced by critics who hold that an investigator has focused on the "wrong" links or did not provide a "complete" explanation.

Classifying types of power. Even though the analysis of power has not produced many rigorous causal models, it has spawned a profusion of schemes for classifying types of power relations (e.g., Parsons 1963a; 1963b; Oppenheim 1961; French & Raven 1959; Cartwright 1965).

Among the characteristics most often singled out for attention are (1) legitimacy: the extent to which *R* feels normatively obliged to comply with *C*; (2) the nature of the sanctions: whether *C* uses rewards or deprivations, positive or negative sanctions; (3) the magnitude of the sanctions: extending from severe coercion to no sanctions at all; (4) the means or channels employed: whether *C* controls *R* only by means of information that changes *R*'s intentions or by actually changing *R*'s situation or his environment of rewards and deprivations. These and other characteristics can be combined to yield many different types of power relations.

As we have already indicated, no single classification system prevails, and the names for the various categories are so completely unstandardized that what is labeled power in one scheme may

be called coercion or influence in another. Detached from empirical theories, these schemes are of doubtful value. In the abstract it is impossible to say why one classification system should be preferred over another.

Nonetheless, there are some subsets of power relations—types of power, as they are often called—that call attention to interesting problems of analysis and research. One of these is the distinction between *having* and *exercising* power or influence (Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, p. 71; Oppenheim 1961, chapters 2, 3). This distinction is also involved in the way anticipated reactions function as a basis for influence and power (Friedrich 1963, chapter 11).

To illustrate the problem by example, let us suppose that even in the absence of any previous communication from the president to Senator *R*, or indeed any previous action of any kind by the president, Senator *R* regularly votes *now* in a way he thinks will insure the president's favor *later*. The senator calculates that if he loses the next election, he may, as a result of the president's favorable attitude, be in line to receive a presidential appointment to a federal court. Thus, while Senator *R*'s voting behavior is oriented toward future rewards, expected or hoped for, his votes are not the result of any specific action by the president.

If one holds that *C* cannot be a cause of *R* if *C* follows *R* in time, then no act of the incumbent president *need* be a cause of Senator *R*'s favorable vote. Obviously this does not mean that Senator *R*'s actions are "uncaused." The immediate determinant of his vote is his expectations. If we ask what "caused" his expectations, there are many possible answers. For example, he might have concluded that in American society if favors are extended to *C*, this makes it more likely that *C* will be indulgent later on. Or he may have acquired from political lore the understanding that the general rule applies specifically to relations of senators and presidents. Thus, the causal chain recedes into the senator's previous learning—but not necessarily to any specific *past* act of the incumbent president or any other president.

This kind of phenomenon is commonplace, important, and obviously relevant to the analysis of power. Yet some studies, critics have said, concentrate on the exercise of power and fail to account for individuals or groups in the community who, though they do not exercise power, nonetheless have power, in the sense that many people try assiduously to anticipate their reactions (Bachrach & Baratz 1962). This failure may be a result of



certain paradoxical aspects of having power that can make it an exceedingly difficult phenomenon to study.

For in the limiting case of anticipated reactions, it appears, paradoxically, that it is not the president who controls the senator, but the senator who controls the president—i.e., it is the senator who, by his loyal behavior, induces the president to appoint him to a federal court. Thus, it is not *C* who controls or even attempts to control *R*, but *R* who attempts to control *C*—and to the extent that *R* anticipates *C*'s reactions correctly, *R* does in fact control *C*. It is, then, not the king who controls the courtier but the courtier who controls the king.

Now if we examine this paradox closely we quickly discover that it arises simply because we have tried to describe the relationship between king and courtier, president and senator, *C* and *R* by distinguishing only one aspect, namely, the exercise of power. The courtier does indeed exercise power over the king by successfully anticipating the reactions of the monarch and thereby gaining a duchy. But it was not this that we set out to explain. For it is the king who has, holds, or possesses the capacity to confer that dukedom, and even though he does not *exercise* his power, he gains the willing compliance of the courtier.

What is it, then, that distinguishes having power from exercising power? The distinction could hinge upon the presence or absence of a manifest intention. We could define the *exercise* of power in such a way as to require *C* to manifest an intention to act in some way in the future, his action to be contingent on *R*'s behavior. By contrast, *C* might be said to *have* power when, though he does not manifest an intention, *R* imputes an intention to him and shapes his behavior to meet the imputed intention. If one were to accept this distinction, then in studying the *exercise* of power, one would have to examine not only *R*'s perceptions and responses but also *C*'s intentions and actions. In studying relationships in which *C* is thought to *have* power, even though he does not exercise it, one would in principle need only to study *R*'s perceptions, the intentions *R* imputes to *C*, and the bearing of these on *R*'s behavior. Carried to the extreme, then, this kind of analysis could lead to the discovery of as many different power structures in a political system as there are individuals who impute different intentions to other individuals, groups, or strata in the system.

The distinction between having and exercising power could also turn on the directness involved in the relation between *C* and *R* and on the spe-

cificity of the actions. In the most direct relationship *R*'s response would be tripped off by a signal directly from *C*. In this case, *C* is exercising power. But some relationships are highly indirect; for example, *C* may modify *R*'s environment in a more or less lasting way, so that *R* continues to respond as *C* had intended, even though *C* makes no effort to control *R*. In these cases, one might say that although *C* does not exercise control over *R*, he does *have* control over *R*. There are a variety of these indirect, or "roundabout," controls (Dahl & Lindblom 1953, pp. 110 ff.).

**Measuring power.** Even more than with power terms themselves, notions of "more" or "less" power were in classical theory left to the realm of common sense and intuition. Efforts to develop systematic measures of power date almost wholly from the 1950s. Of those, some are stated partly in mathematical formulas, some entirely in non-mathematical language. Since the essential features can be suggested without mathematics, we shall describe these measures in ordinary language. (The reader should consult the sources cited for the precise formulations. Most of the best-known measures are presented and discussed in Riker 1964.)

In a rough way, the various criteria for measuring power can be classified into three types: game-theoretical, Newtonian, and economic.

**Game-theoretical criteria.** Shapley, a mathematician, and Shubik, an econometrician, have jointly formulated a "method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system" (1954). This is intended to measure the power accruing to a voter where the outcome or decision is determined exclusively by voting. In these cases the rules prescribe what proportion of votes constitutes a winning proportion (e.g., a simple majority of all committee members). Thus each member has a certain abstract probability of casting the last vote that would be needed to complete a winning coalition, in other words to occupy a pivotal position with respect to the outcome. By adding his vote at this crucial juncture, a voter may be conceived of as having made a particularly decisive contribution to the outcome; thus, gaining his vote might have considerable value to the other members of a coalition that would lose without his vote. Shapley and Shubik proposed measuring the power of a voter by the probability that he would be the pivotal voter in a winning coalition. Because their measure is entirely limited to voting situations and excludes all outcomes other than the act of voting itself, the utility of the measure is limited to cases where most of the other familiar elements of political



life—various forms of persuasion, inducement, and coercion—are lacking. [See COALITIONS.]

*Newtonian criteria.* On the analogy of the measurement of force in classical mechanics, a number of analysts propose to measure power by the amount of change in  $R$  attributable to  $C$ . The greater the change in  $R$ , the greater the power of  $C$ ; thus  $C_a$  is said to exert more power than  $C_b$  if  $C_a$  induces more change in  $R_a$  than  $C_b$  induces in  $R_b$  (or in some other  $R$ ). Measures of this kind have been more frequently proposed than any other (Simon 1947–1956; March 1957; Dahl 1957; 1963, chapter 5; Cartwright 1959; Oppenheim 1961, chapter 8).

"Change in  $R$ " is not, however, a single dimension, since many different changes in  $R$  may be relevant. Some of the important dimensions of the "change in  $R$ " brought about by  $C$  that have been suggested for measuring the amount of  $C$ 's power are (1) the probability that  $R$  will comply; (2) the number of persons in  $R$ ; (3) the number of distinct items, subjects, or values in  $R$ ; (4) the amount of change in  $R$ 's position, attitudes, or psychological state; (5) the speed with which  $R$  changes; (6) the reduction in the size of the set of outcomes or behaviors available to  $R$ ; and (7) the degree of  $R$ 's threatened or expected deprivation.

*Economic criteria.* Where the game-theoretical measure focuses on the pivotal position of  $C$ , and Newtonian measures on changes in  $R$ , a third proposal would include "costs" to both  $C$  and  $R$  in measuring  $C$ 's power. Harsanyi has argued that a complete measure of power should include (1) the opportunity costs to  $C$  of attempting to influence  $R$ , which Harsanyi calls the *costs* of  $C$ 's power, and (2) the opportunity costs to  $R$  of refusing to comply with  $C$ , which Harsanyi calls the *strength* of  $C$ 's power over  $R$  (1962a, pp. 68 ff.). The measure Harsanyi proposes is not inherently limited to the kinds of cost most familiar to economists but could be extended—at least in principle—to include psychological costs of all kinds.

*Designing operational definitions.* Empirical studies discussed by Cartwright (1965), March (1965), and others, and particularly community studies, have called attention to the neglected problem of designing acceptable operational definitions.

The concepts and measures discussed in this article have not been clothed in operational language. It is not yet clear how many of them can be. Yet the researcher who seeks to observe, report, compare, and analyze power in the real world, in order to test a particular hypothesis or a broader theory, quickly discovers urgent need for opera-

tionally defined terms. Research so far has called attention to three kinds of problems. First, the gap between concept and operational definition is generally very great, so great, indeed, that it is not always possible to see what relation there is between the operations and the abstract definition. Thus a critic is likely to conclude that the studies are, no doubt, reporting *something* in the real world, but he might question whether they are reporting the phenomena we mean when we speak of *power*. Second, different operational measures do not seem to correlate with one another (March 1956), which suggests that they may tap different aspects of power relations. Third, almost every measure proposed has engendered controversy over its validity.

None of these results should be altogether surprising or even discouraging. For despite the fact that the attempt to understand political systems by analyzing power relations is ancient, the systematic empirical study of power relations is remarkably new.

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[See also COMMUNITY, article on THE STUDY OF COMMUNITY POWER; POLITICAL SCIENCE; POLITICAL THEORY. Directly related are the entries AUTHORITY; BALANCE OF POWER; GOVERNMENT; MILITARY POWER POTENTIAL; POWER TRANSITION. Other relevant material may be found in CAUSATION; COERCION; DECISION MAKING; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; MONOPOLY; OLIGOPOLY; POLITICAL PROCESS; SOCIAL CONTROL.]

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## REVOLUTION

Revolution in its most common sense is an attempt to make a radical change in the system of government. This often involves the infringement of prevailing constitutional arrangements and the use of force. "Revolution" may also mean any fundamentally new development in the economy, culture, or social fabric—that is, in practically any field of human endeavor. In its modern (political) sense, the term was first used in the Italian city-states in the late Middle Ages, when it referred mainly to ecclesiastical reforms. The word first entered the English language in about 1600; under Cromwell, paradoxically, it came to mean the restoration of the old order. Traditional Spanish or Latin American *pronunciamentos*, Middle Eastern *coups d'état*, and the frequent upheavals in which one ruling clique replaces another, merely substituting one king, colonel, or courtier for another, without otherwise affecting the system of government or the fabric of society, cannot be considered revolutions unless, as has happened in a few cases, such upheavals are transformed into movements that bring about radical social change. On the other hand, it would be misleading to confine examination of the subject to the French and Russian revolutions, regarding all others as merely precursors of, or deviations from, these "classic" types.

Modern revolutions are usually carried out, according to their leaders, on behalf of the popular forces against despotism, corruption, and an outworn social and political order, and under the banner of progress, freedom, and social justice. Social movements, however, have to be judged not only by intentions, ideological declarations, and promises, but also by their actual performance. Some of those who take revolutionary action in the name of freedom and social justice are demagogues or impostors; others sincerely believe in these ideals but as a result of their actions may bring about a state of affairs that is a complete negation of their beliefs. Thus it is not always easy to distinguish between revolution and counterrevolution. The rise of totalitarianism has further obscured what was in the nineteenth century a seemingly clear-cut conflict between left and right. Condorcet's dictum that only movements striving for freedom can be truly revolutionary has become less and less tenable.

The causes of revolution. Despite the different patterns revolutions have followed, it is possible to trace certain features common to all. They usually follow the complete or partial breakdown of the old

order caused by the inefficiency of the governing class or by economic crisis, war, or similar happenings. Yet a "revolutionary situation" per se does not necessarily result in revolution; it may just as easily lead to anarchy or to a nonrevolutionary dictatorship if the revolutionaries (usually a conspiratorial group better organized than their rivals) are not capable of swift and decisive action.

The incident that sparks a revolution may be trivial: the performance of an opera of Daniel Auber's in Brussels in 1830; a student's cane dropping into the orchestra pit from a balcony in Munich in 1848; or the punishment by bastinado of a group of merchants in Tehran in 1905. The deeper causes, of course, go further back in time, and are more complex. Temporary economic crises have played a certain part in the outbreak of revolutions (the French famine of 1788, the bread riots in Petrograd before the February Revolution in 1917). However, left-wing French historians (Jean Jaurès, Georges Lefebvre) have doubted whether the economic crisis alone would have induced the masses to participate actively in the revolution of 1789, and communist historians, commenting on the year 1917, have attributed more importance to antiwar feeling than to food shortages.

War appears to have been the decisive factor in the emergence of revolutionary situations in modern times; most modern revolutions, both successful and abortive, have followed in the wake of war (the Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian revolution of 1905, the various revolutions after the two world wars, including the Chinese revolutions). These have occurred not only in the countries that suffered defeat. The general dislocation caused by war, the material losses and human sacrifices, create a climate conducive to radical change. A large section of the population has been armed; human life seems considerably less valuable than in peacetime. In a defeated country authority tends to disintegrate, and acute social dissatisfaction receives additional impetus from a sense of wounded national prestige (the Young Turks in 1908, Naguib and Nasser in 1952). The old leadership is discredited by defeat, and the appeal for radical social change and national reassertion thus falls on fertile ground.

Established elites and ruling classes have, however, also fallen in times of peace, for such reasons as sheer ineffectiveness, corruption, general boredom, or inability to adapt themselves to changing conditions. Corruption or extreme conservatism by itself, however, does not produce revolution. Despotism is often overthrown, not when they are being most tyrannical, but rather when



The established elite loses its self-confidence and starts making halfhearted attempts to become more liberal. The French Revolution of 1789 broke out after the States-General had been called; the revolution of 1848, after the unpopular Guizot government had fallen; the Hungarian revolution of 1956, after the surviving victims of extreme tyranny had been released. A united elite with a firm belief in the rightness of its cause has hardly ever been overthrown, regardless of the extent of its political, military, or economic setbacks. On the other hand, a comparatively minor reverse may prove fatal to an otherwise successful and reasonably competent elite that has lost its self-confidence and its will and ambition to rule.

A frequent source of revolutionary tension is the social unrest that may occur when a section of the population or a social class does not receive the political rights which it feels correspond to its value in society, when it faces a rigid structure or elite, or when its social and economic demands are not fulfilled. Oligarchies tend to defend their own privileges and to ignore the demands of a newly emergent sector or class, and as a result the "outsiders" despair of the possibility of gradual, peaceful change and conclude that only the complete overthrow of the old order will give them their rights and restore justice. In this context all revolutions, from the *secessio plebis* and Marius in ancient Rome to the French and Russian revolutions, are simply the culmination of long-drawn-out social processes; not the result of some sudden dissatisfaction of part of the population, but the last phase of a process of long duration.

In a similar way the rebellion of colonies against the metropolitan country and their eventual secession is a revolutionary process, made possible by the social, economic, and political development of the colony and the gradual evolution of a local elite.

Revolutions have a tendency to spread. Events in 1848 and 1918-1919 provide the best-known examples, but this generalization is also true of comparatively minor revolutionary uprisings. The Spanish revolution of 1820 (Rafael del Riego) indirectly provoked uprisings in Portugal (Bernardo C. Sepulveda), Naples (Guglielmo Pepe), and Piedmont. The French revolution of July 1830 had repercussions in Belgium and Poland. Many Asian and African countries gained independence after India had won hers in 1947. A revolution in one country frequently acts as a stimulus to revolutionary activity in another.

The phases of revolution. The stages of a modern revolution vary according to time, place, and the character and aims of the revolutionary group.

The activities of a group that has set itself limited aims, as in Mexico in 1910, differ from those of a party that stands for the total transformation of society, as in China in 1949. There are, however, certain features common to all but a very few revolutions.

*Prerevolutionary outbreaks.* Few revolutions come as a bolt from the blue: demonstrations, strikes, meetings, outbreaks of violence, a partial or total breakdown of law and order usually foreshadow the shape of things to come.

*Initial moderate stage.* After it has come to power, a revolutionary movement, being a coalition of various groups and parties, often assumes a moderate character. The exceptions are revolutionary movements that have come to power after a prolonged civil war and have decimated their enemies and rivals as a result of that war (e.g., Yugoslavia in 1945, China in 1949). Once the leadership of the former regime has been overthrown and the outstanding symbols of its rule removed, the new revolutionary regime is interested above all in "business as usual," in other words, the restarting of essential services, work in factories, shops, and on the land. A total breakdown would not be in the interest of the revolution, which usually lacks the qualified manpower to fill all key positions with its own candidates and therefore needs the cooperation of a substantial number of supporters of the old regime. Some genuine revolutionary movements fail at the first stage; Chu Yüan-chang came to power in 1368 as an agrarian revolutionary, yet could not carry out any radical reforms because he needed the assistance of the wealthy landowners to pay his army. Batista's Cuban uprising in 1933 differed from the traditional Latin American *coup d'état* and had the makings of a genuine revolution, since it placed sergeants over officers, yet its sole achievement was to enable the newcomers to share the spoils of the old system.

*Radical phase.* Revolutionary movements that outlast the first phase—both those which have more ambitious plans and those which are driven forward by the sheer logic of events—tend to adopt more radical measures in the second phase. At the same time the coalition of parties usually splits up, and the more radical elements (Jacobins, Bolsheviks) emerge as the sole possessors of power. Within the ruling group power passes into the hands of a very small number, often into the hands of a single individual. This process may be hastened by counterrevolutionary activities and/or foreign intervention, but it may also happen irrespective of such opposition. Every major revolution has destroyed the state apparatus it found and eventually



replaced it by setting up another, generally stronger bureaucratic organization in its place. This centralizing dictatorial trend has been marked in every modern revolution.

In many revolutions there are two distinct phases: the overthrow of the upper aristocracy in the English Civil War, for example, was followed at a later stage by the emergence of the middle and lower classes. The February Revolution of 1917 was followed by the Bolshevik seizure of power. Once the main revolutionary measures have been carried out and a certain normality re-established, there is frequently a change of guard. Some of the revolutionary heroes and leaders succeed in adjusting themselves to the new administrative and organizational tasks facing them; others do not and are cast aside, giving way to managers and bureaucrats. In the struggle for power that often ensues, it is by no means always the most radical leader who triumphs, but the better tactician, the man with the most support within the ruling group, the army, the police, or other power base.

*Postrevolutionary situation.* How do revolutions end? Some revolutionary movements fail at a very early stage or are beaten by the forces raised against them. Some of those that last longer peter out because a key leader dies (Oliver Cromwell) or because internecine strife undermines the revolutionary party (e.g., France in 1794). Others evolve over a long period of time and gradually change their character. Certain revolutionary achievements are maintained; others are slowly eroded, although the phraseology of the revolution is usually preserved. There are unlimited variations on this theme.

*The personnel of revolutions.* The typical nineteenth-century or twentieth-century revolutionary is of middle-class or lower-middle-class origin—student, young lawyer, or junior army officer. Elderly and very rich people or those with conservative inclinations are unlikely to lead or engage in revolutionary activity. There are, as usual, exceptions: the Brazilian revolution of 1889, which led to the downfall of the monarchy, was a movement of protest by leading *hacendados* against the abolition of slavery. The railroad disturbances in China in 1911, which led to the deposition of the Manchu dynasty, began as a protest of the principal railroad shareholders against nationalization. On the whole a revolutionary mentality is unlikely to flourish in such circles, although a number of aristocrats were on the side of the *tiers état* in 1789. The majority of leaders of socialist movements and of proletarian revolutions have been of middle-class origin; this fact suggests that the

feeling of frustration, the quest for power, the sense of injustice, and various idealistic aspirations are of greater importance in the formation of a revolutionary than is economic discontent. Oppressed nationality is occasionally an important factor (the high percentage of Jews, Latvians, Armenians, etc., in the initial stage of the Russian Revolution, the prominent part played by national minorities in revolutionary movements in the Balkans and the Middle East, the role of Poland in 1848, and so on).

In those parts of the world where grave social and political problems exist, higher education acts as a powerful stimulus toward revolution. The illiterate masses may be quiescent, however miserable their lot, but higher education provokes a "revolution of expectations" that cannot be fulfilled. Students and high school pupils have played a very prominent part in both the Russian and Chinese revolutions and in revolutionary movements in Latin America, the Middle East, and other parts of Asia and Africa; the fact that these were or are countries with a high proportion of unemployment or misemployment of university graduates is not accidental. The conflict of generations is another factor of considerable importance (the revolution of the *tenentes* in Brazil in 1939; of young army officers in Venezuela in 1945, in Egypt in 1952, and in Iraq in 1959).

Some revolutionary movements have been led and supported by one specific class or group (for instance, peasant revolts), but the major revolutions have had a broader basis both as to leadership and rank and file. Intellectuals have played a leading part in most revolutionary movements in Europe since the eighteenth century, while in many countries outside Europe young army officers have had a conspicuous role. The army as such in these countries is no more revolutionary in spirit than the police or the civil service, who on the whole play a passive part (or a waiting game) and regain importance only after the victory of the revolution; but as the principal source of physical power, the army is the most obviously effective instrument of revolution. Young revolutionaries in the Middle East and in Latin America have often chosen to become army officers because this career was the most likely to give them power and thus bring about political and social change.

Since, as a rule, a revolution can succeed only if preparations for it are kept secret, these have usually been confined to a small revolutionary high command. In the era before modern political parties came into being, an important part was played by secret societies, such as the clubs in France on



the eve of 1789 or the Chinese secret societies, which traditionally had great political influence (the White Lotus in 1775, the Society of Heaven's Law in 1813). A certain amount of conspiracy is involved in every revolution, but its ramifications are often exaggerated (the "hidden hand," the "conspiracy theory" of history) and undue importance subsequently attributed to certain bodies (the Illuminati, the Freemasons), attributing causal or organizational connection to events that were in fact quite unconnected. Apart from what is planned, there is in each revolution a spontaneous element, which is sometimes far more decisive. The revolutions in Germany and Austria in 1918 were neither foreseen nor planned by any revolutionary high command.

Revolutionary uprisings undertaken by the army are usually prepared by a single commander or a small group of officers (junta) having the support of a substantial part of the army. The garrison of the capital or the units stationed nearby are usually of decisive importance in this context. Twentieth-century revolutions in the more highly developed countries need a mass basis; the army may be essential for the initial stage, but different instruments are required to hold power and to carry out the changes deemed necessary. The more ambitious military usurpers have therefore tried either to collaborate with some of the existing political parties or groups or to create a political mass movement of their own (Perón, Nasser, etc.).

**Success or failure of revolution.** The factors determining success or failure in revolution are as various as the factors that generate revolutionary activity in the first place. The most frequent causes of failure are lack of support or active resistance by the bulk of the population and disunity or lack of purpose on the part of the leaders. In all modern revolutions the support of a militant minority and the physical seizure of some vital *points d'appui* (such as the seat of government, the army and police commands, the means of mass communication—radio, press, etc.) are decisive. These steps are carried out by a comparatively small minority and stand a good chance of succeeding if the group has mastered the elementary technique of the *coup d'état*, if the enemy is disorganized and incapable of counteraction, and if the bulk of the population is at least neutral. In the decisive first hours or days of revolution a few hundred, or at the most a few thousand, revolutionaries can achieve success even in a large country. (In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the pace was usually more leisurely.) Once a strong revolutionary dictatorship has been established, a comparatively small mi-

nority can retain power for a considerable time provided that its policy does not antagonize all of the people for most of the time or permit the antagonized to organize. Technical progress in transportation and communication has made it much easier for such a regime to influence the whole population and control the entire territory, whereas in the past there was always a danger of counterrevolution breaking out in a remote part of the country.

The timing of a revolutionary attempt is of crucial importance; so are the personalities of its leaders. It is doubtful whether the October Revolution of 1917 would have succeeded without Lenin and Trotsky or indeed whether it would have been undertaken at all. The Bolshevik uprising succeeded, whereas communist or left-wing extremist revolutions elsewhere in Europe (Budapest, Munich) failed. Lenin's party was numerically stronger and better organized than the rather amorphous groups that supported the Bavarian and Hungarian revolutions; the ruling class was weaker and more discredited in Russia than in central Europe. In addition, counterrevolutionary action by foreign powers was, for geographic reasons, less effective in Russia than in Hungary and southern Germany.

A number of revolutions have failed because their leaders lacked the will and ability to persevere in a revolutionary course of action after the first demonstrations or fighting had taken place (Germany in 1848); they feared anarchy and radicalism in their own ranks more than they feared their enemies. Other revolutions failed because they were betrayed before the planned coups were carried out, since preparation is by necessity limited to a fairly small group, the arrest of some leaders can mean a lasting setback for a revolutionary movement.

**Counterrevolution.** Groups of people adversely affected (or likely to be so affected) by a revolution often band together to try to avert it or, if it has already occurred, to overthrow it. Support for counterrevolutionary movements in the nineteenth century usually came from the aristocracy, the clergy, or the higher ranks of the army—all those with a vested interest in preserving the old order. Toward the end of the century, however, and in particular after World War I, certain important changes took place. Since revolutionaries were appealing to the mass of the people and trying to establish, wherever possible, a mass basis of support for their activities, the counterrevolutionaries had to adapt to the new conditions. To have any political influence at all they were compelled to accept a part (sometimes a large part) of the revolutionaries'



program and to adopt their tactics. In Europe only those counterrevolutionary movements that have done so have enjoyed success for any length of time, although overwhelming outside assistance may serve as well. The counterrevolutionary movement usually restricts itself at first to mere demagogic phrasemongering; but gradually it spreads and gains a momentum of its own. The trade unions founded by Colonel Zubatov of the Russian police in 1900 were originally meant to combat the revolutionaries, but in the competition for popular support they gained a measure of independence, and their sponsors lost control over the movement. The fascist and national-socialist movements in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s usually began as counterrevolutionary movements; but the majority of their leaders did not belong to the old order and had no intention of restoring it. In their extreme forms these movements were quasi-revolutionary in character (National Bolshevism in Germany; Mussolini's Republic of Salò, etc.) or nihilistic (Hitler), rather than reactionary. The traditional categories of "revolutionary" and "counterrevolutionary" continued perhaps to make sense when applied to the more rudimentary forms of European fascism, but they became irrelevant in regard to its more advanced forms and to the totalitarian state in general. The Hungarian revolution of 1956 has proved this beyond reasonable doubt.

**Consequences of revolution.** It is characteristic of a revolution (in contrast to a mere *coup d'état*) that it has far-reaching political, social, and sometimes economic or cultural consequences. Revolutions have frequently been the "locomotives of history"; just as frequently they have been quite senseless, causing much unnecessary suffering. Revolutions have liberated peoples and elevated classes; at the same time some of the greatest crimes in history have been committed in the name of revolution. It has been argued that the emancipation of the third estate in France and the transformation of Russia into a democracy were already under way in 1789 and 1917 and that the revolutions merely gave a spectacular acceleration to an inevitable historical process. Since force begets force, however, violent revolution, though intended to overthrow despotism, very often culminates in a new tyranny. Since the idealism and devotion inherent in revolutionary movements thus serve to bring about a new despotism, the movements can hardly be regarded as great successes in terms of what they set out to do. Against this it is argued that the lasting "social achievements" of revolutions are more decisive than any short-lived "political distortion" or terrorism.

The major revolutionary movements of modern times have claimed a world-wide mission and have been expansive in character. The French Revolution in the years 1789–1815 undoubtedly helped spread civil liberties throughout Europe; some of its reverberations were felt in Europe and the rest of the world long after. Yet the attempt to bring the blessings of civil liberties forcibly to other countries produced a chauvinistic, antiliberal reaction in some parts of Europe, which had fateful consequences. Revolutions that set themselves limited objectives may succeed in achieving genuine reforms if they represent the aspirations of the majority of the population. The more violent a revolution, the greater the amount of coercion applied, the more likely that dictatorship, ostensibly established for a short "transition" period only, will be perpetuated. Revolutions that aim at a total transformation of society claim to act in the interests of the majority, but since the majority does not realize where its own best interests lie, it is left to a small avant-garde to make the decisions for it. In consequence it is more than likely that a society will emerge in which severe repression seems to be permanently built in. Such a state may achieve striking results in various fields, such as the national economy or national defense, but to judge from past experience, it will not succeed in building a freer and more just society.

**Doctrines of revolution.** The modern conception of revolution as a fundamental transformation dates back to the eighteenth century, although it is not quite correct to argue that the idea of a radical new beginning was altogether alien to ancient times. However, until the late eighteenth century the advocates of utopian societies were, with some notable exceptions, not revolutionaries, and revolutionaries were not utopians. Ordinarily, the revolutionaries fought against absolute monarchs or tyrants in the name of a natural order that the latter had violated. This tradition was expressed in the American War of Independence and the early stages of the French Revolution. The French Revolution produced an immense amount of theorizing on the subject, and the discussion received fresh fuel from the many revolutionary outbreaks of the nineteenth century. The famous exchange between Burke and Paine set the pattern for an argument which has continued to the present day. The conservative viewpoint rests on the belief that political and social continuity are essential prerequisites for an orderly society; that abstract rights and model constitutions count for little in practice; that revolutions are at best destructive and only replace one despotism by another—if they do not result in a



period of general anarchy. The nineteenth-century conservative regarded the revolutionary movement as inherently sinful, its leaders as misfits and criminals, and its followers as the deluded dregs of society.

Revolutionary theory in its more extreme forms, on the other hand, held that revolutionaries were only the most consistent fighters for freedom, justice, and the other ancient ideals of mankind and that therefore in the long run they could do no wrong. If conservative and liberal doctrine was largely based on a fear of violence, revolutionary theory belittled the significance of violence and terror and almost totally ignored the realities of political power in a modern society.

In recent decades the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of proletarian revolution has all but monopolized discussions on the subject. It claims to be a scientific doctrine and regards history as proceeding according to ascertainable laws. Revolutions fulfill a crucial function in the development of society: they overthrow the old social order, which has outlived its usefulness, and establish a new order; in this process power passes from the hands of one class (which is reactionary) to another (which is progressive in character). According to Marxist theory, the productive forces of society at certain stages of their development clash with the existing relations of production. The existing social order begins to impede their further development, and an epoch of social revolution begins. The basic problem in each revolution is the question of state power; through the class struggle power passes from one class to another. The class struggle may lead to civil war; its very highest form is revolution. All revolutions before 1917 only brought about the replacement of one form of exploitation by another; only the socialist (communist) revolution puts an end to man's exploitation by man. This is the final revolution, for in a socialist society there can be, by definition, only "nonantagonistic conflicts," conflicts that can be resolved in a peaceful way.

The historical fate of Marxist-Leninist doctrine is of great importance. It has been very successful, but not where it expected to succeed—in the industrially developed countries of Europe and North America. Instead it became the ideology of an industrial revolution in backward countries. The revolutionary situation that Marx had expected to develop in western and central Europe failed to arrive. In the underdeveloped countries, on the other hand, the Western impact produced strains that made for a different kind of revolutionary situation. These revolutions were not proletarian in character; neither in China nor in Cuba did the

working class take a prominent part in the revolution. These revolutions, however, brought to power regimes that were either communist from the first (China) or that soon adopted a "Marxist-Leninist" viewpoint (Cuba).


These historical fortunes of the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution made various ideological mutations and adaptations necessary. The socialist parties of Europe became democratic in character; some of them continued to pay lip service to revolution, but their practice, and gradually their theory, became "revisionist." In the late 1950s several European Communist parties also began to show what some observers regarded as reformist inclinations. In Russia, Trotsky and others had propagated the idea of the permanent revolution, the doctrine that a "bourgeois revolution" in Russia (or a similar country) would immediately be followed by the establishment of a "proletarian dictatorship" and that an upheaval in one country would inevitably lead to revolution on a wider scale. The world revolution failed to materialize, however, and in the Soviet Union there developed what has become known (though never defined in detail) as the Stalinist concept of the "revolution from above." Revolution no longer meant the liberation of society from outworn political and spiritual fetters. Now it stood for the reshaping of society by a dictatorial regime controlling a centralized state apparatus and an all-pervading party organization. The "revolution from above" established communist regimes in eastern Europe; abortive revolutionary uprisings from below (Berlin in 1953, Poznan and Budapest in 1956) were later directed against these regimes.

Revolutionary movements continue to exist in the underdeveloped parts of the world; the revolutionary potential of these countries is far more pronounced than that of the industrially advanced nations. Revolutionary doctrine in these areas has absorbed some elements of the Marxist-Leninist theory, but to a very considerable extent it springs from other sources, such as resentment against the white nations that ruled the colonial world for so long. Attempts to organize the former colonies and underdeveloped countries into one united front against the metropolitan countries can be traced back to the 1920s, and in a somewhat modified form the idea has found new proponents in the 1960s; they argue that the underdeveloped countries are the "proletarian nations," the only truly revolutionary force on a world scale.

According to the Chinese communist thesis, revolutions (and wars of liberation) would and should continue regardless of consequences, whereas most Russian and European communists maintain that



**D.E.S.S. DE GESTION EUROPEENNE ET INTERNATIONALE**



## **INDIA : ECONOMIC SURVEY**

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Lecturer : **Dr. Surendra Singh YADAV**, Financial Officer, Department of Defense

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READINGS for SESSION 3

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# The Economist


A SURVEY OF INDIA



## The tiger steps out



# INDIA



## Hello, world

**I**NDIA," chant the world's brokers and bankers like a mantra, "has a middle class of 250m people." If this is intended to convey something about a decent house with a garden, a car, plenty of gadgets and a holiday a year, it is rubbish.

The claims being made for India these days are a reflection of fashion, not fact. India is in vogue, for three reasons: the discovery of emerging markets by the West's financial institutions at the beginning of this decade, economic reforms that started in India in 1991, and a growing fear that China, the moneyman's first choice, is spinning out of control. With democracy, English and a decent legal system, India looks more manageable.

India has an economy slightly smaller than Belgium's. Its GDP per head is \$310. Fewer than half of its 950m people can read. Between them, they have only just over 6m telephones and 35m television sets. Some 14% of the population has access to clean sanitation—a lower proportion than anywhere else except for a handful of Sudans and Burkina Faso. According to the World Bank, 63% of India's under-five-year-olds are malnourished. Perhaps 40% of the world's desperately poor live in India. Apart from a tiny elite in Delhi and Bombay, India's rich are poor by anybody else's standards: according to the National Council for Applied Economic Research, only 2.3% of the population has a household income of more than 78,000 rupees (\$2,484).

Until recently, to attribute any of this to mismanagement was to invite hostility. There would be mutterings about the "Hindu rate of growth", as though the country were somehow predestined for

sloth; there would be claims that, after all, much had been achieved because India no longer had the famines it once had; and there would be recourse, at the smartest of dinners, to homilies about the importance of Gandhian asceticism and the unimportance of economic growth. To suggest that borders should be opened to trade, or that foreigners should be allowed to own companies in India, was to threaten recolonisation by multinationals.

This defensiveness was probably a post-colonial hangover. The Gandhian belief in self-reliance that informed the fight for independence had deteriorated into isolationism; that, combined with a chauvinist pride in the system that the heroes of independence had built, prevented Indians from seeing how badly it had served them. Besides, too many of the people in a position to do something about that system were doing too well out of it.

### Seen it on the box

Attitudes have changed over the past few years. No doubt the openness that has come with economic reform has hastened the change; but a new atmosphere also helped to make those changes more acceptable. Maybe enough time has passed since India got rid of the British for its people to see the rest of the world as an opportunity, not as a threat. Whatever the reason, India is now perceptibly more open to the outside world. The insecurity that manifested itself as arrogance is going. The insularity of the past has been replaced by an enlivening consciousness of how badly the country has done; and of how much it has to do to start to catch up

*Economic reform has helped, but India's government is still frustrating its people's ambitions, writes our Asia editor, Emma Duncan*





Looking out



with the rest of the world.

Some of the change may also be the result of another recent revolution, about which the government could do nothing but fume: the advent of proper television. Until 1992, Indians were condemned to Doordarshan, the state-owned television, still the country's only terrestrial broadcaster. The most exciting programme it ever produced was a 98-part dramatisation of a religious epic, the Mahabharata. Then Star-TV, a Hong Kong-based satellite network, arrived, along with Zee TV, a Hindi channel. In 1991, 330,000 homes in India received satellite or cable channels; by September 1994, 12m did. Multiply that by the average household size of 5.2, and a great many Indians are getting to see the outside world for the first time.

Rightly or wrongly, television gets the blame (or the credit) for all sorts of changes in India over the past few years: for the fact that so many teenage girls in towns now wear western, not Indian, clothes; for the fact that some advanced, cosmopolitan couples have started living together before they are married ("it's easier to explain it to a mother who has seen 'The Bold and The Beautiful'," says a young woman, referring to an American soap screened on Star-TV); for the breasts that have appeared on the covers of magazines; and for the fact that many Indians perceive their society as increasingly con-

sumerist and materialistic.

Consumerism is a troublesome idea for a country whose hero liberated his country wearing a loin-cloth, and spent his leisure hours toiling at a spinning-wheel. Not that Gandhi invented asceticism: Hinduism preaches self-purification through the denial of desires. The cultural habit of not displaying wealth was reinforced by high tax rates and a large black economy: anybody who looked too wealthy was liable to a visit from the tax inspectors. But now Indians have started showing off a bit. The standard cramped, grubby office from which million-dollar businesses were run is being replaced by something more in tune with international taste. Bombay businessmen are casting aside their horribly-cut casual clothes in favour of suits and ties. Cars are getting flashier, parties more ostentatious: a businessman recently hired an airliner for his daughter's wedding. Salaries in the private sector have rocketed in the past couple of years as Indian companies compete for talent with foreign interlopers.

Money-making has replaced revolution as the chief preoccupation of the young. "Even the students of Calcutta," says T.N. Ninan, editor of the Business Standard, in mock-astonishment at the revolution that has taken place in India's most revolutionary city, "don't talk about politics any more." Politicians are held in general contempt. Now that Indians are better able to examine their country's failures, they are also quicker to allocate blame. This disillusionment is sharper because of the reverence in which Indians hold the grubby modern breed's predecessors, Gandhi and Nehru.

As people lose their reliance on government, so they look to the private sector to fulfil their aspirations. In the past, the hordes of graduates who hit the job market every year used to scabble for public-sector posts that offered at least a secure pittance and a cramped flat: now people would rather join a private firm. The old prejudice against private enterprise and in favour of public service has been reversed. Many in government still have to catch up with this change. As P. Chidambaram, who resigned as commerce minister in 1992, says, "The people are ten years ahead of us." Outdated attitudes in government are holding back what should be one of the world's most vibrant economies.

## The revolution so far

*A small bunch of economic reformers is fighting a guerrilla war against the apathy of most bureaucrats and politicians*

"IT IS not entirely wrong," writes Jagdish Baghwati, an expatriate economics professor at Columbia University and long-time critic of India's old ways, "to agree with the cynical view that India's misfortune was to have brilliant economists: an affliction that the Far Eastern super-performers were spared." For those clever, foreign-trained economists who packed the committee-rooms of Delhi during the decade after independence designed in fine detail a system that combined the worst of socialism and capitalism, by suppressing growth while failing even to deliver the social welfare that communist systems provided.

Maybe the economist-surplus has its advan-

tages, though; for three decades later a different group of equally brilliant people is conspiring to undo the system their predecessors built. The task is a harder one, for once a system exists the powerful people who do well by it have an interest in preserving it. Momentum is on the reformers' side; yet the battle is still only half-won.


The system developed in India after independence constrained the growth of the private sector by allowing it to expand only with government permission. It reserved heavy industry for the public sector, and stunted trade by quotas and high tariffs. Access to foreign exchange was limited. There were controls on land use, on trade in farm products—



## Great and small

GDP per person\*, 1993, \$

1



even, if the mood suited, on the price of onions. Such a cock-eyed system was sustainable only so long as India's macroeconomics were in order.

On this front at least, India has done better than most other poor countries. Its governments have paid their debts, and kept budget deficits and inflation low. In the 1980s, however, India's macroeconomics came unstuck: governments began to push for growth not by giving the private sector its freedom but through Latin American-scale borrowing. By the end of the decade, India's debt-to-GDP ratio was nearly twice its level in 1980. In 1991, with only two weeks-worth of foreign-exchange reserves left, the government went to the IMF.

The macroeconomic crisis was resolved with impressive speed, if not in the most desirable way. The budget deficit, which had reached 8.4% of GDP in the April-March 1990-91 fiscal year, dropped to 5.7% by 1992-93. Some of that reduction came in things the government should never have been spending on, such as export subsidies; some in less-expendable items, such as health and education. Yet India got off lightly: macroeconomic stabilisation meant that between the fiscal years 1991-92 and 1992-93, GDP grew by 1.1%, and picked up in the following year to 4%. By contrast, Mexico experienced no net growth at all for nearly a decade after its (far-worse) debt crisis in 1982.

Reformers took advantage of the macroeconomic crisis to push through some big microeconomic changes. Much of the industrial-licensing system was dismantled, and areas once closed to the private sector were opened up: electricity generation, bits of the oil industry, heavy industry, air transport, roads and some telecommunications. Foreign investment, formerly allowed in only grudgingly and subject to arbitrary ceilings, was suddenly welcomed. Approval is now automatic for foreign equity stakes of up to 51% in most businesses; stakes up to 100% may be allowed. Raw materials and capital goods can be freely imported. The maximum tariff rate is down from 400% to 65%. The rupee was devalued by 24% in 1991; most exchange controls have been lifted, and the currency is now pretty much convertible. The top rate of income tax is down from 56% to 40%, and of corporation tax, from 57.5% to 46%. A complex system of excise duties has been replaced by a sort-of-VAT.

Politicians and bureaucrats explain at length that reform in India is "pragmatic" not "ideologi-


cal". What that seems to mean is that hardly anybody in the government believes in it. That is probably because India never suffered a disaster on the scale of Latin America's hyperinflation or the former Soviet Union's economic collapse. India had a short-term financial problem that was swiftly sorted out; and both politics and the bureaucracy are packed by people who do not see change as in their interests.

Even when reform nevertheless has support from the top, India is an especially hard country to push it through. Pranob Bardhan, professor of economics at the University of California at Berkeley, and Mrinal Datta Chaudhuri of the Delhi School of Economics, have called it a "multiple-veto system". This may be partly the result of the bureaucracy, in which files pass from desk to desk to desk, needing the signature of each incumbent; it may also reflect the anarchistic individualism of Indians, all of whom think they deserve a say. Indians are an opinionated lot, and no great respecters of authority. This does not help things to happen quickly.

## The war goes on

So the reform process moves on, but slowly. It resembles guerrilla warfare, with the aggressors a small band of technocrats fighting the rest of the bureaucracy and almost all the politicians. The finance minister, Manmohan Singh, counts as a technocrat: other politicians certainly do not regard him as one of them. His principal lieutenant is Montek Ahluwalia, the finance secretary. They have their men planted in most of the ministries, usually as economic advisers.

Indeed, a few individuals have been crucial to reform. Airline liberalisation, for instance, happened because the skies were run by two successive reformers: Arif Mohammed Khan of the Janata Dal, followed by Congress's Madhavrao Scindia, who has since been edged out of government. Since a direct attack on the monopoly of Airlines, the government-owned domestic carrier, was politically



Do away with licensing, liberalize controls, simplify rules and encourage economic growth, you say. In short you want me to scrap my ministry!

- (i) Do away with licensing
- (ii) Liberalize controls
- (iii) Simplify rules
- (iv) Encourage economic growth





impossible, aspiring carriers were given licenses to run air taxis. In fact, they operated as airlines, but were not allowed to advertise or publish schedules. This was clearly absurd; and a public outcry forced the government to regularise their position.

Mr Scindia's successor takes a different attitude. He has ruled that private companies cannot recruit Indian Airlines' staff without six months' notice and a government no-objection certificate; they must run unprofitable routes; a stay order has been put on the import of new aircraft; and Damania Airways, which had started enticing passengers with free liquor, was grounded for 45 days because a passenger was said to have got drunk. "The empire strikes back," comments Cyrus Guzder, managing director of Air Freight, Indian partner of the London-based courier company DHL.

Mr Guzder is happier than he was, though, for he now has a supporter within the government. Over the past decade, the private sector has quietly broken the public postal monopoly in high-value items. There are now hundreds of courier companies, in a market worth around \$100m a year. Last year, the postal ministry tried unsuccessfully to reimpose its monopoly. Mr Guzder and his colleagues got their customers to petition the government; but he gives most credit to a new secretary to the department, who told the private companies that the government was reconciled to losing its monopoly of high-value items so long as it retained control of the bulk postal service. A new postal bill is now being drafted. "Incredible," says Mr Guzder, who had earlier lost faith in the government's ability to change.

## Indian business shapes up

*Business has leapt at the challenges that the new environment presents*

**A**FTER four decades of suffocation and a couple of years of post-adjustment gloom, Indian business is bouncy. The business-confidence index compiled by the National Council for Applied Economic Research went from optimistic to ebullient during 1994. Corporate profits in the first half of 1994-95 were up by 102%. The capital-goods industry, the first to go into recession, is flourishing. Its output shrank by 5.3% in 1993-94; but in the first two months of 1994-95, it was 18% up on the same period of the previous year.


Yet the statistics do not present a clear picture of a business sector that has leapt on to a higher growth path. GDP growth is still slower than in the 1980s. Some recent figures seem downright contradictory. The Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) runs a survey of 1,800 companies that suggests a 15% increase in sales for the first half of 1994-95. But the industrial-production index, which should not diverge too far from the sales figures, looks like coming in at around 7%. Exports rose by 20% in 1993-94; but claims that India was on its way to join the big exporters' league looked premature when in the first half of 1994-95, growth dropped back. Exporters have been disadvantaged

by the capital that has flowed into the country thanks to foreign enthusiasm for India: although the government has been buying dollars to prevent the rupee appreciating, an inflation rate edging towards two digits has meant that the real exchange rate has gone up.



The huge flow of funds into the stockmarket—market capitalisation grew from 1,110 billion rupees in 1990-91 to 3,980 billion in 1993-94—has given companies plenty of investable cash. Yet it is not clear that they are investing the stuff. Much of it has been used to restructure their finances, exchanging expensive bank loans for equity; but companies do not seem to be using this cheaper money to build new factories. CMIE figures show that in 1992-93, companies were putting 3% of their funds into stocks and bonds and 52% into fixed assets; in 1993-94 they put 22% of their money into the markets and only 47% into assets.

Yet this does not mean that nothing is happening in Indian business. When the environment is changing fast, thanks to the opening of the economy to foreign and domestic competition, new companies have an advantage over old ones. In India, the business scene used to be dominated by firms with pedigrees going back before independence. Now there are sizeable new players speeding past them. Videocon, owned by the Dhoot brothers, formerly motorcycle dealers, is one of three big television manufacturers. It is currently negotiating a joint-venture to make Toshiba VCRs for export. Essar, in steel and oil refining, is planning to expand abroad. The Jain Group, which makes farm equipment, has seen a 400% increase in turnover in the past three years, and now employs 3,000 people. Anil Jain says that they could have done it without liberalisation, but it would have taken four to five years longer.

Management consultants are much in demand, as old business houses try to restructure. McKinsey has 50 consultants in India; other consultants include Andersen Consulting, Coopers & Lybrand and a host of Indians with foreign education and working experience. According to one such, Mrityunjay Athreya, the new environment de-







mands a new range of skills: "In the past, when companies were making plans, the first thing they looked at was the statute book. Now they have to look at the market." Market research, advertising and public relations, none of which companies really bothered with before, are booming.

Companies are also trying to restructure to cut costs and increase efficiency. Some of their hierarchies were as nonsensical as the civil service's: one engineering company had a (now defunct) senior assistant deputy manager. Typically, according to Mr Athreya, companies are cutting their hierarchies from nine levels to four or five. And they are sampling a couple of decades'-worth of foreign management fads. All at once, people are trying just-in-time, *kaizen* (continuous improvement), business process re-engineering, total quality management, human-resource development. The arrival of the latest foreign management guru in India is often front-page news.

There is more competition for talent, and the arrival of foreign companies is pushing salaries up. Clever Indians are nothing like as cheap as they were. Pradip Shah, a Harvard graduate who had been earning 400,000 rupees a year running a credit-rating agency, has been hired by George Soros for over 10m rupees. Salaries of \$100,000-200,000 a year are no longer rare. By American or British standards, this is not astounding; but in a country in which, until August 1993, the government set a ceiling on chief executives' cash salaries of 15,000 rupees a month, it is a big change.

From an era when companies spread themselves wherever they could get a permit, companies now have to think about concentrating on "core competences". Some are restructuring: the huge old business house Tata, which is strongest in engineering, has sold its soaps and toiletries company to Hindustan Lever. Shaw Wallace has sold a profitable tea company, Tezpore Tea, because it decided that it did not fit with its strategy to expand into the fast-growing liquor market. With the maximum tariff down to 65%, companies now face fiercer competition from abroad, and so are having to think harder about what it is that can be done well in India. Fast growth is most noticeable in areas that need cheap but well-educated people.

High levels of engineering skills, for instance, have led to a boom in exports of car parts. The Anand group exports to General Motors, Ford and Chrysler; the Kalyani group supplies Daimler-Benz



**Business is using new tools**

in Indonesia; Mahindra produces parts for Chrysler, Ford and Renault. Software exports began to take off in the 1980s. Bangalore, home of India's software industry, is now one of the world's largest software exporting centres. Other computer-related services are also migrating to India: a company called Airline Support Services in Bombay's Santa Cruz Electronics Export Processing Zone, for instance, computerises all Swissair's paperwork. In Switzerland, the labour would cost 25 times as much.

The geography of industrial expansion is changing, too. In the past, as well as determining which sectors it wanted new investment in, the government decided which areas of the country new factories should be built in. Now that companies can go where they like, they are choosing the parts of the country that are already rich and well-provided for. That will make the differences between rich and poor India, between the places that seem to operate in time-zones centuries apart, even more painfully obvious than they are already.

## Go west

*India's regional divide will widen as the rich get richer and the poor get poorer*

**D**RAW a line down India from Kanpur, in Uttar Pradesh, to the tip of the subcontinent. On the western side are the bits of India that work; on the east, the bits that don't. Setting aside the obvious objections (Kerala may be literate, but it is dirt-poor; Tamil Nadu contains Tiruppur, hub of India's booming knitwear industry), there is a broad truth to the division. The reason is that the east was rich in iron and coal, and so home to the heavy industries that the state set up in the 1950s. They have seen a long, gloomy, strike-ridden decline. On the

west were the lighter industries that the government left in private hands.

This is only one of the many lines that divide India. There is the north-south divide, which is partly about language—the south refuses to speak Hindi, sticking to English as its business and official language—and partly about a difference in atmosphere between the edgy, fractious north and the calmer south. There are separatist movements—the one in Punjab has cooled down, but Kashmir is still burning. And there are the divisions between



castes, and between Hindus and Muslims, both of which have recently led to riots, killings and fears about India's ability to survive as one country.

The east-west divide looks less immediately dangerous. But it worries those who wonder about the long-term consequences of liberalisation. The west seems better placed to take advantage of the new policy not only because it is richer, but also because it is more open to the outside world. Calcutta may have been India's first great port, but the people of Bombay and its surroundings are quicker to travel and trade than are the Bengalis. The Patels, for instance, who come from six villages in Gujarat, were faced with famine at home a century ago, so they took off first to East Africa, and then colonised the world. The oil boom sent hundreds of thousands of westerners, from Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Gujarat, off to work in the Gulf. Many of these Indians who went abroad are now coming home, bringing with them flashy consumer goods and new ideas.

The prosperity that once centred on Maharashtra has spread southwards and northwards, too. Bangalore, Karnataka's capital, has grown with the software industry, partly because it had a long history of good technical education, thanks to an enlightened 19th century ruler, and partly because it is a nice place to live. Northwards, Gujarat is booming, and industry is dispersing even into Rajasthan, which once had little to boast of, but its palaces.

Consider Falna, a small town in south-western Rajasthan where dignified men in crimson turbans and loose white clothes cycle slowly through the streets. It has a population of 17,000 and an ambition to become the umbrella capital of India. Trains from Delhi to Ahmedabad stop at Falna, but it is too insignificant to appear on the timetable.

A couple of long-established umbrella-parts factories have recently been joined by Futex, a Taiwanese joint venture. Karl Chen, Futex's joint managing director, explains that his company thought it worth starting up in India because making umbrella parts is so labour-intensive. Indian workers, he says, cost \$50 a month, 5% of the price of a Taiwanese; but you get 15% as much work out of them. Still, having worked in China, he has a certain weakness for the Indians. "The Indians," he says firmly, "are more intelligent than the Chinese. If you tell a Chinese to go from A to B, he will go the way you tell him. An Indian will try to find a short cut. This is bad in the short run, because it may affect your quality. But in the long run, it is a good thing, because they are innovative."

Along the road, female building workers in pink and orange skirts and shawls are putting the finishing touches to Midas Mink, a South Korean joint-venture to finish spectacle frames. Piles of plastic spectacle frames, just imported from South Korea, lie around waiting to be turned and polished. Joon-ho Lee, an engineer with little English and less Hindi, has the dazed expression of a man who has woken up on a different planet. He explains that the reason for the joint-venture is the low cost of labour; but questions about Indian productivity reduce him to inarticulacy.

Around the corner is Falna Television, owned and run by Abdul Rehman, a 70-year-old with primary-level education. He manufactured transistor

## West is best

Development Indicators, latest	Literacy rates		Income tax returns, per 1,000	Registered motor vehicles, per 1,000	Power consumption per head, Kwh
	Male	Female			
Eastern	59.0	32.9	1.17	17.5	217.3
Western	67.4	43.8	2.13	39.3	464.0
All India	64.1	39.3	1.58	27.3	330.6

Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy

radios, but when satellite television came to India he worked out, from books and magazines, how to make a satellite dish. He now employs 50 people to manufacture 2,000 dishes a year. He sits in a cramped shed, playing with a remote-control device he has designed that manipulates the dish out in his yard to receive different channels. The dish swivels slowly, and the picture on his monitor flips from Chinese to Russian to Mongolian television.

Falna also boasts Rajasthan's biggest bus company. Jagtar Singh used to be a conductor with the state bus company; now he has built up his own fleet of 135 buses. The government does not allow his company to use metalled roads, and he has to pay for the maintenance of the dirt roads he uses. The government sets the ticket price. Even so, Khalsa Buses makes profits, while the government bus company makes a loss.

Falna's industrialists are a close-knit bunch, who meet most evenings in the local equivalent of a Rotary Club to discuss the state of the world. They





are not satisfied with the services the government provides, so they supplement them. As well as two private hospitals, there are two trust hospitals, set up and run by local businessmen. There is also a government-run hospital, but the building was put up by the Chopras, Falna's foremost industrial family. "Everybody," says Vinod Chopra, "wants their name on a building." Posterity will remember other luminaries by a college, a girl's school and a centre for training the handicapped.

### How the other half lives

On the other side of the east-west divide is Mirzapur, in eastern Uttar Pradesh. It is the centre of India's carpet-belt, which grew up around weavers imported from Persia by the Mogul emperor Akbar in the 16th century. The biggest exporter in Mirzapur, Obeetee, was set up in 1920 by the great-uncle of the present chairman, Edward Oakley.

There used, according to Mr Oakley, to be six or seven big carpet factories in the area; but the factories have gone thanks to a combination of labour laws and union militancy. The exporters now all operate like Obeetee, which employs only 500 people in its factory to dye wool and design and pack carpets; the actual carpet-making work is contracted out to 3,500 loom-owners, who employ around 10,000 workers in all. Labour has quietened down these days: not since the mid-1980s has Obeetee seen the mob violence of previous decades. Still, its managing director, Vinod Sharma, says that he has never known such bad times. Iran is subsidising exports, and the Chinese are flooding the market with carpets at around 10-15% below Obeetee's prices. Mr Sharma suspects them of dumping carpets to destroy the Indian industry.

Mr Sharma's biggest problem is, however, dealing with western concerns that Indian companies employ child labour to keep their costs down: there are threats in America and Germany of a boycott of goods made with child labour. Obeetee's contractors have to promise not to use child labour; and Mr Sharma says that the company has set up as good a monitoring system as is possible, for 3,500 sites strewn over an area 200km wide. Yet, as Mr Sharma asks, what good would it do the children of Uttar Pradesh if 1.5m carpet-workers were put out of work by a western boycott?

In Madhopur, a village of 2,000 people outside Mirzapur, weaving is the only work there is. There are around 40 looms in the village. The weavers, who sit in a row peering through the half-finished carpets at the pattern they have to follow, are paid 20-30 rupees for an eight-hour day; loom-owners explain that the pay is low because standards and productivity aren't what they used to be. The village is surrounded by millet, sugar-cane and yellow-flowered mustard; but the villagers own only around 40 acres of land. Buffaloes wander among the mud houses. The adults are thin and beaten; naked children splash and giggle under a water-pipe used for washing the carpets. There is no government school. Around half the children attend a private school; but it is hard to imagine that they learn much for 10 rupees a month. There are ten television sets and one fridge in the village. Other than that, the only thing that has changed recently is migration: people are leaving.

Yet things are changing in the state governments: cuts in public-sector investment have forced states to fight for private-sector investment. Chief ministers have been travelling, not just around India but around the world, in search of investment. Most of the states have set up offices in Delhi where potential investors are bombarded with glossy brochures, computer disks and presentations. Advertising agencies are being hired to spruce up the images of the stodgiest of states.

In the first couple of years of liberalisation, the main bait they offered was tax incentives. Maharashtra and Gujarat, in particular, bid furiously against each other to offer the biggest rebates. At one time, Gujarat was offering five times the value of the capital investment in sales-tax exemptions. Then state governments came to realise that such bribes were not cost-effective; and that infrastructure was the investors' main concern. So infrastructure budgets are going up—Andhra Pradesh's by 20% and Rajasthan's by 15% this year. State governments are working with private investors on infrastructure projects: a port in Gujarat, for instance, and a water-supply system for Tiruppur in Tamil Nadu.

The rich states already have better infrastructure, and the customers to pay private investors who want to build more. That will attract more investment. Figures from October 1994 on planned private-sector investment put the top two states as Maharashtra and Gujarat: while they are likely to get 602 billion and 520 billion rupees-worth of investment respectively, Uttar Pradesh (with a population three and a half times the size of Gujarat's) may get 224 billion and Bihar only 48 billion. Competition may improve all the states; but it will also reinforce the success of the rich.



Rajasthan revs up



## The revolution yet to come

There are still too many constraints on the economy to allow it to function as efficiently as it could

THE lively competition at state level has a parallel in Delhi: it was partly China's success that shamed the Indian government into changing. Correspondingly, recent worries among foreign investors about China are making the Indians smug.

They do not have much reason to be, according to Mr Chen, the umbrella-parts maker in Rajasthan, who opened a factory in China two years ago. He does not think that, as things stand, India has a chance against China. The factory in China went into profit in its first year; the factory in Rajasthan may take another two or three years to make profits. There are four problems. In India, he pays 25% duty on capital goods and 50% on raw materials; for goods he exports from China, he pays no tariff on imports. In India, he pays 18-21% interest on borrowed money; in China, he borrows from Hong Kong at 6%. The power problems are worse in India, with three-hour-a-day power cuts and damaging voltage fluctuations that require companies to generate their own power. And then there is productivity. Indian workers, says Mr Chen, cost around \$50 a month; in China, they cost the same; in Taiwan, they cost \$950 a month. But, he says, pointing at the factory floor below his office, the furnace is manned by one person in Taiwan, two people in China and six people in India.

Some of Mr Chen's problems are being addressed. Further reductions in import duties are promised. The cost of borrowing is coming down: in October 1994, the government allowed banks to set their own interest rates. Rates immediately dropped by 1-1½%. Private-sector investment in infrastructure may help solve the power problem. Low Indian productivity, however, reflects a complex of influences, only some of which are being sorted out. Part of it is to do with India's rotten education; but it is also to do with politics, not markets, dictating how the private sector operates. The removal of the licensing system went some way towards solving this. But a range of surviving restrictions still suppress the growth of the private sector.

Why, for instance, doesn't India export toys and


cheap radios? So many countries that have made it from poverty to prosperity—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan—started that way. This correspondent went to a toy stall to find out. Most were tacky, ugly and fragile. There was, in a corner, a tough-looking, nicely-designed tape-recorder that could have sold in any western toy shop. Not surprising; for it was made in China. Presumably the disparity in price and quality between Indian and Chinese toys is such that it was worth smuggling in; for the import of most consumer goods is still banned in India.

Toys, like cheap radios and 836 other items, including most consumer goods, are reserved for the "small-scale" sector—companies with an investment of less than 6m rupees. The idea of small-scale reservations, peculiar to India, goes back to Gandhian beliefs about the virtues of the village economy, intellectualised by the economists of the 1950s, who argued that if the consumer-goods industry expanded too much, it would become capital-intensive and thus not provide jobs.

The consequences for the textile sector have been detailed by Dipak Mazumdar, a World Bank economist. Large textile mills were not allowed to increase the production of cotton cloth, which was reserved for small firms. The big mills expanded into synthetics, which were heavily taxed to protect the cotton industry. So Indian consumers paid exorbitant prices for synthetic cloth, while cotton-cloth production became uncompetitive on world markets. Between 1960 and 1980, India's share of world exports of cotton textiles dropped from 8.8% to 4.1%, while Pakistan, Taiwan and South Korea raised their respective shares from 4.9% to 9.4%, 1% to 5.1% and 0.4% to 6.6%.

Linked to reservations for small firms is the ban on consumer-goods imports. If big Indian companies are not permitted to expand into consumer markets, the argument goes, why allow foreign ones? So India's consumer-goods industry suffers not just from being kept artificially small; protectionism also fosters poor design and shoddy quality. Now that the government is keen to promote exports, it is embarrassed by the poor quality of most Indian goods. A couple of complaints from foreign buyers of Indian goods in 1994 provoked a typical response from the commerce ministry: instead of advocating that Indian industry should be exposed to competition, it proposed imprisoning the exporters of low-quality goods.

The government's residual puritanism underpins the import ban. "There's a clear political perception," according to Rakesh Mohan, economic adviser at the industry ministry, "that loosening up on consumer goods would lead to more conspicuous consumption. In a sense, this is hypocritical, because the rich have always been able to get these things." Shankar Acharya, economic adviser at the Ministry of Finance, argues that things are changing. Exporters can apply for a special import licence for certain consumer-goods imports, and there is "de facto liberalisation" through smuggling. "Of course, this isn't government policy."





Nobody now seriously tries to justify small-scale reservations on economic grounds. It is, says Mr Mohan, "purely a matter of vested interests. Small-scale producers aren't cottage fellows. They are people who perhaps have turnovers of 10m-30m rupees. In their locality, they're the big shots. And if you have 500 politicians, maybe 100 will know 200 big industrialists, and 400 will know 5,000 small ones. Which do you think will be the stronger lobby?" Mr Mohan says there is "glacial progress" on getting rid of small-scale reservations. In the garment industry factories may be set up with an investment of 30m rupees so long as they export 50% of their product. Mr Mohan hopes that this is the thin end of the wedge. "The same thing happened with the industrial licensing system. We chopped away at the edges, and finally the whole thing was abolished."

V.N. Gadgil, official spokesman of the ruling Congress party, sees things differently. Asked whether the small-scale reservations will go, he shakes his head firmly, several times. "You may call it emotional, but it is part of the struggle for liberation. The reservations started to protect the producers of khadi [rough cotton cloth]. Gandhi called it the livery of freedom." But what if the reservations hamper India's ambitions to become an exporter? "We have a large enough domestic market. The exporters do not need to worry too much about that."

#### Let them die

Along with these restrictions on companies' expansion, there are even more damaging constraints on their contraction. The government does not seem to accept that merely allowing companies to grow is not enough to produce a healthy economy. Companies must also be allowed to merge, shrink—or die.

As newly-free companies expand eagerly, some markets are looking distinctly overcrowded. The tyre industry, for instance, has around 16 producers in a market that can probably sustain only five. Some restructuring is obviously needed; but there are all sorts of barriers to takeovers in India. Their origin, argues Omkar Goswami, an economist at the Indian Statistical Institute, lies in the instincts of past governments to look after the interests of established business families. The Companies Act, for instance, places restrictions on the transfer or acquisition of shares, including a provision that allows the government to refuse a transfer of a block of shares if it would create "a change in the controlling interest of the company... and that such a



We shouldn't encourage big industries—that's our policy, I know. But, I say, we shouldn't encourage small industries either. If we do they are bound to become big...!

change would be prejudicial to the interests of the company or to the public interest."


If it is difficult to take over a failing company, it is even harder to close one down. The reformers have been struggling to establish what is known as an "exit policy" since 1991. Labour laws make it hard to fire anybody. A firm may not make more than 100 workers redundant without government permission—which is almost never granted. When cases have gone to the courts, they have generally found in workers' favour. Mrinal Datta Chaudhuri, of the Delhi School of Economics, says that judges have regarded labour cases rather as child-custody cases, seeing the workers' welfare as their primary responsibility. There is a hint that this may change, however: in 1994 the Supreme Court threw out a petition by trade unions against the takeover of a Tata company by Hindustan Lever.

Some argue that labour laws do not much matter, because businessmen simply pay their workers to resign. They do, but that makes restructuring expensive; and the hassle and cost involved are a disincentive to investing. The laws may also have made working conditions worse, not better, for they have pushed businesses out of the "organised sector" to which they apply. Increasingly, industry is in the largely unmonitored "unorganised" sector of small companies that rarely conform even to the barest of safety standards. The share of the labour force in the "organised" private sector fell from 3.3% to 2.8% between 1981 and 1991, a curious phenomenon in a developing economy.

In Dharavi, in northern Bombay, the "unorganised" sector provides employment for migrants from poorer states. In a shack made out of corrugated iron, 12 workers dye fabrics that will be made into garments to sell to western chain stores. There are pools of chemicals on the floor of the 20-foot by 15-foot room, where the workers cook, eat and sleep between the vats. They have no plans to leave, though: they come from Uttar Pradesh.

#### Still protected

Average import-tariff rates, latest



Source: World Bank



# They can't let go

*The public sector is dragging the economy down, and politics is preventing the government addressing the problem*

THE problems of the public sector in free India were neatly illustrated at Delhi airport's old domestic terminal. On one side were the new private airlines, Damania Airways, Sahara, Jet Airways, East West Airlines and Modiluft, their punctiliously-polite staff smiling with the determination of cut-throat competitors. On the other side of the barrier was the state-owned company, Indian Airlines, almost empty of passengers, though still fully staffed. Indian Airlines' flights are still relentlessly late, its staff as unforgiving as ever—and already there are rats scurrying down the pipes in the new terminal. Indian Airlines may have a better future than other public-sector companies, for one of India's most respected managers, Russi Modi, has left the Tata group to join it. Yet he will not even have the power to set pay levels: throughout the public sector they are determined centrally.

In theory, India's public sector makes a 2% return on capital. In practice, according to Y. Venugopal Reddy, economic adviser to the commerce ministry, this is an overstatement. Yet the prime minister has no plans to let the private sector take over state-owned companies. "We have not bitten the bullet on 51%," says Shankar Acharya, economic adviser to the finance ministry. That is not, he believes, thanks to overwhelming public support for public ownership. "Partly it is ideological: there is still a view that public ownership is not a bad thing. Partly it is to do with the trade unions. Bureaucrats are not best-placed to judge these things, but my impression is that the average voter would not mind privatisation."

The government claims that its policy of selling off small tranches of shares in the more profitable public-sector companies will improve their effi-

ciency. But an internal government document shows that some bureaucrats do not agree:

Partial divestment of equity in the public sector enterprises fails to address the efficiency problem... it has no impact on ownership, control and management... it has been used more as a fiscal tool in order to raise cash to finance the government deficit, rather than to improve the efficiency of enterprise operations... There is also the danger that such an approach can be a temptation to privatise badly and to postpone the more difficult but much-needed longer-term fiscal reforms.

Bureaucrats, however, do not understand the politics of privatisation. Look at electricity. India consumes 382 kilowatt hours of electricity per person per year, compared with 11,000 in America. At peak hours, there is already a 20% shortfall in capacity; hence persistent and worsening power cuts. According to the latest Five-Year Plan, 43,000MW were supposed to be installed in 1992-97. In fact, 12,000MW will have been installed. "If the economy picks up," says one American power expert, "demand is going to go crazy." He reckons that 6% economic growth requires an extra 9% of power capacity a year. That means an investment in electricity of \$200 billion over the next 12 years.

The obvious solution is to turn to the private sector. This has two advantages: the government will not have to finance the expansion, and politicians can make lots of money from backhanders. So the government has embraced the idea of private investment in infrastructure with enthusiasm. But there is one problem: unwillingness to tackle the public sector's inefficiencies.

Electricity is run mainly by state electricity boards (SEBs), with some generating capacity in the hands of the National Thermal Power Corporation. On average, the cost of producing electricity in India is 1.61 rupees per unit; and the price is 1.31 rupees. Prices are low because state governments want to bribe voters—especially farmers. In Tamil Nadu, farmers get their electricity free. In other places, they pay nominal charges. Industry normally pays over the odds, to help make up the losses. Officially, 22% of power is lost in the course of transmission and distribution. Unofficially, the figure is 48%. That is partly because of shoddy equipment; but it is more because of the man from the electricity company who says that he can reduce your bill on a freelance basis—and because of the "jumpers" that people attach to power lines.

The SEBs have also been job-creation centres for friends and relatives of politicians. Andhra Pradesh's SEB has 5,000MW of installed capacity and 80,000 employees: that is 150 times as many as would be employed to generate and distribute a similar amount of power in America. And the SEBs owe the NTPC 50 billion rupees. Foreigners thinking of investing in power generation in India find the SEBs off-putting. "Would you want these people as customers?" asks one.

It would, of course, be possible to reform the SEBs. And, nudged by the World Bank, six state gov-



The public sector at work



ernments are indeed considering restructuring; one, Orissa, might even be persuaded to think of privatisation. But the better-off state governments have no such plans, for the SEBs are too useful a source of patronage to let go.

The solution, enthusiastically espoused by state governments and the power ministry, is for central government to plug the hole. A test case involves the Dabhol project in Maharashtra, a 2,015MW project put together by three American companies, Enron,

Bechtel and GE Capital. They want a counter-guarantee from the central government, which would mean that, if the SEB didn't pay its bills, the money would come out of the state's allocation from central government. The finance ministry, which knows that in reality the money would come out of the central government's budget, has been battling against giving a counter-guarantee. It believes that once Maharashtra got such a promise, other states would demand one too.

## Illfare

IN 1947, when Jawaharlal Nehru spoke to Indians of their "tryst with destiny", he promised that a main task ahead for the government was to eliminate disease and ignorance. India's poor performance here darkens the country's economic prospects: sick, illiterate people do not make good workers. But more important, it demonstrates that governments have failed in the most basic way to improve the lives of their citizens.

India's most visible failure over health is filth. The consequences got embarrassing publicity in an outbreak of pneumonic plague in 1994. Less noticeably, 300,000 children a year die of diarrhoea. The illnesses that in 1992 killed 79 infants out of every 1,000 (compared with 31 in China) are mostly related to poor sanitation.

Indians are themselves partly to blame, with their astonishing disregard for public space. People with spotless homes tip their rubbish into the street, just far enough away from the front door so that they do not actually trip over it. Hinduism is obsessed with purification, yet people commonly urinate in the street.

Some people speculate that the caste system that divides Indians so rigidly also leaves no sense of responsibility for communal places. Or perhaps the blame can be laid with purification rituals, for creating a sense of inner cleanliness that permits indifference to real filth. But that cannot explain why, amid New Delhi's grand imperial buildings, the courtyard below the finance minister's office is occupied by a pile of broken furniture and three dead plants; or why there are rats running around the office of the secretary to the economic adviser in the ministry of commerce; or why municipal services cannot clear away the heaps of stinking rubbish that pollute the air.

According to *India Today*,

an investigative magazine, Delhi generates 3,880 tonnes of garbage a day and clears away 2,420 tonnes; it produces 1,800m litres of sewage a day and collects 1,260m of them. India's cities are growing unmanageably fast. But they would cope better if their municipal services worked as they are meant to. Officials admit that many people on the payrolls do not exist. According to G.M. Khairnar, formerly Bombay's municipal commissioner, three-quarters of its sweepers work for no more than three hours a day. Sometimes they do not turn up at all; or they subcontract their jobs, for which they get 2,000 rupees a month, for 10-20 rupees a day. The law stops them from being sacked. The contractors who run some of the rubbish-collection lorries are also involved in various scams, according to Mr Khairnar, for he initiated actions against 70 officials; but he has been suspended from his job for complaining about political corruption.

As for Indian education, the odd thing is that in some areas the record is so good. Kerala's literacy rate of 90% is better even than China's 73%. But that only goes to show how bad things must be elsewhere in India to bring its overall rate down to 48%.

Kerala's performance cannot just be


put down to a history of Christian missionaries and benevolent rulers. In the days of the Raj, parts of Kerala were left under "native rule" by royal families who believed in educating their people. But the areas directly ruled by the British trailed behind; and yet in the past half-century, they have caught up because left-wing governments set out to improve the lot of the lower orders.

Amartya Sen, professor of economics at Harvard, argues that educational inequalities reflect and entrench social inequalities. India's hierarchical, brahmin-dominated society has been noticeably casual about primary education; resources have been poured into the higher education that benefits the upper classes.

Primary education in India is not compulsory: central government leaves it to states to decide whether it is important to send children to school. They have often decided that it is not. In rural India, a quarter of boys and half of girls in the 12-14 age group have never been to school. Those who make it through secondary school, however, have an excellent chance of getting a high-class university education. India has a huge supply of people with more education than they can use. The well-off pay peanuts for this privilege, as the government subsidises tertiary education to the tune of 50 billion rupees a year. In India as a whole, primary, secondary and tertiary education get around a third of the budget each. In Kerala, primary education gets 60% of the budget.

High levels of education do not guarantee rapid growth. Kerala, one of the poorest parts of India, is evidence of that. But education is probably a necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for fast growth. A recent study by the World Bank on the origins of the East Asian miracle could identify nothing that the region's diverse successes had in common except for low inflation and high levels of education. At least India scores pretty well on inflation.

### Getting smarter





# No rows for Rao

Narasimha Rao is using old political methods to bring in a new set of economic rules. It is not working

**P**OLITICIANS often have an interest in keeping things the way they are; yet it was a politician who started all this change. Narasimha Rao, the prime minister, has at least one of the attributes of a statesman: he thinks about how to win in the long run as well as more immediately.

Mr Rao is a rather ambiguous figure. Nobody expected him to launch economic reform: he was seen, before he became prime minister, as a standard Congress party operator with the usual lack of vision and integrity. He is a scholar, an old-style brahmin pundit, but he never flaunts his learning. He is an exceedingly clever man—James Manor, a shrewd observer of Indian politics at Sussex University, reckons that he is the cleverest prime minister India has had—who seems to go out of his way to conceal the fact. Asis Nandy, a political scientist at India's Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, says that he "has that quality which is essential for political survival in South Asia: to look stupider than you actually are."

Nobody expected Mr Rao to last as long as he has. He was never supposed to come to power in the first place: he took over as a safe pair of hands when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated during the 1991 election campaign, and won without gaining an overall majority. The Bharatiya Janata Party was riding a wave of right-wing Hinduism; and the conflict between Hindus and Muslims over the holy site at Ayodhya was coming to a head. His government seemed bound to collapse.

But Mr Rao survived, and the BJP lost. In subsequent state elections, Congress did well and the BJP disastrously. No doubt the BJP in part brought about its own decline, both through its internal divisions and because it presented Indians with a vision of social disruption that many reject. But Mr Rao is also a cunning political operator, who knows how to choose the right candidates for the right constituencies, how to make a patchwork of alliances, and how to lie low at the right time.

Lying low is Mr Rao's most characteristic game. At moments of crisis, he often disappears. His principal aim seems to be to lower the volume in Indian politics. In an excitable country, where only a decade ago 3,000 Sikhs were murdered in Delhi in a couple of days, that is an attractive ambition. Yet Mr Rao's unwillingness to face conflict makes him cautious; and caution does not suit a statesman. That is the contradiction in his administration: he has the vision to recognise the ends, but not the courage to will the means.

One of his long-term aims was to clean up the Congress party. To that end, he announced that in 1991, after a 19-year gap, there would be party elections. They were an embarrassing failure, rife with violence and rigging, exposing to the country the nature of the party. The venture was aborted. Mr Rao said he was going to persist; but has not done so. His own behaviour has not been impeccable, either: doubtless fearing threats to his position, he is both party president and prime minister. Nobody else is allowed to have both a party and a govern-



The half-statesman

ment post.

Perhaps Mr Rao has given up his aim of cleaning up Indian politics. It may seem too long a shot. Economic reform, however, he has not abandoned; but right now he seems to lack the courage to do the hard bits. "It comes in such small doses," says Mr Chidambaram, his former commerce minister, "that one sometimes despairs."

Mr Rao may believe that the reforms made so far will buoy up the economy enough to make these hard bits easier. Job losses in the private organised sector, the public sector and among the central government's 4m civil servants would be easier to sell if the rest of the private sector were generating more employment. But the economy will not really flourish as long as the next stage of reform remains undone. The burden of publicly owned industry means that taxes have to be higher than they should be, that the government does not spend on things it should do, or that it ends up running a dangerously inflationary economic policy. The missing "exit policy" means that businesses find it hard to improve their efficiency by restructuring.

Mr Rao's caution is, in a way, curious. It is not as though large numbers of voters would suffer from such measures. He seems to be perpetuating what Mr Reddy at the commerce ministry calls "the tyranny of the 10%"—the proportion of the labour force who, because they are in the private organised sector, the public sector or the civil service, might be affected by measures necessary to get the economy working properly. There are only 26m of them, out of a population of 950m. Those who belong to Congress-affiliated unions expect special treatment; even more could make life difficult if they decided to go on long, disruptive strikes. But a prime minister who combined courage with vision would tackle them. "We are a democracy," Mr Rao's apol-





ogists explain, when asked why he has failed on this front.

In that case, Mr Rao might turn for support to another group, whose interests do not coincide with this powerful minority: the other 924m Indians. The government has made almost no attempt, so far, to gather political support for the grand task it is attempting. Reform has been carried out almost surreptitiously, as though it were something to be ashamed of. Perhaps Mr Rao feels overshadowed by the rhetoric of Gandhi and Nehru. Salman Khurshid, minister of state for foreign affairs, suggests that this is a problem: "We have not," he says, "found the right vocabulary." If that is so, Mr Rao might take a lesson from Margaret Thatcher, a woman he probably does not admire, but with whom he has a lot in common. She took on vested interests by appealing over their heads to lower-middle-class voters, promising them freedom and opportunities that they had been denied. This argument is stronger in India, whose economic system has reinforced a social-class structure built on a religion that sanctions inequality.

Or perhaps Mr Rao is more comfortable with traditional Indian politics—the politics of division. India's politicians have usually eschewed ideology in favour of building alliances from caste and religious groups. Congress's traditional constituency, now breaking down, was built from the untouchables at the bottom of the pile, the Brahmins at the top and the Muslims on the side. Other parties of the left and right made do with the castes in between.

Caste is at the centre of the liveliest current political issue, the argument over reserving jobs and

college places for particular castes. The original intention was to help untouchables who in a brahmin-dominated society had few hopes of a university place or a government job. But the politicians soon realised that handing out these goodies was an easy way to buy votes, so the number of jobs and places reserved for "backward castes" escalated. The "backward castes" make up around half of the population; it is a sad comment on Indian democracy that half the country's people reckon they need to rig the system to make it work for them. The issue has become so fraught in places—particularly the poorer parts of the north, where job opportunities outside government are limited and violence anyway comes easily—that questions about how to create more opportunities by building a prosperous economy do not get a hearing.

A braver leader than Mr Rao might have the courage to try a new sort of politics, one based on conviction not on division. It is possible that one might emerge if Mr Rao's reversals in state elections in December 1994 are compounded by a bad performance in more state elections early this year. Since Congress has no mechanism for getting rid of a leader, it seems likelier that Mr Rao will simply cling on until the general election in 1996.

Congress is unlikely then to win an overall majority. The small left-wing parties that have gained some ground recently might form a coalition, which would fall to pieces as swiftly as previous Indian coalitions have; or Congress could form another weak administration, preoccupied with offending nobody. And Mr Rao's friends would still be saying "We are a democracy, of course," when asked why difficult things had not been done.

## Righteous anger

DEMOCRACY has always been a source of pride for Indians: the country may not match up to its Asian neighbours in prosperity, but its people have always been able to boast that it scores better than most on political freedoms. That refrain is heard less often these days, however. Not only are India's economic failures more obvious, as the rest of Asia streaks ahead; so are the flaws in its political system. Shame and anger at the way politics works have overtaken pride.

Thanks to India's free and increasingly hard-nosed press, everybody knows which ministers are said to be taking cuts from which contract; who is good friends with which underworld king; or who has taken more trouble to fix the results of a state election. People say—as they always do—that it has all got worse. Maybe it is just that journalism has got better and that more people can read; or that these days Indians expect better treatment from their leaders.

But if things are getting worse, there is a plausible explanation. Indira Gandhi corrupted politics by using gangs as enforcers for the politicians; and the enforcers slowly came to realise that they could do both jobs themselves. In Bombay, where six politicians have died in gang warfare in the past two years, the connection between politics and the



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Indians are fed up  
with the way their  
country is run.  
They need to unite  
to demand change





underworld is notorious. Elsewhere too, violence is so commonly used in politics that a newspaper story claiming that "an opposition Telugu Deasm worker was killed in a bomb attack, carried out allegedly by Congress activists" during the Andhra Pradesh state election got only two paragraphs on the inside page of a newspaper.

"The political class," says a veteran politician with passion, "is so venal, so corrupt." A top civil servant, on first meeting, launches into a diatribe against the morality of India's rulers, arguing that the only positive sign in Indian politics was the beginning of a popular revolt against the politicians. In the vanguard of that revolt is an unlikely character: the chief election commissioner, T.N. Seshan. Cabinet secretary in the 1980s, he was given the election commission job by Mr Rao, who probably now regrets it.

Mr Seshan produces sheaves of documents off his shelves, detailing the abuses of the electoral system. This "Voter's 20-point programme" has 200 items under the "what goes wrong" heading, such as: "musclemen are used to capture booths, criminal elements are nominated as candidates, politically motivated officers actively assist in electioneering, forthright officers are sidelined, electoral rolls are rigged in favour of political parties", and so on. He leaps upon all manner of election abuses: during the state election campaign in late 1994, he indicted two central government ministers for trying to bribe voters with promises of cheap sugar and reserved jobs for Muslims.

Mr Seshan has had countless run-ins with the government, but the government has always lost because the Supreme Court has taken Mr Seshan's side. At one point it called a special session of parliament ("a Seshan session," says Mr Seshan, chortling) to amend his constitutional powers. The public response has been extraordinary. There are Seshan fan clubs all over the country. He gets 100-200 letters a day and has 1,000 pending invitations to speak. "I'm just fighting what the ordinary man in the street thinks is his fight against a corrupt political system," he says with uncharacteristic

modesty.

But if the ordinary man in the street wants a decent political system, why does he not vote for one? Probably the explanation is something to do, once again, with the divisions that criss-cross Indian society. When Indians are so easily divided on caste, regional and religious grounds, it is hard for a political party to unite them on an ideological issue. That is the secret of the Congress party, which has ruled India for 43 out of the 48 years since independence.

Twice in the past ten years, Congress has faced a serious challenge from parties that marketed themselves as promising a cleaner, better future. That is what brought V.P. Singh to power with the Janata Dal party in 1989 after he broke away from Congress. The right-wing BJP swept polls in the early 1990s with a promise of renewal and regeneration before it took up the insidious cause of Hindu fundamentalism and thus, fortunately, sunk itself. Both attempts failed not because the platform lost its appeal, but because the movements dissipated in division and disagreement.


Perhaps there is something to be said for India's divisiveness. Had the BJP, with its appeal to Hindu fundamentalism, spoken to a united mass of Hindus, it might have swept the country; as it was, the differences between higher and lower castes, and between moderates and extremists, kept it from hanging together as a coherent force.

Yet if India's divisiveness helps defend it against dangerous enthusiasms, it also makes it harder for anything good to happen in the country. For conviction and vision find it hard to make themselves heard against the noise of a multitude of different squabbles. That is why Indian politics fails to grapple with such important matters as education or, right now, whether to pursue an economic reform programme that at last gives the country a chance to fulfil its potential.

Perhaps good will come out of Indians' growing anger at the way their country is run. V.S. Naipaul, an Indian by descent but not by upbringing or nationality, touches on this possibility in his latest book on India. He wrote two books on the country in the 1960s and 1970s: short, harsh books about a place sunk deep in post-colonial shame. His new one is long, rambling, more ambivalent and compassionate: a worse book, but truer to India's ambiguities. "The idea of freedom," he writes, "has gone everywhere in India... People everywhere have ideas now of who they are and what they owe themselves... The liberation of spirit that has come to India could not come as release alone. In India, with its layer below layer of distress and cruelty, it had to come as disturbance. It had to come as rage and revolt. India was now a country of a million little mutinies."

India is an ambitious country these days: there is more hope, but there is more frustration too. If Indians can stop turning their anger on each other, and use it instead to demand the kind of government they need, they will be on the way to getting a healthier, better-educated country with cleaner politics and an economic system that works. Then—but only then—there will be no stopping the new tiger.

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The vision thing



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## Parliamentary politics

DONATED BY  
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The constitution of 1875 was both the longest lasting and the least systematic constitution in French history, and it operated in a way rather different from its authors' intentions. The conservative National Assembly had hoped to moderate universal suffrage through the balancing institutions of Presidency and Senate, but in practice the system became one of parliamentary sovereignty, with governments made and unmade by the Chamber of Deputies and lacking independent executive authority. President and Senate were overshadowed, though both retained a good deal of influence. It was the *Seize Mai* crisis of 1877 which was largely responsible for this evolution, by ruling out the concept of a dual responsibility of governments to president and Chamber, and by discrediting the weapon of dissolution. Presidents retained the power to dissolve the Chamber (with the consent of the Senate), but it was never again used, and governments were deprived of a means of disciplining their parliamentary majority.

Presidents were elected for seven years by the Senate and Chamber together (for this purpose, and for constitutional revision, they met in joint session at Versailles and were called the *Assemblée nationale*). The candidacies of leading politicians usually failed (e.g. Ferry in 1887), and obscure but worthy provincial figures were preferred; but there was a reaction against this tendency with the election of Poincaré in 1913. The first Republican president, Grévy, had been one of the leaders of the party, and was no mere figurehead. One of the President's duties was choosing prime ministers when governments fell, and the fluidity of French politics gave him considerable freedom of choice. He could not impose his own candidate on a hostile Chamber (though Poincaré tried this with Ribot in 1914), but he could keep out men he disliked. Grévy acted thus to delay the advent to office of Gambetta, and was able to give three terms of office to his own candidate, the pliable Freycinet. Grévy has been blamed for perverting the parliamentary system from the start by refusing to appoint the natural leader

of the majority, but in practice there was no alternative. Grévy also encouraged ministers from one Cabinet staying on in the next, thus ensuring stability but at the cost of the principle of collective responsibility. When governments were short-lived, the Senate provided a formed an element of continuity. The constitution required the president to preside at Cabinet meetings, and their advice was particularly important. This was especially so in foreign affairs, where presidents had certain prerogatives under the constitution. Poincaré again provides the example, and Poincaré endeavoured to strengthen the executive by systematic use of the Presidential

The powers of the Senate also evolved over time. To make it a conservative body, the constitution required that a quarter of its members should be appointed for life, and the rest should be indirectly elected. The senatorial election was held in each department, the members of *conseils généraux*, *dissement*, and delegates from each commune. The Senate's enormous rural preponderance. The Senate was renewed every three years, to insulate it from sudden shifts in public opinion. Republicans were traditionally hostile to the Senate. Gambetta had persuaded the majority of the Chamber, arguing that it would be a 'grand council of the people' in the democratic spirit of village politics.<sup>3</sup> The Republic, but the issue ceased to be an important one after the 1884 constitution in the life of the Third Republic): life senators, and communes were to be represented by colleges in proportion to their population. The Senate was hostile towards rural France, and the system guaranteed that its members were members of the 'political class', local notables rather than men of eminence in other spheres. The Senate had a provincial and old-fashioned flavour, like Bodley as resembling 'a retreat for elderly men' rather than an active legislative body.<sup>3</sup>

In fact, the legislative powers of the Senate were limited compared to those of the Chamber, and there was no machinery for amending legislation indefinitely. Financial bills had to pass through the Chamber, but the Senate established the right of veto, although the formation of ministries



as both the longest lasting and the least French history, and it operated in a way of intentions. The conservative National moderate universal suffrage through the Presidency and Senate, but in practice the elementary sovereignty, with governments Chamber of Deputies and lacking independent President and Senate were overshadowed, and deal of influence. It was the *Seize Mai* largely responsible for this evolution, by a dual responsibility of governments to by discrediting the weapon of dissolution. er to dissolve the Chamber (with the consequence never again used, and governments were disciplining their parliamentary majority. for seven years by the Senate and Chamber and for constitutional revision, they met in and were called the *Assemblée nationale*). The politicians usually failed (e.g. Ferry in 1887), provincial figures were preferred; but there was a tendency with the election of Poincaré in President, Grévy, had been one of the as no mere figurehead. One of the President's ministers when governments fell, and the gave him considerable freedom of choice. own candidate on a hostile Chamber (though Ribot in 1914), but he could keep out men he s to delay the advent to office of Gambetta, the terms of office to his own candidate, the has been blamed for perverting the parliamentary start by refusing to appoint the natural leader

of the majority, but in practice there was rarely a clear majority for the president to submit to. Grévy also encouraged the practice of ministers from one Cabinet staying on in the next, which provided stability but at the cost of the principle of collective responsibility.<sup>1</sup> When governments were short-lived, the presidents themselves formed an element of continuity. The constitution allowed them to preside at Cabinet meetings, and their advice and experience could be important. This was especially so in foreign affairs, where the presidents had certain prerogatives under the constitution and were usually better informed than ministers. The role of Poincaré on the eve of 1914 again provides the example, and Poincaré indeed seems to have hoped to strengthen the executive by systematic use of the powers of the Presidency.

The powers of the Senate also evolved over the years. In order to make it a conservative body, the constitution had provided that a quarter of its members should be appointed for life, and that the rest should be indirectly elected. The senatorial electors were the deputies in each department, the members of *conseils généraux* and *conseils d'arrondissement*, and delegates from each commune, which guaranteed an enormous rural preponderance. The Senate was renewed by thirds every three years, to insulate it from sudden shifts of opinion. Although Republicans were traditionally hostile to the very principle of a second chamber, Gambetta had persuaded the majority to accept this Senate, arguing that it would be a 'grand council of the communes' embodying the democratic spirit of village politics.<sup>2</sup> The Radicals remained hostile, but the issue ceased to be an important one after the method of choosing senators was changed in 1884 (the only significant revision of the constitution in the life of the Third Republic): there were to be no new life senators, and communes were to be represented in the electoral colleges in proportion to their population. The Senate was still biased towards rural France, and the system guaranteed also that most senators were members of the 'political class', local politicians or veteran deputies rather than men of eminence in other fields. This gave the Senate a provincial and old-fashioned flavour, and it struck observers like Bodley as resembling 'a retreat for elderly men of education' rather than an active legislative body.<sup>3</sup>

In fact, the legislative powers of the Senate were co-extensive with those of the Chamber, and there was no machinery to prevent it delaying legislation indefinitely. Financial bills had to be initiated in the Chamber, but the Senate established the right to amend them. Similarly, although the formation of ministries was a matter for the



Chamber the Senate asserted its right to defeat them. The first notable case of this was the Radical Bourgeois government of 1895-6, which the Senate disapproved of because of its income-tax proposals; Bourgeois resigned rather than test the constitutional issue. The Senate was to succeed in delaying an income-tax until 1914, and used its delaying powers in the same way against social measures like the pensions legislation of 1910, first passed by the Chamber in 1906. The way the Senate was chosen meant that it lagged a generation behind the opinion of the country. No Socialist senator appeared until 1906, and although the majority of senators were Radical in the 1900s they were old-fashioned Radicals devoted to private enterprise and the rights of property. They were also firmly anti-clerical, and conservative on constitutional questions; the Senate rejected proportional representation, and in later years it was to oppose giving votes to women. (France had a suffrage movement, but it made little political impact before 1914.)<sup>4</sup> In 1914, the conservative mentality of the Senate was perhaps less unrepresentative of the country than it was to appear after the war, but it was already making much more use of its obstructive powers than in the Republic's early years.

Nevertheless, the Chamber was the real centre of political life. In a parliamentary system, the functions of the legislative body go beyond legislation itself, and include the accurate and sensitive reflection of public opinion, forming governments and providing them with the support needed to govern effectively, controlling the executive, and acting as a forum for the adjustment of interests and the peaceful solution of conflicts. How successful was the French Parliament in performing these functions, and how far was it the real centre of power in view of the influence of pressure-groups, of a powerful bureaucracy, and of rival opinion-forming agencies like the Press?

It is difficult to deny the success of the French system in giving representation to opinion in all its ideological and geographical diversity. In the early years, the Chamber was really a collection of individuals loosely united by their adherence to sets of principles, and (in theory at least) highly responsive to their electors' views. Constitutional purists, indeed, disapproved of parties and parliamentary groups because they falsified the direct operation of universal suffrage and fettered the independence of the deputy. Deputies did form parliamentary groups, but the boundaries between them were clearer in the National Assembly, when they were based on the varieties of monarchism, than in the 1880s and 90s when most deputies thought of themselves primarily as Republicans. Many did not join any group, while

others belonged to more than one. In the 1880s groups became more distinct, and in 1910 the Chamber recognized groups officially, and obliged every deputy to belong to only one. In 1910-14, there were usually ten groups for deputies who are not members of a group.

With a few exceptions, like the Socialist party, the groups were not like disciplined parties, and it is not surprising that the Parliament lacked firm majorities, and that a series of short-lived governments developed. The only exception was the period of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes, when the groups agreed to work together and institutionalized their cooperation in the *délégation des gauches*. In the 1880s, on the other hand, no cohesive Republican majority might seem to have emerged, and rivalries and the deputies' sense of independence prevented permanent leadership from developing. Every group had a majority, but there was normally nothing like a permanent majority would not disappear if individual deputies were disaffected. Parliamentary procedure made it difficult to bring down governments, the classic weapon being the motion of censure. The interpellation procedure allowed any deputy to ask a question on a particular question, and the vote on it could be a vote of confidence or censure. Sometimes the government survived such debates in order to demonstrate that they were not so weak; sometimes dissidents within the coalition staged a revolt; sometimes defeat came unexpectedly, often because of the emotions and rhetoric of the debate. In the 1880s, a minister needed to resign only when the question of confidence was formally posed, but few prime ministers made mistakes. In 1914, once it was clear that their majority was crumbling, prime ministers resigned for tactical reasons (with an eye to the next election) and still appeared intact.

The manifold ways of bringing down governments were discussed in Soulier's detailed study of 'ministerial instability'. Ministerial instability did not necessarily mean chaos or the end of the government: even at times when the turnover of ministers was high, there were not the long and debilitating 'ministères de transition' of the Fourth Republic. Behind the façade of instability, there were important elements of continuity, notably the fact that the same stability was accompanied by the stability of the personnel. Ministers were drawn from a small pool, and the same men were in and out of different Cabinets. When a government fell, it was



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With a few exceptions, like the Socialist party group, these groups were not like disciplined parties, and it is not surprising that the French Parliament lacked firm majorities, and that a system of unstable and short-lived governments developed. The only exception was during the period of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes, when four major groups agreed to work together and institutionalized their co-operation in the *délégation des gauches*. In the 1880s, on the other hand, when a cohesive Republican majority might seem to have existed, personal rivalries and the deputies' sense of independence prevented any permanent leadership from developing. Every government started with a majority, but there was normally nothing to guarantee that this majority would not disappear if individual deputies or groups became disaffected. Parliamentary procedure made it quite easy to defeat governments, the classic weapon being the 'interpellation' debate. The interpellation procedure allowed any deputy to initiate a debate on a particular question, and the vote on it could easily be turned into a vote of confidence or censure. Sometimes governments arranged such debates in order to demonstrate that their majority still existed, sometimes dissidents within the coalition staged them to bring it to an end; sometimes defeat came unexpectedly, opinion being swayed by the emotions and rhetoric of the debate. In principle, governments needed to resign only when the question of confidence had been formally posed, but few prime ministers made much effort to fight back once it was clear that their majority was crumbling, and some even resigned for tactical reasons (with an eye to returning later) when it still appeared intact.

The manifold ways of bringing down governments have been documented in Soulier's detailed study of 'ministerial instability'. But instability did not necessarily mean chaos or the breakdown of government: even at times when the turnover of ministries was high, there were not the long and debilitating 'ministerial crises' of the 1930s or the Fourth Republic. Behind the façade of instability, there were important elements of continuity, notably the fact that 'ministerial instability was accompanied by the stability of ministers'.<sup>6</sup> Ministers were drawn from a small pool, and the same faces reappeared in different Cabinets. When a government fell, it was normal for several of



its members to join the next Cabinet, and they might include the prime minister himself, returning to the ranks. Cabinets formed by this process of *replâtrage* were common, while those whose membership was entirely new – e.g. the Bourgeois government of 1895 – were regarded as an unusual phenomenon. The real turning-points in politics have to be sought, therefore, when one 'team' of politicians which has provided the ministerial personnel for a number of years gives way to another.<sup>7</sup>

It was also common for certain ministries to be held by the same person through several governments, providing another element of continuity. This was especially true of the foreign office, where some degree of permanence was obviously desirable. Delcassé, who held the post in six Cabinets between 1898 and 1905, was the best but not the only example of this. The same was true of certain technical ministries, like the ministry of posts, held by the obscure Cocherly in eight successive governments (1879–85). The number of ministerial posts available was in any case small – around eleven on average, with a few under-secretaryships. Some posts went to senators, and the ministries of war and marine were frequently held by generals and admirals. The pickings for deputies were therefore not extensive, and this accentuated the monopoly held by the ministerial cliques. It does not seem that the Chamber's readiness to overthrow governments can be explained by hunger for jobs; most deputies were content to remain 'backbenchers' as long as they knew that the government was at the mercy of their votes.

A system of relatively unstable governments based on shifting coalitions has a number of consequences for political life. One is that there is no clear relationship between the majority in the country, as expressed in elections, and the majority in Parliament. Parties which form second-ballot alliances in an election do not necessarily work together once Parliament has met, and the play of alliances can produce governments of quite different political complexions in the lifetime of one legislature (e.g. that of 1893). Governments are made and unmade by the professionals, in manoeuvres which fascinate the initiated but tend to produce disillusion and anti-parliamentary feelings among the electorate. To bring about a closer correspondence between elections and the formation of governments was one of the aims of electoral reformers, especially those like Gambetta who looked forward to the growth of a two-party system in France.

The period of the Bloc was one when electoral alliances held through the lifetime of the legislature. At other times, it is possible to

discern a real but less direct connection with Soulier, for example, suggested that the in broke up in the course of a legislature in favour of centres, but tended to reconstitute itself as the producing an alternation between polarized Mayeur, on the other hand, says of the 1893 'moderate' majority produced by the election of years when various alternatives had been tried. One rule that does seem valid is that coalition is a natural development within Parliament, but not into electoral terms, the electors preferring to keep the divisions alive; the *Ralliés*, for example, found their alliances with moderate Republicans in the 1890s in the spirit of *ralliement* was not as popular with the Catholic deputies.

A second consequence of the system of coalition is that it gives a special advantage to parties in the whose support is needed for any successful government. They rarely feel inclined to deny it on grounds of principle. In the 19th century, the Radicals became the main beneficiaries; as they who gained most by second-ballot elections. In the same way, the system favoured the emergence of a leader – or 'anti-leader':<sup>10</sup> the man who was able to bridge differences and working out compromises, a lobbyist and purveyor of the Chamber. Masterpieces like Briand enjoyed long ministerial careers, the system tended to discourage able men in favour of inoffensive ones, and to prevent the office of prime minister from acquiring real authority; the prime minister was only a figurehead; his office was always combined with holding a portfolio.

Another consequence linked with this was the lack of a firm government and the formulation of policy. Decisive action could always offend part of the electorate, and it was difficult to impose unpopular but necessary measures on deputies who were always looking over their shoulders at their constituencies. Before 1914, however, France did not face the social and economic problems which made the 'weakness' of the 1930s so disastrous. The majorities wanted strong governments or reforming legislation, but they preferred to be left alone.



Cabinet, and they might include the young to the ranks. Cabinets formed by this system, while those whose membership was bourgeois government of 1895 – were common. The real turning-points in politics were when one 'team' of politicians which has remained for a number of years gives way

to certain ministries to be held by the same men, providing another element of continuity. True of the foreign office, where some continuity was obviously desirable. Delcassé, who held office in 1898 and 1905, was the best but not the same was true of certain technical posts, held by the obscure Cocheret in 1879–85. The number of ministerial posts was small – around eleven on average, with some posts went to senators, and the posts were frequently held by generals and deputies were therefore not extensive, and were held by the ministerial cliques. It does not readiness to overthrow governments can be said; most deputies were content to remain in office; they knew that the government was at the

of unstable governments based on shifting allegiances and consequences for political life. One is that the difference between the majority in the country, as in the majority in Parliament. Parties which win an election do not necessarily work together, and the play of alliances can produce different political complexions in the life of the country (that of 1893). Governments are made and broken, in manoeuvres which fascinate the public, and disillusion and anti-parliamentary feelings are kindled about a closer correspondence between the actions of governments was one of the aims of the republicans; those like Gambetta who looked for a two-party system in France.

It was one when electoral alliances held sway in the legislature. At other times, it is possible to

discern a real but less direct connection with opinion in the country. Soulier, for example, suggested that the initial majority gradually broke up in the course of a legislature in favour of a coalition of the centres, but tended to reconstitute itself as the next election approached, producing an alternation between polarized and centrist phases.<sup>8</sup> Mayeur, on the other hand, says of the 1893 legislature that the natural 'moderate' majority produced by the election emerged only after some years when various alternatives had been tried and found wanting.<sup>9</sup> One rule that does seem valid is that coalitions of the centre were a natural development within Parliament, but were difficult to translate into electoral terms, the electors preferring to keep the old party divisions alive; the *Ralliés*, for example, found that they could not form alliances with moderate Republicans in the 1898 election, and that the spirit of *ralliement* was not as popular with Catholic electors as with Catholic deputies.

A second consequence of the system of coalition governments is that it gives a special advantage to parties in the centre of the spectrum, whose support is needed for any successful government and who will rarely feel inclined to deny it on grounds of principle. In the twentieth century, the Radicals became the main beneficiaries of this, just as it was they who gained most by second-ballot electoral alliances. In the same way, the system favoured the emergence of a particular kind of leader – or 'anti-leader':<sup>10</sup> the man who was adept at smoothing over differences and working out compromises, affable to deputies in the lobbies and purloins of the Chamber. Masters of these emollient skills like Briand enjoyed long ministerial careers, and in the long run the system tended to discourage able men in favour of second-rate and inoffensive ones, and to prevent the office of prime minister developing real authority; the prime minister was only *primus inter pares*, and the office was always combined with holding a normal ministerial portfolio.

Another consequence linked with this was that coalition inhibited firm government and the formulation of policy on a long-term basis. Decisive action could always offend part of the government's majority, and it was difficult to impose unpopular but statesmanlike policies on deputies who were always looking over their shoulders to their constituencies. Before 1914, however, France did not face the international and economic problems which made the weak leadership and 'immobilism' of the 1930s so disastrous. The majority of Frenchmen did not want strong governments or reforming legislation, but valued their independence and preferred to be left alone. In Siegfried's words, the



d and which was 'adapted to the needs, failings of the French people'.<sup>11</sup> took up much of the time of Parliament, series of the period centred on legislative proposals was not really seen as a . With a few exceptions (e.g. Clemenceau) take office with a fixed programme of did few of the reforms were carried out. o be distinguished from other industrial thargy, especially on social questions. an problems of parliamentary procedure r when the will existed contentious legis- y against even the fiercest opposition, as l laws of Ferry and Combes and by the : that the legislative procedure gave great of vested interests.

ramme of government legislation espec- h. The government did not control the d government bills had only limited of the legislative process was the system Every Bill passed through a committee ate, and might be indefinitely delayed or next stage, it was the committee's version government's original proposal that was of the committee who conducted the priate minister. In any case, by the time a the government had frequently changed, er from one legislature to another. Legis- cess largely independent of changes of hands of the deputies as a body, not con- individual deputies also had unlimited power used it profusely.<sup>12</sup>

y appointed on an *ad hoc* basis for each bill, nmittees for different areas of policy soon recognized in 1902; from 1910, members to the parliamentary groups. It was in the e real work of the Chamber was done, and us deputies to gain a reputation as experts erial office. The most powerful of all was ch used its position to review the whole , and presented elaborate reports, which

often delayed the voting of the budget itself. The chairman of the budget committee was an influential figure: in 1877-81, it was Gambetta, and there were certain men who through chairmanship of the Senate or Chamber committees and spells of office as minister of finance built up a reputation as experts in the mysteries of finance. They included Léon Say and Rouvier, both able spokesmen for private enterprise who had the confidence of business interests, and the very different Caillaux, the champion of income-tax, who was able to boast that 'whether in office or out of it, I dominated financial policy between 1899 and 1914, and imposed my ideas'.<sup>13</sup>

Since there was a standing committee corresponding approximately to each ministry, they were a means by which Parliament sought to control the bureaucracy, but were not very effective in this task. The machinery of the centralized State was ancient and powerful, and it has often been said that ministerial instability did not affect the continuity of policy because the bureaucrats did the real work of governing the country. It was obviously difficult for a minister who stayed only a few months to make much impression on policy, and most were perhaps more interested in administering the patronage which their ministry commanded. After about 1900, the development of *cabinets*, private offices staffed by young men outside the bureaucratic hierarchy, was a symptom of the desire for more political control.<sup>14</sup> Historians have neglected the policy-making activities of civil servants, but one may mention a few names: Charles Dumay, director of the *administration des cultes* from 1887 to 1906, who guided the relations of Church and State under the Concordat;<sup>15</sup> Arthur Fontaine, who at the *Office du travail* (which in 1906 became the ministry of labour) inspired much labour legislation between 1891 and 1920;<sup>16</sup> and Ferdinand Buisson, director of primary education from 1879 to 1896 and theorist of the *école laïque*, who later became a Radical deputy and a luminary of the *Ligue de l'Enseignement* and *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*.

The training and background of the top civil servants gave them a strong *esprit de corps*. Recruitment was by examination, though political influence still counted for much, and for the best jobs it was almost essential to have attended the *Ecole libre des sciences politiques*, founded in 1871. Between 1901 and 1935 this school provided the *Conseil d'Etat* and the *inspection des finances* with 98 per cent of their entry, the diplomatic service with 88 per cent, and the *Cour des Comptes* with 87 per cent (these were the four so-called *grands corps*). Since it was a private and expensive institution, recruitment was virtually restricted to an upper-middle-class elite.<sup>17</sup>



There was one field, foreign policy, where the continuity of policy and the influence of the officials were especially marked. Parliamentary debates on foreign affairs were rare, and the relevant committee (which also covered the colonies) was one of the weakest. Here the constitution gave governments independent executive power, for it was the president who negotiated and ratified treaties, and only certain kinds of treaty required parliamentary approval; where the interests and security of the State were concerned, treaties might be kept secret. Thus the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance, the basis of foreign policy for twenty years and arguably the reason for France's involvement in war in 1914, were known to only a handful of men and were never debated in Parliament. A minister like Delcassé could have a real influence on policy because of his relatively permanent tenure, but he himself virtually ignored Parliament and the Cabinet; foreign ministers were most successful when their ideas coincided with those of the Quai d'Orsay.

The feeling was that foreign affairs were 'above politics', and that a partisan approach would encourage France's enemies. Much of the activity of the army and navy escaped civilian scrutiny for the same reason, at least until the Dreyfus affair. The laws on conscription were a politically controversial matter, but military policy proper was left to the generals, and Parliament generally voted whatever credits were requested for arms and equipment. Civilian control undoubtedly existed in principle (though its chief representative, the minister of war, was always a general until 1888), but in practice the army was seen as an untouchable 'ark of the covenant' and given a potentially dangerous autonomy.

The same was true of the colonies, although here the operative factor was lack of general interest rather than patriotic bipartisanship. After the controversy over Ferry's policies had died down, French colonial expansion went ahead steadily with little interference from Parliament, and in some cases was decided by the initiatives of the soldiers and officials on the spot. One has also to reckon here with the influence of 'one of the most powerful pressure groups in the history of the Third Republic',<sup>18</sup> the 'colonial party'. The core of the colonial party was the 'colonial group' which brought together deputies of all parties interested in colonial expansion, and which at the height of its influence in 1902 had nearly 200 members. It was linked with outside bodies like the *Comité de l'Afrique française*, which organized expeditions in Africa and was supported by imperially minded geographers and propagandists, and the *Union coloniale française*, representing business

interests. The man behind the colonial party Etienne, an important *Alliance démocratique* politician, Algerian seat, Africa was always the party's main interest behind the expeditions which led up to the Fashoda crisis and France's later penetration of Morocco. After Fashoda, interest died away and the party broke up. The active members of the colonial party were able to wield such influence because they were interested enough to oppose them, and because they were within the system. The colonial party had its sympathies in the foreign office and the colonial ministry, and its trained colonial administrators was inspired by it.

A pressure-group headed by deputies is perhaps not a pressure-group at all, if one takes this term to mean a group putting pressure on Parliament from outside. In France, such organizations did not go very far in France before the economic and local interests were represented by their legitimate capacity, and the conflict between them. One might expect business interests to be to the fore, but the most influential organizations but this was not really the case. There were numerous employers' organizations, but they were often the annual banquet was their chief activity. In the coalmining, which had formed a *Comité des mines* in France in 1887,<sup>20</sup> and the iron and steel industry by the *Comité des forges*. The *Comité des forges* was influential, and worked behind the scenes to ensure that foreign policy benefited French industry. In other organizations, however, were often concerned with strike-breaking rather than lobbying, and they were not the body to represent business interests. There was a *Comité du commerce et de l'industrie* (the 'comité Mascara' party, but this was not so much a pressure-group as a lobby, which the Radicals (and the *Alliance démocratique*) had their business sympathizers.<sup>21</sup>

The truth is that businessmen hardly needed the general atmosphere was so favourable to them. In the same way, the formal organization of agriculture was unnecessary when most deputies represented rural areas. The needs of agriculture could be expressed through the most articulate spokesmen of agriculture, the small farmers and the highly capitalized farmers of the north.



in policy, where the continuity of policy was especially marked. Parliamentary procedure was rare, and the relevant committee (which was one of the weakest. Here the constituent executive power, for it was the only ratified treaties, and only certain kinds of treaty approval; where the interests and concerns, treaties might be kept secret. No-Russian alliance, the basis of foreign policy, arguably the reason for France's involvement in the Boer war, known to only a handful of men and were

A minister like Delcassé could have a secure position of his relatively permanent tenure, but not in Parliament and the Cabinet; foreign policy was successful when their ideas coincided with

in affairs were 'above politics', and that a lack of courage France's enemies. Much of the policy escaped civilian scrutiny for the same reason. The laws on conscription were passed without matter, but military policy proper was left to the army. The army generally voted whatever credits were needed for armament. Civilian control undoubtedly existed, but its chief representative, the minister of War (until 1888), but in practice the army was 'above the covenant' and given a potentially

in the colonies, although here the operative interest was rather than patriotic bipartisanship. Ferry's policies had died down, French colonial policy had steadily with little interference from the government. Policy was decided by the initiatives of the government. One has also to reckon here with the most powerful pressure groups in the history of France, the 'colonial party'. The core of the colonial party was the 'colonial party' which brought together deputies of all political persuasions, and which at the height of its power had 200 members. It was linked with outside France, which organized expeditions supported by imperially minded geographers. The *Union coloniale française*, representing business

interests. The man behind the colonial party was really Eugène Etienne, an important *Alliance démocratique* politician who sat for an Algerian seat; Africa was always the party's main interest, and it was behind the expeditions which led up to the Fashoda crisis in 1898, and France's later penetration of Morocco. After France had established herself in Morocco, interest died away and the colonial group of deputies broke up. The active members of the colonial party were few; they were able to wield such influence because nobody else was interested enough to oppose them, and because they were operating from within the system. The colonial party had its sympathizers in the army, the foreign office and the colonial ministry, and the *Ecole coloniale* which trained colonial administrators was inspired by its ideas.

A pressure-group headed by deputies is perhaps not a true pressure-group at all, if one takes this term to mean a lobbying organization putting pressure on Parliament from outside. The formation of such organizations did not go very far in France before 1914, partly because economic and local interests were represented directly by deputies in their legitimate capacity, and the conflict between them was open. One might expect business interests to be to the fore in forming powerful organizations but this was not really the case. By the 1900s there were numerous employers' organizations, but it has been said that very often the annual banquet was their chief activity.<sup>19</sup> The exceptions were coalmining, which had formed a *Comité central des houillères de France* in 1887,<sup>20</sup> and the iron and steel industry, represented since 1864 by the *Comité des forges*. The *Comité des forges* was undoubtedly highly influential, and worked behind the scenes to secure protection and to ensure that foreign policy benefited French industry. Other employers' organizations, however, were often concerned with price-fixing or strike-breaking rather than lobbying, and there was no effective central body to represent business interests. There was a *Comité républicain du commerce et de l'industrie* (the 'comité Mascaraud') tied to the Radical party, but this was not so much a pressure-group as a conduit through which the Radicals (and the *Alliance démocratique*) tapped the funds of their business sympathizers.<sup>21</sup>

The truth is that businessmen hardly needed pressure-groups when the general atmosphere was so favourable to their activities. In the same way, the formal organization of agricultural interests was hardly necessary when most deputies represented rural constituencies and the needs of agriculture could be expressed through the ballot-box. The most articulate spokesmen of agriculture, however, were landowners and the highly capitalized farmers of northern France, and the French



Parliament did remarkably little to help the ordinary peasant proprietor or the rural worker. There were no significant measures, for example, to end the abuses of *métayage*, to give tenants more security of tenure and to compensate them for improvements, or to make agricultural credit more readily available. Attention concentrated instead on tariff protection and maintaining or securing fiscal privileges. Conservatives succeeded in persuading peasants that protection was good for them and income-tax would be bad, though there was reason to doubt both propositions, and in the long run protectionism held agriculture back by delaying mechanization and structural reform.<sup>22</sup>

The tariff issue was important because it brought together industrial and agricultural interests. It was the former who took the initiative: with the exception of a few industries with a large export trade like silk, French industrialists had always been protectionist by instinct, but on the agricultural side the winegrowers had favoured free trade until the phylloxera crisis (which began around 1875 and ravaged French vineyards until the end of the 1880s) made France a net importer of wine. The economic crisis of the 1880s completed the conversion to protectionism, and from then on the movement was steadily away from free trade, with the Méline tariff of 1892 and the tariff of 1910 as the main landmarks; the first significant protection for agriculture came with the wheat duties of 1885. The evolution of these tariffs illustrated some of the defects of the parliamentary system – nothing was easier than to buy votes and satisfy vested interests by adding constantly to the list of protected goods – and the power of the Chamber's *commission des douanes*. It was as head of this committee that Méline made his mark, and it worked out the details of the 1910 tariff while the government tried rather desperately to restrain it in the interest of good relations with other countries, especially Germany.<sup>23</sup>

It was easy for all to unite against foreigners, but over tax concessions rival interests came into conflict. In the early twentieth century, the agricultural interest was divided by the 'war of the beet and the grape', which was a war between north and south. Its origins were in the problems of the wine industry. The recovery from phylloxera had involved the abandonment of marginal production in the older wine-growing areas, and the growth of a large-scale capitalistic wine industry in Languedoc, whose efficiency led to a serious crisis of over-production and a collapse of prices. The taxes on drink became a controversial issue, and one where the interests of winegrowers diverged from those of the sugar-beet refiners, who were the main source of industrial alcohol, and who formed a very powerful lobby:

they had already succeeded in protecting them. The prohibition of colonial cane sugar, in getting export duties abolished by the 1902 Brussels Convention, was a success (just as dairy interests were able to get 10% on margarine).<sup>24</sup> All in all, alcohol was a highly political issue. Those interested in it included the café-owner, the distiller, their own defence organizations, and the *bouilleurs* who distilled their own wine or fruit duty-free. Only when the government attacked the privileges of the *bouilleurs de vin* in 1903 was reversed in 1906.

Lower taxes did not solve the problem of alcohol. The industry collapsed disastrously in the early 1900s, culled by social disturbances in Languedoc in 1907. The root of the trouble was 'fraud', and Parliament tried to deal with it by passing laws on the quality and labelling of alcohol. This further rioting in 1911, when the winegrowers of Champagne were excluded from the designated champagne region, the government was to buy up surplus alcohol at an inflated price from wine and beet growers, but these great days of alcohol in the future; so was the enforced use of alcohol. Experiments with this had already begun.<sup>25</sup> Before any action was needed, because the deputies representing the industry acted together in defence of the industry regarded as a force difficult to resist.

No account of parliamentary politics or of the influence of interest groups would be complete without reference to the Press, which was enjoying a golden age.<sup>26</sup> Paris had about seventy dailies, and the province had about twenty. The circulation of the Paris Press, however, was not large. The four so-called *journaux d'information*, popular newspapers developed since about 1880 with the advent of the mass-circulation newspapers were run on business lines, and served the interest of their readers rather than provide ideological propaganda. Their political line was usually somewhat neutral, although the magnates who themselves entered politics, like the proprietor of the *Petit Parisien*. These mass-circulation newspapers, with the traditional *journal politique*, which was as the organ of a party or tendency and gave its readers a platform for comment. The circulation of these papers ranged from 70,000: they included the *Figaro*, which evolved from moderate conservatism, the old-fashioned lib-



to help the ordinary peasant proprietor no significant measures, for example, to give tenants more security of tenure improvements, or to make agricultural attention concentrated instead on tariff securing fiscal privileges. Conservatives felt that protection was good for them though there was reason to doubt both in protectionism held agriculture back structural reform.<sup>22</sup>

because it brought together industrial as the former who took the initiative: industries with a large export trade like always been protectionist by instinct, winegrowers had favoured free trade which began around 1875 and ravaged (of the 1880s) made France a net importer. The crisis of the 1880s completed the movement then on the movement was steadily Méline tariff of 1892 and the tariff of the first significant protection for agriculture of 1885. The evolution of these tariffs of the parliamentary system – nothing and satisfy vested interests by adding protected goods – and the power of the Press. It was as head of this committee that worked out the details of the 1910 tariff rather desperately to restrain it in the other countries, especially Germany.<sup>23</sup> against foreigners, but over tax concessions. In the early twentieth century, the led by the 'war of the beet and the between north and south. Its origins were in industry. The recovery from phylloxera had marginal production in the older wine- with of a large-scale capitalistic wine inefficiency led to a serious crisis of over- prices. The taxes on drink became a where the interests of winegrowers sugar-beet refiners, who were the main and who formed a very powerful lobby:

they had already succeeded in protecting themselves from the competition of colonial cane sugar, in getting export bounties until these were abolished by the 1902 Brussels Convention, and in banning saccharin (just as dairy interests were able to get laws limiting the use of margarine).<sup>24</sup> All in all, alcohol was a highly political commodity, and those interested in it included the café-owners, who were forming their own defence organizations, and the *bouilleurs de cru*, farmers who distilled their own wine or fruit duty-free. Only the boldest government attacked the privileges of the *bouilleurs de cru*, and an attempt to cut them down in 1903 was reversed in 1906.

Lower taxes did not solve the problem of wine prices, which collapsed disastrously in the early 1900s, culminating in the major social disturbances in Languedoc in 1907. The popular view was that the root of the trouble was 'fraud', and Parliament responded to this by passing laws on the quality and labelling of wine (which caused further rioting in 1911, when the winegrowers of the Aube department were excluded from the designated champagne area). After 1914, the government was to buy up surplus alcohol at an agreed price from both wine and beet growers, but these great days of the alcohol lobby were in the future; so was the enforced use of alcohol as motor fuel, though experiments with this had already begun.<sup>25</sup> Before 1914 no real lobby was needed, because the deputies representing winegrowing areas acted together in defence of the industry regardless of party, and were a force difficult to resist.

No account of parliamentary politics or of the propaganda activities of interest groups would be complete without some consideration of the Press, which was enjoying a golden age.<sup>26</sup> On the eve of 1914, Paris had about seventy dailies, and the provinces 250. Three-quarters of the circulation of the Paris Press, however, was accounted for by the four so-called *journaux d'information*, popular newspapers which had developed since about 1880 with the advent of mass literacy. These newspapers were run on business lines, and sought to entertain and interest their readers rather than provide ideological guidance; their political line was usually somewhat neutral, although there were Press magnates who themselves entered politics, like Jean Dupuy, proprietor of the *Petit Parisien*. These mass-circulation papers contrasted with the traditional *journal politique*, which was thin on news but acted as the organ of a party or tendency and gave its readers much political comment. The circulation of these papers ranged between 20,000 and 70,000: they included the *Figaro*, which evolved from royalism to moderate conservatism, the old-fashioned liberal *Journal des Débats*,



and *Le Temps*, noted for its foreign coverage and regarded as the semi-official mouthpiece of the Quai d'Orsay. One special tradition of French journalism was the 'one-man' newspaper, read because it expressed the views of either a leading politician, many of whom spent large sums on maintaining unprofitable papers, or a talented journalist. The Socialist newspaper *L'Humanité*, for example, was read by many simply for Jaurès's editorials. It was on the Right especially that a tradition of combative and often brutal personal journalism flourished, represented (in rough chronological order) by the intransigent Catholic Veuillot in *L'Univers*, by Rochefort, who moved from support of the Commune to extreme nationalism, by the Cassagnacs, father and son, who kept Bonapartism alive in *L'Autorité*, by the anti-Semitic Drumont in *La Libre Parole*, and by Maurras in the *Action française*.

One important function of the Paris Press was co-ordinating opinion throughout the country, for it had a high circulation in the provinces, and provided most of the ideas for the provincial Press, which was less influential than the number of titles would suggest. According to the historians of the Press, 'scissors became the main equipment of the journalist' in the provinces;<sup>37</sup> most papers took their news from Paris agencies, and the monarchist parties in the 1870s had pioneered a system of party news agencies which supplied sympathetic newspapers throughout the country. Since local politicians also got the ideas for their speeches from the newspapers, the result was that politics was debated in much the same terms everywhere. Only the largest provincial dailies had offices in Paris, and only one really established a reputation outside its region: this was the *Dépêche* of Toulouse, which under the ownership of the Sarraut family became a great organ of Radical opinion, a French counterpart of the *Manchester Guardian*.

The golden age had its darker side. The Press law of 1881 was perhaps excessively liberal in allowing attacks on individuals, and the tone of the Press was often violent and scurrilous. Moreover, the large number of small and financially unsound papers encouraged venality. Many newspapers were controlled by financial or business interests with axes to grind, but the worst abuses were in the financial pages, where it became normal to accept money for giving favourable publicity to companies' shares and concealing their difficulties. This abuse was revealed but not ended by the Panama scandal. Since so many Frenchmen invested their savings in foreign government stocks, these governments also began buying the services of newspapers to laud the soundness of their economies and the virtues of their rulers. The most notorious case of this kind, though not the only one, was the

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Russian Press campaign. Russian subsidies were especially lavish after 1905, when it was necessary to re-establish confidence in the regime, and their distribution was connived at by the French government. These pressures on the Press were familiar to insiders, but not to the newspaper reader, and they were a danger to democracy mitigated only by the multiplicity of choice which the Press offered.

On the whole, the Press focused attention on parliamentary politics rather than diverting it. In classic nineteenth-century fashion, the public discussion of politics centred on the parliamentary arena and on the personalities and the manœuvrings of politicians, and debates and speeches were reported at length. Even those newspapers which were interested mainly in entertainment and sensation were provided with a good deal of material by the politicians, in the form of crises, scandals and duels (the survival of which in the world of politics was one of the stranger aspects of Republican manners). One of the most publicity-conscious of politicians, Caillaux, carried this to new heights in 1914 when his wife shot Calmette, editor of *Le Figaro*; the trial (and acquittal) of Mme Caillaux monopolized the headlines in the weeks when the Balkan crisis was building up to war.

One can conclude, therefore, that in many ways Parliament remained the real centre of interest and the real centre of power. It had to co-exist with a strong centralized State whose organs enjoyed much autonomy, and with numerous interests who used their economic and social power to get what they wanted, yet it remained the forum through which these interests mediated their conflicts. Moreover, it was still the individual deputies who retained much of the control over legislation, and who acted as the channel for the play of interests. Each of the 600 or so deputies used his vote and his influence in a different way, and there was no neat structure of interest groups tied in with parties to give the bargaining process shape and discreet propriety. The workings of such an open parliamentary system were often unedifying, but it could hardly be denied that they were democratic.



system was one which worked and which was 'adapted to the needs, the inclinations and even the failings of the French people'.<sup>11</sup>

The process of legislation took up much of the time of Parliament, and most of the great controversies of the period centred on legislative proposals; yet introducing such proposals was not really seen as a major function of governments. With a few exceptions (e.g. Clemenceau in 1906) governments did not take office with a fixed programme of reforms, and even when they did few of the reforms were carried out. By the 1900s France seemed to be distinguished from other industrial countries by its legislative lethargy, especially on social questions. Lack of political will rather than problems of parliamentary procedure seems the real cause of this, for when the will existed contentious legislation could be carried rapidly against even the fiercest opposition, as was shown by the anti-clerical laws of Ferry and Combes and by the three-year law. But it was true that the legislative procedure gave great scope for the obstructionism of vested interests.

The procedure made a programme of government legislation especially difficult to carry through. The government did not control the parliamentary timetable, and government bills had only limited priority. The central feature of the legislative process was the system of committees (*commissions*). Every Bill passed through a committee before coming to general debate, and might be indefinitely delayed or extensively amended. At the next stage, it was the committee's version of the Bill rather than the government's original proposal that was debated, and the *rapporteur* of the committee who conducted the debate rather than the appropriate minister. In any case, by the time a Bill emerged from committee the government had frequently changed, and Bills could be carried over from one legislature to another. Legislation was therefore a process largely independent of changes of government, and was in the hands of the deputies as a body, not controlled by the executive. Individual deputies also had unlimited power to present private bills, and used it profusely.<sup>12</sup>

Committees were originally appointed on an *ad hoc* basis for each bill, but a system of standing committees for different areas of policy soon grew up, and was officially recognized in 1902; from 1910, members were chosen in proportion to the parliamentary groups. It was in the committees that much of the real work of the Chamber was done, and they were a way for ambitious deputies to gain a reputation as experts and stake a claim to ministerial office. The most powerful of all was the budget committee, which used its position to review the whole field of government policy, and presented elaborate reports, which

often delayed the voting of the budget itself. The budget committee was an influential figure: in the Senate or Chamber committees and spells of finance built up a reputation as experts in the ministry. It included Léon Say and Rouvier, both able and enterprising who had the confidence of business and the different Caillaux, the champion of income-tax, that 'whether in office or out of it, I dominated between 1899 and 1914, and imposed my ideas'.<sup>13</sup>

Since there was a standing committee corresponding to each ministry, they were a means by which the government could control the bureaucracy, but were not very effective. The machinery of the centralized State was ancient and had often been said that ministerial instability did not matter of policy because the bureaucrats did the real work of the country. It was obviously difficult for a minister in a few months to make much impression on policy. The government was perhaps more interested in administering the ministry commanded. After about 1900, the government had private offices staffed by young men outside the ministry. This was a symptom of the desire for more political activity. The government have neglected the policy-making activities of the ministry. I may mention a few names: Charles Dumay, director of *laïcité* from 1887 to 1906, who guided the government and State under the Concordat;<sup>14</sup> Arthur Fontaine, director of *du travail* (which in 1906 became the ministry of labour legislation between 1891 and 1920;<sup>15</sup> and director of primary education from 1879 to 1906, who later became a Radical deputy in the *Ligue de l'Enseignement* and *Ligue des Droits de l'Enseignement*.

The training and background of the top civil servants was a strong *esprit de corps*. Recruitment was by examination and influence still counted for much, and for the government it was essential to have attended the *Ecole libre des sciences politiques* in 1871. Between 1901 and 1935 this school produced 98 per cent of the *inspection des finances* with 98 per cent of the *service des finances* with 88 per cent, and the *Commissariat général* (these were the four so-called *grands corps*), and expensive institution, recruitment was by the upper-middle-class elite.<sup>17</sup>



## CHAPTER 7

# The Right

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In the 1870s, the French Right was represented in Parliament by old-fashioned and public spirited country gentlemen; by 1914, France had an extreme nationalist movement, anti-parliamentary and anti-Semitic, whose ideas and tactics anticipated fascism. How far was there really a single 'Right', and what elements of continuity can be found in its evolution? In his book *The Right Wing in France from 1815 to de Gaulle*, René Rémond argued (as the title suggests) that the Right had a continuous history, but one made up of three strands embodying characteristic mentalities and attitudes, and represented by different parties in turn – an application, of course, of Siegfried's theory of political temperaments. In the 1870s, the three traditions – the Legitimist or 'ultra' Right, Orleanist liberalism, and the authoritarian or nationalist Right – were identified with the three monarchist parties, but by 1900, argues Rémond, the corresponding parties were the *Ralliés*, the Progressists and the nationalists. The obvious danger of this approach is that it directs attention to the survival of old attitudes rather than the appearance of new ones; the Right evolved with French society, and since political positions are based as much on what men are against as what they are for, the nature of the Right was partly determined by the history of the Left. The appearance of Socialism had a profound effect, and by 1914 anti-socialism (combined with nationalism) had replaced the defence of religion as the principal binding element of the Right and the means by which it attracted supporters in all classes.

The core of the Right was, as always, those who had wealth and influence to defend, and who had a general preference for traditional social authorities and ways of behaviour. This was clear enough in the 1870s, when the three monarchist parties had a common interest in preserving the dominance of the notables against the advances of democracy. Several historians have recently emphasized that the Legitimists were far from being archaic relics of a past order, but retained much wealth and social influence. Their dominance of the

National Assembly was not just the result of a natural reflection of their power, and their conservative constitution and reconstruction of France seriously pursued and not necessarily doomed. They had much support among the middle classes, and were able to suppose that it could retain its traditional voters. But when this supposition proved false, they no longer be held against the verdict of universal suffrage. They were left without a strategy, and the actions of MacMahon were inspired by desperation rather than clear thinking. They were caught in a trap. The *de facto* establishment was that it was their plans which seemed revolutionary, and they exploited this against them, and confiscated their belief in the established order which is normal psychology of the Right. The special feature of the Third Republic was that it represented a system permanently deprived of political power – as Halévy pointed out.<sup>1</sup> Frustration at this exclusion led them to contemplate the use of violence and the overthrow of the regime – but in the 1870s the royalists (though they were inhibited from this by their own strict principles).

The three parties differed in their attitudes. Legitimists accepted universal suffrage, but reconciled with the rule of an elite by the traditional respect for religion or the habit of deference to authority. Bonapartists had its democratic aspect, but the idea of strong government based on the potential of the masses, but the Bonapartist leaders in the 1870s to exploit this. Most Bonapartist deputies were managed to carry the loyalty of their peasant voters, but whose instincts were those of the National Assembly they generally supported the republican cause and defended the Church, so that Bonapartism was a variant of conservatism rather than a political movement suggested by its slogan *l'appel au peuple*.<sup>2</sup>

Orleanism was to lose its distinctive identity. Those Orleanists who stayed in the royalist camp in their lot with the Republic became indistinguishable from their Legitimist colleagues, and the tradition was forgotten. The Orleanist attitude



National Assembly was not just the result of a freak election, but a natural reflection of their power, and their efforts to create a conservative constitution and reconstruct France on Catholic lines were seriously pursued and not necessarily doomed to failure. The Right had much support among the middle classes, and it was not unreasonable to suppose that it could retain its traditional influence over rural voters. But when this supposition proved false, and the front could no longer be held against the verdict of universal suffrage, the Right was left without a strategy, and the actions of MacMahon and Broglie were inspired by desperation rather than clear thinking. The Right were in fact caught in a trap. The *de facto* establishment of the Republic meant that it was their plans which seemed revolutionary; the Republicans exploited this against them, and confiscated for their own use that belief in the established order which is normally an essential part of the psychology of the Right. The special feature of the Right under the Third Republic was that it represented a 'natural' governing class permanently deprived of political power – a case unique in Europe, as Halévy pointed out.<sup>1</sup> Frustration at this exclusion could tempt them to contemplate the use of violence and the exploitation of crises against the regime – but in the 1870s the royalists (though not the Bonapartists) were inhibited from this by their own strict constitutionalism.

The three parties differed in their attitudes towards democracy. The Bonapartists accepted universal suffrage, but believed that it could be reconciled with the rule of an elite by the device of a plebiscitary empire, and they looked to an authoritarian government rather than to religion or the habit of deference to maintain order and social stability. Bonapartism had its democratic and anti-clerical wing, and the idea of strong government based on mass support had radical potential, but the Bonapartist leaders in the 1870s were not well placed to exploit this. Most Bonapartist deputies were landowners who had managed to carry the loyalty of their peasant voters over into the new regime, but whose instincts were those of other notables. In the National Assembly they generally supported the common conservative cause and defended the Church, so that Bonapartism became a regional variant of conservatism rather than a political movement of the kind suggested by its slogan *l'appel au peuple*.<sup>2</sup>

Orleanism was to lose its distinctive identity in a similar way, for those Orleanists who stayed in the royalist camp rather than throwing in their lot with the Republic became increasingly difficult to distinguish from their Legitimist colleagues, and the liberal side of their tradition was forgotten. The Orleanist attitude to democracy had been

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one of distrust but not of outright rejection. Orleanists accepted the principles of 1789 and the secularization of society, but in the tradition of Tocqueville they valued liberty more highly than equality, and feared that universal suffrage would endanger civil freedom by giving power to those without property or education, who would drag society down to a common level of mediocrity. The Orleanist ideal was a property-based franchise, but this was now a lost cause, and it did not seem possible to adapt a party whose essential principle was elitism to the new conditions of mass politics.

The Orleanist spirit was perhaps best represented in the 1870s by the doubts expressed by certain intellectuals about the advance of democracy, and notably by Renan and Taine, two thinkers in the mainstream of the positivist and scientific tradition. Renan published his reflections on France's defeat, *La Réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France*, in 1871. Like many others, he attributed Germany's victory in large part to her educational and scientific superiority, and called for urgent reforms in France, but he feared that science and culture might not flourish in a fully democratic atmosphere, just as he thought that the martial virtues were best cultivated in an aristocratic society. Renan proposed that if universal suffrage was to survive at all it should operate through indirect election; later he was to recover his faith in democracy, and occupy a position in the Republican pantheon. Taine, however, who started from a similar cultural elitism, pushed reaction much further, producing in his monumental *Les Origines de la France contemporaine* a much-read analysis of recent French history which came to provide the standard conservative view of the French Revolution. With the Commune very much in mind, Taine emphasized the violent and irrational side of the Revolution and blamed it on the Enlightenment thinkers, with their abstract ideas and failure to understand the organic development of societies; as a liberal, Taine thought that the Revolution had destroyed the true spirit of individual liberty and delivered France over to the bureaucratic State organized by Napoleon.

Hostility to the Revolution and what it stood for was at the centre of the Legitimist view of society, to which most of the vital ideas of the Right may be traced. The Legitimists did not, of course, believe that the *ancien régime* could be restored, but they were 'counter-revolutionaries' in that they condemned many nineteenth-century developments and hoped to resist and if possible reverse them. The attitude of the Legitimists tended to be defensive and pessimistic, as they struggled to hold back the decline of faith, the growth of a materialist and urban civilization, and the rise of social insubordination. Their

own ideal, which arose naturally from their lords, was a hierarchical society in which individuals were based on mutual respect and status, and in which social superiors accepted their dependants and practise Christian charity of a society based on personal relations and on which transcended the cash nexus could lead but the traditional French Right did not go but happened was rather that Catholic employers to the industrial world, enfolded their workmanistic institutions and expecting in return tance of their authority.

The moral view which lay behind this ideal of human nature: the individual, it was thought to guide him, roots to give him a sense of identity, institutions like the family and the Church to integrate him into the wider community. The charge against the Right was that it had dissolved these bonds and set man adrift. Catholic social theory was the concept of the organic society, for example, a pioneering sociologist who had a Catholic social thought, developed a theory of the paramount importance of the family. Coined by which went back to Montesquieu, the new social organisms coming between the individual and the State, a version of it which reappeared in French thought was the need for the 'decentralization' of power, to mean in practice more power for local notables and agents of the centralized State.

Those who wanted a more thoroughgoing conservatism could turn to the Catholic tradition of Maistre, and which exalted the principle of authority, both King and Pope. Within the Church the current was running strongly in the late nineteenth century, the 'liberal Catholic' movement which had tried to reconcile with the principles of 1789 had withered in the papacy, and it was ultramontanism which appealed to priests and to zealous new religious orders. This intellectual sympathy was only one of the links between Catholicism and Legitimism. For the Right, connection was a matter of instinct – loyalty to the same unquestioning nature as loyalty to



outright rejection. Orleanists accepted the secularization of society, but in the tradition of liberty more highly than equality, and would endanger civil freedom by giving property or education, who would drag society of mediocrity. The Orleanist ideal was a fact this was now a lost cause, and it did not carry whose essential principle was elitism to politics.

perhaps best represented in the 1870s by certain intellectuals about the advance of Renan and Taine, two thinkers in the historic and scientific tradition. Renan published a defeat, *La Réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France*, he attributed Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian war to her scientific and cultural superiority, and called for a new social and scientific atmosphere, just as he thought that France had been cultivated in an aristocratic society. Renan's message was to survive at all it should operate later he was to recover his faith in democracy in the Republican pantheon. Taine, however, a similar cultural elitism, pushed reaction much further in his monumental *Les Origines de la France contemporaine*, a synthesis of recent French history which came to a pessimistic view of the French Revolution. Much in mind, Taine emphasized the violent nature of the Revolution and blamed it on the Enlightenment's abstract ideas and failure to understand the needs of the societies; as a liberal, Taine thought that the Revolution had destroyed the true spirit of individual liberty and the bureaucratic State organized by Napoleon. The Revolution and what it stood for was at the centre of French society, to which most of the vital ideas of the nineteenth century Legitimists did not, of course, believe that France could be restored, but they were 'counter-revolutionaries' who condemned many nineteenth-century developments and if possible reverse them. The attitude was defensive and pessimistic, as they saw the decline of faith, the growth of a materialist society and the rise of social insubordination. Their

own ideal, which arose naturally from their experience as rural landlords, was a hierarchical society in which the relations between individuals were based on mutual respect and the acceptance of inherited status, and in which social superiors accepted their obligation to protect their dependants and practise Christian charity. In principle, this vision of a society based on personal relations and on a social interdependence which transcended the cash nexus could lead to a critique of capitalism, but the traditional French Right did not go far along that road; what happened was rather that Catholic employers tried to transfer the ideal to the industrial world, enfolded their workers in a network of paternalistic institutions and expecting in return an unquestioning acceptance of their authority.

The moral view which lay behind this ideal was pessimism about human nature: the individual, it was thought, needed authority to guide him, roots to give him a sense of identity, and strong social institutions like the family and the Church to integrate his life with that of the wider community. The charge against the Revolution was that it had dissolved these bonds and set man adrift. Behind most right-wing social theory was the concept of the organic society: Le Play, for example, a pioneering sociologist who had a considerable influence on Catholic social thought, developed a theory of corporatism based on the paramount importance of the family. Corporatism renewed an idea which went back to Montesquieu, the need for independent social organisms coming between the individual and the State; a special version of it which reappeared in French thought from time to time was the need for the 'decentralization' of government, which would mean in practice more power for local notables at the expense of the agents of the centralized State.

Those who wanted a more thoroughgoing philosophical basis for conservatism could turn to the Catholic tradition which went back to Maistre, and which exalted the principle of authority as represented by both King and Pope. Within the Church itself the ultramontane current was running strongly in the late nineteenth century: the 'liberal Catholic' movement which had tried to reconcile Catholicism with the principles of 1789 had withered in the climate of Pius IX's papacy, and it was ultramontanism which appealed to the younger priests and to zealous new religious orders like the Assumptionists. This intellectual sympathy was only one of the reasons for the symbiosis between Catholicism and Legitimism. For the average Legitimist, the connection was a matter of instinct – loyalty to the Church was of the same unquestioning nature as loyalty to the dynasty. The fact that



the Church taught respect for traditional authorities was of course one reason why the Right approved of it, but it would be unjust to see it as the only reason. Conservatives cared deeply about moral questions (the term 'moral order' summed up the spirit of their governments well); they tended to interpret social problems in terms of moral decline, and wished to regenerate France through a programme of moralization in which the Church would naturally be the main agency. They talked frequently of 'saving France', and the idea of rebuilding national greatness through making France a Christian nation again was perhaps the principal way in which they expressed their patriotism in this period.

If it is easy to see why the Right defended the Church, it is less obvious why the Church committed itself so thoroughly and openly to Legitimism, a political judgment which proved disastrous. Here too the identification was often instinctive: for the Legitimist de Cabrières, for example, bishop of Montpellier from 1873 to 1921, 'the preservation of the faith and the conservation of a social order based on hierarchical relations, with landed property as the economic foundation, were simply the same cause.'<sup>3</sup> But even moderate bishops found it difficult to resist the pressure of the rich laymen on whom much of the strength of the Church depended. The leaders of local society, and of the conservative party, were also the leaders of Catholic opinion, and often close allies of the intransigent religious orders. It was they who financed Catholic charities and schools, and the Church depended on their social influence as landlords or employers for the maintenance of its hold on the masses.

The loyalty of the monarchists to their pretenders handicapped their efforts to retain power in the 1870s, and the principle of monarchy itself had little popular appeal. Bonapartism had profited from the death of Napoleon III in 1873, but when the Prince Imperial was killed in South Africa in 1879 the Bonapartists split into two factions, since the immediate successor, Prince Napoleon, had near-Republican views which were unacceptable to most of the leaders. This was the end of Bonapartism as an effective independent force, though Bonapartists won as many seats as royalists in the 1881 election. In 1883 Chambord died, and the long-awaited 'fusion' of the royalists took place. Many Legitimists who had remained in politics from a sense of honour now gave up the struggle, and provincial Legitimist newspapers closed by the dozen. But in fact the collapse of monarchy as a cause allowed the Right to re-emerge as 'conservatives' and rebuild their popularity by exploiting new issues. In the 1885 election there was a single 'conservative union'

list in most constituencies, and the Right ran 1,800,000 in 1881 to 3,500,000 in 1885 (4,300,000).

Permanent exclusion from power at least could benefit from the unpopular aspects of the Right attacked the Opportunists over a including the agricultural crisis, the extravagant expenditure and Ferry's colonial policy. It was ever, and especially the educational reform something to fight for. Conservatives of all b sectarianism of Ferry's policies, and felt th without God' the government was flouting th majority and destroying a moral sanction on depended. The havoc spread by this 'social c theme of conservative oratory for many years.

The case of education illustrates how cor was slipping away from them. Until Ferry's schools could be run by religious orders, an power on municipal councils to bring this : the school system was directed by Republic tives who wanted to maintain Catholic schoo of their own pockets – industrialists often d put pressure on their workers to use them. I cult after Combe's law of 1904, which ex religious orders on which Church schools c ban private education altogether (as many conservatives could certainly feel that the l tively to frustrate their efforts to fulfil their

By insisting on the religious issue, and on generally, the Right was able to attract n Royalism had in any case never been a purel but had rested partly on the 'old Catholic b vincial France'.<sup>4</sup> Many businessmen and pro by economic relations, social aspirations a with the old upper class, and in areas like : political climate was conservative, middle-cl where have been moderate Republicans v Legitimists'.<sup>5</sup> During the lifetime of the Tl of *bien-pensant* tendencies among the bourg growing popularity of Catholic secondary attracted 43 per cent of all secondary school



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Permanent exclusion from power at least meant that the opposition  
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 the Right attacked the Opportunists over a wide range of questions,  
 including the agricultural crisis, the extravagance of government ex-  
 penditure and Ferry's colonial policy. It was the religious issue, how-  
 ever, and especially the educational reforms, which gave the Right  
 something to fight for. Conservatives of all kinds were alarmed by the  
 sectarianism of Ferry's policies, and felt that in creating the 'school  
 without God' the government was flouting the instinctive wishes of the  
 majority and destroying a moral sanction on which the health of society  
 depended. The havoc spread by this 'social crime' remained a favourite  
 theme of conservative oratory for many years.

The case of education illustrates how conservatives felt that power  
 was slipping away from them. Until Ferry's legislation, public primary  
 schools could be run by religious orders, and notables could use their  
 power on municipal councils to bring this about. But after the 1880s  
 the school system was directed by Republican prefects, and conserva-  
 tives who wanted to maintain Catholic schools had to finance them out  
 of their own pockets – industrialists often did so on a large scale, and  
 put pressure on their workers to use them. But even this became diffi-  
 cult after Combe's law of 1904, which excluded from teaching the  
 religious orders on which Church schools depended. Combes did not  
 ban private education altogether (as many Radicals demanded), but  
 conservatives could certainly feel that the law was being used vindic-  
 tively to frustrate their efforts to fulfil their social and religious ideals.

By insisting on the religious issue, and on the defence of social order  
 generally, the Right was able to attract much middle-class support.  
 Royalism had in any case never been a purely aristocratic phenomenon,  
 but had rested partly on the 'old Catholic bourgeois oligarchy of pro-  
 vincial France'.<sup>4</sup> Many businessmen and professional men were linked  
 by economic relations, social aspirations and intellectual sympathies  
 with the old upper class, and in areas like the west where the general  
 political climate was conservative, middle-class people who might else-  
 where have been moderate Republicans were Orleanists or 'liberal  
 Legitimists'.<sup>5</sup> During the lifetime of the Third Republic, the advance  
 of *bien-pensant* tendencies among the bourgeoisie was reflected in the  
 growing popularity of Catholic secondary schools – which by 1899  
 attracted 43 per cent of all secondary school pupils.<sup>6</sup>



The rich middle class too were alarmed by the undermining of social discipline, and frustrated by the fact that the wrong people were in power. Legitimists like Bishop Freppel might affect a lofty disdain for 'the handful of doctors and veterinaries who today preside over the destinies of France',<sup>7</sup> but for serious men like the Catholic employers of Lyons the situation demanded action.

They could not understand [writes the historian Vaucelles] the reasons for the growing influence wielded by the new elites. 'Were not the conservatives capable of satisfying all the legitimate interests of the masses? By their public-spiritedness, their integrity, their independence and their experience of affairs, did they not offer the electors all the safeguards they could desire? One could hardly say the same for the Republicans.'<sup>8</sup>

The action which these conservatives took was, significantly enough, the foundation of a popular newspaper, the *Nouvelliste de Lyon* (1879). The popular Press was one of the keys to the new mass politics, and an even more important newcomer was *La Croix*, the Assumptionist newspaper, which became a daily in 1883. *La Croix* achieved a large national circulation through a network of committees and volunteer distributors, which enabled the Assumptionists to act as a force at election times – an example of how the influence of the clergy helped to compensate for the Right's lack of strong party organization.

Frustration at exclusion from power and the search for a means of reaching mass opinion were the motives for the Right's attraction to Boulanger, for he seemed to have found the secret of mobilizing opinion against the Republic through the popular themes of nationalism and anti-parliamentarism. These themes were to become identified with the Right, but Boulanger had of course begun as the protégé of the Radicals, and the leaders of the movement remained men in the Radical or revolutionary tradition – several of them, like Rochefort, were followers of the insurrectionary Socialist Blanqui. Boulanger turned to the royalists for finance, and they responded because they hoped to use him to overthrow or discredit the Republic and discard him later. Much of the money for his campaigns came from the royalist Duchess d'Uzès, and the revelation of this in 1890 contributed to the discrediting of the movement.

Over forty Boulangist deputies were returned in the 1889 election – Boulangist and conservative campaigns were generally separate, but with alliances at the second ballot. They were a somewhat hetero-

geneous collection, for Boulangism was to negative movement which simply attracted Opportunist rule for any reason. There was continuity with Bonapartism, as might be expected, and a reactionary element in Boulangism, and some of the orthodox conservatives who had adopted a conservative stance were the election of Boulangists in big towns and working-class support. In the south-west, Boulangism took over the heritage of Bonapartism. Bordeaux was left-wing and in alliance with the Radicals. Néré (in an often cited but unpublished thesis) argued that Boulangism exploited working-class depression which began in 1882; Boulangism was on the road to Socialism, but was important because of their former allegiance to bourgeois Republic.

One of the deputies elected in 1889 was M. L. as a 'revisionist' at Nancy; his programme was 'abolition of the parliamentary regime . . . nothing but impotence and corruption', a programme similar to those which appeared in contemporary France though he struck a distinctive note with a demand for French workers against immigrant competition. He presented himself in the 1890s as a 'nationalist Socialist'. Boulangist deputies figured as part of the movement voting with the Socialists on social questions. Boulangism, and in the closely connected *Ligue des Patriotes*, the outlines of a new 'reactionary' anti-capitalist, and pointing forward to fascism. Clearly discernible, the mythic politics of our shape."<sup>11</sup> Two other possible components were developing in the 1880s and 90s: anti-Semitism and 'Christian democrat' movements.

The exploitation of anti-Semitism and the technique was introduced in France by Edouard Lullien. He published his immensely successful *La France juive* in 1886, how every aspect of life in France was controlled by the Jews, which became the endlessly repeated theme of the daily newspaper *La Libre Parole* which Dr. Dreyfus. Anti-Semitism had not played an important part in the agitation, but *La Libre Parole* was launched in 1889, the Panama scandal, which fed both anti-Semitism and Boulangism.



re alarmed by the undermining of social  
the fact that the wrong people were in  
Freppel might affect a lofty disdain for  
veterinaries who today preside over the  
rious men like the Catholic employers of  
action.

d [writes the historian Vaucelles] the  
fluence wielded by the new elites. 'Were  
le of satisfying all the legitimate interests  
public-spiritedness, their integrity, their  
perience of affairs, did they not offer the  
they could desire? One could hardly say  
ns.<sup>8</sup>

ervatives took was, significantly enough,  
newspaper, the *Nouvelliste de Lyon* (1879).  
of the keys to the new mass politics, and  
comer was *La Croix*, the Assumptionist  
daily in 1883. *La Croix* achieved a large  
a network of committees and volunteer  
the Assumptionists to act as a force at  
of how the influence of the clergy helped  
s lack of strong party organization.  
rom power and the search for a means of  
the motives for the Right's attraction to  
to have found the secret of mobilizing  
c through the popular themes of nationa-  
n. These themes were to become identified  
nger had of course begun as the protégé  
aders of the movement remained men in  
tradition – several of them, like Rochefort,  
urrectionary Socialist Blanqui. Boulanger  
finance, and they responded because they  
throw or discredit the Republic and discard  
money for his campaigns came from the  
d the revelation of this in 1890 contributed  
movement.

puties were returned in the 1889 election –  
ve campaigns were generally separate, but  
nd ballot. They were a somewhat hetero-

geneous collection, for Boulangism was to a considerable extent a  
negative movement which simply attracted those discontented with  
Opportunist rule for any reason. There was some geographical con-  
tinuity with Bonapartism, as might be expected in view of the plebis-  
itary element in Boulangism, and some Boulangist deputies were  
orthodox conservatives who had adopted a new label. What was new  
was the election of Boulangists in big towns, where they attracted  
working-class support. In the south-west, for example, rural Boulan-  
gism took over the heritage of Bonapartism, but the Boulangism of  
Bordeaux was left-wing and in alliance with Radicalism.<sup>9</sup> Jacques  
Néré (in an often cited but unpublished thesis) has stressed the way in  
which Boulangism exploited working-class discontent caused by the  
depression which began in 1882; Boulangism proved to be only a stage  
on the road to Socialism, but was important in detaching the workers  
from their former allegiance to bourgeois Radicalism.

One of the deputies elected in 1889 was Maurice Barrès, who stood  
as a 'revisionist' at Nancy; his programme included, along with  
'abolition of the parliamentary regime . . . which has given proof of  
nothing but impotence and corruption', a number of social reforms  
similar to those which appeared in contemporary Radical programmes,  
though he struck a distinctive note with a demand for the protection of  
French workers against immigrant competition.<sup>10</sup> Barrès described  
himself in the 1890s as a 'nationalist Socialist', and he and other  
Boulangist deputies figured as part of the Left rather than the Right,  
voting with the Socialists on social questions. It is possible to see in  
Boulangism, and in the closely connected activities of Déroulède's  
*Ligue des Patriotes*, the outlines of a new 'radical Right', popular and  
anti-capitalist, and pointing forward to fascism: 'primitive, but already  
clearly discernible, the mythic politics of our own century were taking  
shape.'<sup>11</sup> Two other possible components of a new Right were also  
developing in the 1880s and 90s: anti-Semitism, and the 'social Catho-  
lic' and 'Christian democrat' movements.

The exploitation of anti-Semitism and xenophobia as a political  
technique was introduced in France by Edouard Drumont, who pub-  
lished his immensely successful *La France juive* in 1886. This described  
how every aspect of life in France was controlled by Jews in high  
places, which became the endlessly repeated theme of the anti-Semitic  
daily newspaper *La Libre Parole* which Drumont founded in 1892.  
Anti-Semitism had not played an important part in the Boulangist  
agitation, but *La Libre Parole* was launched just in time to exploit the  
Panama scandal, which fed both anti-Semitism and nationalist anti-



parliamentarism. *La Libre Parole* circulated widely (it was said, perhaps wrongly, to be the favourite reading of country priests) and was scurrilous in tone. It is hardly necessary to dilate on the way anti-Semitism exploits psychological anxieties and economic distress by directing them against a simple target, and at this time the economic crisis and the rise of Socialism provided the necessary material. It was also the case that anti-Semitism was an attractive journalistic technique because it 'personalized . . . the evil forces against which the newspapers were seeking to crystallize the varying discontents of their readers'.<sup>12</sup> In his study of the anti-Semitic campaigns of *La Croix*, Sorlin concluded that they were partly inspired by the need for themes which would appeal to a mass readership, though he also found that anti-Semitism permeated the militant Catholic thought of the time.<sup>13</sup>

The Catholic origins of French anti-Semitism have been stressed by several recent historians, and may be overlooked if the phenomenon is approached with twentieth-century fascism in mind. (There were protofascists among the anti-Semites, like the fantasist Marquis de Morès, or Jules Guérin, who took over the *Ligue antisémite* originally founded by Drumont; both men deployed gangs of thugs on the Paris streets drawn from the butchers of the La Villette slaughterhouses.) Drumont himself was a racial anti-Semite, but he was careful to adapt his doctrine to Catholic ideas and cultivated traditional conservative themes like nostalgia for the *ancien régime*. The credulity of many Catholics made them receptive to conspiracy theories and to the identification of Jews (and freemasons, for anti-masonry and anti-Semitism often went together) with satanic forces;<sup>14</sup> but anti-Semitism was also endemic, partly for snobbish reasons, among educated and upper-class Catholics. One thing which encouraged it was the bankruptcy of the *Union générale* bank in 1882. This had been founded as a specifically Catholic bank to break the Jewish and Protestant hold over French banking, and it attracted the funds of the Church and the savings of Catholics, both rich and poor; it was also a Legitimist institution, Chambord himself being among the original shareholders.<sup>15</sup> When the bank crashed, therefore, a large number of right-wing families lost heavily; the collapse was due primarily to the bad management and speculations of its founder Bontoux, but the idea soon grew up that it had been engineered by the Jews. Verdès-Leroux, who has studied the Press treatment of the scandal, concludes bluntly that 'anti-Semitic ideology was in France above all the work of the Catholics'.<sup>16</sup>

The story of the various movements of renewal within the Church is a complex one, only partly relevant to political history. In the 1870s,

the social conscience of the Church was represented by the 'Cercles', inspired by the aristocratic laymen Adolphe de la Tour du Pin, which tried to reach the workers through other social activities under the patronage of the Church. In the 1880s other social activities under the patronage of the Church began to set up *syndicats mixtes*, organizations which brought employers and workers together. The *Union catholique des patrons du Nord*, founded in 1882, was one of the most powerful sections of the *patronat*, remained faithful to the Church until 1914.<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, the encyclical *Rerum novarum* encouraged the 'social Catholic' movement and opened a debate within the Church. At a series of conferences, reaching a peak in 1896-7, a 'Christian democracy' took shape, though no permanent organization was established. It acted under the 'triple inspiration' of 'religion, justice and acceptance of the Republic',<sup>18</sup> and was not led by a group of young priests (the *abbés démocrates*) who would have freed the Church from its dependence on the propertied classes. The democrats encouraged the formation of unions, but not alone rather than *syndicats mixtes*, though they did not ignore class conflict. They were also, along with the *patronat*, the focus of anti-Semitism within the Church. Drumont joined himself with the movement, and appeared at its conferences. Anti-Semitism was espoused by two of the founders, Lemire and Garnier. It was rejected, however, by the majority, and came the best-known figure in the movement. Lemire was elected to Parliament in 1893. Lemire was to campaign for the *syndicats mixtes*, his favourite project being the provision of a home for every worker (the 'coin de terre' movement).

The Christian democrats' social ideas were a break with tradition – Mayeur calls the movement a 'birth of a new tree'<sup>19</sup> – but their acceptance of democracy and their grudging republicanism of the *Ralliés*, made them acceptable within the Church. As such, they were unacceptable to the secularist establishment, whose polarizing effect made all democratic movements within the Church suspect. This was especially so after 1904, and in the years down to 1914 the Church turned in on itself and rejected the chance of breaking with the established order. Lemire, for example, was censured, and was suspended by the ecclesiastical authorities when he refused to give up his parliamentary career. The Church ordered the dissolution of the most radical movement.



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The Christian democrats' social ideas were in the conservative  
 tradition - Mayeur calls the movement a 'branch of the traditionalist  
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 grudging republicanism of the *Ralliés*, made them a left-wing force  
 within the Church. As such, they were unable to survive the Dreyfus  
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 censure, and was suspended by the ecclesiastical authorities in 1914  
 when he refused to give up his parliamentary seat. In 1910, Pius X  
 ordered the dissolution of the most radical movement of all, the *Sillon*,



When the Dreyfus affair began, therefore, the outlook for the Right was gloomy, and it was not surprising that whatever propaganda advantages it might offer were exploited. The anti-Semites naturally fastened on it in order to revive themes in which the public was losing interest, and in the agitated atmosphere which the affair produced the veterans of Boulangism saw another opportunity of overthrowing the Republic by force. Déroulède's attempted coup in 1899 was seriously meant if farcical in execution, but the eventual result of the agitation was the smashing of extremist organizations by Waldeck-Rousseau. Despite the Left's talk of the 'Republic in danger', only a minority of the Right ever put their faith in violent action – the real danger lay in the influence which they retained within the Establishment. But the actions of a minority served to discredit the Right as a whole, just as the Church became the general target of Republican vengeance.

The most significant result of the affair for giving it a new coherence and sense of involvement and the actions of the Dreyfusards conservatives to the workings of democracy, the emergence of a new ideology centred on the affair welded together the different strands in the previous decades, fused the tradition and ended the confusion – very real in the nationalism belonged to the Right or the Left – conservative emotions on the army.

Few officers, however, drew political conclusions for the French army had a very strong tradition of civil power, whatever it might be. The army was *la grande muette*, and serving soldiers were not allowed to speak. The etiquette of the officers' mess depressed



the century by the layman Marc Sangnier. The young Catholics and devoted itself to hierarchy became alarmed when Sangnier Socialists and stood for Parliament himself. His influence in Church activities was growing, and influence through bodies like the *Association française* (founded in 1886 under the inspiration of the 1900s), but the Church's lack of the energies of young middle-class Catholics and movements like the *Action française*.

and Christian democracy were all ways of capturing a popular following, but none of its electoral fortunes. Most of the Boulangers in 1893, and the group disappeared as its members becoming Socialists. The Right lost its seats in that election, and whereas in the 1880s it had appeared on equal terms it now appeared with some ninety seats, but Méline's moderate republicanism captured the centre ground as the defenders of the Right had over 300. The Right was also split by its essentially parliamentary movement had no social Catholicism or Christian democracy. The *Rallié* leaders, but most of them were without connections and highly orthodox views. Neither in capturing seats by mobilizing new voters nor in getting any tangible reward for their

beginning, therefore, the outlook for the Right was not surprising that whatever propaganda was exploited. The anti-Semites naturally gave themes in which the public was losing interest. The atmosphere which the affair produced the opportunity of overthrowing the Republic's attempted coup in 1899 was seriously shaken, but the eventual result of the agitation was the organization by Waldeck-Rousseau of the 'Republic in danger', only a minority of which in violent action – the real danger lay in the fact that it remained within the Establishment. But the affair did discredit the Right as a whole, just as it was a general target of Republican vengeance

through the violently anti-Dreyfusard campaigns of *La Croix* (until 1900, when the Pope forced the Assumptionists to hand the paper over to laymen).

The most significant result of the affair for the Right was perhaps in giving it a new coherence and sense of direction, for the issues involved and the actions of the Dreyfusards crystallized the objections of conservatives to the workings of democracy, and encouraged the emergence of a new ideology centred on the concept of nationalism. The affair welded together the different strains which had developed in the previous decades, fused the traditional and the populist Right, and ended the confusion – very real in the 1890s – about whether nationalism belonged to the Right or the Left. And not least, it focused conservative emotions on the army.

The army had long been regarded as above party, and had been left to run its own affairs, until the affair brought home the fact that a large part of the officer corps was out of sympathy with the Republic. As a whole the officer corps was not aristocratic – many officers were promoted from the ranks, and most led a modest bourgeois existence – but it had become a refuge for members of old Catholic families, who thought that in the army they were serving France rather than the Republic. The higher up the ranks one looked, the more prominent were men of good family with Jesuit educations: the Jesuits had been especially efficient at cramming for the military schools, but the idea that Jesuit confessors pulled the strings of the General Staff was one of the myths of the Dreyfus affair. Although the army was far from being a state within the State, the officers did live in an enclosed world, and one rather alienated from contemporary values. It was tempting for them to contrast the ideals by which they lived – patriotism, duty, discipline, professional work patiently carried out for modest rewards – with the materialism and corruption of the world outside, just as it was tempting for right-wing theorists to exalt the army as the last repository of these healthy virtues. It was in part the enclosed nature of the army that caused the affair itself: as Dreyfus's second conviction showed, officers found it difficult to repudiate decisions made by their colleagues or superiors, and the attempts to reopen the case were resented as civilian meddling in a professional matter.<sup>20</sup>

Few officers, however, drew political conclusions from their views, for the French army had a very strong tradition of obedience to the civil power, whatever it might be. The army was the silent service (*la grande muette*), and serving soldiers were not even allowed to vote. The etiquette of the officers' mess deprecated references to politics or



religion, and this was one reason why André's attempt to purge the army after the affair had such a bad effect on morale: the army had previously been a field where political patronage was excluded and promotion was not linked to political views. In the same way, officers disliked the use of the army in political disputes, and a number of Catholic officers resigned rather than take part in the repressive measures against religious orders in 1880 and under Combes; the use of the army in strikes, it is true, rarely caused such crises of conscience.

Although most officers shared traditional conservative ideas, they did not have any separate ideology of the kind which is needed to provoke armies into intervening in civilian affairs. The army might have supported the use of force in 1877 by MacMahon,<sup>21</sup> because MacMahon held legitimate authority, but all the evidence is that officers had no sympathy either with Boulanger or with the nationalist agitators at the time of the affair. Nevertheless, the army became a symbol for both sides because of the values for which it was thought to stand.

The principle of civil society [said Clemenceau] is right, benevolence, justice; the principle of military society is discipline, duty, obedience. The battle is between the two. The whole revolutionary tradition of France against the blind authoritarianism of a caste, that was the whole of the Dreyfus Affair.<sup>22</sup>

The question of nationalism was involved directly in the affair because the main rational argument of the anti-Dreyfus side was that justice to one individual might have to be overridden in the interests of national unity and security. The sacredness of the national cause was preached by the conservative intellectuals of the *Ligue de la patrie française*, and nationalism in the broad sense of emphatic patriotism and concern for a strong army and for the protection of France's international position became a central theme for all conservatives. The use of the word nationalism in the special sense of right-wing extremism appeared at the end of the 1890s, and 'integral nationalism' reached its fullest expression in the writings of Barrès and Maurras (the phrase was Maurras's, but he had much in common with Barrès). These two writers have attracted much attention in recent years, because they can be seen not implausibly as precursors of fascism. Maurras in particular spread his savage critique of democracy widely in the inter-war years, especially in Catholic and upper-class circles, and provided much of the intellectual inspiration of the Vichy regime. But there is a difference

between precursors and the real thing, and in many respects no more than a reworking of traditional right-wing ideas.

The ideas were certainly influential, but on the significance of the movements connected with Maurras's *Action française*. The political socio between 'extremism of the right', or traditional 'extremism of the centre', the authoritarianism which is the true basis of fascism.<sup>23</sup> French whole to belong to the first category: it was the Right extended its support, especially among but it did not turn into a radical, independent to mobilize mass support against such right-wing and big business. The 'extremists of the centre' in Radicalism, which in France was able to elect the 'small man' while keeping him loyal to the Right. The way in which Boulangism had developed suggests that there was indeed an organic continuity. One side of Boulangism was not really carried over into the 1900s. Nationalism might have turned into given 'extensive unemployment, impoverishment and frightened petty bourgeoisie',<sup>24</sup> but in fact these were absent, and extremism remained on the margins.

Like other countries, France experienced a crisis of the nineteenth century, in which certain elements of the rationalist and liberal tradition. At the time reflected in the debate over the 'bankruptcy of the Republic' by the critic Brunetière (later a prominent anti-philosophy of Bergson, whose lectures enjoyed a considerable world. Politically, it took the form of distrust of government, and the cult of action and violence. The syndicalism of the 1900s, with its slogan of 'revolt against reason', and in the expression of this 'revolt against reason', and in the Sorel complained that 'sublimity has vanished from the parties, giving place to a morality of extraordinary parties', giving place to a morality of extraordinary parties.<sup>25</sup> 'Jansenist fury against the squalor of parliamentary parties'<sup>26</sup> was shared by one of the most ardent poet Péguy. Péguy reacted violently against the idealism of the Dreyfusard cause was exploited by the anti-clericals and (in his view) by the concept of 'mystique' degenerating into 'politics'.



reason why André's attempt to purge the army had a bad effect on morale: the army had no political patronage was excluded and no political views. In the same way, officers were not involved in political disputes, and a number of officers rather than take part in the repressive measures in 1880 and under Combes; the use of force, rarely caused such crises of conscience. The army shared traditional conservative ideas, they were the ideology of the kind which is needed to maintain order in civilian affairs. The army might have been the force in 1877 by MacMahon,<sup>21</sup> because of its authority, but all the evidence is that the army was not with Boulanger or with the nationalist movement. Nevertheless, the army became a part of the values for which it was thought to

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between precursors and the real thing, and integral nationalism was in many respects no more than a reworking and modernization of traditional right-wing ideas.

The ideas were certainly influential, but one should not overestimate the significance of the movements connected with them, which included Maurras's *Action française*. The political sociologist Lipset distinguished between 'extremism of the right', or traditional authoritarianism, and 'extremism of the centre', the authoritarianism of the middle class, which is the true basis of fascism.<sup>23</sup> French nationalism seems on the whole to belong to the first category: it was a means by which the Right extended its support, especially among the lower middle class, but it did not turn into a radical, independent movement which sought to mobilize mass support against such right-wing forces as the Church and big business. The 'extremists of the centre' had an outlet, after all, in Radicalism, which in France was able to express the resentments of the 'small man' while keeping him loyal to the democratic tradition. The way in which Boulangism had developed out of Radicalism suggests that there was indeed an organic connection, but the Socialist side of Boulangism was not really carried over into the nationalism of the 1900s. Nationalism might have turned into fascism, says Sternhell, given 'extensive unemployment, impoverished peasants, and a ruined and frightened petty bourgeoisie',<sup>24</sup> but in fact these social conditions were absent, and extremism remained on the margin of politics.

Like other countries, France experienced a 'cultural crisis' at the end of the nineteenth century, in which certain intellectuals turned against the rationalist and liberal tradition. At the level of ideas, this was reflected in the debate over the 'bankruptcy of science' started in 1895 by the critic Brunetière (later a prominent anti-Dreyfusard) and in the philosophy of Bergson, whose lectures enjoyed success in the fashionable world. Politically, it took the form of disillusion with parliamentary government, and the cult of action and violence. The revolutionary syndicalism of the 1900s, with its slogan of 'direct action', was one expression of this 'revolt against reason', and its self-appointed theorist Sorel complained that 'sublimity has vanished from the ethics of both parties, giving place to a morality of extraordinary meanness.'<sup>25</sup> Sorel's 'Jansenist fury against the squalor of parliamentarism and political parties'<sup>26</sup> was shared by one of the most ardent of the Dreyfusards, the poet Péguy. Péguy reacted violently against the way in which the idealism of the Dreyfusard cause was exploited for narrow political ends by the anti-clericals and (in his view) by Jaurès, and in his famous concept of 'mystique' degenerating into 'politique' one can see the



common feeling that the compromises of democratic politics degraded the purity of moral passion. As a Socialist who rediscovered Catholicism (the conversion of young intellectuals was itself a sign of the times) and a mystic patriot who died at the front in 1914, Péguy summed up some of the contradictions of the age, and was ideally placed to become a cult figure in later years.

Anti-parliamentarism went back to Boulanger, and was perhaps endemic in France. It became a part of integral nationalism because Barrès and Maurras argued that the parliamentary system encouraged anarchy and dangerously weakened France's will and unity. For their basic premise was that the interests of the nation must be the supreme criterion of policies and institutions. It represented a reality which was higher and more permanent than the individual, and provided him with a loyalty which transcended class and sectional interests. The idea that the nation alone could give meaning to the life of the individual was the special theme of Barrès, whose cult of 'la terre et les morts' insisted on man's need for 'roots' in the community where his ancestors had lived and left their bones. The individual who was uprooted lost contact with the instinctual basis of life, and entered the desert of abstract ideas. In his best-known political novel, *Les Déracinés* (1897), Barrès traced the fortunes of a group of young men who left their native town of Nancy to make careers in Paris, and went to the bad in various ways. For Barrès also believed that loyalties must start with the region before they could be transferred to the nation, and the cult of his native Lorraine became a vital part of his nationalism. (Maurras started his literary career with the Provençal revival movement, the *Félibrige*; it is perhaps odd that both nationalists should have been regionalists, but it fitted into the 'decentralist' tradition of the Right.)

Barrès also developed in *Les Déracinés* his criticism of French education, especially the philosophy taught in the lycées, for teaching an abstract idealism divorced from national realities, a theme which he was to develop in his attacks on left-wing intellectuals and their malign influence at the time of the Dreyfus affair. This was in the tradition of Taine, whom both Barrès and Maurras admired, and there was nothing particularly new in the denunciation of individualism, abstract ideas and deracinated intellectuals. What was new, by comparison with traditional right-wing ideas, was the exaltation of the State and of force, and the way in which nationalism was turned into a doctrine of exclusion. Julien Benda, whose *La Trahison des clercs* (1927) was an attack on nationalist thinkers for abandoning the values of the French intellectual tradition, saw nationalism as the prime example of that

twentieth-century phenomenon 'the political hatreds'; it brought together and possessed classes for the proletariat, and for democracy.<sup>27</sup>

Barrès said that 'nationalism means relation to France. But how can we do the common definition and idea of France?'<sup>28</sup> He adopted their own arbitrary definition of France and declared that those who did not share it were not Frenchmen. Both decided that Catholicism was the organic personality, and gave it a central place. Neither believed in it personally. Both thought that Jews were an alien element in the nation, and its traditions even after several generations. Barrès was cultural in theory, but in practice used the ideas of Maurras who pushed this line further. He was one of four 'confederate states' who were plotting against the Jews, the Protestants, the freemasons and the foreign ancestry) – a development of the ideas popular among Catholics.

Barrès and Maurras differed in their views on parliamentary democracy. Barrès always favoured it and was in the Bonapartist plebiscitary tradition, but accepted the modern world. Maurras was a 'professor of energy', and his emphasis on the romantic cult of violent action were antithetical. Both supported Déroulède in 1899, and that was a favourable moment for a courageous surgeon appeared to excise the poison. Barrès himself pursued an orthodox path, but on the other hand, rejected the Republic. He really belonged to the 'ultra' tradition of the work of 1789. He too wanted authoritarianism, but that the only form of it which suited France was monarchy, and he made the *Action française* was recognized by the pretender, the Comte de Paris (strained relations at times), and the *Action française* the moribund royalist organization.

The *Action française* was founded in 1894 but began its active period in 1908, when and when the younger militants were or



promises of democratic politics degraded. As a Socialist who rediscovered Catholicism, being intellectuals was itself a sign of the who died at the front in 1914, Péguy contradictions of the age, and was ideally in later years.

it back to Boulanger, and was perhaps ne a part of integral nationalism because hat the parliamentary system encouraged akened France's will and unity. For their terests of the nation must be the supreme tutions. It represented a reality which was t than the individual, and provided him ded class and sectional interests. The idea give meaning to the life of the individual rrès, whose cult of 'la terre et les morts' ots' in the community where his ancestors The individual who was uprooted lost cons of life, and entered the desert of abstract olitical novel, *Les Déracinés* (1897), Barrès p of young men who left their native town Paris, and went to the bad in various ways. loyalties must start with the region before the nation, and the cult of his native Lor- of his nationalism. (Maurras started his vençal revival movement, the *Félibrige*; it ionalists should have been regionalists, but t' tradition of the Right.)

*Les Déracinés* his criticism of French educa- phy taught in the lycées, for teaching an from national realities, a theme which he s on left-wing intellectuals and their malign : Dreyfus affair. This was in the tradition rrès and Maurras admired, and there was the denunciation of individualism, abstract ctuals. What was new, by comparison with s, was the exaltation of the State and of a nationalism was turned into a doctrine of hose *La Trahison des clercs* (1927) was an rs for abandoning the values of the French nationalism as the prime example of that

twentieth-century phenomenon 'the intellectual organization of political hatreds'; it brought together anti-Semitism, the hatred of the possessing classes for the proletariat, and the hatred of authoritarians for democracy.<sup>27</sup>

Barrès said that 'nationalism means resolving every question by relation to France. But how can we do this, if we do not have a common definition and idea of France?'<sup>28</sup> In practice, he and Maurras adopted their own arbitrary definition of what true Frenchness was, and declared that those who did not share these values were not true Frenchmen. Both decided that Catholicism was a part of France's organic personality, and gave it a central place in their ideas, although neither believed in it personally. Both too were anti-Semites, arguing that Jews were an alien element in the nation who could not share in its traditions even after several generations – their nationalism was cultural in theory, but in practice used the vocabulary of racialism. It was Maurras who pushed this line furthest with his doctrine of the four 'confederate states' who were plotting to destroy France – the Jews, the Protestants, the freemasons and the *métèques* (anyone of foreign ancestry) – a development of the conspiracy ideas already so popular among Catholics.

Barrès and Maurras differed in their views about what should replace parliamentary democracy. Barrès always called himself a Republican, and was in the Bonapartist plebiscitary tradition which called for strong government but accepted the modern world. He admired Napoleon as a 'professor of energy', and his emphasis on energy and virility and his romantic cult of violent action were among his 'fascist' aspects. He supported Déroutède in 1899, and thought the Dreyfus affair 'the favourable moment for a courageous surgical intervention'.<sup>29</sup> But no iron surgeon appeared to excise the parliamentary gangrene, and Barrès himself pursued an orthodox parliamentary career. Maurras, on the other hand, rejected the Republic and democracy itself, and really belonged to the 'ultra' tradition which wanted to reverse the work of 1789. He too wanted authoritarian government, but decided that the only form of it which suited France's national traditions was monarchy, and he made the *Action française* a royalist movement. It was recognized by the pretender, the Duc d'Orléans (though with strained relations at times), and the *Action française* virtually took over the moribund royalist organization.

The *Action française* was founded in 1898 (not by Maurras himself), but began its active period in 1908, when its newspaper became a daily and when the younger militants were organized as the *camelots du roi*,



a force deployed in violent demonstrations, usually against a carefully chosen symbolic target. An example was the campaign against the lectures at the Sorbonne of the historian Thalamas, whose works were held to have insulted Joan of Arc, whose cult was a speciality of the *Action française*. Much of the movement's activity was centred on the Latin Quarter, for it had many student members; the spread of such ideas among students was seen at the time as a striking aspect of the nationalist revival, and the *Action française* differed from the leagues of earlier years in having distinguished intellectual supporters, attracted by the logic and sophistication with which Maurras presented his ideas.

The *Action française* was the only active organization of its kind by 1914, and had come by then to concentrate on anti-German propaganda. At the time of the affair, however, it seemed that a wide-ranging nationalist movement was emerging. Nationalist and anti-Semitic leagues were active in many towns, and helped to organize a wave of anti-Semitic riots which broke out in 1898 at the time of Zola's trial. In the 1898 election, a dozen nationalist deputies were elected, and in 1902 over fifty; it was in 1900 that the nationalists won their victory on the Paris municipal council, and in the 1902 election they gained 37 per cent of the vote in Paris. The nationalist movement in Paris has been studied by Watson, who finds that it was a much less radical affair than Boulangism. The candidates were sponsored by the conservative *Ligue de la patrie française*, and they stood in middle-class areas, gaining seats from the Radicals by adding lower-middle-class support to the traditional conservative vote. Their campaigns stressed anti-socialism and anti-parliamentarism, but not anti-Semitism or military and foreign-policy themes. On the whole, therefore, they were conservatives who adopted a new label and exploited new issues for opportunistic reasons, and they later declined because they were indistinguishable from other conservatives – most of them, for example, supported the Church in the Separation crisis. The same points probably apply to the nationalist deputies as a whole, for by 1910 they had disappeared as a separate group and were absorbed into the other right-wing parties.<sup>30</sup>

There is no doubt that nationalism did appeal especially to the lower middle class, and the activists in the *Action française* and similar movements (including those of the 1880s and 90s) seem generally to have been clerks, shop-assistants or artisans, with a leavening of students and middle-class youths. Membership often overlapped with that of Catholic organizations, for the Church seems to have been especially successful in recruiting its activists in this social milieu, retaining its

influence over young men who had attended one of the few genuinely successful and independent schools that were then formed by white-collar employees.<sup>31</sup> It included some points which appealed specifically to the lower middle class, like the denunciation of chain stores, a powerful enough theme without the need for anti-Semitism. Moreover, nationalists made little appeal to the working class. There was, it is true, the 'yellow' movement, whose organizer Biétry founded a shop party in 1903, but the 'yellow' trade unions were few, and their existence depended on the favour of employers. Nationalism, and one cannot really take the existence of a coherent 'national socialist' movement. Barrès was much less of a 'socialist' after the 1898 election, and Maurras was never very interested in social issues. 'd'abord' was his slogan.

It is tempting to exaggerate the importance of nationalism because of the intrinsic interest of its ideas, but in the Right of the 1900s, which was overwhelmingly parliamentary. Maurras's ideas became widely known, and the use of violent methods attracted only a small following. In Parliament, the Right now consisted of three groups: the *Action libérale* and the Progressists. The latter continued the *Rallié* tradition, and came in practice to represent the traditional Right; only a few backwoodsmen clung to their royalism. *Action libérale* deputies were clerics, but they were more open to nationalist ideas than in the past, thanks to the way in which they brought together the 'ultra' and nationalist strands of the new ideas in traditionalist garb.<sup>32</sup> The influence of nationalism was especially important, as it provided intellectual support for nationalist newspapers throughout the country.

The Progressists, on the other hand, had no special interest in nationalism, although (with much of their membership) they were keen patriots who defended the army. Their conservative middle-class electors were more concerned with economic and social issues. It was anti-socialism which pushed the Progressists over to the right, and the theme was as important as nationalism in the politics of the Right. In day-to-day politics, 'nationalism' was comparatively rarely, whereas a constant battle



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 working class. There was, it is true, the 'yellow' trade-union move-  
 ment, whose organizer Biétry founded a short-lived National Socialist  
 party in 1903, but the 'yellow' trade unions were anti-strike organiza-  
 tions which depended on the favour of employers, not offshoots of  
 nationalism, and one cannot really take them as evidence for the  
 existence of a coherent 'national socialist section of the Right'.<sup>32</sup>  
 Barrès was much less of a 'socialist' after the Dreyfus affair than before,  
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It is tempting to exaggerate the importance of extreme nationalism  
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 of the Right. In day-to-day politics, 'national' issues came up com-  
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the Socialists and against social legislation which threatened conservative interests. This was the stuff of urban politics – at Marseilles, for example, anti-collectivism and income-tax played a much larger part in the Right's campaign in 1914 than the three-year law<sup>34</sup> – and in the pattern of modern right-wing politics that was now emerging nationalism had to take its place alongside the defence of the Church and of economic liberalism.

It seems clear that the new nationalist doctrines were the product of internal tensions rather than external threats: the Boulanger movement was linked with fears of Germany, but (despite Fashoda) there was nothing similar at the time of the Dreyfus affair. In the years before 1914, however, there was a more general revival of nationalist feelings which does seem to have been the product of international tensions, and which was clearest after the second Morocco crisis in 1911. It affected the whole of middle-class opinion, and was shown by the renewed popularity of the army and by a revival of interest in military questions; even the growth of sporting activities, a new social phenomenon among the bourgeoisie since the turn of the century, had strong patriotic overtones.<sup>35</sup> This nationalist revival, which seemed to show a new French self-confidence rather than a sense of insecurity, culminated in the passing of the three-year law. The promotion of the patriotic issue by Poincaré, Briand and Millerand no doubt had internal policy motives as well as military ones, because of its wide appeal. On the one side, it could gather support from the Radicals – Eugen Weber has argued that it was the 'bridge' across which they passed definitively from Left to Right, though this seems contestable;<sup>36</sup> on the other, it was a cause to which the Right could hardly deny their support. The moderates succeeded in attracting a section of the Progressists back to the government side, and the Right found itself in much the same position as under Méline: forced to support the government against a common enemy, but powerless to gain any concessions for itself.<sup>37</sup> The chief political beneficiary of the new nationalist mood was not the right-wing opposition, still less the *Action française*, but Poincaré, elected President with the Right's votes. 'The whole of Europe, unsettled and agitated, is preparing for an inevitable war', wrote de Mun after Poincaré's election in 1913; that is why 'the good Frenchmen for whom I speak turn towards him, full of anxiety and of hope'.<sup>38</sup>

## CHAPTER 8

*The working-class movement*

The term 'working-class movement' is used in the history of Socialist ideas and parties and that of the working class, although it is common in French usage to distinguish between the two and to reserve the phrase *mouvement ouvrier* for the trade-union organizations developed in France and in the early twentieth century, and in the early twentieth century trade unions were notable for their rejection of revolutionary syndicalism. The working-class movement, however, should be understood apart from each other, how the leaderships rarely overlapped every worker's advance of parliamentary Socialism was close to the consciousness through strikes and the pattern of development, too, was the same. The movement: reduced to impotence for a decade, they established themselves as effective and experienced a 'take-off' after 1890 which worked in the working class. Both were still divided into the Socialist parties, but achieved unity early in the unions in 1902, the Socialists in 1905. The working-class movement by 1914 formidable forces in French society succeeded in capturing the loyalty of the whole of the working class.

The divisions and the relative weakness of the working-class movement were connected with the slow development of the movement; yet France had a longer tradition of Socialist thinking and consciousness than Britain. Socialist theories had flourished since the 1820s, and the working-class movement in politics went back to the Revolutions of 1848, however, was something distinct from the tradition, directed towards the seizure of power by (or for) the working class towards an alternative vision of society. The working-class movement towards 1870 was Blanquism.



and military posts in West Africa and Indo-China. Expansion outwards from the latter under this was not resumed until the 1880s. By 1871, France was established as a World Power: all her possessions had been linked into a vast if not very popular system of direct or indirect rule was established over the world. Much of this expansion was in territory not previously controlled – there was no clash with German ambitions, the Moroccan question. But there were areas (West Africa) where France posed a direct challenge to British interests. In the 1890s, Britain seemed the main enemy rather than Germany. An alliance with Russia had strong anti-British implications. The Moroccan crisis in 1898 showed, colonial expansion was a game, but on the whole French and British policies were complementary, and unlike Germany France was not threatening to replace Britain as a world power by building up a great battle-fleet. The Franco-Prussian war liquidated the remaining colonial disputes, and the Triple Entente, created by Russia in 1907, provided security for France through this alliance. France seized every opportunity that offered itself for restoring her position and to have restored France to the first rank of world powers without seriously risking war or disturbing the balance of power, was a remarkable work of skill and determination on the part of those who directed French policy. France's colonial ambitions had necessarily been modest, and France's policy of 'recueillement' (recovery). The more zealous members of the Right wanted France to intervene to restore the temporal power, but this demand was firmly resisted by the Orleanist minister between 1873 and 1877. The danger of a civil war, especially at a time when Bismarck was in conflict with France, increased the unpopularity of the Right. The most significant contribution to France's national unity was the law of 1872 which moved towards the Prussian system of universal service. The traditional French system was selective: all were liable to be drawn, but those who were unable to serve had been able to buy substitutes. This proved to be a virtually professional army with few trained reserves. The law of 1872 demanded short but universal service as the basis of national defence, but the generals, supported by Thiers, claimed

that only long service could produce trained and disciplined men. The law of 1872 was a compromise: the annual 'contingent' was divided by lot into two parts, one serving for five years and the other for only a few months. Substitution was abolished, but inequalities remained through various exemptions, which being based on education mainly favoured the middle class. About 30 per cent escaped service; the Republicans were especially irritated by the exemption of seminarists, and continued to campaign for a more democratic system.<sup>2</sup> But the law of 1872 succeeded in creating numerical equivalence between the French and German armies.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, a general staff on Prussian lines began to evolve, and the construction began of a massive line of fortifications along the eastern frontier designed by General Séré de Rivières. These moves were enough to alarm Bismarck; the 'war-in-sight crisis' of 1875 was set off by a modification of the French military system, and seems to have been intended to force the French to abandon it. In fact, the sympathy shown by other Powers during this war scare increased French confidence, and France's participation in the Congress of Berlin in 1878 marked the re-establishment of her European status.

When the Republicans took over power, they chose to flex their muscles in the colonial rather than the continental field, and it is with Ferry that the beginnings of colonial expansion are associated. In his first ministry, he established the French protectorate over Tunisia (1881); in his second, he began a war in Madagascar which led on to a virtual protectorate in 1885, and extended French power in Indo-China from its base in Cochinchina to Cambodia, Annam and Tonkin, which involved a war with China successfully concluded in 1885. The temporary reverse at Lang Son, however, brought Ferry's political career to an end, and showed that the colonial cause was still far from popular. Conservatives condemned it as wasteful and dangerous, but the strongest opposition came from Clemenceau and the Left. Colonial expeditions were unpopular because they meant higher taxes and the death of conscript soldiers (a problem later avoided by creating a 'colonial army' of native troops and French volunteers). Ferry was also attacked for bypassing and deceiving Parliament: his technique, pioneered in the capture of Tunis and to be imitated later during the acquisition of Morocco, was to start with police operations or 'punitive' campaigns, and to appeal to the Chamber for credits only when things had gone so far that French prestige and honour would suffer from withdrawal.

The real charge against Ferry was the patriotic one that he was

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diverting French attention from the blue line of the Vosges and the task of *revanche*. He was accused of being a dupe of Bismarck, who was encouraging colonial adventures in order to weaken France and embroil her with potential allies like Britain and Italy. It was true that Bismarck was prepared to give France a free hand in the colonial field, and the French statesmen knew this. But Ferry was hardly lacking in patriotism, and he defended his policies vigorously in speeches and in a book published after he left office. Their significance lies in the stress put on economic motives for expansion, although this may not reflect the real balance of motives in Ferry's mind – when colonies were attacked for their cost, it was natural to emphasize the return they could bring.

Ferry's arguments gave pride of place to French industry's need for new and secure outlets for its products. Like others at the time, Ferry feared that the growth of protectionism in Europe would squeeze France out of her traditional markets, and create a crisis of over-production with grave social consequences. 'Colonial policy is the daughter of industrial policy . . . . The protective system is a steam engine without a safety-valve, if it does not have a sound and serious colonial policy as its corrective and auxiliary.'<sup>4</sup> It is easy to show that these fears were misplaced, and to demonstrate that France's colonies proved disappointing from an economic point of view – by 1914 they accounted for only 11 per cent of France's exports, 9 per cent of her imports and 9 per cent of her foreign investment;<sup>5</sup> but that does not prove that the economic motive was not a real one at the time.

It seems agreed, however, that Ferry's own initiatives were taken for political reasons rather than under pressure from economic interests. In Tunisia, the ruler was entangled in debts to French bondholders, and French companies competed with Italian ones for railway concessions, but the decisive motives were the need to pre-empt action by Italy and the desire to assert French prestige. The expedition went ahead when Gambetta was converted to support for it; 'France regains her rank as a great power', he wrote to Ferry, congratulating him on its success.<sup>6</sup> This theme was taken up by Ferry, speaking in 1885: colonization was the great European enterprise of the age, and if France stood aside while other countries acted she would be 'abdication' her position and would fall to the third or fourth rank among Powers.<sup>7</sup> As the colonial propagandist Leroy-Beaulieu wrote in 1882, colonization 'is the only great enterprise which destiny permits us. . . . Colonization is a question of life or death for France.'<sup>8</sup> Ferry and the colonialists were well aware that colonies were in a sense a 'compensa-

don', both material and psychological, for though it was an idea not to be publicly expressed who has argued against the economic interest as the fundamental cause of French colonial reaction to France's defeat.<sup>9</sup> Despite Ferry's requests which he made were retained, and he was generally regarded as a source of pride and 'civilizing mission'. The Radicals had forged the empire, and were among those who profited from it as honours or businessmen.<sup>10</sup> The Right too had with the values which it defended – it was, the Church and the army were contributing to it, although the empire was never at the centre as it was of British.

In 1885, the feeling that the Opportunists' flame of *revanche* was part of the general feeling which led to the Boulanger crisis, in which feeling was a significant element. Two incidents: in January 1887, Bismarck named an obstacle to friendly relations with France, the general's popularity; and in April 1887, an affair, when a French police agent was arrested, most serious war scare since 1875. These incidents were connected with the Reichstag election and Bismarck's passing of a new army law. In France, the military reform of 1889, which abolished exemption for the *curés*) and the division of the conscription now for one year or for three, the main vice being educational, so that the middle class. This law was the work of Freycinet, and an important improvement in the army's composition.

The dismissal of Bismarck did much for Germany, and opened the way for the Franco-German alliance. The alliance had always made geopolitical considerations both of the French Left, who were of Alexander III, who detested Republics, and agitation of the Boulanger type might deter a German war. On the French side, the main were revanchist journalists like Juliette (Gambetta), the military, who could see the many to fight on two fronts, and financiers



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However, that Ferry's own initiatives were taken for er than under pressure from economic interests. was entangled in debts to French bondholders, ies competed with Italian ones for railway con- sive motives were the need to pre-empt action by to assert French prestige. The expedition went ta was converted to support for it; 'France regains power', he wrote to Ferry, congratulating him on s scheme was taken up by Ferry, speaking in 1885: e great European enterprise of the age, and if s while other countries acted she would be 'abdicat- d would fall to the third or fourth rank among onial propagandist Leroy-Beaulieu wrote in 1882, only great enterprise which destiny permits us. . . . sion of life or death for France.'<sup>8</sup> Ferry and the ll aware that colonies were in a sense a 'compens-

tion', both material and psychological, for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, though it was an idea not to be publicly expressed. Brunshwig, indeed, who has argued against the economic interpretation of colonialism, sees the fundamental cause of French colonial expansion in nationalist reaction to France's defeat.<sup>9</sup> Despite Ferry's unpopularity, the conquests which he made were retained, and by 1900 France's empire was generally regarded as a source of pride and justified by reference to its 'civilizing mission'. The Radicals had forgotten their opposition to the empire, and were among those who profited from it as colonial governors or businessmen.<sup>10</sup> The Right too had come to identify the empire with the values which it defended – it was, after all, the scene where the Church and the army were contributing most to France's glory – although the empire was never at the centre of French national feeling as it was of British.

In 1885, the feeling that the Opportunists were failing to tend the flame of *revanche* was part of the general disillusion with their rule which led to the Boulanger crisis, in which the revival of anti-German feeling was a significant element. Two incidents had their place in the episode: in January 1887, Bismarck named Boulanger as the main obstacle to friendly relations with France, which greatly increased the general's popularity; and in April 1887 there was the Schnaebelé affair, when a French police agent was arrested on the frontier – the most serious war scare since 1875. These incidents were not unconnected with the Reichstag election and Bismarck's desire to secure the passing of a new army law. In France, the war scare contributed to the military reform of 1889, which abolished exemptions from service (even for the *curés*) and the division of the contingent by lot; service was now for one year or for three, the main criterion for short service being educational, so that the middle class were still privileged. This law was the work of Freycinet, who also carried out some important improvements in the army's command structure.<sup>11</sup>

The dismissal of Bismarck did much to relieve French fears of Germany, and opened the way for the Franco-Russian alliance. This alliance had always made geopolitical sense, but went against the inclinations both of the French Left, who were hostile to autocracy, and of Alexander III, who detested Republics and feared that chauvinist agitation of the Boulanger type might drag Russia into a Franco-German war. On the French side, the main proponents of the alliance were revanchist journalists like Juliette Adam (former mentor of Gambetta), the military, who could see the advantage of forcing Germany to fight on two fronts, and financiers who saw Russia as a fruitful



field for investment – the first Russian loan was raised in Paris in 1888. The downfall of Boulanger and the stable government of Freycinet in 1890–2 reassured Alexander III, and a move towards closer relations began. In 1891, a French naval squadron visited Kronstadt, and an informal political entente followed. In 1892, the military convention which was the kernel of the alliance was signed for the French by General Boisdeffre. Under its terms, which were of course secret, each country would help the other if attacked by Germany, with or without her Triple Alliance partners, and each would mobilize in any case as soon as any of the Triple Alliance powers did so; the convention was to last as long as the Triple Alliance itself.<sup>12</sup> The alliance was finally ratified by an exchange of letters in December–January 1893–4.

The alliance gave France both military and emotional security – the importance of the latter was shown by the scenes when Russian sailors visited Toulon in 1893, and during the subsequent State visits of Nicholas II. The Republicans swallowed their objections to tyranny, and criticism of Russia became an unpatriotic act. The middle class demonstrated their enthusiasm in a practical way by investing in Russian State and railway bonds. By 1914, a quarter of all French foreign investment was in Russia, and was to be lost in 1917. The French government tried to tie these loans to the purchase of French arms (Schneider was now becoming one of the great European arms firms, renowned for the quality of its armour plate) and to the construction of strategic railways. After Fashoda, for example, one loan was earmarked for the Orenburg–Tashkent railway, to threaten the British in India, and later the French encouraged railway-building which would speed up mobilization against Germany. French firms came to play a large part in the industrialization of Russia, and recent research has stressed that French investment was ‘entrepreneurial’ as well as ‘rentier’ in character.<sup>13</sup>

In the 1890s, the implications of the alliance seemed as much anti-British as anti-German, as France’s colonial expansion brought her into conflict with Britain in several parts of the world. This rivalry was embittered by the Egyptian question. France had traditionally co-operated with Britain in expanding European interests in Egypt and exploiting its rulers’ indebtedness, but in the crisis of 1882 caused by nationalist agitation she had refused to join Britain in the bombardment of Alexandria and the subsequent military occupation. Gambetta had been willing to participate, but neither his successor Freycinet nor Parliament were prepared to take the risk of acting against Bismarck’s disapproval. Once British rule was established, however, it was

resented by the French, and the Quai d’Orsay could complain that French interests in Egypt were threatened and to demand the end of the British occupation.

Conflict also arose in Asia, as the French expanded eastwards from Indo-China over Laos, and east of Siam which Britain wished to preserve as an independent country. France forced various concessions on Siam through diplomacy, causing a confrontation with Britain which was not settled until 1896. Other French advances in this period included serious fighting in 1895–6 and to guerrilla resistance gradually suppressed by General Galliéni, and in the east against serious local resistance – the armistice eastwards from Senegal, linked the French coast with the interior, established a Saharan frontier with Britain. In the mid-1890s created a single West African domain. The challenge to Britain, however, came from the Congo, which had been established by the explorer Brazza in 1880. He pushed north towards Lake Chad, the colonial idea of beating the British to control of the upper Nile. A barrier across Africa from east to west. The French *franaise* was very active in sponsoring and gaining the Marchand expedition, which reached Fashoda in July 1898; Kitchener appeared soon afterwards and withdrew. Despite strong nationalist agitation, the French government had no choice but to accept that Britain and France shared the Sudan between them. Preparation for the crisis had been inadequate: an international conference on Britain which would have raised the question, but support was not forthcoming even from Germany.

The foreign minister at the time of Fashoda was Delcassé, who just succeeded the more cautious Hanotaux; he remained in office until 1905 and did more than most ministers to shape the orientation of policy. Delcassé is best remembered for his *entente cordiale*, but he was not originally pro-Britain. A member of the colonial party, and had encountered a challenge on the Nile when himself colonial minister. Fashoda for the colonial party was that there was no challenge to Britain, and the idea arose of a bargain with Morocco. Delcassé’s policies were directed towards Morocco and to strengthening France’s position in the Mediterranean.



first Russian loan was raised in Paris in 1888. Bismarck and the stable government of Freycinet in 1890, and a move towards closer relations with the navy, a naval squadron visited Kronstadt, and an alliance followed. In 1892, the military convention of the alliance was signed for the French by Bismarck, and its terms, which were of course secret, each promised to assist the other if attacked by Germany, with or without the other powers, and each would mobilize in any case as the Alliance powers did so; the convention was the Triple Alliance itself.<sup>12</sup> The alliance was finally confirmed by letters in December-January 1893-4. It gave France both military and emotional security – this was shown by the scenes when Russian sailors were welcomed, and during the subsequent State visits of the Tsar, when the Russians swallowed their objections to tyranny, and became an unpatriotic act. The middle class enthusiasm in a practical way by investing in railway bonds. By 1914, a quarter of all French capital was in Russia, and was to be lost in 1917. The alliance tied these loans to the purchase of French arms (the quality of its armour plate) and to the construction of railways. After Fashoda, for example, one loan was for the Orenburg-Tashkent railway, to threaten the British. Later the French encouraged railway-building for mobilization against Germany. French firms participated in the industrialization of Russia, and recent French investment was 'entrepreneurial' as Bismarck's.

Implications of the alliance seemed as much anti-British as France's colonial expansion brought her into conflict with Britain in several parts of the world. This rivalry was evident in the Egyptian question. France had traditionally been in competition with Britain in expanding European interests in Egypt and the Sudan, but in the crisis of 1882 caused by British refusal to join Britain in the bombardment of Alexandria and the subsequent military occupation. Gambetta refused to participate, but neither his successor Freycinet nor Bismarck took the risk of acting against Bismarck's policy. British rule was established, however, it was

resented by the French, and the Quai d'Orsay continued until 1904 to complain that French interests in Egypt were being unfairly treated, and to demand the end of the British occupation.

Conflict also arose in Asia, as the French extended their rule westwards from Indo-China over Laos, and cast eyes on Siam, which Britain wished to preserve as an independent buffer State. In 1893, France forced various concessions on Siam through gunboat diplomacy, causing a confrontation with Britain which was not resolved until 1896. Other French advances in this period were in Madagascar, where determination to turn the protectorate into a colony led to serious fighting in 1895-6 and to guerrilla resistance which was only gradually suppressed by General Galliéni, and in West Africa, where – also against serious local resistance – the army pushed the frontier eastwards from Senegal, linked the French coastal settlements with the interior, established a Saharan frontier with Algeria, and so by the mid-1890s created a single West African domain. The greatest challenge to Britain, however, came from the Congo, where the French colony had been established by the explorer Brazza in 1879-82. As the French pushed north towards Lake Chad, the colonial party conceived the idea of beating the British to control of the upper Nile, and establishing a barrier across Africa from east to west. The *Comité de l'Afrique française* was very active in sponsoring and gaining official approval for the Marchand expedition, which reached Fashoda from the Congo in July 1898; Kitchener appeared soon afterwards, and demanded its withdrawal. Despite strong nationalist agitation and anti-British feeling, the French government had no choice but to back down, and Britain and France shared the Sudan between them. French diplomatic preparation for the crisis had been inadequate: the idea was to force an international conference on Britain which would reopen the Egyptian question, but support was not forthcoming even from Russia.

The foreign minister at the time of Fashoda was Delcassé, who had just succeeded the more cautious Hanotaux; he was to stay in office until 1905 and do more than most ministers to bring about a reorientation of policy. Delcassé is best remembered as the architect of the *entente cordiale*, but he was not originally pro-British – he was a leading member of the colonial party, and had encouraged the idea of a challenge on the Nile when himself colonial minister. But the lesson of Fashoda for the colonial party was that there was little future in challenging Britain, and the idea arose of a bargain involving Egypt and Morocco. Delcassé's policies were directed towards a French takeover of Morocco and to strengthening France's position against Germany.



In 1899, he secured a revision of the Franco-Russian alliance which tied it less narrowly to the Triple Alliance, and in 1902 Italy gave a secret assurance that her membership of the Triple Alliance was not directed against France. Support for French action in Morocco was promised by Italy in 1900 (in return for a free hand in Libya) and by Spain in 1904. The entente with Britain was a late development, and was not helped by the pro-Boer attitude of French opinion in the Boer war. But the visit to Paris in 1903 of Edward VII (whose influence on policy the French were inclined to overestimate) paved the way for the Franco-British entente of 1904. This was not an alliance, but a settlement of old disputes, and Britain promised support over Morocco in return for French acceptance of the British presence in Egypt.

Rival French financial groups were already active in Morocco, Eugène Etienne formed a special *Comité du Maroc* to supervise the operation, and General Lyautey began a policy of 'peaceful penetration' by military incursions across the Algerian frontier. These initiatives sometimes had to be restrained by Delcassé, and in general the pressure of economic interests was subordinated to political aims. Delcassé did not make any attempt to conciliate German interests, and believed that his diplomatic preparations would allow France to defy German opposition. In March 1905, the German intervention came, with William II's visit to Tangier. In the subsequent crisis, France was forced to agree to an international conference, and the prime minister Rouvier dismissed Delcassé. This might seem a humiliation, but opinion was generally against Delcassé, who was felt to have taken unnecessary risks and subordinated French policy to the interests of the colonial clique. The Moroccan affair had come to a head at a time of weakness for France, with the army demoralized after the Dreyfus affair and the 'affaire des fiches', and Russia in chaos; when the Tsar met William II at Björkö in July 1905 it seemed that the alliance itself might be crumbling. In the event, however, the Algeciras conference was a success for France: thanks to the support of her allies, she gained the essential footholds in Morocco (control of the ports and finances), and the German design of intimidating France into abandoning the *entente cordiale* failed.

The first Moroccan crisis was notable for the lack of bellicose feelings in France. The Left was now in power, and although the anti-militarism of Socialists and syndicalists had little influence at government level, the Radicals also had a strong internationalist wing, as was shown by the leading role of Léon Bourgeois in the Hague conferences

of 1899 and 1907. The Radicals were responsible for the 1905 law, which reduced service to two years: the same length for all conscripts – a reduction in the military, but was undoubtedly popular. He appeared on the Left, and in his *L'Œuvre* proposed a citizen militia on Swiss lines: to break down the barrier between the officer class and the ranks – officers were to be educated at the universities – but he also argued that the abolition of general staffs would make aggressive war impossible. It was also Jaurès who led the Left's attack on the 1905 law, which he denounced as a threat to the Republic, a example to other Powers. Until then the law had been largely ignored by Socialists, but colonialism was attacked on humanitarian grounds and as a means of economic exploitation. The anti-colonial case was strengthened by colonial scandals which surfaced in 1905, the Goko Sangha affair, in which a Congolese chief the Congo tried to obtain a huge indemnity for damage supposedly caused by C.

Morocco remained a potential flash-point. Germany determined to establish full control of the Moroccan coast to suppress dissensions and internal disorder, while France had a great interest in the question, despite an agreement of 1904 to limit exploitation in 1909. In 1911, the second Moroccan crisis, sent an expedition to Fez which was opposed by Germany. However, and the German gunboat *Panther* appeared in the straits. After the lengthy negotiations which followed, France secured her protectorate over Morocco (formally recognized in 1912) in return for the cession of part of the French Congo, against significant French opposition by the Left.

Now that Germany had been 'compelled' to accept the new relations could return to normal. In fact, however, the rise of intensified national feeling in France, and the opinion became convinced that German aggression was inevitable. The election of Poincaré as president and the 1912 election were among the consequences of this new situation. That Franco-German relations had become more normal in domestic politics, with Poincaré and Clemenceau, Caillaux and Jaurès at the head of the coalition, was a victory for the latter, and if international relations were to be improved, it was a victory for the latter, and if international



vision of the Franco-Russian alliance which the Triple Alliance, and in 1902 Italy gave a membership of the Triple Alliance was not support for French action in Morocco was (in return for a free hand in Libya) and by the with Britain was a late development, and the Boer attitude of French opinion in the Boer war in 1903 of Edward VII (whose influence on Delcassé inclined to overestimate) paved the way for the crisis of 1904. This was not an alliance, but a tacit understanding, and Britain promised support over French acceptance of the British presence in

groups were already active in Morocco, a special *Comité du Maroc* to supervise the French policy began a policy of 'peaceful penetration' across the Algerian frontier. These initiatives were restrained by Delcassé, and in general the French interest was subordinated to political aims. The French attempt to conciliate German interests, and the military preparations would allow France to defy Germany. In March 1905, the German intervention came, at Tangier. In the subsequent crisis, France called an international conference, and the prime minister was Delcassé. This might seem a humiliation, but against Delcassé, who was felt to have taken French policy to the interests of Morocco. The Moroccan affair had come to a head at a time when the army was demoralized after the Dreyfus affair, and Russia in chaos; when the Tsar died in July 1905 it seemed that the alliance itself was in jeopardy. However, the Algeiras conference, thanks to the support of her allies, she gained control of Morocco (control of the ports and finances), and prevented Germany from intimidating France into abandoning the

The crisis was notable for the lack of bellicose feelings. Germany was now in power, and although the anti-militarist syndicalists had little influence at government, there was a strong internationalist wing, as was shown by Léon Bourgeois in the Hague conference

of 1899 and 1907. The Radicals were responsible for the army law of 1905, which reduced service to two years and for the first time made it the same length for all conscripts – a reduction which was opposed by the military, but was undoubtedly popular. More radical military ideas also appeared on the Left, and in his *L'Armée nouvelle* of 1911 Jaurès proposed a citizen militia on Swiss lines: one of his aims was to break down the barrier between the officer class and the rest of the nation – officers were to be educated at the universities instead of at special schools – but he also argued that the abolition of standing armies and general staffs would make aggressive war impossible.

It was also Jaurès who led the Left's attack on the Moroccan enterprise, which he denounced as a threat to European peace, and a bad example to other Powers. Until then the colonial question had been largely ignored by Socialists, but colonialism was now attacked both on humanitarian grounds and as a menacing extension of capitalist exploitation. The anti-colonial case was strengthened by the unsavoury colonial scandals which surfaced from time to time, like the N'Goko Sangha affair, in which a company with a concession in the Congo tried to obtain a huge indemnity from the French government for damage supposedly caused by German incursions.

Morocco remained a potential flashpoint, for the French were determined to establish full control of the country by exploiting tribal dissensions and internal disorder, while Germany refused to drop her interest in the question, despite an agreement on joint commercial exploitation in 1909. In 1911, the second crisis began when the French sent an expedition to Fez which was obviously the prelude to a takeover, and the German gunboat *Panther* appeared at Agadir. At the end of the lengthy negotiations which followed, Germany recognized the French protectorate over Morocco (formally established in 1912) in return for the cession of part of the French Congo, a sacrifice imposed against significant French opposition by the pacific Caillaux.

Now that Germany had been 'compensated', it might seem that relations could return to normal. In fact, the 1911 crisis led to a period of intensified national feeling in France, in which a large segment of opinion became convinced that Germany was preparing war. The election of Poincaré as president and the passage of the three-year law were among the consequences of this new mood, and they showed also that Franco-German relations had become a major question in domestic politics, with Poincaré and Clemenceau among the hard-liners and Caillaux and Jaurès at the head of the conciliators. The 1914 election was a victory for the latter, and if international tension had relaxed it is



unlikely that the three-year law would have lasted long. But it was impossible for France to avoid involvement in the crisis of 1914, and once Russia was at war with Germany the provisions of the 1892 convention came into force (though it was concealed from French opinion that Russia had mobilized first). Because of the requirements of the Schlieffen plan, Germany declared war on France rather than vice versa, so that no debate on the issue was held in the French Parliament. The mood of patriotic exaltation in which the 'sacred union' was formed does not suggest that any force in France could have resisted the tide of war.

Historical debate over the origins of the First World War has recently revived, and the way in which German policy and German domestic tensions pointed to war has become clear. Nobody would now claim, as did German propagandists between the wars, that French 'revanchism' was a cause of war. The extreme nationalism of the *Action française* movement, which was in any case directed against other Frenchmen as much as against Germany, was not representative of opinion as a whole, and had no influence in governing circles. The French political system, for all its faults, placed power in the hands of moderate and responsible men, who were prepared to ignore pressure-groups like the colonial party and to sacrifice their colleagues (like Delcassé in 1905) if a real danger of war appeared, just as in the last resort it was Parliament and the civilians who controlled France's military plans. Nevertheless, the mood did change in France in the years before the war, and her policies raise a number of interesting questions.

France was a formidable military Power, and one historian speaks of the 'aggressive confidence of the French General Staff' in these years.<sup>14</sup> Before the three-year law, the French had an active army of 524,000 compared with Germany's 645,000.<sup>15</sup> But this near-equality was maintained only through considerable sacrifices: the proportion of the budget spent on the armed forces rose from a quarter in 1872 to 36 per cent in 1913, and manpower resources were stretched to the limit, since France called up 83 per cent of those liable for military service, while Germany could get by with 53 per cent.<sup>16</sup> The population question was causing great concern on the eve of the war, and the French were looking to the empire to compensate for their own inferiority - conscription was extended to the native population of Algeria in 1912. The additional strain of the three-year law was therefore hardly welcomed in France, and was accepted only because of the German army laws of 1912 and 1913, which raised the German forces to over 800,000;

France was able to keep up only by lowering two 'classes' of conscripts were called up in

The French generals also wanted long-trained soldiers were suited to the aggressive strategy of Colonel Grandmaison, which was stressed the importance of taking the initiative and the need to maintain high morale and spirit and putting the emphasis on attack. This was disastrous in the conditions of trench warfare. Joffre as Chief of the General Staff in 1911 was an offensive school, and the war plan prepared in 1914 ('Plan XVII') included provisions in Lorraine, to provoke a decisive battle. His predecessor Michel had had a more defensive provision for a German attack through Alsace. Joffre had failed to find out about the details of the German plan, and his own French war plans were concerned with attack, and there was no thought of invasion. The point about Joffre's appointment was the change of the command structure which for the first time gave the army a single commander, so that Joffre's plan was conceived within a fundamental unity. This was a sign that the army's prestige had risen, and that the politicians were preparing to take more policies autonomously.<sup>17</sup>

French naval power was a good deal less than British, and opinion took little interest in it, and Germany did not pose a direct threat to France. In the late 19th century the naval Power, but in 1914 she had only a small modern class. This was partly because of the expense of building torpedo-boats and submarines, and partly because of the doctrines of Admiral Aube in the 1880s. Aube had argued that France's naval policy should be directed against Britain directly, but to be able to break the German blockade of commerce with cruisers. The inability of the French navy to compete with Britain had, however, become apparent, and the navy became a byword for neglect. A series of explosions and sinkings in the 1900s led to a series of parliamentary enquiries, and the navy reached its present position under the naval minister, the sectarian Radical Camille Dreyfus, who sought to reform the officer corps by fraternizing with the d



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France was able to keep up only by lowering the recruiting age, so that  
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The French generals also wanted longer service because only well-  
 trained soldiers were suited to the aggressive tactical doctrine, associ-  
 ated with Colonel Grandmaison, which was now accepted as orthodoxy.  
 This stressed the importance of taking the initiative in warfare,  
 and the need to maintain high morale by cultivating the offensive  
 spirit and putting the emphasis on attack – an idea that was to prove  
 disastrous in the conditions of trench warfare. The appointment of  
 Joffre as Chief of the General Staff in 1911 was a victory for the  
 offensive school, and the war plan prepared by Joffre which was in  
 force in 1914 ('Plan XVII') included provision for a French offensive  
 in Lorraine, to provoke a decisive battle at an early stage. Joffre's  
 predecessor Michel had had a more defensive plan, and had also made  
 more provision for a German attack through Belgium – though the  
 French had failed to find out about the Schlieffen plan. But even  
 Joffre's plan was conceived within a fundamentally defensive strategy:  
 all French war plans were concerned with how to respond to a German  
 attack, and there was no thought of invading Germany. An additional  
 point about Joffre's appointment was that it coincided with a reform  
 of the command structure which for the first time gave the peacetime  
 army a single commander, so that Joffre had unprecedented power:  
 this was a sign that the army's prestige had recovered from the Dreyfus  
 affair, and that the politicians were prepared to trust it to devise its  
 policies autonomously.<sup>17</sup>

French naval power was a good deal less impressive, for public  
 opinion took little interest in it, and Germany's naval expansion did  
 not pose a direct threat to France. In the 1870s, France was the second  
 naval Power, but in 1914 she had only two Dreadnoughts of the most  
 modern class. This was partly because energies were diverted instead  
 into building torpedo-boats and submarines, an emphasis which went  
 back to the doctrines of Admiral Aube and the 'jeune école' in the  
 1880s. Aube had argued that France's need was not to challenge  
 Britain directly, but to be able to break a British blockade and raid  
 commerce with cruisers. The inability of the navy to protect France  
 from Britain had, however, become apparent at the time of Fashoda,  
 and the navy became a byword for neglect and maladministration; a  
 series of explosions and sinkings in the 1900s gave rise to several parlia-  
 mentary enquiries, and the navy reached its nadir under Combes's  
 naval minister, the sectarian Radical Camille Pelletan, who offended the  
 officer corps by fraternizing with the dockyard workers and naming



battleships *Justice* and *Vérité* to underline the triumph of the Dreyfusards. Matters only really improved when Delcassé returned to office as minister of marine, and initiated a large-scale building programme in 1912.

The *entente cordiale* allowed the French navy to concentrate its efforts in the Mediterranean, and this arrangement was formalized in the Franco-British naval agreement of 1913. On the military side, regular staff talks had been taking place since 1906, and it was agreed that in the event of war Britain would send an expeditionary force to the continent (though this was given only marginal significance in the French military plans). Britain was not formally committed, of course, to aiding France if war came; the veiled assurances of Grey's letter to Cambon in November 1912 were the most that could be extracted, but the assumption that Britain would in fact intervene was one of the bases of French policy-making.

One of the arguments against the 'alliance system' is that it encouraged rash actions inspired by overconfidence – France was bolder in Morocco, for example, than she could have been without British support. The main charge made against France by 'revisionist' historians after the First World War was that French support encouraged Russia's ambitions in the Balkans, and that under the influence of Poincaré Russia was given *carte blanche* in much the same way as Austria was by Germany. Poincaré certainly worked to strengthen the Franco-Russian alliance, and visited St Petersburg as prime minister in 1912 and as president; he and Viviani were there in July 1914, and the advice they then gave cannot be known. Poincaré felt unable to restrain Russia's forward policy in the Balkans (as France had restrained Russia during the 1908–9 Bosnian crisis), but it is probably going too far to accuse him of encouraging it or of wanting a general war. He felt obliged to support Russia because the alliance was France's chief defence against the growing German menace, and like other European statesmen he acted on the assumption that peace was preserved by the balance of power, so that to weaken the alliance would be catastrophic. In critical situations, this meant accepting the risk of war – in Poincaré's own words, 'France must give the impression of a Nation which does not want war, but does not fear it.'<sup>18</sup> It seems fair also to say that Poincaré did nothing positively to avert war, and that he allowed himself to hope that a war would be short and successful and would lead at last to the return of Alsace and Lorraine.<sup>19</sup>

The case against Poincaré was put most strongly in the memoirs of the 'pacifist' Caillaux, who was imprisoned during the war for his

supposedly pro-German tendencies. Severe contrast between the traditional Clemenceau, who saw Germany as the chance to strike again, and the capitalist international banker with close German links forward to a Europe in which frontier economic co-operation.<sup>20</sup> In the style of *Illusion*, Caillaux argued that war did not damage European civilization.<sup>21</sup>

The tendencies represented by Caillaux. German capital had already penetrated France itself, especially through German resources. Both Socialists and extreme nationalists had influence, and in the years after the war German firms and German goods were supported by the government into action.<sup>22</sup> Outside France, German capital interpenetrated. Krupp and Schenck & Co. Ouenza mining company, formed to exploit both Moroccan and German companies freely in both Morocco and the Balkans; often in the Quai d'Orsay which forced barriers into breaking these links and acting more especially the case in the Balkans, where German companies competed fiercely to outdo warring nations, and to build up rival spheres of French capital was used in the service of France and scored some notable successes in Serbia and Greece, and challenging Germany. Even in Turkey itself, France secured an agreement which put German interests on the defensive.

If imperialist rivalries are to be seen as the Balkans that they must be sought, for French and German economic interests were also a field where the French were successful so that the Germans might complain of French policy, however, had little foundation. Since 1871, France had done nothing considered legitimate for any great power. Germany with the Franco-Russian alliance threatened by the German-dominated power and if she had prepared for war against



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supposedly pro-German tendencies. Several historians have pointed out the contrast between the traditional nationalism of Poincaré and Clemenceau, who saw Germany as the hereditary enemy waiting her chance to strike again, and the capitalist internationalism of Caillaux, an international banker with close German connections, who looked forward to a Europe in which frontiers would disappear through economic co-operation.<sup>20</sup> In the style of Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion*, Caillaux argued that war did not pay, and that it would fatally damage European civilization.<sup>21</sup>

The tendencies represented by Caillaux were powerful ones, and German capital had already penetrated to a considerable extent in France itself, especially through German ownership of French iron-ore resources. Both Socialists and extreme nationalists attacked this German influence, and in the years after 1911 the campaigns against German firms and German goods were significant enough to force the government into action.<sup>22</sup> Outside France, too, French and German capital interpenetrated. Krupp and Schneider both participated in the Ouenza mining company, formed to exploit the orefields of Algeria, and French and German companies frequently formed consortia in both Morocco and the Balkans; often it was only political pressure from the Quai d'Orsay which forced banks and industrial companies into breaking these links and acting more nationalistically.<sup>23</sup> This was especially the case in the Balkans, where after about 1910 French and German companies competed fiercely to supply arms and loans to the warring nations, and to build up rival spheres of influence. The power of French capital was used in the service of the Franco-Russian alliance, and France scored some notable successes, becoming the chief supplier of Serbia and Greece, and challenging Germany strongly in Bulgaria. Even in Turkey itself, France secured an important agreement in 1914 which put German interests on the defensive.<sup>24</sup>

If imperialist rivalries are to be seen as the cause of the war, it is in the Balkans that they must be sought, for it was the only field where French and German economic interests were in conflict in 1914. It was also a field where the French were successfully challenging Germany, so that the Germans might complain of 'encirclement'. These complaints, however, had little foundation. In her foreign and colonial policy since 1871, France had done no more than exercise the rights considered legitimate for any great power. If she had 'encircled' Germany with the Franco-Russian alliance, it was because she felt threatened by the German-dominated power block in central Europe, and if she had prepared for war against Germany in the years before



1914 it was because of the deep mistrust aroused by that country's policies. What was new about the last years was perhaps that France had a new-found confidence which made her prepared to confront Germany rather than back down before threats. But as in other countries, the sense of confidence and the sense of insecurity existed uneasily together, and French statesmen were no more able than others to escape from the situation created by the independent pursuit of national interests.

## Conclusion

It is difficult to assess the strengths of the Third Republic in this period without being reminded of the inter-war period and the collapse of the system. It is pointed out, if the Third Republic had been considered a glorious episode in French history, the First World War was to have profound effects on France. The political – especially perhaps in destroying the system's openness to change – and it is far from clear that the changes which appeared later were implicit in the situation. However, the weaknesses, however, were undoubtedly latent, and the system which were tolerable before 1914 were made harsher economic and international conditions.

One of these was the Republic's 'mistrust' of the military, this was offset by certain elements of conservatism. On the other aspect of Cabinet changes, and the power of the President to work against effective government and the role of the parliamentaries often sought a remedy in different constitutional arrangements, but it seems clear to the modern observer that the cause of instability was the absence of a strong central government. The government was most stable during the period of the coalitions returned in the years before 1914. It is true that France was moving towards a new section of different sets of values made up of different groups. One can hardly claim that such a system was a failure of democracy. The British observer B. H. Liddell Hart, a plebiscitary government would work in France. The British observer of the centralized State, saw the failure of the party system as 'a sure sign of the failure of the government',<sup>1</sup> though in fact by 1914 it was not.

The strength of ideological division within the Third Republic. As has frequently been pointed out, the



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## Conclusion

It is difficult to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Third Republic in this period without being influenced by the events of the inter-war period and the collapse of the regime in 1940. But as Siegfried pointed out, if the Third Republic had ended in 1918 it would have been considered a glorious episode in French history.<sup>1</sup> The First World War was to have profound effects on France, both material and psychological – especially perhaps in destroying her self-confidence and receptiveness to change – and it is far from clear that the weaknesses which appeared later were implicit in the situation in 1914. Some of them, however, were undoubtedly latent, and some features of the political system which were tolerable before 1914 were to prove deficient in the harsher economic and international climate of the inter-war years.

One of these was the Republic's 'ministerial instability'. Although this was offset by certain elements of continuity – the 'musical chairs' aspect of Cabinet changes, and the power of the bureaucracy – it did work against effective government and political initiatives. Contemporaries often sought a remedy in different constitutional or electoral arrangements, but it seems clear to the historian that the fundamental cause of instability was the absence of a strong party system. Government was most stable during the period of the Bloc, but centre-based coalitions returned in the years before 1914, and there was no indication that France was moving towards a two-party system. The intersection of different sets of values made this unlikely, and in any case one can hardly claim that such a system is a necessary adjunct of a democracy. The British observer Bodley, who thought that only plebiscitary government would work in France because of the strength of the centralized State, saw the failure of the French to develop a party system as 'a sure sign of their incapacity for parliamentary government',<sup>2</sup> though in fact by 1914 party organization was growing.

The strength of ideological division was arguably another weakness of the Third Republic. As has frequently been pointed out, there has



never been complete consensus about the form of government in modern France, and throughout the life of the Third Republic there were those on both wings of politics who stood outside the system. But by 1914, it would seem that consensus was more general than it ever had been before, or than it was to be after the war, with the rise of Communism and the growth of the nationalist and near-fascist Right. The nucleus of an anti-parliamentary Right existed in 1914, but the progressive *ralliement* of the traditional Right had left only a handful opposed to the Republic itself, and even they accepted constitutional methods. On the Left, the rejection of 'bourgeois' democracy by Socialists and revolutionary syndicalists seemed more extensive, but it is questionable how far a genuine revolutionary impulse survived. Revolutionary syndicalism seems to have been on the decline after 1910, and the success of the SFIO in the 1914 election would probably have led it further along the parliamentary path. The crisis of 1914 revealed the underlying national unity of France, as patriotism overcame the doubts of the Right about democracy and loyalty to democratic ideals overcame the doubts of the Left about bourgeois society. France's experience in the First World War was on the whole to vindicate the democratic system, and to show that popular attachment to the Republic was deep. Despite the occasional dismaying scandals and the disillusion with parliamentarism, most Frenchmen in 1914 seem to have approved of the regime under which they lived and of the leadership which it provided – something which could not be said of all European countries.

It is in any case easy for historians to exaggerate the extent of ideological conflict at this time – especially perhaps if they are not French, so that it is difficult for them to appreciate the instinctive values and experiences which all Frenchmen shared, or if they write the kind of intellectual or literary history which divorces ideas from the men who held them. This is not to deny that the conflict of ideals was real. Indeed, it gave the politics of the Third Republic much of their dignity and interest. Politics were often selfish and sordid, but all parties retained an essentially ethical approach to political life, and acted in the name of democracy, religious faith, patriotism or social justice. Parliamentary debates, in this age of great orators, often reached a remarkably high level of seriousness and generality.

Parliament remained at the centre of the political system. From a functional point of view, it was quite efficient at acting as a forum for interests and distributing benefits, although it has been argued that the weakness of its interest articulation and aggregation structures (i.e.

pressure-groups and parties) was one reason. Another weakness was that those who did not play the parliamentary game: the power of the Right meant that satisfaction of legitimate interests which it represented, not the paucity of social reforms showed the ineffective pressures. The Left, however, remained out of cultivation of class separatism than through. Liberal leaders were only too anxious to absorb and let them taste the fruits of power. One question about France in 1914 is whether the system had been integrated into the system, and whether it came about without revolution through a liberal and Socialist ideals of democracy. The Radical party whose ideas and supporters of Socialists was an element which favoured the parliamentary system that it was flexible shifts in the balance of social power – as it had peaceful yielding of power by the notable

One thing which kept conflict within tolerable limits did not have to cope at the same time with the confrontation of modern societies.<sup>4</sup> The upheavals of modernization had already modernized society in certain stresses of industrialization could be absorbed, while the question of formal popular participation through universal suffrage was not yet remained two main forms of conflict – the religious ideals, involving rival systems of religious and class-based conflict over the distribution of power. The latter gradually became more important. Historians like Thomson have seen 1905 as a turning point: with the liquidation of the religious Church and State, 'dynastic, ecclesiastical issues' replaced by social and economic issues.<sup>5</sup> Social issues were hardly unknown in the 18th century, the Commune, while the old questions remained essential ones down to 1940.

Thomson's basic point, however, with which I agree, was that the rise of a more social consciousness, the substitution of a wage-earning proletariat for 'masses', disrupted the social balance



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pressure-groups and parties) was one reason for French 'immobilism'.<sup>3</sup>  
Another weakness was that those who did not share fully in power  
could not play the parliamentary game: the permanent exclusion from  
power of the Right meant that satisfaction could not be gained for the  
legitimate interests which it represented, notably the Church, and the  
paucity of social reforms showed the ineffectiveness of working-class  
pressures. The Left, however, remained outside more through its own  
cultivation of class separatism than through exclusion, for many Repub-  
lican leaders were only too anxious to absorb Socialists into the system  
and let them taste the fruits of power. One of the unanswerable ques-  
tions about France in 1914 is whether the Socialist party could have  
been integrated into the system, and whether Socialism could have  
come about without revolution through a Jaurèsian synthesis of the  
liberal and Socialist ideals of democracy. The existence of a powerful  
Radical party whose ideas and supporters overlapped with those of the  
Socialists was an element which favoured this, and it was a virtue of  
the parliamentary system that it was flexible enough to accommodate  
shifts in the balance of social power – as it had allowed the reluctant but  
peaceful yielding of power by the notables in the 1870s.

One thing which kept conflict within tolerable limits was that France  
did not have to cope at the same time with all the problems which  
confront modern societies.<sup>4</sup> The upheavals following the Revolution  
had already modernized society in certain crucial ways, so that the  
stresses of industrialization could be absorbed without excessive dis-  
ruption, while the question of formal popular participation in govern-  
ment through universal suffrage was resolved before 1870. There  
remained two main forms of conflict – that between the secular and  
religious ideals, involving rival systems of moral and social values,  
and class-based conflict over the distribution of the national wealth.  
The latter gradually became more important than the former, and his-  
torians like Thomson have seen 1905 as the 'watershed' of the Repub-  
lic: with the liquidation of the religious question by the Separation of  
Church and State, 'dynastic, ecclesiastical and militarist issues were  
replaced by social and economic issues.'<sup>5</sup> This is perhaps too simple –  
social issues were hardly unknown in the decades which began with  
the Commune, while the old questions of power and democracy  
remained essential ones down to 1940.

Thomson's basic point, however, with which most historians would  
agree, was that the rise of a more socially polarized society, and the  
substitution of a wage-earning proletariat for the peasants as the  
'masses', disrupted the social balance which had made the Third



Republic a success in its early years. In the classic period of the Republic, the political system was in harmony with the underlying social structure; an individualist form of democracy reflected the significance of property and economic independence. A more jaundiced view is that the Republic represented above all the more old-fashioned and inefficient elements in French society, and that its 'immobilism' and inherent preference for weak government were suited only to a rigid and stagnant 'stalemate society'.<sup>6</sup> But this is perhaps to apply an image of France which became current under the Fourth Republic wrongly to the years before 1914. During the 'belle époque', France was by contemporary European standards an open society with high social mobility, in which the barriers to talent were low; the ideals of the Republicans and the educational system which they promoted were designed to encourage this openness, and surely deserve some of the credit for the brilliant achievements which are found in this period in so many fields.

The founders of the Republic had a very clear vision of what they wanted to achieve, and the cohesion and nature of the political elite remained one of the strengths of French democracy. Unlike their counterparts in Spain or Italy, the leaders of the liberal middle class succeeded in grouping the major forces in the country around them. Capturing the support of the peasantry was vital, and was achieved in the 1870s by skilful and tireless propaganda, but also significant were the appeal of Radicalism to the lower middle class and the way in which workers, even when they began to vote Socialist, saw Socialism as complementing and fulfilling Republicanism rather than replacing it. Some of this success was due to the deliberate programme of political socialization undertaken in the schools; more, perhaps, to a political culture in which the seeds of democracy were already planted by the nation's historical experience.

The advent of the Republic had involved a limited social revolution – the 'end of the notables' – and as a result France stood out among continental countries for her bourgeois political leadership and for the powerlessness of aristocracies and military cliques. Both the Republicans of the 1880s and the Radicals of the 1900s showed a remarkable toughmindedness in keeping out of power those whom they identified as reactionaries, even when – as in the case of the Church – this led them into intolerant and vindictive measures. The old agrarian and upper-bourgeois elites had the consolation of retaining economic power and the ability to stop or delay social reforms by informal pressure, but they were unable to manipulate the political system them-

selves. The danger of democracy being in any case lessened by the fact that a rigid reverence for property and the small clear field for the operation of capital business interests. The Republic could be said, its constitution proved 'solid', strong enough both to reassure the bourgeoisie and to encourage the growth of democracy'.<sup>7</sup>



came and told the family, "This was an innocent killing. We can give."

Shortly before the BSF came to the Farooqi house, it had been ambushed by militants, killing one soldier.

Although official sources claimed at first that there was a "cross-fire," publicity about the case since then has not acknowledged that the killing was unlawful. In an Indian periodical, the *Illustrated Weekly*, published by the Director General of Police Bedi stated:

Yes, that was a very bad case. A case has been put under investigation. The men have been suspected. I have been done on my initiative.<sup>93</sup>

According to a report in the *Times of India*, four soldiers were suspended and charges of murder filed against them. The officer named to handle the investigation was Deputy Superintendent Masood Ahmad Nagin.

On the same evening that the Farooqi brother's search party came to the door of a house near the Farooqi's and kicked it open. There were seven family members at home. The soldiers came inside and ordered them to go outside. They pushed out two young men, Sh., 22, who is a government employee, and S., 27, a teacher. They shot S. in the abdomen and broke Sh.'s leg with a rifle butt. When S. and Sh.'s uncle came home, the BSF allowed him to take the men to the hospital. He pleaded with the soldiers shot him in the arm and side. After about half an hour, neighbors came and took all three men to the hospital. All three survived.

<sup>93</sup> Sukhmani Singh, "I Have Already Rescued My Men', An Interview with Director General of Police B. S. Bedi," *Illustrated Weekly of India*, October 10-16, 1992, p. 9.

<sup>94</sup> M.K. Tikku, "Srinagar A City of Two Extremes," *Times of India*, September 30, 1992.

<sup>95</sup> For more on this case, see p.115.

## Indiscriminate Use of Lethal Force

### The Killing of Ashiq Hussain

On April 1, 1993, during a funeral procession for the assassinated JKLF leader, Dr. Abdul Ahad Guru,<sup>96</sup> Jammu and Kashmir policemen opened fire on the crowd, shooting Dr. Guru's brother-in-law, Ashiq Hussain, in the head and wounding several others.

According to witnesses, the funeral procession started from the Saura Institute in Srinagar at about 11:00 a.m. When it reached Dr. Guru's house at about 2:30 p.m., the crowd, estimated to number several thousand, demanded to be permitted to carry the procession to the town of Sopore, about 50 kilometers from Srinagar were blocked by security forces who refused to permit the procession to proceed to Sopore. According to witnesses, as the crowd broke into angry protests, Jammu and Kashmir policemen posted as bodyguards to Superintendent of Police Rajendra Kumar then opened fire. Asia Watch has examined photographs taken at the time of the shooting, which show many in the crowd taking cover behind parked vehicles or along the sides of the roads during the firing. The photographs also show Ashiq Hussain, Dr. Guru's brother-in-law, as he was shot in the head during the police firing.

According to one press report, the "angry crowd jostled [SSP] Rajendra Kumar, whose bodyguards opened fire." In a press release issued shortly after the incident, the government stated that,

Mourners for Dr. Guru's funeral procession had been advised to take a particular route. However, as the procession was about to leave on April 2 [sic], a section of the mourners insisted on following a different route. Attempts were made by District Administration officials to persuade them to follow the route already decided. Nevertheless, a section of the people gathered there tried to force their way through the police cordon. At that time, some shots were heard in the vicinity. They are suspected to have been fired by unknown militants. Some persons tried to snatch the rifle from a policeman of the J&K Police. The police also fired a few rounds in the air. During the incident Mr. Ashiq

<sup>96</sup> See p.141.



Hussain, brother-in-law of Dr. Guru was hit by a bullet and died on the spot."

According to reports from journalists, the firing was so intense that even that even Inspector General of Police (IGP) Surinder Singh was forced to take cover on the ground, from which, according to witnesses, he implored the police forces to stop firing. Photographs taken at the scene of the shooting show Ashiq Hussain crouching in a half-sitting position in the middle of the road, along with three other men who were lying on the ground, covering their heads. When Hussain was shot, the sound of gunfire tore a hole in the top right side of his skull.<sup>97</sup> It is evident that a shot fired into the air or over the heads of the crowd could not have struck Hussain while he was in that position. Although the evidence does not indicate that the police targeted Hussain, it is evident from the testimony and photographs that they fired directly into the crowd. The government has stated that an investigation was ordered into the incident. Asia Watch and PHR have received no details about the investigation.

#### Torture<sup>98</sup>

International human rights law prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Torture is widely practiced in Kashmir as a means of extracting information from detainees, coercing confessions, punishing persons believed sympathetic to the militants and creating a climate of political repression.<sup>99</sup> One

<sup>97</sup> The three photographs that show the sequence of events are included in the middle section of this report.

<sup>98</sup> The following material was previously published in Physicians for Human Rights and Asia Watch, *The Crackdown in Kashmir: Torture of Detainees and Assaults on the Medical Community*, (March 1993).

<sup>99</sup> Torture is widely used by Indian police and other security forces, not only in areas of insurgency but throughout the territory. It is used not only against political detainees, but also against ordinary criminals and persons who have committed no crime at all. Those most vulnerable are the poor, members of "scheduled" castes and tribes, "dalits" (untouchables), landless laborers and women. See Amnesty International,

doctor in Srinagar who has treated torture victims estimated that he had seen four times the number of torture cases in 1992 than in previous years. He attributed the increase to intensified government operations. The PHR/Asia Watch investigations indicate that most detainees taken into custody in Kashmir are tortured.

Lawyers interviewed by Asia Watch/PHR stated that security personnel routinely ignore procedural safeguards when taking persons into custody. Although Indian law requires that everyone taken into custody must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours, in fact, detainees are rarely produced at all.<sup>100</sup> Prohibitions and safeguards against torture in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCrP),<sup>101</sup> which prohibit the use of coerced confessions and prescribe inquiries into deaths in custody and prison terms for officers guilty of torture, are also routinely disregarded. To the knowledge of PHR and Asia Watch, the government has never made public any action it has taken to hold security personnel responsible for torture in Kashmir criminally liable for their actions. The U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Resolution 34/169, December 17, 1979) states, in Article 5, that "no law enforcement officials may inflict, instigate, or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment nor may any law enforcement official invoke superior order in exceptional circumstances such as . . . internal political instability or any other public emergency . . . as justification for torture."

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*India: Torture, Rape & Deaths in Custody*, (London: 1992). Article 3 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials states "In the performance of their duty, law enforcement officials shall respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons."

<sup>100</sup> Under Article 9 of the ICCPR, "Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law. . . and shall be entitled to a trial within a reasonable time or released."

<sup>101</sup> Sections 330 and 331 prescribe prison terms and fines for officers guilty of torture. Section 176 of the CCrP requires a magisterial inquiry into any death in custody. The Indian Evidence Act and the CCrP also prohibit the use of coerced confessions.



Every security force has its own interrogation centers in Kashmir, which include temporary detention centers at BSF, CRPF and army camps, hotels and other buildings that have been taken over by security forces. Detainees are first interrogated by the detainee security force for periods of time which may range from several hours to several weeks. During this time the detainee is not produced before a court or given access to anyone outside the interrogation center. Those suspected of being militants are then usually handed over to the Inter-Intelligence Kashmir (CIK), and interrogated at Joint Interrogation Centres (JICs) at which each security force is represented. Detention in the JIC may last for months. If a First Information Report (FIR) is made out, it is not done until after the detainee is handed over to the police.<sup>102</sup>

The following list of interrogation centers represents only a portion of those in operation:

1. Old Airport (BSF)
2. Hari Niwas Interrogation Center (CRPF)
3. Papa I (CRPF)
4. Papa II (BSF)
5. Red 16 (BSF)
6. Badami Bagh (Army Cantonment)
7. Gogoland -- between the old and new airports (CRPF)
8. Joint Interrogation Center (BSF and CRPF)
9. Bagi Ali Mardan (Nowshera) (BSF)
10. Lal Bazaar Police Station (BSF)
11. Hotel Mamta, Dal Gate (BSF)
12. Shiraz Cinema, Khenyar (BSF)

Lawyers in Kashmir told PHR/Asia Watch that they have filed some 15,000 petitions since 1990 calling on state authorities to reveal the whereabouts of detainees and the charges against them. However, the authorities have not responded, and the petitions remain pending in the

<sup>102</sup> Detainees are generally detained outside the state under one of two laws: the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA). Both laws suspend safeguards against arbitrary arrest and grant the authorities sweeping powers to detain persons even for the peaceful expression of their political views. For more on these laws, see Asia Watch, *Kashmir Under Siege*, pp. 108-125.

courts. A large number of bail applications are also pending. Even when the High Court has ordered state authorities to produce detainees in court or release those against whom no charges have been brought, state and security force officials have refused to comply. Lawyers have also filed petitions charging officials with contempt for non-compliance, but these petitions have also received no response.

Under pressure from the authorities, the courts routinely grant government officials extended time to respond to petitions. After that, judges generally refer the case to the "larger bench." According to lawyers in Kashmir, that bench must be constituted by the Chief Justice. Despite the referrals, it has not been constituted. One judge, S. M. Rizvi, who managed after great resistance from the security forces to obtain records for 14 detainees -- but only after they were released -- determined that no procedural safeguards had been followed in any of the cases. Detainees who had been held for up to a year had not been granted access to legal counsel. In some cases, after a year had passed without formal charges being brought, the security forces filed another FIR to hold the detainee on the pretext of a new investigation. Shortly after Rizvi had succeeded in obtaining these records, he received orders that he was to be transferred out of the state. After the Bar Association threatened to strike in protest, the orders were withdrawn. However, since then, judges have been reluctant to challenge the actions of the security forces.

It is also clear that civil and security officials in Kashmir are aware of the widespread use of torture. Asia Watch and PHR obtained copies of numerous petitions brought on behalf of torture victims before the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, and other documentation, including a letter from the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Crime Branch in Srinagar confirming that medical evidence supported charges of torture and the subsequent death in army custody of a resident of Baramullah, Abdul Jabir Mir, in 1992.

A great number of methods of torture are practiced in Kashmir. One method is so widely used that a prominent physician told Asia Watch:

Electric shock is nothing. That's routine here.

At the time, the physician was treating a torture victim, Masroof Sultan, 19, who had been taken into custody by the BSF on April 8, 1993, and tortured at the Papa II interrogation center at Hari Niwas. Masroof was severely beaten and given electric shocks to his chest, genitals and



feet.<sup>103</sup> Torture and assaults on a number of health professionals is documented below.<sup>104</sup>

Other common methods include suspension by the hands or feet, stretching the legs apart, and burning the skin with clothes irons or other heated objects. Victims have also been kicked and stomped on by security forces wearing spiked boots. Another common form of torture is the crushing of the leg muscles with a heavy roller.<sup>105</sup> Extensive muscle damage (rhabdomyolysis), such as that caused by the roller treatment, releases toxins that may result in acute renal (kidney) failure and has in several instances required dialysis.

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<sup>103</sup> Masroof Sultan's case is described in detail on p. 43.

<sup>104</sup> See p. 120.

<sup>105</sup> Some of the other methods, such as sexual molestation, placing chili powder in the eyes and elsewhere in the body, and methods of psychological abuse are documented in Asia Watch, *Kashmir Under Siege* (May 1991).

## Torture Victims with Acute Renal Failure [Rhabdomyolysis]

According to doctors interviewed at the Saura Medical Institute, 37 torture victims have been diagnosed with torture-induced acute renal failure since July 1990. Three patients with acute renal failure died, two as a consequence of pulmonary edema and one from a ruptured spleen. Approximately ten patients required dialysis; the remainder of patients with rhabdomyolysis did not.<sup>106</sup>

- During a crackdown in the Telbal neighborhood of Srinagar on October 13, 1992, BSF forces detained fifteen young men. All of the detainees were taken to an empty house where they were interrogated and tortured. Several of the detainees were later admitted to the hospital with acute renal failure. F., 22, who works as a private driver in Srinagar, was beaten with *lathis* (canes) on his buttocks, arms and hands. His feet were tied, and he was beaten on the soles of his feet with lathis while being suspended. There were approximately twenty BSF soldiers present while he was being beaten, among them three officers who ordered the others to carry out the torture. The officers, identified as Yadav, Chander and Qadiri, each had two or three stars on their uniforms. While beating him, the soldiers accused F. of being "a commander of the militants." F. was also tortured with the roller on his thighs, and was beaten so severely he began vomiting. He was detained for about three hours.

F. stated that a doctor, whom F. identified by his medical bag and stethoscope, was present when they were tortured. The doctor ordered F. to take some medicine, but F. refused. The doctor then said to him, "If you don't take the medicine, I'll put a shoe in your mouth." F. was admitted to the hospital with signs and symptoms of acute renal failure.

- B., a sixteen-year-old student, was also taken into custody during the Telbal crackdown. He was beaten with *lathis* on his buttocks, arms and hands and was also subjected to the roller treatment. The torture lasted approximately five hours, and he was released at about 2:30 p.m. Soon after his release, he experienced diffuse body aches, shivering and vomiting. He was admitted to the hospital with the symptoms of acute renal failure and subsequently required dialysis. When PHR examined him in October, B. appeared to be improving. However, extensive bruises

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<sup>106</sup> See also G.H. Malik, "Acute Renal Failure Following Physical Torture," (Nephron, forthcoming).



were visible on his shoulders and back and diffuse, moderate bruises over the buttocks where the roller had been applied.

- H., a seventeen-year-old student was at home when the Telbal crackdown began. When he came out of his house at 10 a.m., he told the BSF soldiers who stopped him that he was a student. They assured him, "We will not harm students who have identification cards." H. requested to be allowed to leave because he had an examination that day, but he was made to join a group of students in the area who had been separated from the men assembled outside. The students were detained until 3:00 p.m. H. noted that some soldiers were videotaping the group of students as well as the other detainees.

H. and twelve other students were taken in jeep to a nearby house. There each of them was beaten and tortured in turn. The methods of torture included roller treatment, suspension upside down by both hands and feet, and beating. H. was tortured for approximately one hour. In addition to the methods mentioned, H. was also beaten with a strap approximately 100 times while suspended. After he was released he began vomiting. The vomiting persisted for three days before H. was admitted to the hospital. When PHR examined H. on October 19, H. had extensive and marked bruises which were confluent and extending from the mid-posterior thighs to the upper back. The injuries were consistent with the crush-type injury that results from the roller treatment.

#### Additional Torture Cases

- Dr. H., a surgeon at the Srinagar Medical College described the case of Muzaffar Ahmed Mirza, 35, an Arabic teacher who died as a result of torture. Muzaffar Ahmed Mirza was arrested on October 4, 1991, in a crackdown in Tral, a village about four kilometers south of Srinagar. He was beaten and given electric shock to the genitals. After that, an iron rod was inserted into his rectum and pushed through to his chest. He was found by the side of a road and taken to the Medical College hospital the next day in severe pain, coughing up blood and showing signs of peritonitis (inflammation of abdominal cavity). The physicians performed a laparotomy (opening up the abdomen) and a portion of Mirza's rectum was repaired. Shortly afterward Mirza began to have difficulty breathing, and an X-ray of the chest showed a ruptured lung. An aspiration of the chest cavity was positive for air, indicating that the metal rod had perforated the liver and ruptured the diaphragm. The next day, Mirza underwent chest surgery which revealed a large

laceration of the diaphragm and left lung. Within two or three weeks, he died of subsequent internal infection. A PHR examination of the abdominal and chest X-rays of the patient and confirmed the finding of a ruptured lung and signs of bowel perforation.

Mirza was interviewed by several journalists before he died, and the case has been widely reported in the international press. The Indian video news program *Eyewitness* also interviewed Mirza, but the edition was censored.<sup>107</sup> A writ petition was filed in the Jammu and Kashmir High Court while Mirza was still alive calling for a judicial inquiry into the allegation of torture. A second petition was filed after his death calling for a judicial inquiry and for the registration of criminal cases against the security personnel responsible for Mirza's death. To Asia Watch and PHR's knowledge, the government has never publicly commented on the incident or prosecuted those responsible for Mirza's death.

- G., 56, who ran a fruit business and taught in a *madrasah* (religious school) in Reban, about four kilometers from Sopore, was arrested from his home at 6:00 a.m. on March 22, 1991, by the 6th Rajput Regiment of the Indian Army. He was taken to an army camp in Sopore where he was ordered to undress. Army officials questioned him, asking "Why do you want to leave India? We feed you and you are ungrateful." He was beaten on his shoulders, back and legs with lathis. He was then forced to stand in a tank filled with cold water up to his waist as soldiers poured buckets of water over his head. This went on for about two hours. G. was then blindfolded and taken to the army cantonment in Badami Bagh, Srinagar, which he learned after the blindfold was removed and he was able to ask other detainees at the camp where he was.

G. was then taken to a room about twelve feet square where 30 young men were detained. After a short time, he was taken to another room where he was again told to undress, and he was beaten with lathis. There were four soldiers, one of whom he recognized as one of those who beat him in Sopore. An army doctor, wearing a stethoscope and apron who was in the room told the soldiers not to beat him. Two other young men, who were also undressed, were waiting in the room. They did not appear to have been beaten. The soldiers stopped beating G. and left. The doctor examined his chest and back with the stethoscope. Then he told him to

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<sup>107</sup> See Edward W. Desmond, "Himalayan Ulster," *New York Review of Books*, March 4, 1993, p. 26; Edward A. Gargan, "Behind its Mountain Walls, Kashmir Wages Vicious War," *New York Times*, October 28, 1991.



get dressed. After the examination G. was taken to small cell, about three feet by five feet, where he was held for three days. After that he was again blindfolded and taken to an interrogation center near the Old Airport in Srinagar where he was punched, kicked and beaten severely with a cable half an inch in diameter for about half an hour. While he was being beaten the soldiers told him to identify his friends. The soldiers also applied electric shock to his chest and temples by a wire attached to a hand crank generator. He was tortured intermittently in this way for two weeks. G. was released on April 16, 1992. He was made to sign a statement which he was told said that the army had not taken any of his belongings. He was then taken by the soldiers to a police control room, where his relatives signed papers which stated that he had been handed over to them.

G. was again arrested by the 6th Rajput Regiment on November 4, 1991, during a crackdown in Larihama, an adjacent village where he has his orchards. He was taken to an army camp at Panjgam. There he was beaten several times a day. As a result of the beatings on the soles of his feet, his feet became swollen and turned black. The soldiers then applied salt on the feet and wrapped them in bandages, under which the skin peeled off. Some soldiers inflicted further injury by stepping on his feet and grinding their boots into them. By this point, the bones of the feet were visible and the feet stank. Two weeks after G's arrest, an officer came to his cell and, seeing the condition of G's feet, asked the soldiers, "Why didn't you bring this to my attention? Take him to a hospital and save his life. I am accountable to my superiors." The soldiers told the officer that G. was "a dangerous militant", but they took him to the medical center. From there, he was transferred to the army hospital. He was admitted to the army hospital on November 20, 1991 and on November 22 both of his feet were amputated. He was released from the army hospital on September 22, 1992. G. has filed an application with the High Court seeking redress, but as of October 1992, had received no response.

## Rape by Indian Government Forces in Kashmir<sup>108</sup>

Reports of rape by Indian security forces in Kashmir emerged soon after the government's crackdown began in January 1990.<sup>109</sup> Despite evidence that army and paramilitary forces were engaging in widespread rape, few of the incidents were ever investigated by the authorities. Those that were reported rarely -- if ever -- resulted in criminal prosecutions of the security forces involved. Since 1990, reports of rape by security forces and army soldiers have continued. In the vast majority of cases, no investigation takes place. In the few cases where the government has ordered inquiries and courts-martial, the findings and the punishments are not made public, leaving the victims to believe that such abuse is committed with impunity.

Rape by security personnel is a gross violation of international human rights and humanitarian law. Until recently, rape has often escaped international scrutiny and condemnation, including rape committed in the context of armed conflict. In the past, rape has often been accepted as "spoils of war" or mischaracterized as incidental to the conflict or as a privately-motivated form of sexual abuse rather than an abuse of power that implicates public responsibility. Reports of the widespread use of rape as a tactic of war in the former Yugoslavia have been instrumental in focusing attention on the function of rape in war and have provoked international condemnation. Such condemnation must be extended to the use of rape in internal conflicts as well.

Moreover, India's own criminal law makes torture a crime and explicitly prescribes punishments for members of the police or other security forces who have committed rape. Under section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), a minimum term of seven years' imprisonment may be imposed for rape. In addition, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1983, which for the first time provided for the offense of custodial rape, prescribes a mandatory 10 years' imprisonment for police officers

<sup>108</sup> The following material was previously published in Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, *Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War*, (May 1993).

<sup>109</sup> Numerous incidents of rape have been reported by Indian and Kashmiri human rights groups. See, for example, Committee for Initiative on Kashmir, *Kashmir Imprisoned* (July 1990).



who rape a woman in their custody.<sup>110</sup> The sentence may be extended to life, and may also include a fine. Commissioned officers of the paramilitary and military forces are included under Section 376(2)(b) of the IPC and are thus also subject to this mandatory sentence. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (1983) also shifts the burden of proof regarding consent to the accused.<sup>111</sup>

However, despite the changes in the law, there is no evidence to show that the authorities have been willing to enforce it.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, Section 155 (4) of the Indian Evidence Act remains in effect. It states:

The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the court, by the party who calls him ... when a man is prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish, it may be shown that the prosecutrix was of generally immoral character.

A survey of rape case judgements in the seven years following the adoption of the Amendment Act reveals that judges continue to base their decisions largely on the "character" of the rape victim.<sup>113</sup>

India's military laws, notably the Army Act and equivalent legislation governing the federal paramilitary forces, also prescribe courts-martial

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<sup>110</sup> Custody is customarily understood to include situations where the victim is effectively under the control of the police or security forces and is not limited to conditions of detention in a prison or lock-up.

<sup>111</sup> Indian Evidence Act, Section 114-A. The inclusion of this provision in the Criminal Law Amendment Act provoked considerable controversy among civil liberties groups, women's organizations, bar associations and others. See Flavia Agnes, "Fighting Rape -- Has Amending the Law Helped?" *The Lawyers*, February 1990, p. 6.

<sup>112</sup> See Amnesty International, "India: New Allegations of Rape by Army Personnel in Jammu and Kashmir," p. 3, and Flavia Agnes, "Fighting Rape -- Has Amending the Law Helped?" *The Lawyers*, February 1990, pp. 4-11.

<sup>113</sup> Flavia Agnes, "Fighting Rape -- Has Amending the Law Helped?" *The Lawyers*, February 1990, pp. 4-11.

and punishments for members of these forces responsible for rape. In general, military courts in India have proved incompetent in dealing with cases of serious human rights abuses and have functioned instead to cover up evidence and protect the officers involved. In this report, Asia Watch and PHR recommend that all military or paramilitary suspects in rape cases be prosecuted in civilian courts.

### A Pattern of Impunity

In one well-publicized case, in May 1990 a young bride, Mubina Gani, was detained and raped by BSF soldiers in Kashmir while she was traveling from the wedding to her husband's home. Her aunt was also raped. The security forces had also fired on the party, killing one man and wounding several others. The government claimed that the party had been caught in "cross-fire." After the incident was publicized in the local and international press, Indian authorities ordered an inquiry. Although the inquiry concluded that the women had been raped, the security forces were never prosecuted.<sup>114</sup> In response to requests from Asia Watch and PHR, the government of India provided the following information on this case:

Contrary to the assertion that the security forces were never prosecuted in the Mubina Gani case, seven Border Security Force personnel have been suspended after a criminal case was registered and investigated. ... The inquiry was not held by the police but by a Staff Court of Inquiry.

Far from contradicting Asia Watch and PHR, the government's statement confirms what we have said. Despite the fact that the investigation concluded that the women had been raped, and that it has been three years since the incident, the BSF personnel responsible have only been "suspended" for a crime which carries a minimum ten-year sentence under Indian law.

In July 1990, police in Sopore registered a case against the BSF for the rape of Hasina, a 24-year-old woman from Jamir Qadeem, on June 26, 1990. According to doctors at the Subdistrict Hospital in Sopore, the

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<sup>114</sup> Amnesty International, *India: Torture, Rape and Deaths in Custody*, (London: March, 1992), p. 21.



BSF had entered the neighborhood at about 11:00 p.m. after an exchange of cross-fire had taken place between their forces and some militant groups. The BSF had then conducted a search of the neighborhood. The doctors stated that when Hasina was brought to the hospital she had vaginal bleeding. The medical superintendent's report also recorded bite marks on her face, chest and breasts and scratches on her face, chest and legs, and injuries to her genital area. A police report filed on July 5, 1990, charged members of the BSF with rape.<sup>115</sup>

In its response to Asia Watch/PHR about this incident, the government of India has stated, "This case has been raised for the first time ... and was not among the two [sic] allegations sent to the Indian government in advance of the publication of this report." As the case was documented in the May 1991 Asia Watch report, *Kashmir Under Siege*, the authorities have had two years to investigate the charges. The cases sent in advance of this report were new cases, the documentation of which was not previously made available to the Indian government.

The reported rape on February 23, 1991, of a large number of women from the village of Kunan Poshpora by army soldiers of the Fourth Rajputana Rifles became the focus of a government campaign to acquit the army of charges of human rights violations. The incident provides a telling example of the government's failure to insure that charges of human rights violations committed by members of its armed forces are properly investigated and those responsible held to account.

The rapes allegedly occurred during a search operation in the village conducted by the army unit. The village headman and other village leaders claimed that they reported the rapes to army officials on February 27, and that the officials denied the charges and took no further action. Officials countered that no clear complaint was made. A local magistrate who visited the village requested that the commissioner order a more comprehensive investigation, only to be told that officials in Delhi had denied the charges without checking with officials in the state. A police investigation that was eventually ordered never commenced because the police officer assigned to conduct it was on leave at the time and was then transferred by his superiors.

In response to criticism of the government investigation, army officials requested the non-governmental Press Council of India to investigate the incident. A committee sent by the Council visited the

village more than three months after the incident occurred. After interviewing a number of the alleged victims, the committee concluded that contradictions in the women's testimony, and the fact that the number of alleged victims kept changing, rendered the charge of rape "baseless." The committee examined medical reports based on examinations conducted on 32 of the women two to three weeks later, on March 15 and 21, 1991, which confirmed that the hymens of three of the unmarried women had been torn. The committee concluded that the medical evidence was "worthless", that "such a delayed medical examination proves nothing" and that such abrasions are "common among the village folk in Kashmir." The torn hymens, the committee argued, could be the result of "natural factors, injury or premarital sex."

While the results of the examination by themselves do not prove the charge of rape, they do raise serious doubts about the army's version of events in Kunan Poshpora. The alacrity with which Indian military and government authorities in Kashmir discredited the allegations of rape and their failure to follow through with procedures that would provide critical evidence for any prosecution -- in particular prompt independent medical examinations of the alleged rape victims<sup>116</sup> -- undermined the integrity of the investigation and indicates that the Indian authorities have been primarily concerned with shielding government forces from charges of abuse. The report echoes the government's concern about international criticism by arguing that the charges against the army constituted "a massive hoax orchestrated by militant groups and their sympathisers and mentors in Kashmir and abroad ... for reinscribing Kashmir on the international agenda as a human rights issue."

In response to the Asia Watch/PHR report, *Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War*, report, the Indian government stated that the Kunan Poshpora case

was investigated not only by the government but by an independent and highly regarded body, the Press Council of India. The Divisional Commissioner, Wajahat Habibullah, after his inquiry into the allegation stated, "While the veracity of complaint is thus highly doubtful, it still needs to be determined why such a complaint was made at all .... I am of the opinion that

<sup>115</sup> See Asia Watch, *Kashmir Under Siege*, p. 87.

<sup>116</sup> For example, the investigation could have availed itself of internationally-accepted forensic procedures to substantiate such charges.



